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C 0 M M U N I Q U E 
The Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in 
Auckland from 25 to 28 August 1975 was attended by economists from 
developed and developing countries interested in economic problems 
and policies of the Asia/Pacific region . 
The sponsoring organization was the New Zealand Association of 
Economists with administrative services being provided by the Center 
for Continuing Education of the University of Auckland . 
For the first time participants included a number of economists 
from small developing countries of the South Pacific such as Papua 
New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga. Other participants included, in addi-
tion to those from New Zealand, economists from Australia, Canada, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, the United States and 
the USSR . 
The conference was concerned with the general theme of economic 
relations between large and small countries of the region, and es-
pecially with the effects on trade, development assistance and for-
eign investment relationships, of differences in size and bargaining 
power . The conference reviewed experience over recent years in 
these respects having regard to the special problems that small coun-
tries face . 
Th ere was a sense of concern about recent trends in the world 
economy and their effects on the development prospects of small coun-
tries especially the poorer ones. The heavy dependence of small 
countries for their prospe rity on trade access to larger Pacific 
country markets was emphasized and alternative means of dealing with 
this problem were examined . These included the reduction of pro-
tection for agricultural produce and manufactured goods in which 
smaller countries have a comparative advantage, and the more vigor-
ous pursuit o f adjustment assistance for industries that could be 
affected in the develop~d countries. 
The extreme decline in commodity prices and uncertainty about 
the resumption of economic growth in industrial countries is seen 
as having depressive effects on incentives for smaller developing 
countries to develop their resources in the long term . 
The conference stressed the importance of securing a fair distri-
bution of the gains from trade, development assistance and foreign 
investment as between the large and the smaller countries. Particu-
lar stress was placed on the difficulties for small countries in 
accommodating foreign investment and aid where these flows were 
relatively large. This situation raised in particular a range of 
social and political problems which were documented in several case 
studies. This led to the conclusion that the achievement of a mul-
tilaterally agreed code of behaviour for foreign investment was an 
urgent task at least on a regional basis. 
The growing problems with foreign aid were noted and attention 
focussed on the special problems that bilateral aid posed for small-
er countries . This pointed to the need for the terms-and condi-
tions of development assistance to be more flexible and for a clear-
er definition of aid objectives. There was wide agreement that the 
complete untying of aid would be a major improvement. A greater 
emphasis on multilateral aid might assist in ameliorating some of 
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the disadvantages that small countries perceived in development 
assistance relationships. 
For the first time in this conference series special attention 
was given to problems in the development of marine resources in the 
region, and the potential for conflicts arising from the extension 
of seaward jurisdictional limits was discussed. 
The proceedings of the conferense will be published early in 
1976. 
The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference will be held 
in Pattaya, Thailand in July 1976, on the subject of Trade and Em-
ployme11t . The Eighth Conference is to be sponsored, among others, 
by the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, and the Asian Develop-
ment Institute. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
OPENING ADDRESS 
F. H. CORNER, 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Wellington 
I confess that I, a diplomat trained as an historian, feel some-
what ill at ease addressing a gathering of distinguished economists. 
But I try to comfort myself ; for instance, by the observation of 
an Englishman that it is very difficult to find any man who is not 
regarded by the learned as an imposter or by the unlearned as abore; 
or by the thought that at a time when economics offers little reas-
surance a certain bleak encouragement can always be gained from the 
lessons of history . History affirms at least the extraordinarysur-
vivability of man, whereas I fear that before long someone's rigor-
ous cost accounting may show that the human race is a venture that 
no longer pays. 
As diplomat I speak more cautiously the more I am forced to admit 
the possibility that diplomacy may not only be incapable of dealing 
with the kind of crises which will determine the fate of human so-
cieties but may become almost irrelevant in the face of them. I have 
in mind crises of food and resources, of population, of inflation 
anj recession, and of their associated evils ranging from famine 
and pollution to alienation, crime, terrorism and political chaos . 
The classical subjects of diplomacy have been within the realm of 
inter-state relationships, matters which, because governments were 
in control of them, could, when the will existed, be dealt with by 
inter-governmental cooperation: border adjustments, the emergence 
of new states, the control of armaments, military disengagement, 
the regulation of trading conditions, or radio frequencies or air 
routes . But now the political map of the world, transformed in 
the first 70 years of this century , is more or less settled; and a 
new era appears to be opening. Though obviously many of the tradi-
tional tasks remain, it could be that the classical period of dip-
lomacy is coming to an end. 
Our greatest preoccupation now will be with the kind of social 
and economic earthquakes "and tidal waves already shaking and wash-
ing over us and likely to increase in number and intensity. Cer-
tainly these affect every nation, revealing every day more clearly 
our interdependence. This fact should lead governments to realise 
the need to shape their domestic policies in such a way that, while 
meeting their individual needs and differently perceived interests, 
they still converge with the policies of other countries . In such 
a situation one might think that the contribution of diplomacy•hDuld 
become more important than ever. But the great crises of our time 
result from such deep-seated forces within individual nation states 
that it may be that they are of a kind which can not be managed by 
governments and scarcely ameliorated by cooperation among natons -
even if the will to cooperate became more evident than it is at pre-
sent. Perhaps there can be little effective international cooper-
ation to solve some of the major crises until many countries, not 
just affluent countries but the developing also, have achieved a 
basic reordering of certain of their domestic economic and political 
arrangements. Comprehension of the need for such changes and the 
will to make them may be developed a little by the diplomatic pro-
cess, by the concentration of effort and exchange of ideas which 
sometimes occur at international meetings - that is, when U1ese meet-
3 
4 OPENING ADDRESS 
ings are more than mere oratory and repetition of slogans. But the 
issues involved touch so close to the most basic interests of indi-
viduals and the historically conditioned organisation of states that 
fundamental shifts obviously will not come rapidly . Few governments 
are likely to dare to make them except perhaps under extreme pres-
sure of necessity - for to do so would often be to imperil their own 
survival as governments . Meantime events move swiftly : populations 
leap ahead, more people starve , the shanty towns spread, signs of 
chaos multiply . The resilience of nations will certainly be tested, 
and the resourcefulness of their leadership . 
Despite such gloomy guestioning of the prospect ahead, of the pow-
er of governments to control events and of the relevance of my pro-
fession I shall nevertheless proceed, if only because, assuming we 
believe the human race has a future , we have to start somewhere . 
And we do best, so I think , to start by looking at the political 
background . Economic and social activities, the whole development 
process, are after all not neutral . There is no such thing as "value-
free" economic policies . They are given shape and purpose by the 
political goals for which they are used; and they must operate 
within a given international framework . 
That framework has been fundamentally altered over the past five 
years or so . The international order under which we lived for a 
generation after 1945 has passed away, irretrievably. In retrospect, 
it may seem more comfortable than it was at the time. Most of you 
were witness to it, as I was. You will recall that two processes 
dominated the international scene during the quarter century after 
the Second World War : the formation of two tight coalitions, each 
grouped about a super-power, hostile towards one another, inflexible 
in their thinking; and the disappearance of the old European em-
pires, leaving scores of infant sovereign states in their wake . 
These were momentous changes . But we survived them without an-
other ma jor conflict . Just how, looking back , I am still not sure. 
The super-powers maintained a fragile peace, each confronting the 
other at the head of their respective alliances . Wars tended to b e 
border wars, at the edges of each other's influence . 
Then confrontation gave way to a tenuous coexistence, and coex-
istence to dialogue and limited cooperation . Some call this detente; 
we know it to be an uneasy accommodation, a moment in history when 
three great powers with many dive rgent interests and ambitions find 
it convenient , each for its own reasons , to blunt the sharpestedges 
of their rivalry . Such a balance could be easily disturbed . But 
it is preferable to the era of confrontation and containment. And 
it opens up wider possibilities for those countries which in the 
previous era were locked into alien ways of thinking and acting and 
had small room to experiment with autonomous approaches to their 
development problems . 
The development preferences of most countries must be modified 
by the need to divert resources to meet the requirements of domes-
tic and external security. But the policies of the main shakers 
and movers on the Pacific stage have not yet been clearly estab-
lished . It will therefore be some time before countries of the Pa-
cific region will have the evidence they need about the external 
strategic situation confronting them . Similarly, in the economic, 
trading and financial fields, it will be some time before Pacific 
countries can predict the likely behaviour and attitudes of the 
economically powerful nations and therefore establish the full range 
F.H. CORNER 
of social, economic and even political options open to them. I 
shall touch upon this matter in a moment. But, as to the politi-
cal framework, at least one can say that with the crumbling of the 
bipolar world and the unwinding of the system it had created, a 
looser pattern of relationships has emerged and a greater oppor-
tunity should exist for each country to contemplate more autono-
mous development patterns. 
I now approach, with even more caution, the new battlefield where 
political and economic forces intersect. We have, it is surely 
agreed, entered a new cycle of change . It is in its early stages, 
but clearly centers of gravity are shifting; power, like wealth, 
is being redefined in new ways; governments are confronted by a 
whole new agenda of problems. 
A new constellation of forces is at work . The world is, as a re-
sult, a more fluid and unpredictable place than it was thirty years 
ago - or even at the beginning of this decade. Of course, it is 
not unknown in history for countries to be faced with economic dis-
equilibrium; and for this to occur at a time of political disarray . 
But never before have the two situations come together, on a world 
scale . Their impact now has sent out shockwaves which have yet to 
work their way clear to the edges of the international system. 
They are not distinct phenomena. There is substantial interaction 
between them. 
The perception each government has of the overall politicalfrarre-
work and what it means for them also helps determine their approach 
to the economic situation and their readiness to act on behalf of 
the interests of others. This is very relevant at present . For 
governments have to accept that the old world economic order has 
broken down as surely as the political assumptions on which it was 
based . The diffusion of political power in the fifties and sixties 
is now being matched by a greater diffusion of economic power . We 
have outgrown the old economic arrangements. This is partly because 
their very success in freeing trade and investment has burst the 
framework set up thirty years ago . Without quite realising it, we 
have indeed moved to a global economy . The major trading nations 
have over the past three years found themselves marching in step to 
the same drummer . We still do not know how to cope with the effects 
on our fragile economic fabric. 
But a new economic order will come because the old one could not 
adequately accommodate the interests of the developing countries 
which have emerged since it was established. The old order was set 
up by twenty or so industrialised Western nations . Naturally it 
worked best for them . Now there are 140 or more sovereign states, 
or nearly treble the number since the war . They want a new framework 
that will accommodate their vision of a good society,will meet their 
needs, will allow them a more autonomous type of development than 
has hitherto been open to them. They want a progressive redirection 
of economic activity away from consumerism towards the goal of pro-
viding a decent minimum life for all human beings . Of course they 
have wanted this for years, but their views made little impact. 
Now they have a certain ability to make themselves heard. The 
developed countries are coming to realise that unless they change 
their technology and their way of life - which few of their people 
show signs of relishing - they are hostages to at least part of the 
developing world and would do well to be more receptive to some of 
the ideas which the different historic experiences of the Third 
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World have brought forth. And in a fluid situation the developing 
countries have grasped the fact that their numbers count when they 
stand together . So the idea of interdependence begins to move from 
the podium to the world of reality. 
The diffusion of power raises in sharpened form the problems of 
reconciling the most efficient distribution of economic activity 
with political sovereignties and individual social choices . The 
old economic orthodoxies are going to have to be reworked. This 
does not mean that the laws of economics have surreptitiously been 
repealed. But, as I have suggested earlier, economics is the serv-
ant and not the master of our political and social goals. As these 
change we will have to adapt the techniques and mechanisms which 
have been familiar in one context so that they will work in another . 
The Pacific basin should be a good catchment area for new ideas. 
With the exception of the EEC which is, after all, a customs union, 
it is the most trade intensive region in the world . It contains 
four of the ten fastest growing economies in the world . Its fifty 
or so trading entities range from archipelagos to atolls - thethree 
economic super-powers, countries in the process of economic take- off, 
down to the smallest island groups in the South Pacific. The pool 
of experience you bring to this conference cannot help being of un-
usual depth and richness . 
What I referred to earlier as the shockwaves of recent changes 
have been felt, too, in our Pacific region . How could it be other-
wise? How can the problems of one area be separated from theccmron 
problems of the human family? East Asia was formerly a prime area 
of great-power confrontation . Its problems have traditionally been 
seen in military terms , as security problems . We in New Zealand 
were not immune from this . For a long time we saw Asia as a sourse 
of threat . Now we approach it positively, as a region of opportu-
nity. The relationships we have formed within and .across the Pacific 
provide the impetus for our continuing economic development . This 
is the one, indeed the only, region of the world where we are able 
to play an innovatory role . We seek to do so, in various fields . 
We are concerned now with the very theme of your conference . 
How, that is, to respond to the newly important relationships be-
tween large and small countries . It is newly important because it 
is at the heart of the problem of development . Given the practical 
stakes involved for many people it is perfectly possible that the 
rich, retreating into their old economic bastions, and the poor, 
relying on the leverage of their new unity, could drift into con-
frontation . Indeed , there were signs in the opening rounds of the 
great international debate that this might happen. The appeals of 
the Third World for their economic emancipation, so long overdue, 
and their denunciations of the existing order with all its inequi-
ties, were matched - in volume if not in number - by the advocates 
of the old order, the order on which Western preponderance has been 
based . It appeared that a test of strength would eventuate . Had 
it done so, it would surely have torn the present economic system 
apart . We seem to have emerged from that crucible . A confrontation 
could still occur, though there are growing signs that even the hot-
heads on both sides are coming to see that cooperation is the only 
alternative to deadlock and the price of deadlock could be high . 
There is little evidence yet, however, of a general acceptance 
that a dynamic relationship will have to be built up between larger 
and smaller, developed and developing, to work out courses of action 
F.H. CORNER 
which will narrow that famous gap - not so much between rich and 
poor as between oratory and practice. This has to come. But the 
process will be difficult and lengthy . 
7 
It could also be explosive. Take one basic principle that has 
first to be established: that a nation ' s autonomous political and 
social goals, and the economic structure which reflects them, must 
be the final determinant of the nature and extent of its develop-
ment; and that the role of countries which desire to contribute 
to development is not to dictate these goals but to assist govern-
ments to achieve them and also to help create the international 
conditions in which they can best be realised . Though this is ccmron-
place enough, its implications are going to shatter some attitudes 
so long held by the richer countries that they have been erected in-
to economic orthodoxy ; for example, the free international market-
place for commodities. Leaving aside how free it has actually been, 
there is nothing sacred about terms of trade . They can be altered, 
and the task will be to settle on the best means of doing so . Free 
trade? By all means; GATT principles and the gradual freeing of 
trade have served the world well over the past generation . But will 
we not now have to move further towards the principle of "selective 
discrimination", already acknowledged in the Generalised System of 
Preferences, to enable the least-developed countries to catch up at 
an accelerated rate? Will not richer governments have to do their 
planning with more and more of an eye on the creation of opportu-
nities for developing countries? These may be opportunities for the 
sale of more processed and semi-processed products; developing 
countries do not want to be locked forever into the export of raw 
materials by the tariff structures of the rich. Or they may be the 
creation of opportunities for employment and the development of ex-
port industries in the developing countries . This is the kind of 
thing that New Zealand is pioneering in cooperation with its near 
neighbours in the South Pacific . 
With each experiment we constantly get back to the question of 
political will. Whether, that is, the richer countries are prepared 
to i mplement ideas and undertakings worked out in international de-
bate . It is fashionable to observe that the world has become more 
interdependent and it certainly is. But it has yet to be proved 
how effective a rallying cry interdependence will be. Our world 
may be as much David's as it is Goliath's . But it is still made up 
of sovereign states of unequal size and wealth. This is the reality . 
We cannot ignore it; we are not likely to be permitted to ignore 
it . Voting majorities may look impressive; so are oil surpluses 
and potential weapons of oil and raw materials; but the day of 
North America, Japan and Western Europe is far from over . I do not 
see them as an unholy triumvirate, garrisoning the rest of the Y.Drld . 
But undeniably their individual power is enormous. In combination 
it would be decisive. Used creatively it is indispensable to the 
solution of our common problems. 
Consolidating the new relationship between richer and poorer, 
larger and smaller, is not going to be painless. It will involve 
sacrifices. And that involves education and political leadership 
of a high order to create a general political will. If that will 
is not created, and if as a result a more satisfactory economic 
framework is not fashioned, then the prospect of sustaining tran-
quility on this globe will be bleak indeed. My point being that 
we have a choice - to work together to bring about a better distri-
bution of economic activity - rationally and as a coordinated re-
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sponse, to try to go our separate ways, jealously guarding our sov-
ereignties . The indications are that the second course is riskier 
than the first and ultimately probably more painful . 
In order to succeed then, for the general good, we shall also 
need to widen the moral and intellectual framework in which we -
the privileged - have hitherto operated. We accept that, within 
our national societies, every. citizen has a claim on that society 
for a decent human life. We are now required to widen this view to 
encompass all citizens in the global society we have brought into 
being . When we do , we may find it is not all sacrifice . There will 
be opportunities as well as burdens . Consumerism must of its nature 
be a transitory pursuit; the rich cannot go on piling up goods for-
ever. After the second car and the boat , what then? A better dis-
tribution of the world ' s economic activity may reinvigorate the 
jaded super-consumer societies already emerging from the end of the 
assembly line of Western civilisation . Might it not put the growth 
of the world's economy on a healthier basis? 
Having talked myself from opening gloom to a glimmer of optimism 
I believe it time to desist; the inevitable next stage is rich ora-
tory. I therefore conclude by congratulating those who had the fore-
sight to organise this timely meeting and to express my confidence 
that your deliberations will make a significant impact upon thinking 
in this country and in the Pacific region . 
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PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AMONG LARGE AND SMALL 
STATES IN THE PACIFIC REGION 
Grant L . Reuber 
Any top ic that highlights the importance of the relative size of 
countries in a particular region , such as the topic chosen by the 
organizers of this session , poses an immediate challenge for the 
economist accustomed to thinking in terms of conventional economic 
principles and international relationships . What is meant by rel-
ative size in this context? Why would one expect it to have a spe-
cial influence on problems of development assistance and economic 
co-operation? Why would one expect this influence, if it exists , 
to be different among Pacific rim countries than anywhere else? 
Size apart, in what sense do problems of development assistance and 
economic co-operation differ in the Pacific area, for whatever rea-
son , from elsewhere in the world? And if the Pacific area is, in 
fact, different, to what degree does it differ and what are-Some of 
the policy implications of the differences? 
Posing these questions i:S much easier than answering them, espe-
cially for someone whose knowledge of the eastern and southern parts 
of the Pacific area i§ very limited . In the discussion that follows 
a few leading characteristics of the area are first briefly reviewed . 
This is followed by more detailed discussion which, first, identi-
fies ' in general terms some of the problems associated with foreign 
trade, foreign investment and foreign aid; second, considers the 
influence of r e lative size on these problems; and third , questions 
what, if any, special factors bear upon these problems in the Pacif-
ic area. 
Some Background Characteristics of the Area 
In aggregate, the countries touching on the Pacific accounted 
for about 61 percent of world output in 1972 and 34 percent of world 
trade (exports plus imports) in 1971 . This picture is, of course, 
very much dominated by the United States and to a lesser degree by 
Japan . If one excludes the United States, the foregoing percent-
ages decrease to 29 percent and 22 percent respectively ; e xcluding 
Japan as well, the figures are 22 and 15 percent; and excluding 
Russia and China, in addition, these shares decrease to 8 and 12 
percent respectively. Omitting all four of these countries, the 
output of the area is equal to 39 percent of the output of the en-
larged European Economi c Community (EEC) and its trade to about 32 
percent of EEC trade . 
Another impressive feature of the area is its high rate of eco-
nomic growth in the recent past relative to other parts of the world 
as well as to earlier historical periods . From 1960 to 1972 the 
annual rate of growth in GNP per capita for the area as a whole av-
eraged about 4 . 3 percent . Again this picture is dominated by the 
United States, Japan , Russia and China. If one eliminates these 
countries, the average (weighted) annual rate of growth for the area 
was 3 . 4 percent during this period . 
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A third noteworthy feature of the area relates to its general 
level of affluence . Only 6 of the 32 countries in the area (Indo-
nesia, China, and countries in the Inda-China peninsula) had a lev-
el of GNP in 1974 below US$200 per head. In 13 countries (Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, New Guin-
ea, Malaysia, Thailand, North and South Korea, the Phillipines and 
Taiwan) per capita income ranged between US$200 and US$500; in 6 
(Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru , Chile and Hong Kong) per capita 
income ranged between US$500 and US$1,000; and in the remaining 7 
(U . S . A. , Canada , Japan, U. S.S . R. , Singaporei Australia and New Zea-
land) per capita income was above US$1,000. ) Although there are 
several highly populated countries - -most notably Indonesia and China 
--where per cap ita income is very low, the area generally does not 
have the massive, hopeless poverty found in parts of Asia and Africa, 
where per capita income under US$200 is commonplace . 
To what degree are the countries of the area economically inte-
grated and what have been some of the forces that have impaired and 
advanced closer integration? Considering the area as a whole one 
i s immediately impressed by the enormous diversity of the area in 
terms of language, customs, religions, political ideals, climate, 
factor endowments of all kinds (both physical and human) , production 
and consumption patterns, the size of countries (however measured), 
and the disparities in the level of development , income and wealth . 
At first blush this diversity might be expected to offer vast oppor-
tunities for specialization and mutually beneficial foreign trade 
and investment as well as foreign assistance. Yet the data suggest 
anything but a highly integrated economic area. Instead, one finds 
several highly integrated sub-areas or regions; and each of these 
regions is as much, or more closely, integrated into other areas of 
the world as with other parts of the Pacific area . 
While economic integration in the Pacific rim area remains patchy, 
it has been increasing quite rapidly at many points since World War 
II. To use exports as an index, from 1961 to 1971 the share of ex-
ports of Pacific rim countries destined to other countries in the 
area increased over 10 percentage points to about 54 per cent in 
1971. 
One of the principal reasons why the area as a whole has not be-
come more highly integrated economically is, of course, the enonrous 
distance among most of the countries in the area. Recent changes 
in transport and communications technology--larger vessels, new deep 
- water port facilities, containerization and satellites, are just a 
few of the many innova t ions--have contributed to a reduction of these 
barriers . · 
But distance is only part of the explanation. Europe and other 
parts of the world, after all, are also very remote from most coun-
tries in the Pacific area. Probably more important than distance 
in impeding closer economic integration and co-operation have been 
the vast cultural and linguistic differences among countries in the 
area, differences in their history and traditions, differences in 
their political systems and economic philosophies and differences 
in their political affiliations . Since World War II these inful-
ences have been eroded considerably by a variety of economic and other 
1) IBRD. World Bank Atlas, Population, per capita Product and 
Growth Rates, 1974 . 
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influences. To what extent and how rapidly this broad range of cul-
tural, social, political and historical influences erode in the fu-
ture, opening the way to closer economic integration, is likely to 
depend in large part upon the relative strength of the countervail-
ing forces of nationalistic political pressures, on the one hand, 
and of market pressures, on the other . 
The influence of nationalistic political pressures in hampering 
closer economic integration in the area is evident in a wide range 
of policies that have been adopted by countries in the area. Vir-
tually all of these, in one way or another, have restricted the flows 
of people, trade, capital and economic assistance within the area. 
While many of these policies have been nominally non-discriminato-
ry among foreign countries, others have been deliberately discrim-
inatory. Most of these measures have been espoused on grounds of 
safeguarding the general social, political and economic interests 
of the country concerned. Some of the policies have reflected gen-
uine concern for the national interests of the country, broadly con-
ceived. Many, however, have been based on little more than the 
straightforward self-interest of powerful groups in the community 
who, in time-honoured tradition, have cloaked vested self-interest 
in articulate nationalism . 
Reference has already been made to the economic pressures for 
closer economic integration in the area. On the demand side, these 
arise from the relatively high and rapidly growing levels of income . 
On the supply side, they arise from the large and diverse factor 
endowments of the area and the shifting patterns of cc:rnparative =sts 
in the world. The economic pressures for closer integration in the 
area seem likely, if anything, to increase in the foreseeable fu-
ture. One reason is the likelihood of relatively rapid economic 
growth in the area, considerably increasing demand not only for more 
goods and services of all kinds but also for greater diversity in 
the range of goods and services available in each country in the 
area. Another reason is the likelihood of continuing changes in 
comparative costs in the area, reflecting changes in the availabil-
ity of raw materials, labour and capital. And a third reason is the 
likelihood of an incre~singly competitive world which will make it 
more important to exploit such economic advantages as are afforded 
by the Pacific area. 
Since 1940 the Pacific area has experienced more war than any-
where else in the world--three major wars as well as numerous local 
wars. In the process, traditional social structures, cultural ties 
and political alliances have been fundamentally shaken and new pat-
terns have emerged. On balance, these changes have reduced ties 
with Europe, have increased local nationalistic political forces and 
have increased intra-are a ties. The extent to which economic pres-
sures bring about closer integration and co-operation in future will 
depend not only upon the degree of economic nationalism pursued by 
each country but also upon the ability to maintain reasonable peace 
and security in the area . 
Trade Relationships 
So much for general perspectives. Among the more specific issues 
that arise, the most important , from the standpoint of offering the 
largest potential gains in economic welfare in the area in the long-
run, are those related to trade. With rising incomes, trade makes 
it possible to satisfy changing and increasingly diversified =nst.nn-
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er tastes more adequately . At the same time, because of wide dif-
ferences in the compo s ition and qua li t y o f productiv e resources, 
trade enables producers to specialize in those areas where they have 
relatives production cost advantages . Furthermore, by enlarging the 
size of the market , opportunities for increased productivity tlrrough 
economies of scale are opened up . In addition, access to .larger 
markets makes it possible to put resources to productive use that 
otherwise would lie idle . 
The geographic pattern of trade among Pacific rim countries in 
1971 is shown in the trade matrix presented in Table 1 of the Appen-
dix . The United States and Japan are the main suppliers of manufac-
t ured products . A large volume of manufactured products based on 
low-cost labour is also provided from small countries such as Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Countries like Canada, and Aus-
tralia also export manufactured products in some volume . Food and 
raw materials are supplied by many of the developing countries. It 
is noteworthy however that the largest producers and exporters Qf 
f ood and raw rraterials in the area, by a considerable margin, are the 
developed countries . 2) 
The trade policy issues that arise may be grouped under four gen-
era l headings: those related to short run adjustment and stability; 
those related to long-run structure of production and trade; those 
related to the terms of trade; and those related to the appropriate 
policy stance vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
The general idea of adjustment assistance is widely understood 
and accepted . As a practical matter, however, it has proven extra-
ordinarily difficult to design and implement policies that simulta-
neously cushion and facilitate adjustment to increased international 
flows of factors, goods and services . Some schemes in fact are little 
more than thinly-disguised protectionist devices. 
The specific measures adopted by countries to cope with short- run. 
dislocations vary greatly . Some are intended to cushion the short-
term impact of changes in policies designed to further longer-term 
objectives , such as trade liberalization policies. Others are in-
tended to cushion the effects of relatively rapid changes in com-
parative costs, such as policies to cope with "low-cost" imports . 
Despite the great variety of such short-run adjustment policies, at 
least two general principles can be enunciated. 
1 . Whil e temporary safegurads, such as restrictions on foreigntrade 
and investment may be a valid means of adjusting to freer interna-
tional fl ows of trade , capital and peop l e, countries at present are 
not subject to adequate international discipline i n introducing and 
applying safeguard and adjustment assistnace policies. Without such 
discipline, such safeguards all too often become permanent protec-
tive devices. As indicated by a group of experts r eporting to the 
OECD in 1972, a common system of rules and more effective procedures 
for international supervision of safeguards is needed . 3) When in-
2) For the world as a whole, exports of food and raw materials ex-
cluding fuel from industrialized countries were almost twice as 
large in 1972 as those from developing countries. GATT, Inter-
national Trade, 1973/74, Appendix Table 6. 
3) OECD, "Policy Perspectives for International Trade and Economic 
Relations", 1972. 
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voked , such safeguards should be subject to annual review to exert 
maximum pressure on countries to adhere to agreed time-tables and 
other cornrni tments. Also, an annual review of each country's or area ' s 
adjustment policies may be useful . If new procedures can be agreed 
upon internationally they should apply to all cases--there is no 
reason why any industry should be considered outside the agreed 
safeguard framework--and they should apply to "voluntary" as well 
as to mandatory schemes . --
2 . Any international safeguard system will work better if coupled 
with more adequate domestic policies of adjustment assistance, re-
gardless of whether the source of disruption is foreign or domestic . 
While these policies will vary from country to country, reflecting 
circumstances and preferences, they should sustain two overriding 
principles : they should give every promise of, in fact, promoting 
adjustment; and they should minimize the diversion of adjustment 
costs to other countries. These principles imply that policies that 
directly subsidize adjustment will normally be preferable to those 
that are simply restrictive . 
Rich countries have a greater economic capacity to bear adjust-
ment costs than poor countries and might, therefore, be expected to 
have more "liberal" adjustment policies . The same can possibly also 
be said of countries with more highly diversified economies, of e-
conomies with more highly mobile and versatile resources, and of e-
conomies with more highly diversified markets at home and abroad . 
This said, it is not evident that country size, as such, has much 
bearing on the question of adjustment policy . Nor is it evident 
empirically that the range and quality of adjustment policies have 
much correlation with country size. What is more, the Pacific rim 
countries, both large and small, appear to exhibit most of the dif-
ficulties associated with adjustment policies found everywhere in 
the world. 
Related to adjustment assistance policies are policies designed 
to cope with short-run instability emanating from fluctuations in 
international demand and supply relationships. A variety of hypoth-
eses. have been developed relating such instability to size . A re-
cently published empirical examination of these hypotheses, measur-
ing size in terms of both population and GNP for a cross-section of 
countries, failed to establish any strong and significant evidence 
of a relationship between size and instability in GNP, exports, im-
ports, capital movements, exchange reserves and the terms of trade . 
This general conclusion remained even after allowance was made for 
variations among countries in their levels of economic development, 
their rates of economic growth, their geographic export concentra-
tion and their dependence upon foreign trade . 4) Nor is there any 
strong theoretical reason for expecting such a relationship. It 
seems doubtful if the conclusions would differ materially if one 
conducted a similar analysis based on Pacific rim countries only . 5) 
4) Nadim G. Khalaf, Economic Implications of the Size of Nations 
(Leiden : E . J. Brill, 1971), Chap . II . 
5) Based on the data given in Khalaf's study, op . cit . , Table 1, 
Appendix A, simple correlations were calculated for Pacific rim 
countries only, relating size to various indices of instability . 
These calculations support the conjucture in the text. 
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Table 1 The Geographic Pattern of Trade 
Destination CENTRAL 
of Exports AND 
CANADA U.S.A. JAPAN U.S.S .R . 
AUST- NEW LATIN 
Source RALIA ZEALANi AMERICA 
AND of Exports MEXICO 
CANADA x 12080 784 125 181 35 183 
[68J (-) [4J (14) (lJ (2) [lJ (3) [OJ (1) [lJ (3) 
U.S.A 10370 x 4060 162 1000 111 3171 
[24 J (-) [9J (-) [OJ (-) [2J (-) [OJ (-) [7J (-) 
JAPAN 875 7610 x 378 718 129 558 
[4J (5) [32J (-) [2J (2) [4J (4) [lJ (1) [2J (3) 
U.S.S.R 14 60 419 x 1.4 1.4 8 
[OJ (0) [OJ (- ) [3J (3) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) 
AUSTRALIA 133 618 1440 69 x 268 38 
[3J (4) [12J (-) [28J (40) [lJ (2) [5J (7) [lJ (1) 
NEW ZEALDND 40 224 117 27 120 x 19 
(3J (4) [17J (-) [9J (10) [2J (2) (9J (11) (lJ (2) 
d 50 2085 513 18.5 6.0 1 575 CENI'RAL AND IATIN 
AMERICA AND MEXICO (lJ (2) (39] (-) [lOJ (16) [OJ (1) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [llJ (18) 
e 3 . 3 11)8 207 6 8 1.1 INOOCHINA 
[OJ (1) [13J (-)'[24J (28) [lJ (1) (lJ (1) [OJ (0) [-J (-) 
INOONESIA 1.6 199 I 545 10 16 . 5 .8 
(OJ (0) [17J H l[45J (55) [lJ (1) (lJ (2) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) 
MALAYSIA 41 209 299 50 30 7 9.4 
[2J (3) [12J (-) [17] (20) [3J (3) [2J (2) [OJ (1) [lJ (1) 
SINGAPORE 21 207 124 38 84 8 9.4 
[lJ (1) [12J (-) [7J (8) 1 [2J (3) (5J (5) [lJ (1) [lJ (1) 
HONG KONG 87 1010 189 .4 81 24 29 
(3J (5) [35J (-) [7J (10) (OJ (0) (3J (4) [lJ (1) [lJ (1) 
f 33 998 I 672 - 58 2 6 OTHER 
[lJ (2) [44J (-) [29J (52) [-J (-) [3J (5) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) 
g 11432 20592 6820 761 2020 .4 544.4 3977 ALL DEVEI.DPED COUNT-
RIES IN PACIFIC AREA [.98J [fllJ [. 73J [.87J [ .88J [ . 93J [.87J 
ALL DEVELOPING COUNT- 1236.9 4816 2549 110.6 283 .4 43 . 6 615.6 
RIES IN PACIFIC AREA (2J [ .19J [ .27J [ . 13J [ .12J [.07J [ .13J 
'IDI'AL 11668.9 25408 9369 871.6 2303.8 588 4592.6 
$ nullion; [ J percentage of total world exports of the exporting country; ( ) 
percentage of total world exports less exports to the U.S . of the exporting-
country. 
a = parentheses in column (1) indicate exports from Pacific rim country to other 
Pacific rim countries as a percentage of World Exports . 
b = parentheses in column (3) indicate exports from Pacific rim country to other 
Pacific rim countries excluding the U.S.A. as a percentage of world exports. 
c = parentheses in column (4) indicate exports from Pacific rim country to other 
Pacific rim countries excluding the U.S .A. as a percentage of world exports 
excluding the U.S.A. 
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among Pacific Rim Countries in 1971 
~XPORTS EXPORTS EXPORTS EXPORTS 
~g~FIC H8~FIC ~ROM FR8M DiCIFIC PA IFIC 
~M RIM ~ tiNTRY RIM INDO- moo~ MALAY- SINGA- HONG l;OUNTRY COUNTRY COUNTRY OTHER ~HER TO TO OTHEI CHINA NESIA SIA PORE KONG ~~CIFIC WORLD PACIFIC TO RIM WORLD 
RIM COUNTRIES EXCLUD-~~UNTRI- EXCLUDINGING USA 
U.S.A. 
- - 15 10 20 265 13698 17670 1618 5590 
[-] (-) [-] (-) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [OJ ,(0) [2J (5) [78Ja [9Jb [29JC 
441 263 71 315 424 1021 21409 44130 21409 44130 
[lJ (-) [lJ (-) [OJ (-) [lJ (-) [lJ (-) [2J (-) [.49J [.49J [49J 
595 451 205 509 789 1967 14784 24020 7174 16410 
[3] (4) [2J (3) [lJ (1) [2J (3) [3J (5) [8J (12) [62J [30J [.4•l] 
155 11 2 5 - 445 1122 13810 703 13391 
[lJ (1) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [-] (-) [. 3J (3) [8J [5J [5J 
37 43 69 117 85 276 3193 5070 1753 3630 
[lJ (1) [lJ (1) [lJ (2) [2J (3) [2J (2) [5J (8) [63J [35J [48J 
7 2 12 13 8 20 609 1360 385 1136 
[lJ (1) [OJ (0) [lJ (1) [lJ (1) [lJ (1) [2J (2) [45J [28J [34J 
1.1 - 1.5 1.1 3.5 15 3270 5357 1185 3272 
[OJ (0) [-] (-) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [OJ (0) [OJ (1) [61J [22J [36J 
34 12 38 59 59 21 556 847 448 739 
[4] (5) [lJ (2) [5] (5) [7] (8) [7] (8) [3J (3) [66J [53J [61J 
.3 x 22 148 11 41 995 1200 796 1001 
[OJ (0) [2J (2) [12J (15 [lJ (1) [3J (4) [83J [66J [80) 
26 10 84 368 26 63 1222 1720 1013 1511 
[2) (2) [l] (1) [5J (6) [21.] (24 [2] (2) [4J (4) [71) [59) [67] 
192 - 401 x 94 51 1229 1750 1022 1543 
[11) (12 [-] (-) [23) (26 [5] (6) [3) (3) [70J [58) [66) 
54 65 34 122 x 53 1739 2870 729 1660 
[2) (3) [2] (4) [l] (2) [ 4J (7) [2J (3) [61) [25) [39) 
28 12 3.0 25 56 30 1923 2297 925 1299 
[l] (2) [l) (1) [OJ (0) [lJ (2) [2) (4) [lJ (2) [84) [40) [71] 
1235 770 374 969 1326 3994 54815 106060 
[. 78J [.89J [39] [.57] [.84) [ . 94) [.83) [.87) 
339 99 583.8 723.1 249.5 274 10921 16041 
[.22) [.11] [ .61J [.43J [ .16) [.061 [.17) [.13) 
1574 869 957.8 1692.1 1575.5 4268 65736 122101 
d = includes: Chile, Colanbia, Costa Rica, E.quador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru. 
e = Includes: Khmer Republic, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Peoples Republic, Vietnam 
Republic. 
f =includes: China (mainland), China (Taiwan), Korea DE!rocratic Peoples Republic, 
Korea Republic, Papua New Guinea, Philippines. 
g =All Developed Countries include: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
U.S.S.R., U.S.A. 
Source: UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, 1972-3 
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Economic analysis is richer in theoretical hypotheses relating 
size to the longer- term structure of trade and production . As for 
demand, it has frequently been suggested that nowadays consumption 
patterns and aspirations in less populous or poorer countries may 
be considerably influenced by consumption habits in large , rich and 
dominant economies. Consumer preferences, shaped in part from a-
broad, feed back upon the pattern of production and trade which in 
turn may confer advantages upon the suppliers in the large coun-
tries whence originates the external influence on preferences . Al-
so, especially in poorer countries, heightened consumption aspira-
tions, stimulated by life-styles abroad, may increase consumption 
at the expense of local saving, thereby hampering investment and 
development . While external influences along with many other fac-
tors may well play a role in shaping preferences, the significance 
of these influences in the present context is open to doubt . It is 
very doubtful whether any of the countries in the Pacific area, ir-
respective of size, can claim to have a dominant influence on pref-
erences in the area, with the possible exception of the United States 
--and even there things foreign have considerable appeal . 
Several hypotheses have been proposed on the supply side. One 
hypothesis, first developed by A. Hirschman and subsequently exam-
ined by S. Kuznets, M. Michaely and others, is that there is atend-
ency for the foreign trade, particularly exports, of smaller coun-
tries to be more highly concentrated, in terms of both the commod-
ity and geographic pattern of trade, than that of larger countries. 
This is because smaller countries usually have a less diversified 
economic structure which leads them to greater specialization. The 
reason for expecting an association on the import side is much less 
clear nor is it apparent whether one might expect any such associ-
ation to be positive or negative.6) 
The hypothesis relating to exports is generally supported by a-
vailable empirical evidence. N. Khalaf's study, already cited, 
considers both the geographic and commodity concentration of trade 
and attempts to isolate the partial effect of size after allowing 
for the level of development and trade dependence. His empirical 
results may be summarized as follows: 
1. There is a strong inverse relationship between export concentra-
tion (both geographic and commodity) and size (both population and 
GNP) regardless of the level of development and the degree of depend-
ence on trade. 
2. The association between export concentration and size is much 
stronger than the association between import concentration and size. 
3 . The association between import concentration and size is weak 
and may in fact not exist at all; to the extent that there is an 
assoication, it seems to be positive . 7) These general conclusions 
appear to be borne out for the sub-set of Pacific rim countries as 
we11.8) 
A second set of hypotheses concerns the relationship between size 
6) For a review of the literature see Khalaf, op.cit., Chap. III. 
7) Khalaf's analysis considers only the commodity concentration of 
imports and with the data available is unable to test for the 
partial effect on import concentration after allowing for the 
effects of different levels of development and trade dependence. 
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and dependence upon foreign trade . S . Kuznets and others have sug-
gested that because of the relatively more limited size of domestic 
markets and the resulting domestic constraints on the division of 
labour and economies of scale , because of the more limited diversity 
of resources and greater concentration of domestic economic activ~ 
ity , and because of the relatively lower internal transport costs 
in a small country , one would expect an inverse correlation between 
size and trade dependence, defined as the ratio of exports and im~ 
ports to GNP . This hypothesis is borne out by Kuznets ' empirical 
investigations which further indicate a stronger inverse relation 
for developed than for less~developed countries (LDCs) . Kuznets 
also suggests that there is a lower limit to the amount of goods 
and servi ces that can be made available through foreign trade . 9) 
N. Khalaf ' s more recent examination of the data generally sup- ' 
ports the view that size is inversely related to tradA (exports plus 
imports) as a percentage of GNP . 10) The relationship is much strong-
er when export proportions alone are related to size , implying a 
much weaker relationship between import proportions and size as one 
would perhaps expect . 111 Further, this evidence indicates that the 
impact of size on trade dependence is unaffected by the level of eco-
nomic development or the rate of economic growth . As far as Pacific 
rim countries are concerned , it appears that the same general con-
clusions apply . 12) 
A third group of hypotheses relates economic growth and dP,VAlop-
nent to size . There is little theoretical reason why one would ex-
pect a strong systematic relationship between size and either growth 
or development, nor is there much empirical basis for believing that 
such a relationship exists . 13) 
A fourth hypothesis concerns the terms of trade . It has long been 
recognized that, in principle, one country which has a strong bar-
gaining position relative to another can shift the terms of trade 
in its favour . And it is frequently assumed that this not only pro-
vides a considerable advant.age to large countries over small coun-
tries , but also that large countries have in fact availed themselves 
of this advantage . Two aspects of this question may be distinguished. 
The first concerns fluctuations in the terms of trade . It has been 
argued that small countries, because they have less control over ex-
port and import prices and because their trade tends to be rrore high-
8) As before this conjecture is based on a recalculation of simple 
correlation coefficients for Pacific rim countries only, using 
Khalaf ' s data. 
9) Simon Kuznets , Economic Growth of Small Nations (Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 1945). 
10) No significant association is apparent, however, when size i s 
measured by population . Nor is any relationship apparent be-
tween size , however measured, and foreign trade per capita . 
11) The inverse relationship between export proportions and size 
is stronger when size is measured by population than by GNP . 
12) This view is based on a recalculation based on Khalaf ' s data 
of the simple correlation coefficients between size and trade 
proportions and export proportions . 
13) See Khalaf, Chap. v. 
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ly concentrated are likely to experience more severe fluctuations 
in their terms of trade . Khalaf' s work, while revealing some traces 
of an inverse relationship between terms of trade, stability and 
size, fails to find a strong relationship that warrants much con-
fidence . This appears to be true of the Pacific countries included 
in his sample as well . The second aspect abstracts from fluctua-
tions and concerns the extent to which large countries have sought 
to shift the secular terms of trade in their favour relative to 
small countries. The main method of trying to achieve such a shift 
would presumably be through a combination of tax, trade and subsidy 
policies . Various biases are apparent in these policies for most 
countries , such as those against imports having higher degrees of 
processing and manufacturing , a bias against "low-cost" imports and 
so forth . These biases , however , are evident in the policies of 
most countries and appear to bear little or no relation to country 
size as such . Moreover , it is difficult to see how a deliberate 
attempt by large countries to rig t he terms of trade against small 
countries could be achiev ed , given (i) the improbability of large 
countries colluding among themselves in this way (ii) that coun-
tries ma i ntain common policies vis-a- vis all their trading partners 
and (iii) the volume and range of trade conducted by large coun-
tries among themselves . Indeed , for the Pacific rim countries at 
least , one has the impression that most of t he larger countries, 
including the richest countries , have at least as liberal trade pol-
icies on the whole as the smaller c ountries . But this seems likely 
to be more a reflection of different levels of development , income 
and other factors than of country size . 
A fifth group of hypotheses are concerned with trade dynamics . 
All of these assume that countries with higher per capita income 
are those more richly endowed with capital , that consumer needs can 
be met by a variety of differentiated goods differing not only in 
quality but also in cost , and that rising living standards tends 
to bias the search for new consumer and producer goods towards those 
products that are most desired in high i ncome countries and are 
labour-saving . B. Linder suggests that a differentiated product 
must first be sold in an extensive domestic market before it can be 
exported- - if only because of the information- cost advantage. He 
also suggests that manufactured exports will be destined dispro-
portionately to other countries at similar income levels because 
of a greater similarity of consumer taste patterns . J. Dreze has 
argued that small countries are likely to find their comparative 
advantage in undifferentiated manufactures because scale economies 
in product design , advertising, sales promotion, information costs, 
etc ., place the manufactur~r of differentiated products in a small 
market at a disadvantage . R . Vernon's product-cycle hypothesis 
suggests that product innovations are likely to be developed in 
high- income countries and then diffused through trade, foreiqn in-
vestment and imitation to other countries . 14) In addition, I. Kravis 
has argued that the export trade of large countries may be inflated 
by many " specialty" items--not because of cost advantages but sim-
ply because its large markets support production of such itens which 
then are "available" for export. 
14) For a lucid summary of these propositions see R.E. caves, "In-
ternational Corporations : The Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment", Economica, XXXVIII, pp. 19-21 (Feb . 1971). 
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All of these propositions are essentially concerned with econo-
mies of scale that in some form or another may favour large over 
small countries. They differ from more conventional economies of 
scale in emphasizing the role of experience and the cumulative ad-
vantage of learning by doing. Conventional economies of scale, on 
the other hand, emphasize the effect of small markets, resulting 
in thin and inefficient transactions channels, short production 
runs and high fixed costs per unit of output because of small vol-
umes. For example, one study suggests that at a per capita income 
level of US$300, economies of scale are significant up to a popula-
tion of 100 million in most manufacturing industries (equivalent 
to a market of 11 million at U.S. income levels) .15) In another 
study evidence is presented which indicates: (i) that size creates 
advantages for small countries in international trade in manufac-
tured goods; and (ii) within the manufacturing sector, small coun-
tries tend to have a comparative advantage in semi-manufactures 
and a disadvantage in finished manufactures.16) 
The latter study concludes that these findings support the thesis 
that small countries are likely to gain the most from trade liber-
alization and regional integration. This emphasizes the pointthat 
the smallness of the market is usually mainly the result of delib-
erate policies, domestic and foreign, which impede local access to 
foreign markets both for inputs and for outputs. One study, for · 
example, has suggested that the combined cost to Canada in the mid-
sixties of the Canadian and U.S. tariffs on industrial products 
was of the order of 10 percent of GNP, more than half of which repre-
_sented foregone economies of scale due largely to U.S. tariffs.17) 
A central question is the extent to which trade patterns may be 
biased by history (who started first?) and the relative size of coun-
tries and the extent to which foregone economies of scale are main-
ly the result of ill-conceived policies which, in attempting to can-
pensate for the disadvantages of history and size, have increased 
the constraints of market size. Though by no means conclusive, the 
evidence available suggests that trade barriers, even when justified 
on "infant-industry" grounds, have frequently done more to impede 
than to advance the ability of small countries to gain from econ-
omies of scale. A recently conducted study of Canada's trade op-
tions, for instance, concludes that unilateral free trade--while 
less advantageous than multilateral free trade or bilateral free 
trade with the u.s.--would be preferable economically to Canada's 
present level of trade barriers.18) 
The foregoing review of the relation of size to trade patterns 
suggest that size as such is of little consequence except as it af-
fects the concentration of exports and economies of scale. Foreign 
trade, by relaxing the constraints imposed by small domestic markets, 
15) H.B . Chenery, "Patterns of Industrial Growth", American Eco-
nomic Review (Sept. 1960), pp. 645-646. 
16) Bela Balassa "Country Size and Trade Patterns: Comment", 
American Economic Review, LIX (March 1969), pp. 201-204. 
17) R.J. and P. Wonnacott, Free Trade Between the United States 
and Canada (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). 
18) R.J. Wonnacott, Canada's Trade Options, Economic Council of 
Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975). 
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permits small countries to specialize more fully and achieve great~ 
er economies of scale . For small countries, access to foreign mar-
kets thus becomes an important factor in raising living standards 
and increasing economic development . In this, Pacific rim coun-
tries face much the same problems as elsewhere. What are some of 
these problems and how do they differ in the Pacific? 
Consider first the question of dealing with the socialist state 
trading countries, of which there are several in the area includ-
ing particularly Russia and China . Because of their proximity and 
future potential both as markets and sources of supply, these coun-
tries perhaps play a more important role in this area than in most 
others. Because of this, trade relations with these countries are 
not only important now but also may become more important in future. 
These relations pose both economic and political difficulties. On 
the economic side, there is the difficulty of establishing satis-
factory channels foi: the flow of trade between private entrepreneurs 
on one side of the market and state buying and selling on the other. 
In addition , there is the difficult problem of insuring that the 
power of the state-trader is not used to exploit his trading posi-
tion in competitive world markets or to discriminate among traders 
from different countries . On the political side, there is the prob-
lem of avoiding the possibility that trade may become an avenue for 
exercising political domination and control. These difficulties 
are probably greater for the smaller and poorer countries in the 
areas than for the larger and richer countries . 
State-trading countries apart, a major preoccupation of many coun-
tries in the area is their trade relations with the United States 
and Japan--by far the largest and most highly industrialized coun-
tries in the region . Here the problems are primarily those of gain-
ing access to these markets on more favourable terms, including the 
removal of a host of non-tariff barriers, avoiding special discrim-
inatory measures such as dumping duties, restrictions on "low-cost" 
imports, restrictions on export supplies of critical production in-
puts and erratic changes in policy which have greatly magnified ef-
fects upon the smaller economies with which these two countries trade. 
A second group of smaller but industrialized high-income coun-
tries includes Canada and Australia and to some extent New Zealand . 
These depend heavily upon foreign trade and therefore have a strong 
interest in a liberal world trading regime . At the same time, their 
own policies, reflecting nationalistic aspirations at home andhopes 
for a bigger place in the sun internationally, have, on the whole, 
been less liberal than those of the United States and some countries 
in Western Europe . Thus these 'countries are frequently found argu-
ing the virtues of freer trade trading arrangements elsewhere in the 
world while maintaining equally forcefully that special circumstances 
preclude the full application of the same principles to themselves . 
A third group of countries includes the small developing coun-
tries which have highly developed export sectors specializing in 
labour-intensive manufactures : e.g . , Taiwan , Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Korea . The markets of these countries are obviously too small 
to sustain large-volume manufacturing enterprises . For them, access 
on secure, non-discriminatory and liberal terms to world markets is 
essential. For these countries, policies in industrialized coun-
tries to cope with "low-cost" imports , voluntary as well as mandatory 
controls, and adjustment assistance policies have frequently been 
particularly troublesome. 
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Finally there are the remaining countries in the area, some of -
which are large but most of which are small and under-developed and 
some of which depend heavily upon primary product exports such as 
metals, petroleum and agricultural products. These face the tradi-
tional difficulties in foreign markets of most less-developed coun-
tries--unstable primary product prices, escalating trade barriers 
with higher degrees of manufacturing, direct controls and so forth. 
This heterogeneous collection of countries might of course at-
tempt to work out better trading relations among themselves through 
some form of regional integration . This might encompass the area 
as a whole or, more realistically, a series of regional arrangements 
within the area . Attempts have been made to develop such areas in 
Central and South America and the possibility of a freer trade area 
between Canada and the United States has a long history of discussion. 
However, apart from the efforts made in Latin America, the Paicfic 
area has apparently not been fertile ground for regional trading 
arrangements . One major reason perhaps has been the competitive 
nature of many of the economies in the area. Another major reason 
may be the serious political concern about teaming up with the two 
countries offering the largest markets, the United States and Japan. 
And a third major factor may be the strong relationship that most 
of the countries in the area including the largest and most ]XJWerful, 
have with the rest of the world. Whatever the reasons, rather than 
follow a regional approach, a more promising approach may be for the 
countries in the area to use their considerable influence to ~rove 
trading relationships in the world generally and with Western Europe 
in particular . Although the interests and affiliations of the coun-
tries in the area by no means coincide, the continued development 
of a discriminatory trading bloc in Western Europe which has nCM ex-
panded to North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean may provide a 
common motive for renewed and united efforts among Pacific countries 
to bring about greater trade liberalization on a world-wide basis. 
The machinery now available for mounting such efforts seems very 
weak . Moreover, as the EEC has become larger and more firmly es-
tablished, many countries in the area, instead of seeking greater 
co-operation with non-European countries in fostering freer trade 
generally in the world, have followed Canada's example of trying 
to get their noses under the tent through individual deals. 
Recent developments in primary product markets have highlighted 
several special problems that can only be referred to here . To deal 
with these, international action along several lines seems to be 
needed. For example, new rules need to be worked out to subject 
the unilateral imposition of export controls and taxes to interna-
tional review in the same way as the imposition of import barriers . 
In addition, buffer-stock arrangements and commodity stock-piles 
for selected minerals and foods, built up and used in accordance 
with agreed international rules, might help to moderate supply in-
terruptions and price fluctuations. These might be developed in 
conjunction with producer-consumer agreements for selected commod-
ities . At the same time, as mentioned below, co-operative policies 
to ensure an adequate flow of capital into primary commodity devel-
opment are important . And , as also mentioned below, intensified 
efforts are needed to foster the primary producing sectors in de-
veloping countries . Unilateral nationalistic actions to secure raw 
material supplies are likely to prove disruptive and self-defeating, 
particularly if pursued by major industrial countries. 
The same may be said about recent attempts, following the OPEC . 
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example, by producers to develop cartels and administered markets 
for selected commodities. The prospects for most products of main-
taining such collusive arrangements over any extended period are 
dim. Nevertheless, because of the possibilities of earning short-
term monopoly gains, such attempts at collusive action may well be 
made. The danger is that, even if cartels and price-fixing arrange-
ments eventually collapse, high-cost alternatives will have been 
developed in the process which will continue to be protected over 
many years at the expense of low-cost suppliers and consumers. 
Moreover, to the extent that such collusive measures succeed, the 
gains are at least as likely to be made at the expense of the small 
and poor as of the large and rich . 
For most Pacific area countries, whatever their special charac-
teristics , the over-riding trade issue during the next decade seems 
to be how best to promote a world trading system which, as its first 
objective, arrests any retreat into greater protection and, as its 
second objective, promotes the reduction of trade barriers on a mul-
tilateral and non-discriminatory basis . 
Private Foreign Investmentl9) 
Foreign Investment represents an immediate transfer of real re-
sources from the investing to the host country which, along with 
the return flow of interest and dividends, represents a future claim 
on the assets of the importing country. How beneficial an invest-
ment is to both the investing and the host countries depends upon 
the difference, for each, between the rate of return and the cost 
of the investment . 
The revival of the private international capital market and the 
enormous growth of private capital flows has been one of the lead-
ing features of the international economy since the 1950's . Al-
though this increase in private capital investment has been reflected 
in flows to developing countries, it has been concentrated mainly 
in flows among developed countries. Moreover, in contrast to earlier 
patterns, a substantial part of the increase has been in the form 
of direct investment associated with the growth and spread of the 
operations of large international enterprises. The stock of direct 
investment in developing countries alone grew from about US$35 bil-
lion in 1967 to US$52 billion in 1972. 
Table 2 gives some indication of the stock of direct foreign in-
vestment in developed (OECD) and developing countries at the end of 
1970 together with figures on the value of trade and GNP. Evident-
ly direct investment has been more important, relative to output 
and trade, for developed than for developing countries. This is 
true not only for primary industries, where foreign investment has 
been especially important, but also for the manufacturing sector . 
The sectoral distribution of the stock of direct investment at 
the end of 1970 for developed (OECD) and developing countries is 
shown in Table 3. The largest share is in the primary sector, but 
large shares are also found in the manufacturing and service sec-
tors. The regional distribution of the stock of direct investment 
19) Parts of this section draw heavily upon the author ' s earlier 
study Private Foreign Investment for Development (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973). 
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Table 2 Shares of Developing and Developed Countries in 
The Stock of Inward Direct Investment at End-1970 
and in Trade and GNP in 1970 . 
Developing a) Developed b) countries countries Total 
$ billion !_ $ billion % $ billion 
Stock of inward 
direct investment 
23 
% 
at end-1970 39c) (25) ll4d) (75) 153 (100 ) 
Imports plus exports 
197oel 123 (20) 490 ( 80) 613 (100: 
GNP 1970 435fl (18) 1, 937g) (82) 2,372 (100 ) 
a) DAC list of developing countri e s: All Western Hemisphere except 
Canada and the United States , all Africa except South Africa , 
all Asia and Oceania except Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Sino-Soviet bloc countries, and none of Europe except Greece, 
Spain, Turkey, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia. 
b) DAC membership as in 1972 (OECD countries excluding European 
developing countries included under note a) above). 
c) Source: Development Assistance 1971 Review (OECD : Paris, Decem-
ber, 1971) derived from Tables VI-2 and VI-3. 
d) Various national sources , balance of payments flow data and can-
pany reports and accounts . 
e) Source : Monthly Statistical Bulletin, exports f . o . b., imports, 
c.i . f . (New York: United Nations). 
f) Source: Derived from World Bank Atlas (LB.R.D.: Washington, 1972) . 
g) Source: Main Economic Indica tors (OECD: Paris) . 
Table 3 Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries by Sectors at EnCI-1970 
Developing Developed 
countries countries Total 
$ billion _L $ billion % $ billion 
Petroleum 13 (33) 32 ( 28) 45 
Mining 4 ( 10) 8 ' 7) 12 ·,
Manu facturing 12 (31) 48 ( 42) 60 
Other 10 ( 26) 26 ( 23) 36 
Total 39 (100) ll4 (100) 153 
Sources: See G.L.Reuber, Private Fina nce Investment in Development 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1 973) p.253 . 
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among developing countries, by industrial sector is shown in Table 
4 . 
Table 4 Regional and Sectoral Distribution of The Stock 
of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries at End-1970 
($ billion) 
Latin Middle 
America Europe Africa East Asia Total 
Petroleum 4 . 8 0.4 3 . 3 3 . 2 1. 3 13 . 0 
Mining 2.1 0 . 1 1. 4 0 . 4 4 . 0 
Manufacturing 7 . 5 1. 5 1. 3 0 . 2 1. 8 12 . 3 
Other 5 . 4 0 .5 1. 6 0 . 1 2 . 1 9 . 7 
Total 19 . B 2 . 5 7 . 6 3 . 5 5 . 6 39 . 0 
Source : G. L . Reuber, Private Foreign Investment In Development . 
(Clarendon Press : Oxford, 1973), p . 4 . 
Direct investment in production facilities in another country 
usually takes one of two forms : horizontial extension (producing 
the same or similar goods in the host country as in the home coun-
try), and vertical extension (producing inputs for the firm ' s oper-
ations outside the host country which fit into an integrated pro-
duction process at an earlier or later stage than the firm ' s prin-
ciple production activity abroad). Vertical investment is export-
oriented; it usually reflects the availability of either cheap la-
bour or raw materials; and it is undertaken to reduce uncertainty 
and to become, or remain , internationally competitive . Horizontal 
investment is oriented to . sales in the host country . Arrong its lead-
ing characteristics are product differentiation, oligopoly markets, 
advanced technology, sophisticated management and information sys-
tems and relatively high capital intensity . 
Pacific rim countries include both the largest exporters (the 
United States and Japan) and importers of private capital in the 
world . 20) Table 5 shows the net total long-term foreign invest-
ment flows for most Pacific area. countries in 1970-74 (average) and 
in 1974. Unfortunately, with the data available it has not been 
possible to construct a matrix showing exports and imports of cap-
ital among Pacific area countries themselves . Figures on the stock 
of outstanding private direct investment among developing countries 
in the Paicfic area at the end of 1972 are shown in Table 6 together 
with data on GNP and population . 
In order to test systematically for any associations that may 
exist between the stock of direct investment in host countries in 
the Paicfic area and selected economic characteristics of these 
20) Little systematic information is available about the ethnical-
ly-separated "Overseas Chinese". This source of investment 
is ignored in the discussion that follows . 
GRANT L . REUBER 25 
Table 5 Net Foreign Investment Flows Among Pacific Area 
Countries 
($ u. s . millions) 
IDng-Term Direct C':>0v' t 
capital Investment Investment Other 
Average Average Average Average 
1970 1970 1970 1970 
-74 1974 - 74 1974 -74 1974 - 74 1974 
Australia 880 . 8 c) 597 . 0 730 . 2 905 . 0 -92 . 6 - 214 . 0 243 . 2 -94 . 0 
Canada 914 . 8 962 . 0 284 . 2 b) -216 . 0 631. 2 1408 . 0 - · 2b)-230 . 0 
Chile 155. 8 109 . 0 2. 2 12 . 0 136 . 0 97 . 0 17 . 6 
Taiwan 158 . 6 466 . 0 56 . 2 83 . 0 4. 6 13 . 0 98 . 0 370 . 0 
Colanbia 239 . 0 179. 0 29 . 4 28 . 0 127 . 8 73 . 0 81.6 78 . 0 
Costa Rica a) 68 . 4 94 . 1 25 . 3 26 . 8 20 . 9 44.7 22 . 2 22 . 5 
Ecuador 133 . 7 69 . 0 106 . 5 77 . 0 26 . 7 - 6. 4 . 5 -1.6 
El Salvador a) 10 . 0 9 . 5 6. 4 8 . 3 6. 8 15 . 5 - 3. 3 - 14 . 3 
Guatemala 52 . 9 70.1 28 . 5 52 . 3 9. 2 11. 7 15 . 2 6 . 1 
Honduras 36 . 9 52 . 9 5. 0 -1 . 2 14 . 7 27 . 7 17.2 26 . 5 
Indonesia a) 508 . 0 775 . 0 185. 8 278 . 0 327 . 3 497 . 0 
b) 
-5 . 0 
Ja.i:an -2958 . 8 -3980 . 0 -945 . 0 - 1811.0 -576 . 0 - 321.0 -1438 . 0 - 1849 . 0 
Korea 624 . 4 981.0 96 . 2 225. 0 208 . 6 144 . 0 319 . 8 613 . 0 
Malaysia a) 220 . 0 232 . 0 119 . 5 170 . 0 73 . 3 36 . 0 27 . 0 26 . 0 
Mexi= 1458 . 6 3218 . 0 372 . 6 557 . 0 228 . 2 825 . 0 857 . 8 1836 . 0 
New Zealand a) 22 . 8 -79 . 9 30.6 -31.0 -9 . 3 -56 . 0 1.5 7. 2 
Nicaragua a) 62 . 6 114 . 8 12.9 13 . 2 28 . 6 57.8 21.1 43 . 8 
Panama a) 573 . 0 1479 . 0 20 . 2 12 . 0 47 . 1 82.3 505 . 8 1384 . 7 
Peru 290 . 0 930 . 0 32 . 4 91.0 265 . 6 909 . 0 -8 . 2 - 71 . 0 
Philippines 116 . 6 202 . 0 6. 6 35 . 0 91.8 111.0 18.4 57 . 0 
Vietnam 20 . 2 81.0 2. 6b) 11.0 17 . 6 b) 70.0 
Singapore 326 . 8 713.0 259.4 634 . 0 25 . 4 -2 . 0 42 . 2 82 . 0 
Thailand 149 . 2 332 . 0 73 . 2 138.0 9. 0 4. 0 67 . 0 190 . 0 
U. S.A. -4010 . 6 -7150 . 0 -3706 . 0 - 4493.0 -1307 . 6 449 . 0 1003 . 0 -3107 . 0 
a l a v erag e computed for 1970-1973 . 
b) figures not available for all 5 years . 
c) average of long term capital may not exactly equal the sum of 
the other three averages due to rounding. 
Source : International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, June , 1975. 
countries, regression equations (1) and (2) shown in Table 7 were 
fitted to a cross-section of data for 22 developing countries . 
These estimates suggest a strongly significant positive association 
between the stock of direct investment and (i) the level of income 
(GNP per head) and (ii) population size; but no significant associ-
ation is apparent between direct investment and the rate of growth 
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Table 6 Stock of Private Direct Investment (End 1972), 
Population (1971), GNP (1971) and Rate of 
Growth of Real Product (1960-71, 1972), for 
Pacific Rim Developing Countries 
Stock of Private % Growth in 
Investment (1) Real Product 
Total Per Capita Poi;iula ti on GNP 1960 
($ millions) ($) (million) ($ biilions) -70 1972 
Chile 765 76.54 10 . 0 7 . 60 4.4 1. 6 
Colombia 910 40.76 22.3 8.26 5 . 2 6.7 
Costa Rica 185 104 . 23 1. 8 1. 05 6 . 2 5.0 
Ecuador 350 55.56 6 . 3 1. 95 4 . 9 9 . 9 
El Salvador 100 27 . 18 3 . 7 1.18 5.8 2 . 6 
Guatemala 190 34 . 94 5 . 4 2.12 5 . 4 6 . 1 
Honduras 200 23.23 8. 6 2 . 58 5 . 2 4 . 0 
Hong Kong 670 165.64 4.0 3 . 64 9.5 12 . 3 
Indonesia 1200 10 . 07 119. 2 9.53 3 . 5 6.9 
Khmer Rep . 85 11. 05 7.7 1. 00 2 . 3 -5 .4 
Korea Rep. 360 11. 30 31. 8 9.24 8 . 7 7 .3 
Laos 8 2.64 3 . 0 . 36 4.0 3 . 9 
Malaysia 1000 89.61 11. 2 4 . 46 5.8 5 . 6 
Mexico 2650 50 . 55 52 . 4 36.70 7 . 0 7.5 
Nicaragua 85 40 .7 7 2.1 .94 7 . 2 4.0 
Panama 1650 1116 . 37 1. 5 1. 21 7 .9 8 . 1 
New Guinea 435 172 . 62 2 .5 .81 
Peru 880 62 . 81 14 .0 6 . 72 5 . 1 5 . 8 
Phillipines 870 22 . 94 37 . 9 9 . 10 5 .7 4 .6 
Singapore 485 229.86 2 . 1 2.53 9 . 3 6.8 
Taiwan 400 26 . 88 14.9 6 . 40 9 . 6 11. 3 
Thailand 490 13 . 12 37.3 7.84 8 . 0 3 . 1 
Vietnam Rep . 180 9 . 57 18 . 8 4 . 33 3.2 5 . 0 
1) Investments held by DAC countries 
Source: OECD Development Co-operation, 1974 Review. Statistical 
Annex. 
in output . 
21) 
Long-term private portfolio capital flows remain largely con-
centrated among the more developed countries. With some notable 
exceptions, such as Mexico, many developing countries have not been 
able to raise long-term portfolio capital on a large scale on their 
own account . To the extent that they have been able to raise long-
term portfolio capital , most have had to rely upon the intermedi-
ation provided by international agencies, foreign governments in 
21) The specification of this equation is open to question and no 
causal inferences can be legitimately drawn from the estimates . 
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Table 7 Selected Estimated Regression Equations 
1. PODI -226.67 + 1.18 GNP/POP + .015 POP + 7.93 6RP 72 
( .94) (2 . 76) (3 . 52) ( . 25) 
R2 = .5 0 
n =22 
2. PODI -95.51 + 1 . 35 GNP/POP + . 015 POP - 28 . 04 6 RP 60170 
( . 29) ( 2 . 88) (3 . 75) ( . 4 7) 
R2 .50 
n =22 
3 . ODAA = 1 . 13 + . 00018 GNP/POP + .00012 POP - . 33 6RP 60170 
( . 74) ( . 085) ( 6 . 51) (1.19) 
R2 .75 
n =2 2 
4 . ODAC = 1. 61 + .00047 GNP/POP + . 000031 POP - .25 6RP 60170 ( 2 . 37) ( . 50) (3 . 79) (2 . 05) 
R2 .56 
n =22 
5. ODAJ -16 . 21 - . 039 GNP/POP + . 00084 POP + 5 . 38 6RP 60170 
(1. 03) (1. 77) (4. 41) (1. 91) 
R2 = .63 
n 22 
6. ODAu . s".' 122 . 79 - .054 GNP/POP + . 0012 POP - 10 . 61 6 RP 60170 
(1. 67) ( . 52) (1. 30) ( . 80) 
R2 .23 
n =22 
7. ODAT 109 .31 - . 092 GNP/POP + . 0022 POP - 5 . 80 6RP 60170 
(1. 36) ( • 82) (2 . 21) ( . 40) 
R2 . 35 
n =22 
Notation : 
PODI stock of private overseas direct investment, end 1972 
($ million) 
GNP gross national product, 1971 ($ billion) 
POP population size, 1971 (thousands) 
6RP
72 
=change in real product, 1971 to 1972 (per cent) 
6RP
601 70 
= change in real product, 1960 to 1970 (per cent) 
ODA Gross disbursements of bilateral official development assist-
ance, 1969-72 ($ million, annual average) from A (Australia), 
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C (Canada), J (Japan), U.S. (United States) and T (total 
for the four countries). 
n = number of Pacific rim developing countries in sample. 
R2= coefficient of multiple determination 
()= t - statistic 
Source: OECD, Development Co-operation, 1974 Review, Statistical 
Annex. 
developed countries and large private foreign firms. The financial 
intermediary role of the latter has frequently been over-looked . 
Because of this intermediation, direct and portfolio investment in 
many cases can be more accurately seen as complements rather than 
as substitutes. It is also overlooked at times that long-termport-
folio investment which depends heavily upon the intermediation of 
foreign governments, either directly or indirectly through interna-
tional agencies, may be more subject to external political influ-
ences than private investment based primarily upon market consider-
ations . 
Space does not permit an extensive review of the many highly con-
troversial issues that arise in connection with foreign investment. 
At its simplest, the issues of foreign investment, for both the host 
and home countries, largely boil down to two questions, one empir -
ical and the other political and social . The empirical question is 
concerned with the total net economic benefits in terms of real in-
come and employment that the host and home countries derive from 
foreign investment and how changes in policies are likely to affect 
these benefits. The political-social question consists of two parts: 
is there a positive or a negative relationship between the economic 
benefits arising from foreign investment and the host and homecoQn-
tries' social and political interest? And if there is a negative 
relationship, how much economic benefit are countries prepared to 
trade off to achieve more full y their political and social objectives? 
The first question raises a number of subsidiary issues. One is 
its short-run-imp act upon employment and income. Another is its ef-
fect upon the distribution of income. A third concerns the inci-
dence of various types of market imperfections--e. g., lack of knowl-
edge and information, unwarranted allowance for risk and uncertain-
ty, monopolistic powers--on the supply price of capital. A fourth 
relates to the return flow of interest and dividends. And a fifth 
arises when investment is unde~taken by public authorities for po-
litical and social reasons rather than on the basis of economic 
criteria. This points directly to what is perhaps the most serious 
problem in most countries, but especially in developing countries. 
As a result of a wide range of policies--e.g. commercial policies, 
exchange rate policies, tax and subsidy policies and direct controls 
of all kinds--market prices may provide a highly unreliable guide 
from a national standpoint for the efficient allocation of capital 
and as an indicator of the amount it pays to import--to say nothing 
of the efficient allocation of domestic resources. 
To the extent that direct investment simply provides for a trans-
fer of capital from abroad through a different institutional chan-
nel, its effects and the problems it raises are much the same as for 
portfolio investment . The additional complications and much of the 
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-controversy associated with direct investment stem mainly from three 
special ch~racteristics: (i) the degree of non-resident- ownership 
and control frequently accompanying the direct investment, in many 
cases within the context of large international enterprises; (ii) 
the extent to which direct investment provides access to a package 
of auxiliary factors, including technology, management and outlets 
to foreign markets, at lower cost than alternative approaches; and 
(iii) the opportunity afforded host countries to capture a substan-
tial share of the earnings of foreign capital and the rents earned 
on the package of auxiliary factors because of double taxation a-
greements that permit host countries to tax the profits of foreign 
enterprises. · 
Rather than view direct investment as a homogenous aggregate, it 
is more useful for some purposes to think in terms of the broad cat-
egories of direct investment referred to earlier, which have quite 
different characteristics and raise quite different policy issues. 
A large volume of direct investment in the Pacific area, as well as 
elsewhere, has been directed towards the discovery and exploitation 
of natural resources. tn many cases the host country finds itself 
in a strong bargaining positi;n iri dealing with inve~tors in this 
sector. A second category, which may be termed market-development 
investment, has been horizontal investment, intended mainly to pro-
duce processed materials, manufactures and services for sale in the host 
country. Some of this investment has looked forward to the f uture 
development of the local markets to an economic size with interna-
tionally competitive costs. Much of it, however, has been induced 
through an intricate web of subsidies, concessions and so forth, 
with little or no reference to present and prospective levels of 
demand and comparative costs an~ frequently-intended mainly to dis-
place imports. Because of the direct impact of domestic policies 
on such investment, host countries are in a strong bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis this type of investment. The third category of di-
rect investment which has become important during the past decade, 
particularly in the Pacific area, is highly export-oriented, verti-
cal investment, intended primarily for the purpose of supplying ex-
ports of manufactured products assembled in another country--usual-
ly a developed country: 22) Such investment has been based - mainly 
on the availability of cheap labour and a favourable investment cli-
mate in the host country. Some of the leading examples of this lat-
ter type of investment are found in Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and South Korea -- all very small countries that have achieved rap-
idly growing levels of prosperity. Because of the characteristics 
of such investment, host countries find themselves in a weak bar-
gaining position in dealing with investors in this sector. 
Much of the controversy about the economic aspects of foreign 
direct investment has to do with the terms on which the investment 
is supplied. (As such it is analogous to traditional terms of trade 
arguments common in discussions about foreign trade) . The question 
at issue is the extent to which market imperfections result in terms 
(i.e . supply prices) that are disadvantageous to host countries, 
_compared to the terms that would prevail if markets were more per-
22) See G.K. Helleiner, "Manufactured Exports from Less Developed 
Countries and Multinational Firms", Economic Journal 83 
(March 1973), pp. 21-47. 
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fectly competitive. This leads to questions about decisions in the 
private sector on such matters as transfer pricing, the sourcing of 
inputs and the sale of output, the repatriation of profits, the trans-
fer of knowledge and skills, employment practices, the location of 
production facilities, and the like . One central issue running 
through this discussion is the extent to which maximizing profits 
for the enterprise as a whole throughout the world conflicts with 
the national interests . Related to this is the quesiton of how the 
host country can collect more of the rents accruing to foreign in-
vestors without at the same time impairing the flow of investment . 
This turns out to be extremely difficult to answer in any practical 
way ; and in many instances t~e preoccupation with gaini~g-improved 
terms for the host country has resulted either in reduced flows of 
investment and/or in compensatory policies to maintain investment 
flows in the face of policies designed to improve the terms on which 
investment is accepted. 
Examples abound of countries that over the years have developed 
conflicting combinations of policies, some of which attract foreign 
investment, some of which deter foreign investment and most of which 
lead to a misallocation of resources both within and among countries . 
Much of the legislation that now exists on local equity participa-
tion , the employment of local personnel , pre- scheduled disinvest-
ment, local R & D activities , compulsory export quotas and the like, 
probably does more harm than good for at least three reasons : the 
losses incurred by reducing the flow of investment may well outweigh 
the benefits gained through improved terms; the uneven incidence of 
such complicated measures results in the misallocation of not only 
foreign but also domestic resources; and the subsidies entailed to 
overcome the disincentives created by such measures wipe out par-
tially or wholly the benefits derived from such investment as does 
occur . In many cases, direct subsidies to develop local technology, 
training and the like would be more effective and cheaper than im-
posing restrictions and requirements on foreign investors . 
Another aspect of these policies is that they frequently treat 
all foreign investment more or less alike with the result that the 
policies have important differential effects on different types of 
investment . For example, policies that insist upon majority local 
ownership are likely to discriminate heavily against vertical-type 
export-oriented investment relative to horizontal-type investment 
oriented to local markets . Such countries, wishing-to attract in-
vestment in many capital-intensive industries and to increase ex-
ports produced in such industries , need to think in terms of ver-
tical - type investments, initia~ly at least , based on foreign rriarkets 
--unless of course they are prepared to pay whatever subsidies may 
be necessary to overcome the constraints of market size and meet the 
international supply price of capital . This latter policy may cost 
more than the benefits are worth. If countries are prepared to ac-
cept export-oriented vertical-type investment it may also be neces-
sary to accept some of the characteristics typical of such invest-
ments, especially in the manufacturing sector--e . g . , high levels of 
foreign ownership, less local participation, and a relatively weak 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the foreign investor . 
Furthermore, in many cases of investment geared mainly to export 
markets, the possibility of devising practical alternatives to for-
eign direct investment seems particularly remote. It is sometimes 
suggested, for example, that the various components of the package 
associated with direct investment might be unscrambled and that host 
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countries might purchase only those parts that they lack and cannot 
provide otherwise at comparable cost . Although such an approach 
may sometimes be practical, it seems likely to encounter particu-
larly formidable difficulties when confronted with the characteris-
tics of vertical-type export-oriented investments based on closely 
coordinated intra-firm purchases and sales and the easy exchange of 
knowledge, information and personnel across international boundaries. 
These and other issues arise particularly for foreign investment 
in manufacturing industries in developing countries but they arise 
also for relatively small developed countries such as Canada and 
Australia. At the same time, the advantages of foreign direct in-
vestment to the large capital exporting countries have recently been 
more and more called into question. One reason is the loss in tax 
revenue to the investing country--and the gain to the host country 
--because of double taxation agreements. Another reason is the long-
run threat of capital exports to the real income of domestic labour 
in the investing country. And a third reason is the high risk that 
the foreign investment may be expropriated wholly or in part by the 
host country. Thus .the danger has increased that not only host =un-
try policies but also home country policies will develop in such a 
way as to impede the flow of investment and thereby reduce the growth 
and development of the world economy. 
Much of the foregoing relates particularly to investment in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. The situation differs consider-
ably in the raw materials sector because of the high and rapidly 
growing demand for many raw materials in developed countries and the 
abundance of cheap supplies in many developing countries. In these 
instances the bargaining power of the host country frequently is 
much stronger relative to the investor . This may make it feasible 
for the host countries to achieve much more favourable terms with-
out seriously impairing the flow of investment to develop the re-
sources in question. But even in these cases, limits are established 
by the opportunity cost of capital and the availability of other 
sources of supply and substitute materials. Inadequate capital, 
rather than inadequate resources, may be a more realistic constraint 
on primary product supplies in the foreseeable future. If pressed 
too hard, investors may easily be induced to direct their capital 
into other sectors or into the development of high-cost supplies at 
home--to the mutual disadvantage of countries with high-quality re-
sources and consumers everywhere. 
Whether or not these and related issues are more important or 
very different in the Pacific area is difficult to say and perhaps 
not very important. The Pacific area does, however, offer a diver-
sity of approaches to foreign investment which may provide much use-
ful experience as a guide for future policy developments in this area. 
On both the capital export and capital import sides this experience 
ranges from a fairly open non-interventionist approach to a much more 
highly controlled and closely regulated approach. 
In addition, the area offers some examples of regional approaches 
to foreign investment, ranging from the closely-regulated formal ar-
rangements in the Andean Pact to the attempts by private companies 
to establish regional production-sharing facilities among neighbour-
ing countries for particular products. Without attempting here to 
assess these arrangements, any such regional approach faces two basic 
problems. The first is that while some form of regional organiza-
tion may somewhat relax the serious constraints of uneconomic size, 
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even with regional arrangements these constraints are likely to re-
main much more limiting than if firms become more fully integrated 
in the world economy generally or at least with the large economies 
from which most foreign investment emanates. Moreover, such region-
al arrangements may easily result in the expansion of production 
which is economic from a regional standpoint but uneconomic from an 
international standpoint., Secondly, while regional arrangements 
may resolve some of the political problems associated with foreign 
investment, they give rise to another set of political problems that 
seem equally intractable. These relate to the distribution of fa-
cilities and the free exchange of inputs and outputs among the par-
ticipating countries. Several attempts by private firms in the Pa-
cific area to establish some form of regional production sharing 
·arrangements have in fact foundered on the inability of the coun- · 
tries concerned to agree on the sharing of facilities and markets. 
Apparently this also remains a serious obstacle to greater economic 
integration among Andean countries. 
Recently, increasing attention has been given to the possibility 
of international co-operation as a means of dealing with some of the 
difficulties, real and imagined, associated with private direct in-
vestment. Until now, international co-operation in this area has 
been weak and meagre--certainly by comparison to the advances made 
since World War II in such fields as trade, monetary policy, foreign 
aid and defence. The goal of international co-operation in the field 
of investment is the same as in the trade field: to gain as much 
benefit as possible for both investing and host countries by curbing 
the mutually harmful policies that may easily emerge in a world in 
which each country narrowly purs_ues its own interests without rec-
ognizing the reactions that its policies may evoke from others. 
Maintaining as free a flow of international capital as possible by 
curbing any systemic biases resulting from the pursuit of national-
istic policies is likely to be conducive to long-run economic growth 
and development in the world in the same way as is the relatively 
free flow of goods and services. Unfortunately, some of the recent 
international initiatives in this field, instead of focusing square-
ly on avoiding beggar-thy-neighbour policies, have seemed more like 
concerted efforts by capital importers, particularly in developing 
countries, to mount a co-ordinated beggar-thy-neighbour policy a-
gainst capital exporting countries and their investors. As such, 
these efforts have not been very promising. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that there are a number of avenues that might usefully be 
pursued internationally. 
One important area is the CQllection and assembly of more and 
better information. Another is to try and devise a - set of fairly 
widely agreed upon ground-rules establishing limits on the behav-
iour of firms and, particularly, on the behaviour of governments in 
both investing and host countries. In addition, agreed procedures 
for settling disputes would be helpful. A third area is to try to 
work out co-operative arrangements on a number of specific issues. 
Among the leading contenders for such special attention are: sub-
sidies and investment incentives, taxation of foreign investment, 
the extraterritorial extension of national laws, and transfer pricing . 
Such an approach need not await widespread international agreement. 
A useful start might be made by a limited number of major investing 
and host countries, developed as well as developing. And indeed 
some countries in the Pacific area might well be among those who 
offer the greatest promise for an approach along these lines. 
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Foreign Aid 23) 
The last and, in the author's view, least important aspect of 
Pacific area economic relations to be considered here is foreign 
aid. Aid is a gift. It represents a transfer of real resources 
from the donor to the recipient that never needs to be repaid. From 
the standpoint of the donor, it represents a real cost . How much 
donors are willing to pay presumably reflects the utility associat-
ed with economic development abroad relative to other uses for re-
sources and also the amount of development achieved per unit of cost. 
From the standpoint of the recipient, aid represents a net addition 
to available resources which may be used either to increase imme-
diate consumption temporarily or, by first investing the resources 
productively, to raise the level of future consumption. 
Table 8 shows net official development assistance from DAC to 
developing countries in 1963, 1967 and 1973. During this period 
Table 8 Net Official Development Assistance from DAC 
Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral 
Agencies 1963, 1967, 1973. 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Total DAC 
1963 
95.9 
4 . 2 
79.7 
64 . 6 
8 . 7 
819 . 9 
388 . 9 
70.3 
137.6 
37 . 8 
9.9 
44 . 7 
22.9 
6 . 2 
414 . 5 
3566.6 
5722 . 4 
$U.S. millions 
1967 
157 , 3 
15 . 2 
88 . 8 
1--97 . 6 
25 . 9 
825 . 5 
508 . 8 
154.7 
385 . 3 
113 . 5 
9 . 6 
14 . 5 
24 . 9 
59 . 9 
13 . 0 
485 . 0 
3471.8 
6551. 6 
1973 
285 . 9 
40.2 
234.7 
514 . 9 
130 . 4 
1488 . 4 
1102 . 0 
192.0 
1011. 0 
322 . 1 
26 . 5 
86 . 6 
61. 6 
275 . 3 
65.3 
603 . 1 
2968 . 0 
9408 . 0 
as a % of GNP 
1963 
.51 
. 05 
. 57 
.15 
. 11 
. 98 
.41 
.14 
. 20 
.26 
.17 
1. 46 
.14 
. 05 
.48 
. 59 
.51 
1967 
.60 
.14 
.45 
.32 
. 21 
. 71 
. 41 
. 22 
.32 
. 49 
.21 
. 17 
. 54 
. 25 
. 08 
.44 
. 43 
. 42 
1973 
. 44 
. 14. 
. 51 
. 43 
. 47 
.58 
.32 
. 14 
.25 
.54 
.24 
.46 
. 59 
. 56 
.16 
.3 5 
. 23 
. 30 
Source: OECD Development Cooperation, 1974 Review, p . 201 - 202 . 
23) Most of the figures cited in this section have been gleaned 
from OECD, International Co-operation, 1974 Review. 
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'fable 9 Gross ReceiEts of Official Bilateral DeveloEment 
Assistance by Developing Countries 
1969 - 1972 (Annual Average), by Origin 
Australia Canada Japan United States Sub-total DAC 
$ % $ % ~ % $ % $ % $ 
Recipients mil- of mil- of mil- of mil- of mil- of rnil-lion total lion total lion total lion total lion total lion 
Singapore 0.7 3 0.5 2 4. 9 20 6 .1 25 24.7 
Hong Kong 0.1 3 0.3 10 0.4 14 2.9 
Panama 16.3 98 16 . 3 98 16. 6 
Chile 1.5 3 0. 1 0 31.0 55 32.6 58 56.5 
Mexico 0. 4 2 4. 0 24 4. 4 27 16 . 6 
Costa Rica 11.3 88 11.3 88 12 . 9 
Peru 2.5 7 16 . 3 95 18 . 8 52 35 . 9 
Nicaragua 0. 1 1 14 . 0 93 14 . l 93 15.1 
Taiwan 14 . 5 87 1.5 9 16.0 96 16 . 6 
Malaysia 3. 3 9 2.5 7 10.0 26 3.8 1 19 . 6 51 38 . 1 
Guatemala 13.3 89 13.3 89 14 . 9 
Colombia 3. 1 3 0.1 91.0 87 94 .2 90 105.2 
El Salvador 0. 5 5 0.2 2 8.5 81 9.2 88 10 . 5 
Papua, N. Guinea 149 . 6 100 149.6 100 149 . 6 
Ecuador 0. 7 4 0.1 1 11.0 65 11 . 8 70 16 . 9 
Honduras 0.2 2 9.3 93 9. 5 95 10 . 0 
Korea, rep . 0.6 0. 8 111.4 35 202 . 3 63 315.1 98 322 . 3 
Philippines 0.8 1 0.1 50 . 4 57 33.0 38 84 . 3 96 87 . 7 
Vietnam rep. 3. 3 1 2. 1 5 . 6 1 458 . 8 95 469.8 97 483 . 4 
Thailand 3. 9 6 0. 9 1 15.7 25 32 . 5 51 53 . 0 84 63 .4 
Khmer rep. 1.2 3 0.9 2 5. 3 13 24.3 60 31. 7 79 40 . 3 
Laos 1.3 2 0. 5 1 4.8 7 52 . 0 76 58 . 6 86 68.1 
Indonesia 18 . 1 4 5.2 1 110 . 2 23 206 . 8 43 340 . 3 71 482 . 2 
Sub-total 182 .8 9 19 . 5 1 336.4 16 1241.3 59 1780.0 85 2090 . 4 
Total to all 
Countries 197.4 237.5 473.4 2597 . 4 3505.7 6124.3 
Pacific area 
as % of total 92 . 6 8.2 71.0 47.8 50.8 34 . 1 
Source : OECD Development Coo:eeration, 1974 Review , Statistical 
Annex . 
aid flows increased over 60 per cent , compared with almost a five-
fold increase in private investment flows to the LDCs and a three-
fold increase in their exports. The largest donors in the Pacific 
area , by far, have been the United States and Japan . United Stutes 
aid, which remained fairly stable during the first part of the decade, 
has since declined . Japan's aid has risen fairly steadily year af-
ter year . Relative to their capacity to pay (GNP), however, the 
contributions of both the United States and Japan at present are 
comparatively small. The same is true of New Zealand. Australia 
and Canada, on the other hand, are at the upper end of the spectrum . 
Since 1967 Australia's contributions as a share of GNP have decreased 
substantially whereas Canada's share has increased. 
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What is termed development assistance is, of course, not entire~ 
ly a gift. Some of this assistance takes the form of loans on con-
cessional terms. Estimates for 1973 suggest that the grant element 
in Japanese aid was comparatively low: 69 per cent compared with 
99 percent for Australia, and New Zealand, 94 per cent for Canada, 
90 per cent for the United States and 90 per cent for EEC countries. 
Where in the Pacific area has the aid gone? Table 9 shows the 
source and destination of aid in the Pacific area from 1969 to 1972. 
As indicated, about 82 per cent of Australian aid to the Pacific 
area was concentrated in Papua New Guinea. Japanese aid in the area 
was also highly concentrated--81 per cent went to three countries: 
33 per cent each to Korea and Indonesia and about 15 per cent to the 
Phillipines. All developing countries in the Pacific area received 
71 per cent of all Japanese aid disbursements. Canadian aid to the 
area, though more widely disbursed, has been very small, accounting 
for about 1 per cent of the aid received in the area and less than 
8 per cent of Canadian aid disbursements. The largest volume of aid 
has emanated from the United States, which accounts for 59 per cent 
of the aid received.in the area. Over a third of this aid went to 
Vietnam, and about one-sixth each to Indonesia and Korea. The re-
maining third was widely dispensed among developing countries in the 
area. In total, the Pacific area received 48 per cent of United 
States total aid contributions from 1969 to 1973. 
In order to see what, if any, systematic relationships might ex-
ist between aid flows and selected economic characteristics of re-
cipient countries in the Pacific, regression equations (3) to (7) 
shown in Table 7 were estimated. These assume that the flow of aid 
is related to the level of income (GNP per capita), the size of the 
country (population) and the rate of economic growth over the sixties 
(change in real product, serving as a rough proxy for economic per-
formance) . The only significant relationship indicated is a posi-
tive association between aid flows and population. No significant 
association is evident between aid flows and either per capita in-
come or the rate of economic growth. 
This result may not be very surprising given the heterogenous 
nature of the Pacific area . Six countries--Colombia, Papua New 
Guinea, Korea, the Phillipines, Vietnam and Indonesia--account for 
82 per cent of the aid received by Pacific countries from Pacific 
donors . Th e characteristics , problems and prospects of the~e coun-
tries differ considerably . And the same is true for the other de-
veloping countries in the area which receive the remaining 18 per 
cent of the aid provided . 
In recent years the whole question of foreign aid has increas-
ingly been called into question in most parts of the world, reflect-
ing considerable disillusionment on the part of both donors and re-
cipients . Much of this has arisen out o~ the seeming failure of 
sizeable aid flows during the past fifteen years to make much of a 
contribution to achieving its intended objectives. At the same time, 
the aid-giving process has itself evoked new problems for both donor 
and recipient countries. This process of disillusionment has been 
further reinforced by the unfortunate series of crises which have 
more or less simultaneously beset world affairs in recent years: a 
raw materials crisis, a petroleum crisis, a monetary crisis and a 
host of political crises extending from Watergate around the world 
to South America, Inda-China, the Indian sub-continent, the Middle 
East, Africa and Western Europe. 
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In the words of the last DAC report, "the need for a fundamen·-
tal reappraisal of development cooperation policies has been thrust 
upon us". The call for yet another reappraisal of this issue is not 
new of course. In the past such reappraisals (e.g . , the Pearson 
Commission) have focused primarily on fostering substantiallybigger 
and ever-growing foreign aid activities. A more appropriate focus 
now may be how to make the most effective use of existing foreign 
aid resources and how best to scale down to lower levels of aid, in 
real terms, that may occur during the next decade. 
Among the questions that arise in this context are the following : 
Has the time come to withdraw most aid, except for emergency relief 
purposes, from large groups of recipients whose per capita income 
exceeds a certain level, say US$300? Any such approach might great-
ly reduce aid flows to most Paicfic area countries except those in 
Indo-China, Papua New Guinea, ··the Phillipines and Indonesia . Has 
the time come to dismantle much of the huge bureaucratic structure 
that has developed nationally and internationally to handle aid rrat-
ters? Doing so would not only free a considerable volume of finan-
cial resources for aid per se, as distinct from the administration 
of aid, but also would freelilany talented people, particularly in 
.international agencies, to return to their countries to participate 
directly in the development process. For those countries that con-
tinue to receive aid, has the time come to give much greater weight 
than in the past to economic and administrative criteria and demon-
strated performance and less to the variety of political influences 
that have coloured aid policies in most countries in the past? Do-
ing so would mean, for example, eschewing the use of aid as a means 
of stimulating exports from donor countries, concentrating aid more 
heavily in the primary producing sectors of many developing coun-
tries and in projects generally that meet reasonable economic and 
administrative criteria; and having both recipients and donors ad-
here to policies that encourage a freer flow of trade and capital 
in response to market forces . In this latter connection, the i:.:ossi-
bili ty of infusing a larger share of accumulating oil balances into 
the development process has special importance. And finally in con-
junction with an emphasis on increasing production of food and other 
primary products, more viable projects and a freer flow of trade and 
and capital, should greater emphasis be given to reducing i:.:opulation 
growth? If so, it appears that policies will have to be adopted that 
not only make readily available the technical devices for reducing 
births but also provide strong economic incentives for the use of 
such devices. 
None of these questions is new. Yet the current prospects for 
aid-giving may now give these questions greater urgency than before 
when the emphasis in aid discussions was different. Pacific coun-
tries because of their peculiar characteristics may perhaps have a 
special role to play in addressing these and related questions. 
Concluding Observations 
Three general observations may be added in conclusion. First, 
establishing firmer codes of conduct, better procedures and stronger 
institutional arrangements on an international basis are probably 
among the most important steps that can be taken to ensure the na-
tional independence and sovereignty of small countries . For those 
who identify sovereignty with the locus of decision-making, as we 
frequently do in Canada, it is doubtful whether any feature of pri-
vate decision-making at present is at all comparable with the impact 
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of foreign government decisions in larger countries on smallercoun-
tries. Reducing the reach of these decisions through freer inter-
national trade and investment and stabilizing their influence may 
be seen as a major step forward in achieving national independence . 
Secondly, while no one would deny that size enhances a country ' s 
bargaining power in most areas of international affairs, the scope 
for exercising such power in the modern world is frequently closely 
circumscribed by various internal and external influences (as vivid-
ly illustrated recently by the oil crisis in which t he combined JXJWer 
of the industrial world faces a few small developing countries) • 
Moreover , the benefits of being small are frequently overlooked . 
Because of their relative unimportance , small countries have fre -
quently been able to avoid responsibilities and to engage in actions 
that would create major difficulties if undertaken by large countries . 
Finally, in a world drifting towards greater nationalism and a 
series of inward-looking r e gional affiliations , the major signifi-
cance of the Pacific rim area may be as an importnat countervailing 
force working towards open internaitonal economic arrangements . For 
most countries in the area, large as well as small, an open inter-
national system for trade and capital flows offers better prospects 
than a world restricted by various national and regional restrictions. 
In such a restricted world, many countries in the area are likely 
to find themselves left out because of a lack of any natural affil-
iation or, alternatively, drawn into affiliations that they do not 
particularly want for political and economic reasons . 
COMMENTS ON REUBER'S PAPER 
(a) HEINZ ARNDT 
Professor Reuber has presented a most useful and stimulating sur-
vey of the issues before this conference, focusing appropriately on 
the Pacific region and more particularly on relations between small 
and large countries. I am probably a bad choice as discussant be-
cause I find myself very much in agreement with his policy prefer-
ences and judgements, probably more so than many other participants . 
The paper begins with a characterisation of the Pacific region 
and makes the sound point that it is in no real sense an economic 
region, "anything but a highly integrated economic area" . So great 
is the diversity of the area by almost any criterion one can think 
of that almost the only thing that holds it tog~ther is a Japanese 
dream - economic cooperation centred on Japan . Professor Reuber 
refers to the "Pacific rim countries" and gives a figure of 32 such 
countries . They include Papua New Guinea (and by extreme courtesy 
Honduras) but exclude all the Paicfic island mini-states -- Fiji, 
Nauru, Tonga, West Samoa, Micronesia and the many others which are 
still dependencies . These might have been given some mention in the 
paper. They are close to the hearts of our hosts here in Auckland 
and they illustrate in extreme form the problems of small countries . 
The paper goes on to discuss problems of trade , investment and 
aid , with special reference, at least in the trade section, to the 
economic significance of size . After reviewing the empirical evi-
dence, the author concludes that "size as such is of little conse-
quence except as it affects the concentration of exports and econo-
mies of scale" . One suspects that the really important differences 
between large and small countries, which relate to power and to feel-
ings of inferiority, insecurity and isolation, escape econometric 
testing . While I agree, for example, that "a major preoccupation 
of many countries in the area is their trade relations with the U.S. 
and Japan" , I doubt whether it is true that "the problems here are 
primarily those of gaining access to these markets" . The primary 
problem in Latin America's relations with the U. S . A . , and increas-
ingly in S . E . Asia's relations with Japan, is fear - often obsessive 
fear - of dependence . 
In his discussion of foreign investment, Professor Reuber touches 
on a wide range of issues . Again, econometric tests do not yield 
very interesting results . It is hardly surprising, in view of the 
time lags and other complex factors involved, that there is "no sig-
nificant association between direct investment and the rate of growt.~ 
in output" of host countries . Nor is Table 6 very convincing evi-
dence that "small countries on the eastern rim of the Pacific have 
attracted much larger flows than those in the southwestern region" . 
If the rather special case of Panama is excluded, the total stock 
of private investment in the more important host countries of the 
two regions is much the same (US$5 . 5 billion in Latin America and 
US$5 . 9 billion in E.-S.E. Asia). 
38 
GRANT L REUBER 39 
Professor Reuber draws a distinction between "vertical" and "ho-
rizontal" direct investment reminiscent fo Professor Kojima ' s dis-
tinction between "trade-oriented" and "anti-trade-oriented" direct 
investment ("A Macroeconomic Aooroach to Foreign Direct Investment", 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, June 1973) . But whereas Profes-
sor Kojima was primarily interested in whether or not foreign invest-
ment promoted industrial development in line with the host cou.~try ' s 
comparative advantage, Professor Reuber seems more interested in 
the relative bargaining position of the host country . He suggests 
that this is strong vis-a- vis investors in natural resource explor-
ation and development and in "horizontal" import- replacing indust-
ries , but weak in relation to "vertical" export-oriented manuf act-
uring investment, based on the availability of cheap labour . I am 
unconvinced that this classification holds water any better than 
Professor Kojima's . Is not the host country's bargaining strength , 
in so far as it rests on economic rather than political factors, a 
function of the ~conomic benefits expected to accrue to the foreign 
investors or to the investing country, and are these necessarily 
greater for the first . two than for the third type of foreign invest-
ment? 
For the most part, however, I find myself very much in agreement 
with this section of Professor Reuber's paper and especially with 
his implicit endorsement of- Professor Kindleberger ' s plea for a 
"GATT for Foreign Investment" - "to devise a set of fairly widely 
agreed upon ground-rules establishing limits on the behaviour of 
firms and, particularly, on the behaviour of governments in both 
investing and host countries". It seems to me that this is an is-
sue on which the PTD Conference may be well placed to take a public 
initiative. 
In the third section, on aid, Professor Reuber carries the cur-
rent mood of disillusion to the point of asking whether the time 
has come to withdraw most aid, except for emergency relief, from 
countries with a per capita income of more than US$300 (which would 
include all the Pacific island countries) and to dismantle the huge 
bureaucratic structure that has developed nationally and interna-
tionally to handle aid matters . We shall no doubt discuss this 
question further during the Conference. I would at this stage ll'ere-
ly sound the warning that it is surely crying for the moon to sug-
gest that aid, any more than other aspects of national policies, 
should be insulate?- from political influences. The fact that "a large 
share of accumulating oil balances" has in fact been infused in the 
development process - but almost exclusively in Moslem LDCs - illu-
strates the point . 
While Professor Reuber's survey is comprehensive and stimulating, 
and while his policy preferences mostly conform to mine, I finished 
reading his paper with a faint feeling of unreality, of an insuffi-
cient sense of crisis . Economists are notorious pessimists, and 
things somehow rarely turn out quite so bad. But for someone who, 
like Professor Reuber and myself, would like to see "an open inter-
national system for trade and capital flows" the outlook seems to 
me far less rosy than one would gather from the paper. The reason 
is that he almost entirely neglects, or touches only lightly on, 
six powerful current trends in the world which, while not necessa-
rily in every case undesirable in themselves, are all inimical to 
such a system. They are: 
1. The extension to more and more countries of centrally planned 
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economic systems under various political banners of the extreme 
left - the past twelve months have seen another six added to the 
list. 
2 . The shift of emphasis away from economic growth (and, de facto 
though not by logical necessity , away from economic rationality 
and efficiency of resource use) towards redistribution and other 
social (and generally inward-looking) goals . 
3 . The growing threat to the survival of the Western open society , 
based on a mixed economy and political democracy , posed by accel-
erating inflation and/or stagflation . 
4 . The trend, following the OPEC example, towards cartelisation of 
world supplies of basic materials . 
5 . The resurgence of economic nationalism in many developed as well 
as developing countries, manifested in protectionist policies 
and hositlity towards private foreign investment. 
6 . The continuing tendency in various parts of the world towards 
the formation of regional trading blocs . 
The last leads me to add a final word of caution . Professor Reu-
ber points out that "economic integration in the Pacific rim area 
remains patchy" . It is by no means obvious to me that a greater de-
gree of regional integration among all or most of the countries of 
the Pacific is desirable if it can be achieved only by discriminato-
ry moves away from an open trading system . There is scope for help-
ful economic cooperation and sub-regional groupings such as ASEAN . 
But moves towards large economic blocs, EEC style, are another mat-
ter . 
(b) AsHoK DESAI 
Professor Reuber has presented a comprehensive paper in which 
most of the economic issues relating to the relations between large 
and small states in the Pacific Basin find a place . His telescopic 
view, however , perhaps misses some of the microscopic particles. 
He mentions Papua New Guinea i n his discussion of development asist-
ance, but the problems of the numerous mini-states in the South Paci-
fic - Fiji, Western Samoa, Tonga , Nauru, Cooks, Solomons, Gilbert & 
Ellice Islands, Niue, New Caledonia, French Polynesia - escape his 
moving eye . These countries, with populations of less than a milli-
on - in some cases only a few thousand - may not be important in a 
world of 3500 million people . But the number of small LDCs is al -
ready large, and the tendency towards the secession of better-endow-
ed areas from newly independent countries might increase further the 
number of low-income small states . 
A great deal of the work on small ' economies that Reuber relies 
upon - for instance, that of Kuznets or of Khalaf - entails global 
cross-section comparisons . Such comparisons pool together many dis -
parate countries and correlate their size with another characteris-
tic . One or two other variables are sometimes controlled; but the 
analysis is not strictly multivar~ate . Putting a multivariate phe-
nomenon into a bivariate framework can lead to results b iased by 
misspecification . For this reason , global cross-section comparlsons 
are very useful in suggesting positive hypotheses . In particular 
these are two factors which have a strong effect on the level and 
rate of development of small economies, namely natural resources and 
location . If they were taken into account or controlled , global 
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comparisons might well give stronger results than they hitherto 
have. In any case, there is clearly a significant number of small 
economies which are favoured by neither resources nor location . 
unlike the larger LDCs of Asia and Latin America, those of the 
south Pacific also have too small domestic markets to permit much 
import substitution . 
If they are to develop, they must specialize and export; in 
this context, Reuber 's emphasis on the need for freer t rade is 
clearly right. From the viewpoint of small countries, however, 
the distinction between regional arrangements like association 
with the EEC and wider global arrangements is not so important: 
the markets of a trade bloc like the EEC are large enough for them. 
The South Pacific countries might prefer freer access to the mar -
ket of nearby industrial countries like Australia and New Zealand ; 
but they would have no strong preference between larger and small-
er customs unions . 
I am in close agreement with Reuber's observations regarding 
the heterogeneity of foreign investment and the impossibility of 
devising efficient general policies towards it. Most small count-
ries of the South Pacific are, however , far from the stage when 
they could bargain effectively with foreign enterprises . Their 
governments are too small relative to foreign enterprises and their 
markets too small to attract competition among potential entrants . 
They still have to generate options among potential investors, and 
-to foster local enterprise is a way of generating those options 
which, if ably used, could give a small country greater control on 
the rate and character of investment . 
Reuber finds high correlation between aid inflows into Pacific 
countries and their population. In view of the enormous range of 
population, it would be surprising if his estimates were free of 
heteroscedasticity. Besides, here as in the regression estimates 
Reuber cites earlier, it is the missing variable that is important 
- in this case, the spheres of influence which explain why most 
United States assistance went to the coastal states of East Asia, 
most of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia and much 
New Zealand aid to its Anglo-Polynesian neighbours . In so far as 
the spheres of influence persist and compete in the Pacific, Reub-
er may well prove too pessimistic on the quantum of aid and too 
optimistic on the application of economic criteria to its alloca-
tion. 
(cl GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Some speakers criticised Reuber's paper for paying inadequate 
attention to the importance of oligopoly in world trade . This, 
they said, had made the conventional models of international trade 
theory unsatisfactory. Small states were rightly now doing what 
they could to obtain a share of the oligopolistic gains of the do-
minant powers . However, .other speakers drew attention to the dang-
ers of generalisation about oligopoly . For example, the success 
achieved by collective action by oil producers was unlikely to be 
attainable in respect of other materials because of different con-
ditions of supply and demand . Moreover, one should not destroy ef-
ficiency of production and trade in the attempt to secure a fairer 
distribution of the rents of oligopoly . There should be an attempt 
to devise international rules for investment and trade whichapproach 
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the problem of oligopoly and cartels as economists have done when 
considering domestic industrial policy, viz ., outlaw or control oli-
gopolies which impede competition and. efficiency, encourage those 
which foster such objectives. 
Another participant expressed concern at the paper 's apparently 
uncritical acceptance of the . view that aid must be scaled down . An 
international equivalent was still required to the redistribution 
of income and equalization of opportunity effected by individual 
advanced nations through budgetary policy. If aid were cut, there 
was a danger that developing countries would be driven to attempt 
to secure 'justice' by methods which would harm trade and lower 
world output and income . A Japanese participant also suggested 
that aid remained an important element in guaranteeing a minimum 
human requirement in food and supplies. 
There was considerable discussion of whether or not Reuber had 
sufficiently recognized the "crisis in the old economic order" . 
Some felt that the flaws could not be remedied solely through the 
structural adjustments which he recommended . However, one member 
asked how much of these participants' sense of crisis was an over-
reaction to a cyclical recession . An Asian participant pointed 
out that the sense of optimism which characterized Reuber's paper 
must be conditioned by the developments of the past few years . The 
capacity of developing countries t6 continue to pursue "outward-
looking" industrial strategies and trade policies was dependent on 
continued expansion of market opportunities in countries like the 
United States and Japan. They now had to ask whether the current 
"crisis" was going to reverse the trend towards liberalization and 
structural adjustment in developed countries. 
Several participants argued that regional integration had more 
to offer than Reuber suggested, especially for the smaller countri-
es in the region, which could thereby make progress while wating 
for multilateral answers. 
Reuber, while agreeing with many of the comments made, maintain-
ed a sceptical approach to the benefits of regional integration and 
of the "new economic order". 
3 
DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF SMALL COUNTRIES - A SURVEY 
Sir Frank Holmes 
Introduction 
"Small : a., n . , adv. 1 . Not large, of deficient size 
or strength or power or number. 2 . Not much of . 3. Un-
important, trifling. 4 . Socially undistinguished, poor, 
obscure, humble. 5 . Morally mean, ungenerous, petty . " 
Smallness is not easy to define . It is also relative . A Cana-
dian Prime Minister has asserted that Canadians find living next 
to the United States like sleeping with an elephant . Yet in terms 
of land area, Canada is one of the largest countries . In size of 
gross national product (GNP) it is about eighth in the world. In 
population, Canadians probably see themselves as "tenants of life's 
middle state securely placed between the small and great,"l) but 
in fact they rank about twenty-fifth in the international league 
table. 
Economists studying the consequences of size have used each of 
these magnitudes - land , population and GNP - as indicators. Demas, 
2) for example, measured size by the "absolute number of persons 
living in a national economy and its land area . " He drew his divid-
ing lines for a small country at "a population of five million or 
less and with usable land area of ten to twenty thousand square mil-
es or less" . Khalaf3) used both population and gross national pro-
duct as indicators of size . Lloyd4J selected national income as 
the most serviceable guide . 
Any single definition has deficiencies, and whatever the defini-
tion, any dividing line between large and small is arbitrary . "Us-
able land area" is particularly troublesome to translate into oper-
ational terms, involving as it does questions of climate, availabi-
lity and accessibility of resources in demand or likely demand, to-
pography , ease of communication and the like . In discussing deve-
lopment problems, where we are concerned, inter alia, with ques-
tions of the size of the market and scale of output, it seems more 
useful to take one of the indicators of national income or product 
as our main guide . A small gross national product (GNP) may be a 
consequence of a small population and, therefore, a small labour 
force; on the other hand, it may stem from low productivity, due 
perhaps to lack of "usable" resources but usually, more fundament-
ally, to lack of present capacity to put resources, domestic and 
imported, to effective use. It may seem odd, indeed disturbing, 
1) W. Cowper, Tirocinium, line 807. 
2) W.G. Demas, ~he Economics of Development in Small Countries, 
McGill University Press 1965, pp.22 and 40. 
3) N.G. Khalaf, Economic Implications of the Size of Nations, E.J. 
Brill, Leiden, 1971. p.4. 
4) P.J. Lloyd, International Trade Problems of Small Nations, Duke 
University Press, 1968, pp . 3-13 . 
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that in these terms Bangladesh with about 7 3 million people is "small-
er" than New Zealand with just over 3 million. But even if we ack-
nowledge that comparing GNP's by the currency conversion method is 
fraught with pitfalls, and exaggerates real income differences be-
tween less and more developed countries, it is a reflection of the 
present state of the world that, in effective demand and productive 
power, countries of quite large population are frequently "smaller" 
than those with many fewer citizens . 
If the dividing line between large and small in 1972 had been 
set at a GNP of US$10,000 million , only 36 of the 189 countries and 
territories in the World Bank Atlas for 1974 would have qualified 
as large, with Indonesia, Bulgaria , Greece, Norway , Finland, Vene-
zuela , and Iran just making "large country" status . If the line 
had been dropped to US$5,000 million, fifteen others would have 
qualified, ranging from Puerto Rico just above the line , through 
New Zealand in the middle of the added range to the Republic of 
Korea near US$10 , 000 million . Taking the qualifying line down to 
US$2 , 500 million would have brought in fifteen more ; with Burma, 
Ghana and Singapore just qualifying, and with Ireland, Bangladesh 
and Malaysia leading the new qualifiers in the big league . Below 
a GNP of US$2 , 500 million there were 123 other countries ranging 
from the Maldive Islands on about US$10 million, and Western Samoa, 
Seychelles and some of the smaller Caribbean islands on US$20 mil-
lion , to Ecuador and Mozambique a little below the new dividing 
line . 
We New Zealanders think of our economy as small . If New Zealand's 
GNP had been picked as the margin between large and small in 1972, 
only 46 countries would have been above the margin, 142 below . 
Looking at the matter geographically, the large economies are heavi-
ly concentrated in Europe and North America, as the following table 
indicates : 
Number of Countries and Territories 
Above and Below New Zealand ' s GNP, 1972 
Africa 
Asia a 
Europe 
Indones i a and Oceania 
Northern and Central Americab 
Latin America 
Total : 
a. Extending to Israel and Lebanon . 
b . Including Caribbean. 
c . South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt . 
Above 
3C 
9d 
24 
2e 
3f 
5g 
4G 
Below 
51 
32 
11 
13 
27 
8 
142 
d . Japan, People's Republic of China, India, Iran , Republic of 
Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Israel. 
e . Australia and Indonesia. 
f . United States, Canada , Mexico . 
g . Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile . 
Source : World Bank Atlas, 1974 . 
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characteristics of Small Countries 
It should be evident from the foregoing introduction that the 
small can be rich. Of the countries with populations over one mil-
lion in the world Bank Atlas, six of the top twenty in terms of in-
come per capita had populations of less than five million. Ten had 
populations of less than ten million. Khalaf's study5) found no 
significant association between population size and national income 
per head. 
Small countries can also grow rapidly. Khalaf did not find any 
significant relationship between size (whether in population or 
GNP) and rates of growth of GNP, or between population and growth 
of GNP per head . Again, looking at the ranking of rates of growth 
of GNP per capita between 1965 and 1972 in the World Bank Atlas, 
one finds that half of the top ten and half of the top twenty had 
GNP's smaller than New Zealand ' s. Six of the top ten6) and twelve 
of the top twenty7) had populations less than ten million. On the 
other hand, of the twelve countries which had negative rates of 
growth of GNP per head curing this period8), eight had less than 
ten million people and five had less than five million; none of 
them had a GNP greater than New Zealand's . But there is no indica-
tion that their problems stemmed from size per se; their source was 
more probably nther conditions responsible for their relative pover-
ty and a variety of exogenous factors peculiar to the individual 
countries concerned . 
There also seems to be no significant association between size 
and instability, whether of income, exports, imports, terms of trade 
or exchange reserves . This conclusion is not vitiated if the levels 
of economic development of different countries are taken into account . 
Smallness as such does not appear to be a significant source of in-
stability. 9) Khalaf suggests too that factors normally associated 
with smallness, such as a higher than average dependence on trade 
and rather substantial commodity and geographic concentration of 
exports, are not of themselves sources of unusual instability . By 
the same token, policies to reduce dependence on trade and concent-
ration of exports do not necessarily provide the key to greater 
stability. As Lloyd,10) drawing on the work of Michaelyll) and 
Coppockl2) puts it, "no generalizations concerning instability in 
the trade sector are applicable to small countries generally . " For 
the small nations, "it is the specific circumstances of each country 
with respect to the kinds of commodity exported, access to markets 
over the period of years, commodity concentration, adaptability to 
changes in market conditions, and numerous other factors - rather 
5) Op . cit. p . 5. 
6) Singapore , Libya, P . N.G., Greece, Israel, Saudi Arabia . 
7) Above plus Bulgaria, Puerto Rico, Albania, Hong Kong , Mozambique, 
Angola . 
8) Yemen, Niger, Khmer , Jordan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Cuba, Senegal, 
Republic of Vietnam, Guinea, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam . 
9) Khalaf, op . cit., Ch.2 . 
lO)Lloyd, op . cit., p . 51 . 
ll)M. Michaely, Concentration in International Trade, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1965 . 
12)J. Coppock, International Economic Stability, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1965 . 
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than country size or any other single variable - which must be us-
ed to explain the pattern of export instability." 
In his study of the international trade problems of small count-
ries, Lloyd cast doubt on assertions that such countries were nor-
mally characterized by a high ratio of international trade flows 
to GNP and a high degree of commodity and geographic concentration 
of exports. In his conclusion,13) he states that "size of country 
~as not a major determinant of the trade ratios of some sixty count-
ries in 1964 and it was not even a significant factor in the deter-
mination of commodity concentration of exports ........ If a small 
country is defined as any country whose GDP was less than $20 bil-
lion in 1964, it is quite clear that the trade ratios and degrees 
of export concentration of these countries vary widely around the 
all-country averages." He also found that many of the small count-
ries which had high trade ratios had exceptionally low commodity 
concentration in their exports. However, in Chapter 2 of his book, 
14) he makes an important qualification of this conclusion. He 
points out that, with the sole exception of Brazil, all countries 
with GDP's over $10 billion had low commodity concentration in 
their export trade, and all countries with DGP's over $20 billion 
had below average trade ratios. Thus,, large countries do seem to 
have less dependence than the average country on trade and on a few 
export products. Small countries may or may not, depending on many 
circumstances concerning their location, past history, access to 
major markets, resource endowments and so on. 
Khalafl5) found some inverse relationship between size and com-
modity export concentration and a weak inverse relationship between 
size and geographic concentration of exports. He also found, like 
Kuznets,16) a significant inverse correlation between size and the 
ratio of exports to GNP, especially when size was measured by popu-
lation rather than GNP, but his figures for smaller countries were 
fairly widely dispersed around the average. As with Lloyd, however, 
he found a much weaker inverse association between size and the ra-
tio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GNP. The average 
foreign trade ratio seemed to rise from about 0.22 for the twenty 
countries with largest populations to about 0.60 for ten countries 
with an average population of 7.6 million. For the remaining thir-
ty smaller countries in the sample with populations less than 7.6 
million, the ratio fluctuated with a slightly declining trend, be-
ing about 0 . 57 for the ten smallest countries, whose populations 
averaged 1.4 million. Finding similar relationships, Kuznetsl7lhad 
concluded that "apparently, under prevailing political, institution-
al and economic conditions the proportion of total available pro-
ducts that can be secured from foreign trade has an upper limit and 
the proportion of output that must be secured from within the dome-
stic boundaries has a corresponding lower limit." 
Kuznets had found a much closer inverse association between size 
13) Op.cit. p . 124. 
14) Lloyd, op.cit., esp. p.29. 
15) Khalaf, op.cit., Chs. 3 and 4. 
16) S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations" in E.A.G. Robin-
son ed. Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, Macmillan 
1960, esp. pp. 19 and 32-36 . 
17) s . Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, Free Press, Illi-
nois, 1959, p.98. 
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and dependence on foreign trade among richer than among poorer 
countries . Khalaf's study did not confirm this pattern . It sug-
gesiedl8) that small developed countries tended, on average, to 
have the highest dependence on trade, and large less developed 
countries the lowest. But, in general, the inverse association be-
tween size and dependence on trade did not change with levels of 
development . 
In assessing the characteristics of small nations, Kuznets•l9) 
first observation was that their economic structure was typically 
less diversified than that of larger units . Output and productive 
factors were concentrated in fewer industrial sectors. Even here, 
however, he had to note that diversification of industrial struc-
ture was more a function of economic development than of size, pe r 
se. Consequently, the differences between large and small nations 
in range or diversity of structure would be clear only in compari-
sons of nations of similar levels of development. Three reasons 
were advanced for expecting less diversity or greater concentration 
of structure in small countries, especially when the smaller rich 
were being compared with the large . Firstly, small nations were 
usually (though certainly not always) small in area, and since the 
availability of a variety of resources (including climate) was 
largely a function of area, their scope for diversification might 
be restricted by lack of resources. Secondly, small countries of-
fered a limited domestic market. Because of the minimum scale, let 
alone the optimum scale, of plant required for some industries, 
such as those producing, as opposed to assembling, aircraft, auto-
mobiles and electrical and railroad equipment, their inclusion in 
the productive system of a small country would be most uneconomic 
unless it could count on a substantial export market. Thirdly, 
comparative advantage in the supply of a few resources might, with 
a small labour force and deficiencies of other resources, dictate 
concentration upon the areas of comparative advantage to a much 
greater extent than was required in larger nations. Hence the ten-
dency towards greater dependence on foreign trade . 
Kuznets did not present evidence on the structure of the fore ign 
trade of smaller countries, but his analysis implies that primary 
products and simple manufactures tend to assume more importance i n 
their exports than they do in larger countries. This being so, one 
would expect fluctuations in the terms of trade and perhaps insta-
bility of export receipts to be relatively greater than Khalaf's 
study suggests. However, as with trade dependence and export con-
centration, the position with the terms of trade seems to be that, 
while most of the largest countries experience fluctuations below 
the average, there is a wide dispersion around the average for 
small and medium-sized countries. And there is wide variation of 
the instability of export proceeds at all points in the range of 
size of nations. 
The foregoing discussion of the characteristics of small nations 
should have indicated that the possibilities of making significant 
generalizations about their development problems are limited. Both 
large and small countries encouter problems in achieving stable 
growth. Relative size would not seem, on the face of it, to be a 
dominant element in determining a particular country's capacity to 
18) Khalaf, op.cit., pp.120-22. 
19) "Economic Growth of Small Nations", op.cit., pp.15-18. 
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surmount those problems. In discussing the development problems of 
small economies it would seem necessary at least to distinguish be-
tween those which are relatively rich and highly productive, on the 
one hand, and those which are relatively poor and technologically 
underdeveloped, on the other . It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss the problems of poorer countries generally, and this 
writer is in any case more familiar with the problems of a small 
developed country. However, an effort will be made to indicate 
some of the special problems which confront small economies which 
are poor . The problems which I have elected to discuss as of spe-
cial relevance to this gathering are problems of structural trans-
formation, problems of trade dependence (including those involved 
in schemes of regional integration designed to overcome problems 
arising from the difficulties which small economies may encounter 
because of ecor.omies of scale) and problems involved in obtaining 
development assistance from overseas. 
Problems of Structural Transformation in Development 
Economic development has been variously defined. Horace Belshaw 
20)called it "a social process which results in a cumulative inc-
rease in levels of consumption." Charles Kindleberger2l)distin-
guishes development from growth, suggesting that while growth im-
plies more output, more inputs and more efficiency, development in-
volves changes in the structure of outputs and in the allocation 
of inputs by sectors. Demas,22)speaking of development in small 
countries, takes development to mean the structural transformation 
of the economy. He does not regard income per capita as a good in-
dicator of development. He draws attention in particular to the 
deficiencies of "enclave economies", dependent on the exploitation 
of a particular resource, mainly for export, perhaps through for-
eign-owned enterprises, where high incomes might be confined to a 
minority of the population engaged in operating or servicing these 
enterprises, and could in some instances be of limited duration, 
leaving only a limited residue of improved physical and human capi-
tal in the economy. To him, structural transformation of the eco-
nomy is required, and this entails (1) reducing any dualism that 
exists between the different sectors and different regions of the 
economy; (2) drawing surplus labour into high productivity employ-
ment; (3) establishing a national market for goods and services; 
(4) increasing the share of manufacturing and service industries 
in the GDP; (5) increasing the volume of inter-industry transac-
tions mainly through the growth of manufacturing; (6) lowering the 
ratio of imports to GDP and shifting their composition from consum-
er to intermediate and capital goods; and (7) making the economy 
more flexible and adaptable through political, social and institu-
tional change. 
Small, poor countries have similar problems of development to 
those faced by all countries of low productivity and low income per 
head. Generally, the basic problem is to convert a "traditional" 
society into a modern one through a social process which gradually 
20) H. Belshaw, Population Growth and Levels of Consumption, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1956, p.xv. 
21) C.P. Kindleberger, Economic Development, McGraw Hill, 2nd ed., 
1965, p.3. 
22) Demas, op.cit., pp.19-20. 
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makes automatic an increasing accumulation of capital, improvement 
of technology and growth in the skills of labour and management. 
As H. G. Johnson23lhas pointed out, social factors are at least as 
important as the so-called economic in making the transformation 
possible . In particular, self-sustaining development requires po-
litical stability, honest government, an institutional framework 
conducive to planning for the future in reasonable security, a 
legal and judicial system which minimizes the risks of production 
and accumulation, and a social system which promotes mobility, re-
cognizes accomplishment and gives incentives based on productive 
economic contributions rather than personal connections. Even in 
advanced countries, there are strong resistances to the changes re-
quired for further development where these conflict with tradition-
al values and social controls and where the interests of important 
groups seem threatened. The problems are more intransigent in so-
cieties starting from a tribal level of organisation, from an ela-
borate culture attuned to a non-industrial way of life or from a 
"colonial" culture derived from eighteenth or nineteenth century 
models. Many of the smnll countries of Asia and the Pacific face 
complications in developing their economies because of conflicts 
between the requirements for economic growth and their traditional 
ways . For instance, the Prime Minister of Western Samoa24), dis-
cussing his country's development problems in 1970, pointed out 
several suggested economic policies which had been found uncongen-
ial - too close an embrace of tourism would jeopardise Samoa's way 
of doing things; the land tenure system, seen as an obstacle by 
visitng economists, was still the most appropriate for Samoa; with 
numbers threatening to double every twenty years and making serious 
demands on limited resources, Samoa continued to have no population 
policy other than an insistence that "having children is the pri-
vate concern of husbands and wives . " "We are unique" he said, "and 
wish to remain so within the common brotherhood of man." 
Population Problems 
Rapid population growth is a serious problem for many small eco-
nomies of South East Asia and the Pacific. The tendency in the 
1960's was for growth rates to accelerate; and in most countries 
they remain very high, ranging up to 3~% per annum in some cases . 
With a few significant exceptions, sucn as Singapore and to a less-
er extent Malaysia, vigorous population control policies have been 
lacking. Yet the conclusion of Ohlin25)in 1967 is still valid, 
that "it is difficult to undertake any calculation of the economic 
gains that might be realized from population control which does 
not point to very spectacular benefits. On the other hand, it is 
currently believed that successful family planning campaigns can 
be achieved at costs which are extremely low except in comparison 
with the negligible amounts spent so far ." 
23) H. G. Johnson, Economic Policies Towards Less Developed Countri-
es, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1967, Ch . II, esp . 
pp . 44-5. 
24) Hon. Tupua Tamasese Leulofi IV, Western Samoa Faces the Modern 
World, N.Z. Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 
1970, pp.3-4. 
25) Goran·Ohlin, Population Control and Economic Development, OECD, 
Paris, 1967, p.120. 
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Even in countries with considerable resources, more investment 
in population controls should assist greatly in overcoming poverty 
by quite quickly reducing the proportion in the young, dependent 
age groups, by releasing more resources for saving and investment 
and by making some increase in consumption per head possible . The 
case for population control increases if lack of usable land and 
other resources is a severe constraint on development, as it is in 
several small South Pacific countries, for example . It is, of 
course, possible to achieve rapid growth and high living standards 
in small economies with limited resources, as the examples of Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong, and among the most developed Belgium and 
Switzerland, demonstrate. Nevertheless, -history and location have 
been helpful to these countries in their achievements and not all 
economies are similarly favoured . Some of the small South Pacific 
countries presently rely on emigration to relieve some of the pre-
ssures of excessive population . However, this does not provide a 
satisfactory or permanent solution of the problems . One major dif-
ficulty is that it tends to be the more skilled and active members 
of the population who both wish to emigrate and are most favoured 
in the labour markets and immigration policies of the host countri-
es . This makes it more difficult for the small country to estab-
lish a satisfactory base for its own development and increases its 
reliance on remittances home by emigrants and on aid from more de-
veloped countries. The emigrations may also be subject to erratic 
fluctuations . Even in countries like Australia and New Zealand, 
disenchantment with immigration has increased in recent years, for 
social as well as economic reasons. This is accentuated in condi-
tions of recession . 
Problems Arising from Economies of Scale 
In effecting structural transformation, all small countries are 
confronted with some problems arising from the existence of econo-
mies of scale in many lines of production, including the provision 
of public services. Unfortunately , the quantitative evidence avail-
able upon which one might base general conclusions for policy in 
small countries is not very satisfactory, as all who have read the 
proceedings of the Conference of the International Economic Associ-
ation on "The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations" will 
appreciate . E.A.G . Robinson•s26)introduction to the proceedings 
indicated a consensus that most technical economies of production 
were exhausted by firms of quite moderate size but that the real 
value of output of the average .unit of production in advanced count-
ries was growing . It noted that while larger countries normally 
possess an automobile industry, an aircraft industry, locomotive 
building, and heavy machinery building, both mechanical and elect-
rical, smaller countries rarely possess any of these (and, one 
could now add, computer manufacture). A dividing line of between 
10 and 15 million of population as the necessary base for such in-
dustries was suggested, though exception, e.g . Australia, were not-
ed. It was also observed that larger economies could enjoy great-
er specialization of both goods and service industries; in small 
markets, firms tended to be less specialized and more diversified, 
and as a consequence were confronted with mastering a greater vari-
ety of design and production problems. 
26) Op.cit., pp. xiii to xxii. 
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In a recent survey of empirical evidence, Simon Teite127) cast 
doubt on the methodology of the studies by Solow and Douglas which 
had suggested constant returns to scale for the economies which 
they had studied . More recent studies by Walters and by Brown and 
Popkin had found significant economies of scale, using different 
methods. Also the United Nations Study of Industrial Growth in 
1963, using cross-section data for industrialized and developing 
countries, had estimated a co-efficient of elasticity of level of 
output in relation to population size of 1 . 12 for total manufactur-
ing . The co-efficients for food, beverages and tobacco, leather 
and leather products had been less than l; those for clothing, wood 
and wood products, printing and publishing, and stone, clay and 
glass products had been about unity . All others had exceeded the 
average, with the highest coefficients being found for base metals 
(1 . 65) and chemical and petroleum products (1 . 39) . At the level of 
the industrial plant, Teitel cites the results of several studies 
demonstrating increasing returns to scale in such items as pipelin-
es, chemical engineering, process industries (especially chemicals), 
capital intensive producer goods and some consumer-oriented indust-
ries like textiles . Tests of correlation between size of establish-
ment and output per worker for Colombia, Ireland, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Costa Rica and the United States had shown economies 
of scale in most industries in the first four countries, but the 
results were statistically significant in only about half the indus-
tries in the last two countries . Taking average value added as the 
measure of size, the ranking of industries enjoying greatest econo-
mies were (1) tobacco, (2) petroleum and coal products, (3) base 
metals, (4) paper, (5) chemicals, (6) beverages, (7) rubber, (8) 
textiles, (9) electrical machinery, (10) transport equipment . At 
the end of the list were leather, wood, clothing and furniture. 
These rankings showed a uniform pattern across a sample of 25 count-
ries, with similar ordering in both developed and developing count-
ries . 
As indicated, it is difficult to reach general conclusions for 
policy on the basis of this sort of evidence, especially as many 
small nations can escape at least some of the penalties of small-
ness in particular industries by producing for foreigners as well 
as for their domestic markets . We shall return later to the ques-
tion of how satisfactory this avenue of escape can in fact be . 
Meantime, we merely note the conclusions reached by Robinson and 
his conference colleagues in studying the matter . "Our general im-
pression", he said, "was that most of the major industrial economies 
of scale could be achieved by a relatively high-income nation of 50 
million; that nations of 10 to 15 million were probably too small 
to get all the technical economies available; and that the indust-
rial economies of scale beyond a size of 50 million were mainly 
those that derive from a change in the character of competition and 
of specialization", which are however to be explained only partly 
by scale. He emphasized that "large size is not a panacea .. . ... . 
the better and more scientific use of resources is what ultimately 
matters, and size of market is only one ingredient in that more ef-
fective use." However, he concluded, there are no possibilities of 
diseconomies of scale arising from excessive size of the market. 
"There are no penalties for being bigger than the minimum size, if 
such there be, that will exhaust the economies of scale", provided 
27) S. Teitel, 'Economies of Scale and Size of Plant', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol.XIII, Nos. 1 and 2, 1975. 
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that sensible overall management of the large economy continues to 
keep it operating flexibly at high levels of output . 
Problems of Maintaining Efficiency Through Competition 
Especially in industries subject to economies of scale, small 
countries may be confronted with a conflict between their desire 
to promote competition among domestic producers and cater for a 
variety of consumer needs from domestic output, on the one hand, 
and the high costs involved in maintaining a number of producers 
operating on a small scale making a diversity of products, on the 
other. International trade can again provide some solution to this 
problem, if governments are prepared to expose domestic monopolies 
or oligopolies to competition from imports and if growing exports 
of the goods and services concerned are possible. However, in prac-
tice, policies of attracting foreign investments and providing pro-
tection and support for domestic industries have frequently aggra-
vated the problem by encouraging the establishment of several sepa-
rate enterprises, often operating well below capacity and on a one-
shift basis, and, especially in the more affluent societies, trying 
to satisfy consumers' desires for a varied choice . For example, in 
New Zealand, in 1969, thirty-three different models of car were as-
sembled in average production runs of 1600 units. The potential 
for both New Zealand and others to gain from rationalization through 
expanded trade in this field are considerable, if the obstacles to 
doing so can be surmounted . 28) Similar remarks could be made about 
industrial development in many other small countries . 
The problems of scale are aggravated in many small countries by 
competition by different centres and regions, not only for new in-
dustries but also for expensive public facilities such as interna-
tional airports, container terminals, tertiary educational institu-
tions and the like. In a democracy, the pressures are difficult 
to resist, especially in marginal electorates . It is unlikely that 
other forms of government could completely immunize themselves from 
them either . Nevertheless, pandering to them is expensive, as are 
endeavours by small countries to sustain foreign services over a 
wide area and to provide effective independent defence forces . 
Smallness calls for special attention to the costs and benefits of 
expanding public services of these and other kinds . It also sug-
gests serious consideration of the potential for achieving economi-
es through collaboration by, say, educational authorities and local 
governments planning the joint use by students and the local commu-
nity of school facilities, or through use of defence forces to sup-
plement certain projects in construction, health, education and 
transport, for example . · 
Strategies for Industrial Development 
In planning for the structural transformation of small economi-
es, there is a tendency to give considerable emphasis to the deve-
lopment of manufacturing industries. This tendency is evident in 
the approach of Demas, summarized in section 15, where manufactur-
ing is seen as playing a key role in increasing the volume of inter-
industry transactions, reducing dualism and employing labour releas-
ed from agriculture. There is no doubt that industrialization must 
28) See W. D. Rose, Development Options in the New Zealand Motor Car 
Assembly Industry, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research . 
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be an important component of development, but governments may be 
led into false paths if they v iew industrialization too narrowly 
as . the production of manufactured products . As Johnson29)points 
out, "industrialization properly speaking involves the organisation 
of production in business enterprises, characterized by specializa-
tion and division of labour both within and among themselves; this 
specialization is based on the application of technology and of 
mechanical and electrical power to supplement and replace human ef-
fort and motivated by the objectives of minimizing costs per unit 
and maximizing returns to the enterprise . . .•. .. • So conceived, 
industrialization is an economy- wide phenomenon, applying to agri-
culture and the service trades as well as to manufacturing; the es-
sence of it is not the production of the products typically consid-
ered as "industrial" but the rational approach to the production 
process that it embodies . " 
The percentage of the active population engaged in manufacturing 
varies widely in different developed countries, with some small 
economies like Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg exceeding the 
proportions prevailing in the United States and France, for example . 
In the United States itself, the proportion so engaged has dropped 
quite considerably from 30 % in 1947 to 25% in 1971, as service in-
dustries have gained in significance in the "post industrial socie-
ty•. 30) Thus, there is no standard proportion of manufacturing to 
total output required for growth or prosperity; and what is econo-
mically most appropriate will vary from one country to another de-
pending on many factors such as resources, locations, and available 
skills. There seems no reason why a substantial part of the adop-
tion throughout the economy of the rational approach to the produc-
tion process which is required in poor societies cannot be transmit-
ted through the development of primary production, construction and 
other service industries and their ancillaries, as well as through 
manufactures, if the circumstances of the country make this econo-
mically feasible . Certainly, care will have to be taken that the 
development does not become merely an "enclave", as tourist develop-
ment, for example, can become in some countries, especially if the 
facilities are built by foreign enterprises and draw heavily on 
overseas sources for the goods and services supplied to visitors . 
But the important thing is to seek out those activities in which 
each country's comparative advantages lie, having regard to as rea-
listic an assessment as possible of the country's capacity to sell 
and buy overseas now and in the next few years. 
The limitations of an industrial development strategy focussed 
upon stimulating the growth of manufacturing industries to provide 
substitutes for imports, without great regard for the costs involv-
ed, have become increasingly apparent to the governments of many 
small countries in the last few years . The costs become more obvi-
ous when they have passed the stage of providing domestic substitut-
es for the simpler consumer goods and are faced with the problem of 
providing "development in depth", with industries producing inter-
mediate and capital goods where economies of scale are more signi-
ficant . Even before that stage is reached, it is really not satis-
29) Op.cit., p . 45-46. 
30) Lawrence B. Krause, "U.S . Economy and International Trade" in 
K. Kojima ed., Structural Adjustments in Asia-Pacific Trade, 
Japan Economic Research Centre, Tokyo, 1973, esp. pp . 387-389. 
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factory to base policy on the assumption that it is necessary to 
protect a wide range of industries making substitutes for consumers' 
goods , to treat as given their requirements for imports of equip-
ment and materials to satisfy projected consumer demand and, after 
comparing these requirements with projected receipts from exports, 
to class the remainder as the "foreign exchange gap" to be filled 
by overseas borrowing and overseas aid . As Hla Myint3l)has point-
ed out, "where domestic industries catering for luxury consumption 
by the urban classes have been encouraged to grow, because of ine f -
fective taxation and a desire to possess sophisticated industries, 
it does not requ ire much penetration to see that a considerable 
proportion of the so-called 'capital goods' and 'essential' inputs 
merely serve to satisfy luxury consumption inside the country . " 
Such an approach obscures the fundamental economic problem of choice . 
The choice involves decisions, first as to how to convert available 
domestic savings into capital goods, and second as to how to use 
the capital goods to obtain final consumers' goods . At each stage 
there is a choice between the 'direct' method of domestic produc-
tion and the 'indirect' method of international trade. It is un-
wise to accept the existing structure of import substitution as 
given . It is important frequently to ask which industries are 'eco-
nomic', and which are 'uneconomic', and whether or not it might not 
make more sense to use more resources to produce goods for export 
and acquire more consumers' goods indirectly through trade . It may 
not be insignificant that Singapore, forced to switch from a policy 
of import substitution to one of export expansion after its separa-
tion from Malaysia, has led the field in economic growth in the 
past decade . 
In poor economies, especially where capital formation has a high 
overseas content, it is important to avoid measures which promote 
the use of excessively capital-intensive methods . Holding interest 
rates artif ically low can be detrimental to development in such 
circumstances . There is also much merit in Myint•s32lview that, 
especially in poor countries, it is a mistake to identify 'capital 
goods' with durable machinery . Among the most important needs in 
small developing economies are irrigation, land improvement and 
other investments in social overhead capital, which must be done on 
the spot rather than imported in prefabricated form. To provide 
labour for these works on the spot, it is necessary to release peo-
ple who are supported by a 'subsistence fund' while they make their 
contribution to future output. If this is accepted, food becomes 
'capital' and agriculture a major producer of investment goods. 
Especially in countries which have to import a good deal of food 
and other primary materials, because of backward agriculture and 
population pressure, the removal of disincentives to agricultural 
improvement may be a more satisfactory form of import substitution 
than can be achieved by heavy protection of manufacturing. Freer 
importation of cheap consumers' incentive goods could, in some cas-
es, serve a similar purpose in encouraging the expansion of agricul-
tural output. 
This attitude towards industrial development strategy is just as 
relevant to small, relatively rich economies as it is to small poor 
ones. In essence, it lays the emphasis on 'export substitution' as 
31) H. Myint, "Trade, Education and Economic Development", U.M.B.C. 
Economic Review, Vol.VI, No.l, 1970, pp.26-27. 
32) Op.cit., pp.25-26. 
s IR FRANK HOLMES 55 
well as 'ef f icient i mport s ubstitut ion' according to potential com-
parative advantage. It implies a constant review of the costs and 
benefits of controls over international trade and a predisposition 
to allow external economic forces to influence the direction wh ich 
the transformation of the country's economic structure should take . 
The success of such a strategy will of course be determined by many 
other factors, notably by the skill of governments in preserving 
internal and external balance through fiscal , monetary, incomes and 
exchange rate policies . It also assumes that the external world 
will continue to provide opportunities for export expansion and ac-
cess to basic import requirements on a reasonably stable basis. 
Recent developments have naturally brought the validity of this as-
sumption under much closer scrutiny than usual . 
Problems of Dependence on Trade 
As indicated, international trade opens up possibilities for 
small countries to overcome some of the disadvantages of the limit-
ed size of their domestic markets . However, if a high proportion 
of GNP is derived from trade, a country is very dependent for its 
fortunes upon developments and policies in the major countries with 
which trade is conducted . It is not surprising that such depend-
ence should be seen by many in small countries as vulnerability, 
especially if a high proportion of exports is in the form of prima-
ry products subject to considerable fluctuations in price and con-
stantly under threat of restriction by controls, levies and the 
like in major markets. "Colony or .Nation?" 33)is the kind of ques-
tion which inevitably arises in many minds, particularly when ex-
port markets are depressed and the immediate future looks bleak. 
Unfortunately, a policy placing primary emphasis on import sub-
stitution may not be very successful in reducing the vulnerability 
of a small economy . It may or may not reduce the percentage of im-
ports to GNP . Frequently, it may merely change the composition of 
overseas payments, reducing the proportion ~pent on finished, 'non-
essential ' consumer goods and increasing the proportion spent on 
'essential' materials, feuls, equipment, consumer goods and servic-
es . If the import substitutes are produced at relatively high cost , 
the interests of expor~ers and other more efficient industries may 
be adversely affected . Especially if no significant new exports 
are stimulated by the policy, the country may merely have altered 
the nature of its dependence, not reduced it . Paradoxically, more 
success might be achieved in genuinely reducing vulnerability and 
in transforming a 'colonial' structure of production by a policy 
which emphasizes widening the range of export products and markets, 
by actively promoting the development of the more efficient indust-
ries, ensuring that the currency is not over-valued and giving in-
centives to exports of goods and services in fiscal and credit po-
licies. So far as small, affluent societies are concerned, New 
Zealand's recent experience has suggested that a small country can 
develop a growing export of manufactures and services in this way. 
Success has been achieved partly by producing on a large scale 
goods for which we have relatively abundant resources (e . g . in our 
case forest products), partly by finding 'gaps' in larger markets 
for custom-made manufactures not satisfactorily supplied by larger-
33) See for example W.B . Sutch, Colony or Nation?, Sydney Universi-
ty Press, 1968 for a discussion of New Zealand's 'vulnerabili-
ty'. 
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sca l e producers, partly by selling products and services in develop-
ing countries which, being based on the requirements of relatively 
small-scale New Zealand producers, are more attuned to the needs 
of many developing countries than are more sophisticated articles 
and techniques designed for producers in larger and more affluent 
societies. The relative success of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Korea suggests that a strategy of 'export substitution' can al-
so be an effective engine of growth in small developing societies 
without unduly increasing the risks inherent in dependence on over-
seas trade. 
Of course, there are risks inherent in any form of business 
which has to cater for the freely expressed and changing require-
ments of consumers, whether they be domestic or foreign. The spe-
cial risks of export business rest in the lack of protection against 
foreign competition which one's own government may accord in res-
pect of domestic sales, the greater difficulties of keeping in 
touch with the changing requirements of consumers in a wide range 
of distant markets, the possibility of greater instability in the 
overseas markets than at home, and the danger that markets will be 
restricted by the policy actions of foreign governments. Success-
ful exporting therefore requires considerable flexibility and adapt-
ability, such as, for example, New Zealand's dairy industry has had 
to show in diversifying both products and .markets in response to 
changing consumer demands and the restrictions which it has encount-
ered in markets previously dominant in its trade. The risks of d i s-
ruption to trade through instability in major markets have become 
more apparent in the 1970's than in the earlier post-war period. 
The pronounced demand inflation at first caused dramatic increases 
in the prices of .many commodities exported by small countries. How-
ever, in several cases, the boom was short-lived, and the terms of 
trade deteriorated sharply as export prices fell, and the prices 
of manufactures rose in the subsequent period of stagflation in 
North America, Western Europe and Japan. Developments in oil have 
aggravated the internal and external payments problems of many 
small economies. Those small economies which are heavily dependent 
on exports which fluctuate widely in price could usually diminish 
the internal impact of the fluctuations on domestic liquidity, in-
comes and spending through the adoption of schemes of stabilization 
which smooth out the peaks and troughs. With payments to exporters 
based on some sort of moving average of receipts, and with judici-
ous use of fiscal, credit and exchange rate policies, some insula-
tion could be achieved. But severe instability in major economies 
undoubtedly aggravates the problems of smaller economies in sustain-
ing stable growth, and any prolonged period of recession greatly 
strengthens the forces in those countries which advocate more autar-
chic policies in international trade. 
The extent to which small countries can orient their development 
strategies towards exporting is dependent on the readiness of both 
consumers and governments of other countries to accept an increas-
ing flow of the products in which they have a potential comparative 
advantage. Protection in the major developed market economies is 
an important constraint for many whose advantage lies in primary 
production and labour-intensive manufactures. In agriculture, the 
methods of support favoured by several European countries and in 
some products the United States, which hold domestic prices high 
by restricting imported supplies, aggravate the problems by rest-
ricting consumption, artificially stimulating domestic production 
and encouraging the output of substitutes. From time to time, do-
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mestic surpluses arise which diminish market opportunities, especi-
ally if they are unloaded overseas in markets which small countri-
es might otherwise serve . The regionalisation of this form of pro-
tection in the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, particularly 
with Britain becoming a member, has been a source of concern to 
many small countries. Some, like New Zealand and several develop-
ing countries closely associated with one or more of the members of 
EEC, have been able to make special arrangements with the Community 
to offset, in part or in full , the potential damage to important 
export products. However, this obviously accentuates the problems 
of those exporters not included in the arrangements, and in any 
case still leaves to be solved many of the problems caused by the 
community's form of agricultural support . Resistance to competi-
tion from so-called "cheap-labour" countries remains strong in many 
countries, large and small; import controls, "tariff escalation", 
requests for - "voluntary restraint in exporting", union opposition 
to ships manned or operated by citizens of "low wage" economies 
present considerable obstacles to the efforts of the poorer, small 
economies to increase their trade, and possibly reduce their depend-
ence on borrowing and aid, in the process of structural transforma-
tion. 
If these problems are to be alleviated, more efforts will have 
to be made to continue the reduction of barriers to all forms of 
international commerce by international agreement . As the proceed-
ings of the Fifth Session of this Conference in Tokyo in 1973 indi-
cated, 34) the success of these efforts will depend greatly on the 
willingness of governments, especially in the more developed count-
ries, to adopt domestic policies which emphasize adjustment to 
changes in comparative advantages . Such policies, while continuing 
to afford protection to genuine infant industries and against dump-
ing, would rely less on excluding competitive imports and more on 
assisting domestic producers to remain competitive, and to move out 
of activities where they are comparatively inefficient into those 
where their competitive efficiency is greatest. Such an approach 
to policy is likely to be more fruitful for developing countries 
in the long run than the generalized preferences to them in develop-
ed countries upon which emphasis is currently placed. While a mul-
tilateral approach is preferable, something can be done regionally 
or bilaterally. At present, for example, New Zealand is exploring 
with South Pacific neighbours the possibility of New Zealand assist-
ance with the creation of employment opportunities in the islands, 
with better access to the New Zealand market for the products con-
cerned being accepted as an important element in the scheme . 
Regional Integration in Trade 
The difficulties of making satisfactory arrangements for mutual-
ly acceptable reductions of barriers to trade on an international 
basis have led some small countries to consider the possibilities 
of reducing the problems of scale in economic development by region-
al trading arrangements. Given the costs of stimulating industrial 
development in watertight national compartments, it is possible 
that such arrangements could enable the partners to enjoy greater 
efficiency through increased specialization, greater enjoyment of 
34) K. Kojima (ed), 'Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade', 
Japan Economic Research Centre, Tokyo, 1973 . 
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economies of scale and the st i mulus o f greater competition as bar-
riers to trade among them were diminished . There are, of course, 
dangers of uneconomic trade diversion to be considered, along with 
the possibility of damaging adverse reactions by important trading 
partners outside the region . These have been important reasons for 
the relatively disappointing outcomes of attempts to establish re-
gional trading arrangements in the Americas and Africa and for the 
failure of several proposals for integration in Asia and the Paci-
fic, where the strength of ties with countries outside the region 
has frequently been very great and where the strength of the poli -
tical and cultural links which must be associated with successful 
economic integration have been relatively weak. At least as import-
ant has been the problem of overcoming the fears of smaller and 
poorer partners in proposed regional schemes that significant numb-
ers of their domestic industries would be unable to withstand com-
petition from those of larger and stronger partners . 
That this need not be an insuperable problem, at least for more 
affluent small economies, is suggested by the experie~ce of the 
smaller members of the European Economic Community . Nevertheless , 
the "backwash" theory has had a powerful effect in many smaller 
countries in conditioning public opinion and policy makers to take 
a very cautious approach to suggestions of regional freeing of 
trade . The theory suggests that, if trade is freed , there will be 
a drift of production towards certain 'nodal centres ' which already 
provide large markets and other advantages. Peter Elkan,35)usin g 
this approach , contended that if trade were freed unconditionally 
between Australia and New Zealand, output would tend to be concent-
rated in a few large Australian conurbations and a substantial pro-
portion of New Zealand ' s manufacturing industry would be destroyed . 
Despite this, Elkan favoured freeing of trade within certain const-
raints. He proposed a customs drawback union to cover the "backwash" 
problem by dividing trade between the countr i es into eight categori-
es and permitting freedom to the extent to which bilateral trade 
remained in equilibrium within each of these categories . 36) His 
oversimplification of location theory and the mercantilist charact-
er of his proposed solution were severely attacked by other econo-
mists, as was the dependence of his conclusions on the overvalua-
tion of New Zealand ' s currency a t the time . Moreover, while the 
fate which he foresaw for indus try in the smaller country might be 
a consequence if integration were attempted quickly between a large 
developed country and a small poor one, in this instance the small -
er partner was richly endowed with skilled labour, a high rate of 
capital formation and an independent government which , either inde-
pendently or in collaboration with its trading partner, could act 
to correct any tendencies for integration to produce effects cont-
rary to the benefits expected from it . 
Nevertheless, while a so-called free trade area has been establi-
shed between Australia and New Zealand, the freeing of trade is se-
verely constrained in_ practice, larqelv because of unwillinqness 
35) P . G. Elkan, Freer Trade with Australia : Why and How, New Zea-
land Institute of Economic Research, Wellington, 1965 . For a 
review of the debate on these assertions among Elkan , Holmes 
and Bentick see I . A. McDougall, ' NAFTA . A Review', New Zealand 
Economic Papers, VI, No . 2, 1967. 
36) P . G. Elkan, 'How to Beat Backwash', The Economic Journal, March 
1965 . 
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by governments on either side of the Tasman to expose sensitive in-
dustries to competition. Accordingly, while a limited contribution 
has been made to the expansion of trade between the two countries 
in items included in the free trade schedules and through other bi-
lateral exchanges of concessions, the agreement has not really been 
used very effectively so far to contribute to a more rational allo-
cation of resources. Similar political difficulties would seem to 
have limited the effectiveness of other attempts at regional integ-
ration in the Pacific area. This is unfortunate, because such re-
gional arrangements between countries of similar stages of deve-
lopment could provide useful stepping stones towards strengthening 
the capacity of developing countries to participate more freely in 
multilateral arrangements to expand trade. 
Foreign Investment, Overseas Borrowing and Overseas Aid 
Governments in small countries which find it necessary or desir-
able to assist development or offset potential.instability by ob-
taining funds from overseas are often confronted with acute divi-
sions of opinion among different groups in their societies on the 
costs and benefits of the different means available to them. For 
the poorer small countries, the problems are accentuated if the 
flow of grant aid from multilateral sources is small or declining . 
Bilateral grant aid may provide a reasonably satisfactory substi-
tute in many cases, but the net benefits are frequently reduced 
through obligations to purchase equipment etc . from relatively ex-
pensive sources in the donor countries, a problem sometimes also 
confronted in obtaining suppliers' credits and loans from official 
sources . However, in these respects, as with the problem of ensur-
ing that servicing costs of official borrowing and private overseas 
indebtedness do not become an unduly high proportion of present and 
potential exchange earnings, the problems of small countries do not 
differ essentially from those of larger ones, although it is prob-
ably the smallest and weakest developing countries which have suf-
fered most from the dramatic changes in balances of payments provok-
ed by sharp increases in the price of oil and by the consequences 
of the 'stagflation ' recently experienced in the major industrial 
countries . 
Recession of export receipts increases the burden of servicing 
high overseas indebtedness, and the experience of sustaining such 
a burden can greatly influence attitudes of governments in small 
countries to further overseas borrowing . For example, in New Zea-
land , memories of the burden of overseas indebtedness in the Great 
Depression were a significant element in causing the Labour Govern-
ment which was in office from 1935 to 1949 to avoid overseas borrow-
ing, to resort to comprehensive licensing of imports and generally 
to eschew entanglements with overseas financiers. That these atti-
tudes were not confined to the Labour Party is indicated in the 
fact that New Zealand did not elect to join the International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank until 1961 . However , the country's large-
scale resort to overseas borrowing and investment in 1974 and 1975 
reflects both the fading of old memor i es and the speed with which 
the balance of payments can swing from deficit to surplus in a 
small dependent economy confronted with the instability which its 
major markets have experienced in the past four years . Pressures 
to resort to more protectionist policies, especially the intensifi-
cation of import licensing, have been strong, but so far in the 
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main avoided. The relatively low level of the country's foreign 
debt and service payments b efore this deficit emerged and its good 
reputation as a debtor greatly facilitated the raising of large 
sums in a short period. Other, less fortunate, small countries 
would have found it much more difficult to avoid retrenchment and 
the imposition of trading policies damaging to others. This empha-
sizes the importance of the preservation of stable and expanding 
export opportunities for small deve loping countries if they are to 
avoid undue reliance on external aid and bo rrowing and maintain an 
outward-looking and liberal orientation in their development poli-
cies. 
Private overseas investment is a much more potent source of po-
litical debate in small countries than official borrowing . Fre-
quently, while the capital, technical expertise, assistance in find-
ing export outlets and other direct benefits and the external eco-
nomies which such investment may b ring are welcomed, there is con-
siderable concern about either real or imagined threats to politic-
al sovereignty and cultural dist inctiveness . Policies attempting 
to avoid excessive overseas control by such means as insisting on 
a high proportion of local shareholding frequently reduce the bene-
f its to be derived from the investment by the people of the host 
country, without greatly enhancing the scope of control already 
available through Government's general fiscal, industrial and lab-
our policies. Moreover, many small countries following policies 
of import substitution have tended to attract foreign investment 
into relatively high-cost manufacture through offers of protection , 
tax holidays and other concessions. In doing so, they have probab-
ly made less net contribution to development and to exchange saving 
than they had expected, if account is taken of the relatively high 
price of the output to domestic users, including exporters, the ex-
change burden of profit remittances , and the possible external eco-
nomies which would have accrued if the resources had been put into 
other, less protected areas. Again, these problems are not confin-
ed to small economies, andare in any case being covered in other 
papers before the Conference. 
One problem with foreign investment and foreign aid which probab-
ly bears more heavily on small than on large economies is that of 
capacity to fulfil the requirements of those dispensing aid and in-
vestment while ensuring that the proposals made are consistent with 
the country's social and economic objectives . Most aid-giving gov-
ernments and agencies adopt procedures designed to ensure that mon-
ey is given for well-considered projects and spent wisely. Small, 
poor countries are usually woefully short of people capable of de-
signing projects, checking projects designed by others, managing 
and executing approved projects and reporting in approved form on 
the outcomes. In the circumstances, they must place considerable 
reliance on the advice and assistance of overseas experts in all 
these fields. It is understandable that the host governments should 
frequently suspect that particular experts have taken inadequate ac-
count, on the basis of a brief stay , of the distinctive circumstanc-
es and life-style of their countries . The problem is complicated 
if, as is not uncommon, the small country is besieged by experts 
from several different governments and agencies proffering apparent-
ly inconsistent advice on development plans and projects, and in 
the process, via the demonstration effect, raising aspirations be-
yond the capacity of the country to achieve. Such small countries 
are faced with similar problems in checking the desirability of in-
vestment proposals made by foreign private companies . As a conse-
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quence , one frequently finds the flow of aid and investment inhibit-
ed by delays and repetitive evaluations as the administration of 
the small country attempts to safeguard its own interests while ful-
filling the requirements of those bearing the overseas funds . Con-
siderations such as these deserve more careful thought by aid-giv-
ing agencies . They also suggest that small countries must pay more 
attention than larger ones to avoiding waste of scarce management 
skills by unduly detailed official intervention in economic activi -
ty and by undue expansion and proliferation of governmental agenci-
es . 
Conclusion 
This paper has indicated the difficulties involved in making 
significant generalizations about the development problems of small 
countries . Many countries have shown that smallness is not an in-
surmountable barrier in achieving stable growth and prosperity . 
Nevertheless small countries do have special problems stemming from 
more restricted access to some of the economies of scale and from 
the tendencies towards greater dependence on trade which provides 
the major avenue of escape for them. The problems are aggravated 
if poverty is a major reason for the smallness of a country's GNP, 
making assistance from foreign sources a more important condition 
for structural transformation. Small countries are more likely to 
surmount these problems satisfactorily if they can adopt develop-
ment strategies which are based on expanding activities in whic~ 
their comparative advantages lie and which allow external economic 
forces to influence the direction which their development takes. 
Their success will depend heavily on the extent to which larger 
countries maintain high levels of activity in their economies, ac-
cord well-considered aid to the poorer nations, and are ready to 
modify their policies of assistance to domestic producers and cont-
rol of imports so as to enable smaller countries to find expanding 
markets for the goods and services which they can best produce. 
COMME~TS D~ HOLMES' PAPER 
(al MIGUEL WIONCZEK 
In the first part of his well rounded paper SirFrankoffers us 
a review of the economic literature on the "small" nations and ar-
rives at a conclusion that while there is plenty of them the world 
over, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find common character-
istics that would permit them to be put in one single category. 
Such a conclusion should have been expected because the concept of 
"smallness" makes not too much sense whether in economics or else-
where unless one answers two clarifying questions: first, small in 
what respect? and, second, small in comparison with what? Since 
most of the writers on the size of nations define the smallness by 
one of a few simple and very often differing indicators such as 
area, population or GNP, no wonder that their inquiries end with 
rather unhelpful general conclusions of the sort, "there are very many 
small countries in today's world and they differ in practically 
everything" or, "there is no indication that the problems of small 
countries arise from size as such". 
It is easy to understand that in the Pacific area and particular-
ly in Oceania, interest in the subject of "small" countries has 
lately been increasing because of the proliferation of small inde-
pendent states in the area previously integrated in European poli-
tical and economic empires. But the circumstances of this prolifer-
ation strongly suggest that perhaps we c ould be able to understand 
better its political and economic meaning, if the subject were sub-
mitted for analytical treatment to a multidisciplinary team in 
which political scientists and historians would labour along with 
economists. 
Sir Frank should be commended for not abandoning the ring after 
finding out that there are "small" countries of all possible sorts . 
Since his brief general survey of the literature is followed by a 
detailed discussion of development problems of the relatively poor 
"small" countries, my comments will address themselves also to this 
particular subject. 
The subject has been neatly divided by the author into three ma-
jor parts dealing respectively with problems of structural trans-
formation, trade dependence and those involved in external aid. 
Coming from a relativelv poor and underdeveloped subcontinent to 
discuss a paper written- by an economist from a relatively rich and 
small country, I should not surprise anyone by stating that I can 
agree only with some of Sir Frank's propositions while disagreeing 
with others. 
First, I have no problem with the author's general approach in 
respect to the need for structural changes in "traditional" poor 
societies, whether small or not so smali. I do however, have some 
difficulties when Sir Francis postulates "a social process (of mod-
ernization) which gradually makes automatic an increasing accumula-
tion of capital, improvement of technology and growth in the skills 
of labour and management". While there is a large evidence that 
gradual and more or less automatic modernization characterized the 
62 
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development of the parts of the former British empire settled by 
European immigrants, one should keep in mind that over one century 
was needed on the whole under verv special conditions to achieve 
meaningful results of such modernization in the countries concern-
ed. To posit that the former colonial territories in Asia and the 
Pacific region have enough time under the present day conditions 
(the population explosion, for example,) to repeat a similar pro-
cess seems to me highly unrealistic. 
In respect to the problems arising from economies of scale, I 
feel somewhat more optimistic than does Sir Frank. On the basis of 
the existing evidence the author seems to deny most of the "small" 
countries any chance of industrialization unless they will start 
producing for foreigners as well as for their domestic markets . 
Without defending a ridi c ulous position adopted during the Great 
Leap period in China that there is room in every village for a steel 
furnace , I consider that the issue of economies of scales is present-
ed incorrectly in the present economic literature because it uses 
production scales as applied in the advanced industr ial economies 
at the present stage of their development . I am a firm believer 
that there is considerable room for scaling down the size of indust-
rial units in many sectors if an effort is made in that direction . 
No effort can be expected in that respect in the advanced countries 
because they do not need it . But if and when the present day's 
"poor" countries launch their own R&D effort, many ways of finding 
thechnologies appropriate to their market size will be found open-
ing the way for their industrialization. All this does not solve 
the problems of the countries like Western Samoa, but will help 
others of the size of the Philippines and Thailand, to give just 
two examples. 
I am in full agreement with the author on the subject of cooper-
ation among "small" countries in respect to many expensive public 
facilities, including education. The competition in this field, 
particularly among newly independent countries, reflects primitive 
nationalism and ill conceived prestige consideration . It is both 
very costly and more than useless in social welfare terms. 
Most of Sir Frank's observations on the industrial development 
strategies for "small" poor countries and, particularly, his obser-
vations about the need of modernizing agriculture which after all 
may become an industry seem easy to accept. There is, however, in 
my mind a clear limit-to what a - "small" ~ountry can do in th~t: re­
spect after it becomes selfsufficient in foodstuffs . The limit is 
set by agricultural policies of the "big" advanced countries and es-
pecially of the European Economic Community. 
My knowledge of the operation of international trade system leads 
me to agree with most arguments presented in the paper's section on 
the problems of dependence on trade, assuming that--as Sir Frank 
postulates--international trade becomes really and not only formal-
ly free . I am not at all optimistic about the outcome of the pre-
sent round of GATT negotiations not only because of the actual state 
of the world economy but because of the very high domestic political 
cost to the advance~ "big" nations to do aw~y with most quantitative 
trade restrictions. It makes little sense to me to measure the de-
gree of trade liberalization by the height of tariffs at the moment 
in which quantitative restrictions are as high as ever and are even 
being tightened. 
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It is a pity that Sir Frank's paper did not look closer into 
the issue of regional integration. While I would admit that the 
problem of unequal distribution of gains from integration among part-
ners with different levels of industrial development is particular-
ly difficult to solve, Latin American integration schemes made some 
significant progress in dealing with this issue. After having liv-
ed for 15 years with economic integration attempts in Latin America 
I continue to be mildly optimistic about their prospects. The know-
ledge of our integration experiences,~oth achievements and misfor-
tunes, might be of considerable use to other parts of the Pacific 
region. 
To conclude, after having claimed with modesty that he was more 
familiar with the problems of a "small" developed economy than with 
those of "small" poor countries , Sir Frank offered us a very thought-
ful paper that serves well as an introduction to our Conference. 
For this he deserves warm congratulations from a commentator corning 
from far-away Latin America. 
(b) KIYOSHI KOJIMA 
My comments on Sir Frank's really excellent paper will not be 
systematic but rather scattered since I have not had enough time 
to digest its contents and to study this new important subject: the 
development problems of small countries. 
The definition of large, small and smallest economies is certain-
ly not simple . Besides Sir Frank's points recalling arguments which 
occurred in defining the concept of an "optimum currency area", we 
might pay attention to the fact that the size of an economy depends 
upon the degree of integration, within a country or with neighbour-
ing countries. Australia or Canada may not be large economies if 
th~ various states in each country are not well integrated with 
each other, whereas Belgium is a large economy for she is well in-
tegrated with her EEC partners. 
Sir Frank has in mind, sometimes small-rich countries like New 
Zealand or Australia, and at other times smaller countries like 
Fiji, Western Samoa and Papua New Guinea. Problems for the latter 
are completely different from the former, and, therefore, each 
should be treated differently. I have in mind such relations as be-
tween Japan and New Zealand, Japan and Australia, and Japan and 
Korea or Thailand. 
As I see it the major issues of large versus small economies are 
the following three: (i) the difficulty in transformation (especial-
ly industrialisation) of small economies and the relative effici-
ency of such measures (2) ambivalence or antagonism of small econo-
mies towards large economies, and (3 ) whether a global approach or 
a regional approach is the more desirable or necessary to solve the 
problems of small economies. 
Given that a small economy aims at balanced growth of a range 
of industries, not only agriculture and textiles but also interme-
diate goods and machinery production, efficiency and economies of 
scale cannot be neglected and thus international intra-industry 
specialisation for each industry with neighbouring small countries 
and large economies as well is inevitable. Take for example the 
Japanese/Australian relationship . If Australia specialises by 
limiting the range of products within a certain industry (say auto-
mobiles) to obtain economies of scale, there are bound to be-a nurn-
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ber of industries in which she could produce at low cost and export 
to Japan and we should promote mutual direct investment to that end . 
How to realise economies of scale for a small economy is a crucial 
problem . Besides the po i nt Sir Frank mentioned on thi s issue, I 
would like to stress the importance of economies of scale in sea-
transportation . Not only a geographical remoteness of small econo-
mies in the South Pacific f rom the centre of world trade and sepa-
rated by sea from each other, but also the small size of each ex-
port and import transaction, makes sea transportation costs high . 
Therefore, it might be desirable to find means such as the use of 
Japanese trading firms as agents whereby transport costs could be 
lowered and small transactions made economical . 
At the same time, we have to' explore what type of foreign direct 
investment is more suitable to the development of a small economy. 
Perhaps small scale investment undertaken by small or medium scale 
firms which are integrated by the worldwide network of trading firms, 
may be most suitable . 
Aid to the small ~conomy is more efficient and easier to provide 
from the donor country view. However, even small sums of aid from 
a large economy results in the feeling of domination and dependence . 
It is the same story with foreign direct investment and internation-
al intra-industry specialisation . The large versus small economy 
relation is fair as far as we can see from the economic and commer-
cial point of view. Moreover the small economy is able to obtain 
greater benefits from specialisation, direct investment and aid. 
Therefore, the fear of dependence, domination and other hostile 
feeling may largely be political and social characteristics . 
I feel that economic integration is particularly important for 
small economies in the South Pacific region. For example, Latvia, 
with 2 . 5 million people, has attained a fairly high stage of indust-
rialisation mainly due to intra-industry specialisation with neigh-
bouring areas . Sir Frank mentions that at least as important has 
been the problem of overcoming the fears of smaller and poorer part-
ners in proposed regional schemes and that significant numbers of 
their domestic industries would be unable to withstand competition 
from those of larger and stronger partners . Is this applicable on-
ly for integration between, say, Japan and New Zealand? Or is also 
applicable to the integ£atiori between Australia and New Zealand? 
The comparison of these possible directions of integration would be 
interesting. It may be noted however that that kind of adjustment 
and consideration of its costs is necessary even in regard to a 
freer global trade regime. 
The key problem in fostering Western Pacific Economic Integration 
(instead of institutional but functional) is how to harmonise inter-
ests between large and small economies . This requires a new theory 
of economic integration differing from the traditional one which 
dealt with economies that were on a more or less equal footing . A 
new type of integration may be fostered through the establishment 
of intra-industry specialisation in all fields of manufacturing in-
dustries . Foreign direct investment may have an important role to 
play in the development of intra-industry specialisation . 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
There was general agreement that there was no simple dichotomy 
between large and small countries. Countries could be ranked over 
many.spectraranging from smali to large, from underdeveloped to de-
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veloped, from market-oriented to command economies. 
Some consideration was given to the relationship between "econo-
mic viability" and independence . One participant contended that 
the independence of small countries was a political not an economic 
question. Independence had been thrust on some countries, e.g . 
Portuguese colonies, and rejected by others such as the Northern 
Marianas . The question was determined with little reference to 
economic viability. One speaker suggested that, in considering "un-
viable" countries, it was useful to distinguish between "God's Vic-
tims" such as small islands of the Caribbean and the South Pacific 
and "Historical Victims" whose size had been decided by the accident 
of colonization, as in Africa. 
A participant from a very small state emphasized the limited poli-
cy possibilities available to countries like his own in import sub-
stitution, local investment and industrialization . An Australian 
suggested that trade, aid and investment could easily be biassed 
against small countries, because of their small markets, export con-
centration and skewness of production factors . A further problem 
to be emphasized, as it was in the paper, was the limited administ-
rative capacity of many small countries. This must condition their 
approach to policy, and suggested, for example in controlling capi-
tal inflow, that they might take the opportunity to tax foreign in-
vestment relatively highly. 
It was contended that small countries had most to gain from trade, 
that trade was inevitably a most important determinant of their ca-
pacity to grow, and that -regional i~tegration with neighbouring 
countries could be very important in enabling them to secure the be-
nefits of specialization. While acknowledging the role which open-
ing the economy to trade had had in achieving more rapid growth in 
the Thai economy , a participant from that country emphasized the 
need to consider the distribution of the gains from trade both be-
tween and within countries. He was particularly concerned that, 
while American and Japanese involvement with the Thai economy had 
boosted production, it had also provoked social unrest. -
One speaker suggested that an advantage of smallness was that 
large centres would probably not retaliate against defensive or pro-
tective policies. This could ease the problems of insulating the 
economy against instability. However, the same speaker noted later 
that the fact that less developed countries were not under pressure 
to reduce barriers to imports could be a handicap to them, because 
their real problem was to turn infant industries into adults, and 
a protectionist policy might not_ be conducive to this. 
In reply, Professor Holmes concentrated on the part which region-
al arrangements could play in helping small countries to develop. 
Most arrangements were plagued by the pressures exerted by vested 
interests created by past policies of protection and by fears by 
small countries that the larger would enjoy an undue share of the 
fruits of the freeing of trade. Assurances on the distributions of 
gains were therefore important in drawing up the programme for free-
ing trade. It was valuable for participants to accept that a major 
objective of the regional arrangement was to enhance the capacity 
of each of them to participate more effectively in multilateral 
trade with lower trade barriers. 
PART II 
CASE STUDIES 
4 
LATIN AMERICA: THE PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENCE 
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
GERMANICO SALGADO 
The probelms which mankind is facing at present have suddenly re-
veaied to the rich countries that their destiny is not independent 
of that of the poor countries of · our planet. The notion of inter-
dependence is really an attribute of the universalist vision in west-
ern thought. In economics inter-dependence is at the heart of the 
theory of the international economy. But the concept is an abstract 
one and needs to take into account the processes that operate in the 
functioning of the world economy. Amongst these, dominance in rela-
tionships, inherent in the uneven rules of the game, are perceived 
by the powerful countries as well as by the weak . Events of recent 
years, especially the energy crisis, for the first time have creat-
ed amongst the powerful a collectiv e awareness that they depend on 
factors which, at any given moment, could escape their control. 
That this new awareness of inter-dependence gave rise to frustration 
and bitterness is not therefore surprising . Hopefully the rich and 
powerful countries and their leaders will now better understand the 
emotional attitudes of the poor countries against the extreme depend-
ence which has tied them to the major powers and it is worth rememb-
ering that this dependence has resulted in a long-standing situation 
of conflict. 
This awareness of dependence is a fact of life for less developed 
countries and part of their collective conscience . For this reason, 
they are probably psychologically better disposed to participate po-
sitively in the huge task of cooperating to remove the great uncer-
tainties about of the future . 
II 
Latin America moved from the colonial period to the building of 
the actual nations without fundamental changes in economic structure . 
In colonial times certain resources were exploited to the maximum 
extent especially precious metals . Except on rare occasions, the 
metropolitan countries deliberately blocked the development of manu-
factures when the big silver and gold deposits became exhausted . 
Sugar, tobacco, cacao, cotton and a handful of other primary commo-
dities constituted the whole of the exports of those countries. 
Some of them developed in the midst of subsistence economies, isolat-
ed even from the most elementary trade links with the West . Further-
more, as a consequence of the Independence Wars, a series of little 
states was created. Most including Argentina had in those times not 
even reached a population of one million. The most notable except-
ion was Brazil, which was able to maintain - and also increase - its 
large share of the Continent which had been allocated to Portugal 
by the Treaty of Tordecillas . Not surprisingly, Brazil is today 
the most powerful States of Latin America, and the one which is able 
to concentrate its energies on tasks and enterprises of a much big-
ger scale than is possible for the other countries of the Continent. 
"Independence" was accomplished - and it is convenient to empha-
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sise this fact - by the descendants and cultural heirs of the Spa-
nish and Portugese settlers . As long as they existed, the old In-
dian cultures, characteristic of subject peoples, relapsed into ori-
ginal forms, and the new ruling groups felt themselves exclusively 
attached to the cultural tradition of the West and its evolution, 
in spite of their mixed racial origins . Something similar happened 
in the United States, but in the case of Latin America which was as-
sociated with the decline of the metropolitan empires, the approach 
to independence clearly showed the characteristics of a cultural pa-
rasitism, which is only now being shaken off . It is useful to rem-
ember this characteristic in order to understand the absolute iden-
tification of the leading Latin American classes with the life style 
and the consumption patterns of the industrialised countries, which 
is not attenuated, as it could be in Asian and African countries by 
their indigenous values and means of expression. 
With "independence", Latin America became enmeshed in the net of 
international exchange and its characteristic division of labour de-
rived from the western industrial revolution, producing agricultural 
and mineral raw materials, receiving foreign investments for mining, 
for tropical agricultural plantations and for extensive cattle-rais-
ing in the River Plate region. Latin America imported manufactured 
goods from the West and became a permanent debtor of the industrial-
ised countries. Only in recent years has it been possible to pay 
the debts which Bolivar incurred to achieve' the Independence of Great 
Colombia. It is most probably also that the huge sums invested in 
the first railways built during the last century are still beingpaid 
for. 
It is unnecessary to elaborate on the details of the resulting 
economic structure which underwent no real changes until the Second 
World War, a period in which most Latin American countries forced 
by scarcity, began the process o f import substitution. The direct-
ion of trade, and the origin of foreign investment, are good indicat-
ors of the sense of dependence relations with the centres of power 
of the industrial world . With exception of the Republics of the 
River Plate and the Atlantic, which were at the beginning more at-
tached to the United Kingdom, the Continent was entirely in the or-
bit and under the influence of the United States. After the Second 
World War British influence diminished; but in spite of the fact 
that Europe was still important for Latin American exports especial-
ly for the countries of the so-called southern cone of the Continent, 
the United States assumed an important role in the supply of imports. 
In the decade of the sixties the direction of Latin American trade 
tended to diversify in major degree. But paralled to this tendency, 
direct foreign investment from the U. S . assumed a growing importance 
in manufacturing industry and became a major determinant of the stru-
cture of the modern productive sector . The p re-eminence of trade in-
fluences has since tended to be replaced by a more effective means : 
the economic and technological capacity of the multinational (trans-
national) enterprise. 
By 19481) the United States had become the destination of 30% of 
Latin American exports and the source of 59% of its imports. From 
1955 to 1960 the corresponding mean values were 44% and 50% respect-
ively. In 1970 these values decreased to about 30% for exports and 
1) See Indexes of the concentration of external commerce in Kuznets, 
"Economic Growth of Small Nations", in E.A .G. Robinson (ed.), 
The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, Macmillan, 
1960, p . 22. 
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37% for imports. However, the increase in foreign investment was 
evident. Examining the distribution of the "book value" in select-
ed countries of direct foreign investment according to its origin, 
Constantino Vaitos2) found a degree of concentration of United 
States investment in La tin America which is more or less similar 
to the concentration of investments from the UK, France and Belgium 
in countries which up to only a few years ago were their colonies. 
In 1967 the US share of direct foreign investment in selected 
countries of Latin America was: (percent of total) 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
73.0 
76 .4 
90.8 
84.4 
Colombia 86.2 
Honduras 97 . 7 
Dominican R. 81.1 
Guatemala 84.4 
Bolivia 
Costa Rica 
Chile 
(SOURCE : OECD I 
82.9 
89 . 3 
91. 3 
1972) 
Underlying these relations there exists a political heg~mony 
which, as Latin Americans have learned by experience, can develop 
into the most direct and repressive manisfestations. Already in 
1823 the so-called Monroe declaration formally established the zone 
of influence of American imperialism. This declaration did not at 
first prevent intervention by France and England in this part of 
America, and even Spain made an unsuccessful attempt to recover its 
old colonies . Veracruz was bombed by France in 1838; France and 
England made a joint action in the River Plate in 1839. In 1848 
Mexico lost a big part of its territory in a war with the United 
States, and in 1863 Napoleon III put Maximilian of Habsburg on the 
throne of that country until his death. One of the factors in this 
latter intervention, as well as in many others, was (and not merely 
coincidental) the interests of the foreign holders of the public 
debts of these very young and poor republics. Even in this century, 
e.g. in 1902, Puerto Cabello in Venezuela was bombed by England, 
Germany and Italy as a means of exercising pressure for the repay-
ment of outstanding debts. 
The influence of the United States over the Continent began with 
the end of the Civil War in that country. At first the theatre of 
action was Central America and the Caribe which, as from then was 
par excellence the "mare nostrum" of that power, although later on 
great importance was given to the Pacific. By the middle of last 
century Walker began his depredations in Central America acting as 
agent of the bankers Morgan and Garrison. War against Spain start-
ed in 1898 and ended with the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the 
Phillipines and with the so-called independence of Cuba. In 1903 
the United States forced Colombia to give up Panama, as a drastic 
measure in their negotiations for the building of a canal, which 
they had been planning since the time of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
of 1850. Then followed a long series of open or hidden interven-
tions which Latin Americans can or will not forget. In recent years 
these actions end with the blockade of Cuba, the intervention in 
Santo Domingo and, more recently, the overthrow of the Allende Gov-
ernment in Chile, where we find obvious indications of intervention 
of the CIA and of a multinational corporation, the ITT. 
Economic motivation has never been absent from these open mani-
festations of domination. An open reminder of this political pat-
2) "Power, Knowledge and Development Policy: Relations Between Trans-
national Enterprises and Developing Countries", The 1974 Dag Ham-
marskjold Seminar on the Third World and International Economic 
Change, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975 (mimeographed). 
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tern is a quote .from President Taft, who at the beginning of this 
Century stated that right and just foreign policy of the US "does 
not at all exclude an active intervention to secure facilities for 
profitable investments for our merchandise and our capitalists•.3) 
These interventions can take the violent and open form of the 
cases mentioned or be exercised in a more subtle way in the form of 
constant pressure to aid the expansion of the economic interests of 
the metropolitan power . In this context, the Cold War offered a 
splendid opportunity to inject an ideological content into this in-
fluence, consolidating by this means the alliance with the economic 
interests of Latin American leading groups . The effect of this was 
always felt in national politics whenever one or the other were in 
danger. 
As an example of a more modern manifestation of this pressure we 
could quote the suspension or reduction of credits and the direct 
boycott of purchases of raw materialsi which was important and ef-
fective having regard to the chronic weakness of the balance of pay-
ments of these countries . In analysing such measures it is always 
difficult to decide which part of the responsibility corresponds to 
the big multi-national enterprises or which to United States Govern-
ment Agencies. 
This is the normal experience of Latin Americans in their rela-
tions with the centre of world power, and it is not at all surpris-
ing that this domination is blamed, to a great extent, for their 
e conomic backwardness and their political structures . The author 
is convinced that there is a great risk in attributing many of the 
errors and tragic irresponsibilities to the effects of dependence, 
when Latin Americans themselves should be blamed. It is not import-
ant whether these errors were committed with foreign complicity or 
not, but amongst them, the most fundamental is that of not having 
been able to preserve, (as Brazil succeeded in doing) or at least 
rebuild a unity which would have opened up the possibility of of 
taking an active part in the modern world. At any rate, sensitivi-
ty about dependence exists and grows from day to day . This depend-
ence, as we have seen, is real and the awareness of it grows especi-
ally in the presence of the technological gap which is accentuating 
the separation of the Third World from industrialized countries. 
The mastery of technology confers a power which, to those who do 
not possess it, it seems impossible to combat, not even by isola-
tion, which was the last resort in the struggle against dependence 
and which meant the exclusive s pecialization in exports of primary 
products. 
For this reason Latin America·oscillates between the poles of 
ambivalence: either to surrender without anv resistance to cultural, 
economic and technological domination as a price which must be paid 
for moving forward in the wake of the large powers, or to search 
tenaciously for a national identity. The latter finds its expres-
sion in an effort to recover indigenous cultural values, no matter 
how faded they are, and to retain the maximum possible control over 
the utilization of resources and the functioning of the economy, as 
well as to make an effort to find ways of creating structures of in-
ternational ties which would strengthen the capacity to face the do-
minance relationship.4) 
3) Quoted by Eduardo Galeano: The Open Veins of Latin America, Pub-
lishing Department, University of the Republic, Second Edition, 
Montevideo, 1972, p.161 . 
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The pointer of the scale is starting to move between one extreme 
and the other. Ideologically Latin America is getting polarized 
as never before. The most dogmatic positions are present, and un-
fortunately also the most irrational, in the concepts of their in-
ternal politics. But, nevertheless, in spite of this fact, the per-
vading awareness of dependence, which is only the expression of a 
functional insufficiency in the modern world, creates a common bas-
is to make an effort which, of course, tends to get embodied in the 
acceptance of political "pluralism" in inter-Latin-American and inter-
national relations. The search for a coincidence of interests as 
a basis for a real solidarity is growing stronger from day to day, 
not only at the regional level, 'but also in the whole Third World. 
For Latin America the time is also coming, when the conflict with 
the old international order must find a way out, either by a const-
ant confrontation, full of risks for all of us, including the most 
powerful countries, or by cooperation, grounded on a conscience of 
inter-dependence. The latter development will be impossible if the 
world powers do not really change their attitude. 
No matter which way is taken, Latin America is in need of a pro-
found change; with their actual structure it is not an apt entity 
to have an influence on the state, on which the bases for an era 
of co-operation can be forged, and even less when a positive answer 
is missing and a confrontation must be faced. This certainty aris-
es from the process of introspection which has led many Latin Ameri-
cans to place so. much importance on the analysis of the influence 
which dependence has on their economic and social backwardness. 
Some of the contributions which these thoughts have made will be 
mentioned later as a basis for an examination in that light of the 
motivations, characteristics and potentiality of some of the Latin 
American integration efforts . This integration should be one of 
the fundamental elements of the profound changes which Latin Ameri-
ca must undertake immediately. 
III 
The causes and consequences of dependence are of increasing in-
terest in Latin America and many analyses of it have been made. 
This paper is only a summary of some of the most important conclu-
sions of these analyses, and distinguishes some differences regard-
ing the interpretation of the phenomena. 
The technological breach between the industrialized countries 
and the Third World is seen by some as the main cause of economic 
and political dependence, because after all, in the modern world 
knowledge is in itself a source of power. For others dependence 
is the result of more complex connections between the "centre" and 
the "periphery". Of these, the identification of the ruling class-
es of the periphery with the interests and life style of the indus-
trialized countries is of primary importance. This fact would be 
at the root of a circular process which tends more and more to deep-
en technological as well as economic dependence. 
The first conception attributes the main reason for the fast 
growing breach between the rich and the poor countries to the enor-
4) In respect to this it is interesting to notice that the real 
creator of the constitution of the OPEP was a Latin American: 
the then Venezuelan Minister Perez Alfonso. 
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mous scientific and technological progress which has occurred in 
the industrialized countries during the last decades . Technologic-
al dependence is already large and the resulting economic consequ-
ences can not be avoided if direct action is not taken to use the 
capacity of the less developed countries to participate in this re-
volution of knowledge . Salvador Lluch says : "It (technological 
dependence) - though at least apparently not imposed - creates an 
abysmal disequilibrium which is impossible to control and which is 
growing in an exponential way" . 5) 
The economic consequences for the producers of primary products 
sharpen the disparities in trade and payments because the innova-
tions tend : a) to reduce the demand for raw materials directly; b) 
to reduce the relative prices of these raw materials against the 
prices of the incorporated knowledge in goods, this knowledge being 
an increasingly important component of aggregate value; and c) to 
stimulate the rapid expansion of a demand for technology and, furth-
ermore, for knowledge as such - which even without taking into ac-
count the imperfections of the market in which these intangible 
goods are traded has resulted in the value of this type of interna-
tional exchange growing faster than that of material goods . 6) 
We acknowledge that the economic and political conditions in 
which this scientific and technological revolution has taken place, 
have created a critical situation of scarcity in the markets of cer-
tain natural resources and have also dangerously altered the ecolo-
gical equilibrium . But there is no doubt that, by changing these 
conditions, scientific knowledge will be able to respond adequately 
to these challenges. In any case, if the third world and the inter-
national community does not make an effort gradually to narrow the 
gap - and that would naturally require economic and social trans-
formations which go farther than a pure technology policy - depend-
ency will continue to grow . Its obvious relation with the politic-
al hegemony is emphasized in a sentence of a document of the Andean 
Group on the subject: " In relationships between countries, the sub-
tle line which distinguishes interdependence from the state of dep-
endence undergoes continuous variations, depending on the extent of 
access to scientific and technological progress and the degree of 
real use which can be made of it" . 7) 
The second interpretation mentioned, which on some points coin-
cides with the previous one , starts from the observation of the pro-
blems of the economic evolution of Latin America during the latter 
part of the sixties, in particular the growing divergence of stand-
ards of living between the small ruling groups and the large poor 
majorities. This phenomena has tended to emphasize i ncreasingly 
the analysis of the phenomena of "modernization", as being differ-
ent from development and , consequently, one of its factors : the si-
tuation of "external dependence". 
5) The Integration and Challenge of Knowledge", Junta del Acuerdo 
de Cartagena, 1974 (mimeographed). 
6) Lluch, op . cit. page 4 mentions the case of computer systems , for 
which the annual value of software sales including the training 
of personnel, matches the estimated values of sales of equipment 
(hard-ware). 
7) Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena .. . Fundamentals of a Subre ional 
Technological Development Policy, COM/XIII dt2, Lima, Peru, 1974 
(mimeograph) p . 5 . 
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The "modernization" of poor countries is seen by some, such as 
Sunkel , as.part of the development of an international capitalistic 
system , which from the beginning "starting with the XIX century, 
put the world economy under the influence of a few European countri-
es and the u . S . A. 11 .8 
"Modernization" according to others , is the process that results 
from the identification of Latin American " elites" and increasingly 
of the small middle classes with the expectations created by the 
evolution of the consuming society in the industrialized countries 
without having the capacity for technological progress nor the cor-
responding structure of the productive system . 
Celso Furtado, one of the exponents of this thesis, refers con-
cretely to these contrasts between the desired style of life and 
real production conditions, and adds that modernization is the "pro-
cess of adoption 'of sophisticated consuming patterns (private and 
public) without the corresponding process of capitalization and pro-
gress in production methods". 9) 
In both interpretations attention is centred on an identification 
of interests and preferences which , in the case of underdeveloped 
countries, tends to perpetuate the structure of inequality and back-
wardness . 
It is a case of assimilation of demand and consumption patterns 
from the rich or "central " countries by the high income groups of 
the "periphery" . Even if regarded , in a restricted form , as "demon-
stration effect" or, more generally as domination or cultural colo-
nization , this phenomena, without doubt, is considered in the case 
of Latin America , as the nucleus of external dependence and one of 
the essential factors of underdevelopment in Latin America due to 
the fact of what FurtadolO) calls " the pre-existing institutional 
structure as regards the concentration of wealth and income". 
This imitation of consumption behaviour could ',have a powerful in-
fluence in reinforcing these inequalities , not only because in poor 
countries with a low average income , that i ncome must, by definition, 
be badly distributed so that a very small part of the population is 
able to imitate the patterns · of demand and consumption of rich so-
cieties, but also because the constant diversification of these pat-
terns, the continuous appearance of new products and consequently 
the obsolescence of others accentuates the differences and creates 
other disequilibria in the system , some of which provoke an even 
bigger dependence with respect to the "centre" as the source of 
capital and technology . 
This connection between centre and periphery is, of course, noth-
ing new . Latin American "elites " used to imitate the most costly 
ways of spending of the rich countries in the peak periods of export 
of primary products . The capital needs to maintain those exports 
were then fairly small , and used to depend much less than now upon 
imports. Surpluses originated in the increase of productivity , 
which , as a result of the industrial revolution , made international 
specialization possible, and were sufficient, not only to maintain 
the functioning of the system, but also to satisfy the consumption 
8) O. Sunkel , Foreign Affairs , Vol . SO, No . 3 , April 1972 , p . 521 . 
9) The Myth of Economic Development, Editora Paz e Terra , Rio de 
Janeiro, 1974 , p . 81 . 
10) Op . cit . p . 13 . 
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expectations of these groups, which at the beginning constituted 
not more than a few dozen families in each country. 
According to these theses, disequilibrium between the demand re-
quirements of the system and its real productive capacity arose at 
the stage when, due to the increasing market difficulties in the 
primary export sector, import substitution policies were initiated. 
The evolution of these policies is well known. A diversified or 
rather dispersed industry was created, without real vertical integ-
ration or technological requirements, which superficially "mimick-
ed" - as Furtado said - the industrial structure of the rich count-
ries. High cost protected industries, which required both direct-
ly and in respect of infrastructure investment requisites which 
hardly could be satisfied given the weakness of the motives for 
the formation of capital and problems of the balance of payments 
whichrestrictedaccess to the imported component of that investment. 
To overcome those problems dependence on foreign capital and tech-
nology increased. 
According to this view, this process is the essence of the "mod-
ernization" which certain sectors of economic activity have exper-
ienced. This has created a deep division in Latin American societi -
es which goes much farther than a "technological dualism", a dis-
equilibrium at the level of the factors, constituting a real cul-
tural breakdown between on the one hand the leading groups, which 
.are eager to follow the consumption pattern·s of the rich economies , 
and on the other the big marginal majorities, especially the pea-
sants, which live literally in another world. 
The foregoing analysis for reasons of brevity leaves aside socio-
political elements such as the interrelationships between the soci-
al groups in each country and external groups, as well as the dis-
placement of some ruling groups by others, phenomena which, with-
out doubt, contribute to explain the different variations the pro-
cess has taken in Latin America . 11) -
It is a fact, for example, that in certain circumstances a ta-
cit agreement existed between management and certain sectors of or-
ganized labour. But this has not changed the situation of the mass 
of the population, and it is possible, on the contrary, that the 
effect of margination has been to worsen it . 
It is not the occasion to go deeper into this subject. For the 
purposes of this paper it is sufficient if we point out that this 
analysis insists on the fact that cultural dependence is reflected 
in an increasing dependence on f.oreign capital and technology . It 
increases because with industrial growth and the adaptation of in-
dustry to the diversifying demand of the high income groups and in 
spite of the concentration of income the necessities of capitaliza-
tion press more and more on the capital formation capacity of the 
system in absolute terms . Furthermore, the necessity to secure ac-
cess to foreign technology, to facilitate the continuous emergence 
of new products which is characteristic of a consuming society, is 
growing day by day. At the beginning, that access is nothing other 
than the acquisition of capital goods which incorporate that tech-
11) The literature on this topic is already abundant. As an import-
ant exponent see Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dep-
endence and Development in Latin America, XXI Century, Editor5,"'" 
Argentine, 1973 . 
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nology; later on that access means attracting multi-national enter-
prise and depends heavily on its innovative capacity . When the ex-
i~ting pr~t7c~ion is given , t~e dime~sion of the economy is suffi-
cient to initiate the production of intermediate and capital goods 
a step which is ordinarily taken under the pressure of balance of ' 
payments limitations. Even if this has not been the only nor the 
main.reason'. Latin America's experience shows that dependence on 
foreign capital and technology, as has been outlined, has strength-
ened even more . 
The effect of external domination is therefore much more power-
ful. A new international division of labour is being imposed in 
the world by the action of the multi-national enterprise . As Ste-
phen Hymer said, these "are a substitute for the market as a method 
of organizing international exchange 11 .12) 
For the same reason, their action not only contributes to harmo-
nising the demand patterns of high income groups with those of ca-
pitalistic countries, but also tends to directly mould the product-
ive structure and to adapt it to the developing exchange net of ma-
nufactured products which they organize, and which until now rest-
ed fundamentally on the possibility of obtaining fairly cheap lab-
our. No matter what are the merits of recent policies giving prio-
rity to exports of manufacturedgoods in many Latin American count-
ries, the fact is that this priority is directly related to the in-
terests of the multi-national enterprises and that their actions 
will determine the directions of specialization. 
There is no doubt that analyses of the dependence problem imply 
a deep questioning of the economic basis on which the development 
policies of Latin America have rested in the last twenty years. 
Centering the problem on the phenomenon of cultural influence or 
domination, many of the economic variables, which were of great im-
portance in Latin American politics pass to a secondary place. The 
necessity of industrialization, for example, is not questioned, but 
the essence of the industrialization policies followed, which were 
confined to responding to the demands which the system was spontane-
ously creating, should be questioned. Similarly, the efforts to 
increase the flow of external finance and to stimulate the expansion 
of commerce of the less developed countries, even in manufactures, 
would only have the character of temporary palliatives in a basic 
situation of underdevelopment . From this standpoint, even the idea 
of economic integration - in theory so dear to Latin America - would 
lose its real importance for development efforts. As regards integ-
ration attempts as a means of overcoming the relative smallness of 
national markets, Furtado says that "in some cases they permitted 
an extension of the process of import substitution, but they did not 
modify the fundamental problem, which is rooted in a situation of 
dependence 11 .13) 
It refers to a structure with a cultural dimension resistant to 
solutions which do not go to the root of the problem: the real pos-
sibility of the existence of a diversity of systems of values, i.e. 
a cultural diversity in a world, which is getting more and more 
unitedthroughthe power of communications. Logically, this implies 
that the first requirement for a development policy must be to sue-
12) "The Efficiency (Contradictions) of Multinational Corporations", 
American Economic Review, Vol.LX, March 1970, p .441. 
13) Op . cit. p.91. 
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ceed in obtaining a modification of the consumption patterns in or-
der to differentiate these from the most advanced capitalistic eco-
nomies. The depth of the socio-political change which such an ob-
jective would demand, is defined by mentioning, as Furtado does , 
that the formula for "progressively reconditioning consumption pat-
terns as to make them compatible with the desired accumulation ef-
fort", corresponds, in its pure form, to the so-called "chinese mo-
del".14) 
It is not appropriate to analyse here the feasibility of that 
solution for Latin America, but simple to state it as one of the 
options of economic policy . But it is appropriate, on the other 
hand, to point out the critical elements of these analyses because 
they have begun to weigh more and more heavily in the worries and 
preoccupations of Latin Americans. 
It is clear that the last twenty years have not brought about a 
real change in the prospect of building prosperous and just socie-
ties in Latin America, but have reinforced the situation of exter-
nal dependence. In spite of the material progress reached by some 
countries (income per capita has grown quicker than in the rest of 
the less developed world) the lack of the system's equity is so no-
torious and the structure, on which the economy is based, so unstable, 
that there are reasons enough to question so-called development po-
licies. Apart from the unresolved problems of poverty and oppres-
sion, these policies are being criticised for their passivity as 
regards dependence on foreign technology and also on foreign capi-
tal, which, as emphasized earlier, is still increasing, even dur-
ing the prosperous periods which some Latin American countries have 
had. 
Latin America was the first of the developing regions in the 
world to create a regional financial institution, namely, the Bank 
for Inter-American Development (BID) . Because of balance of payments 
problems, which were especially acute during the fifties, Latin Ame-
rica insisted on an increase in the flow of public financing, (that 
was the reason for the creation of the BID) and on the urgent need 
to establish an international structure for co-operation with aview 
to securing stability of markets for primary products , and to obtain 
access to markets for their industrial exports. The creation of 
the UNCTAD was primarily an a < tion of Latin American origin . 
If little or nothing signif i cant has been achieved since then 
with regard to commercial co-operation, it would not be possible, 
in all fairness, to say the same of public financing. This increas-
ed moderately but constantly during the sixties. But this increase, 
however, was not enough to avoid an increased demand for the "hard" 
financing of suppliers credits. The problem of external debt and 
rising trade deficits became more prominent and moreover instabili-
ty in primary product markets was not moderated. Forecasts showed 
the presence of an increasing and progressive shortage of external 
resources, and this induced demands for an increase in external fi-
nancing (preferably on concessional terms) as well as for the crea-
tion of internal and external conditions more favourable to the ex-
port of manufactured products. Several countries adopted resource 
allocation policies aimed at stimulating these exports, though in 
some cases that was only possible with heavy subsidies. 
14) Op.cit. note 1, p.91. 
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For this reason this was a favourable time for the activities 
of multinational enterprises in most Latin American countries. The 
production of more complex goods, and the priority given to the ex-
port of manufactured products, resulted in an almost natural effort 
to attract them . It should also have led to a strengthening of in-
tegration schemes which were already functioning - the Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common 
Market - but the basis on which they were established: a simple free-
ing of trade among different systems, was not adequate to give all 
countries confidence in the benefits. The first signs of restless-
ness appeared then between the Andean countries which came together 
in a new group on different bases. Further on more will be said 
about this integration effort . 
Nevertheless, by the end of the sixties several countries had 
changed the emphasis in their economic policies, especially Brazil. 
In spite of the inertia of the past, the tendency to open the eco-
nomy to the outside in search of a better resource allocation to 
encourage exports started to spread . The effects of this change 
were not reflected in the balance of payments, and the amount of 
external debt combined with the remittance of foreign investments, 
was still a point of concern in this new style of economic expan-
sion. 
World events in the first five years of the seventies underline 
the critical elements of the analysis of dependence. From 1969 to 
1973 the expansion of Latin American exports reached figures which 
have no precedent since the end of the Second World War . A good 
number of countries shared this tendency. A few of them, especial-
ly Brazil and Mexico, but also medium-sized countries such as Colom-
bia, substantially increased their exports of manufactured goods not 
only to other countries of the same region, but also to the rest 
of the world. Export receipts overall also grew faster than they 
had previously and by comparison with the rest of the developing 
world . 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1973, when neither the effects of 
the world inflation nor the impact of the oil price increase were 
still fully felt, the ar.iount and structure of external debt was al-
ready a nightmare for many countries. Amongst them were Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentine, which are relatively large economies, with a 
considerable production of capital goods and intermediate products. 
Furthermore, notably in Brazil, but also in other countries, the 
political system favoured a growing concentration of incomes as 
well as a high rate of capitalization. But in spite of this fact, 
it was especially in those countries that the growth of payments 
for external debt and the remittance of investment reached even 
more spectacular proportions. In Brazil just the disbursed exter-
nal public debt grew from US$2,730 million to US$4,890 million be-
tween 1970 and 1973; in Mexico during the same period, from US$2,960 
million to US$4,000 million; and in Argentine from US$1,800 million 
to US$2,600 million. 
It is not strange that one of the facts to which most attention 
has been paid in this scene of actual or potential payment problems, 
is the growing weight of the remittance of dividends of foreign in-
vestment and the rapid increase of payments for technology which in 
the countries which have been most successful in attracting foreign 
investment, have multiplied in a few years. In 1972 Brazil paid 
for this 34.5% from its export income. If we add to this the repay-
ments of external debt, the payment coefficient was 47.9% of exports. 
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Mexico remitted 17.9% for that item, and its total payment coeffici-
ent was 41.4%; in Argentine the corresponding figures were 12.1% and 
34.3% respectively. 
As long as it was possible to dispose of enough fresh capital to 
compensate for these payments, the problem was of a potential chara-
cter only, and that was the case of Brazil which was at a climax of 
its economic expansion. The great upheaval which the world economy 
suffered since 1974, has changed the situation radically and in this, 
as well as in other cases, the problems of dependence have really 
come to light. Price increases for food and oil, as well as in 
general the effects of international inflation on the prices of im-
ports, greatly affected Latin American countries with the exception 
of Venezuela and some other small oil and sugar exporting countri-
es. In 1974 the situation showed a decrease of reserves and a 
steep increase in external debts. Recent data show that by 1974 
the external public debt of Mexico reached nearly US$8,000 million, 
and in Brazil the total external debt would be US$17,200 million. 
By June 1975 the debt had apparently reached US$19,500 million.15) 
The serious economic recession in the industrialized countries is 
already being felt in Latin America and this time the way of spread-
ing of the phenomena from the centre is not only the foreign market, 
but a much more direct and sensitive tie: the activity of the multi-
national enterprises . 
IV 
The problems of dependence which have been analysed for Latin 
America are the same, with differences in degree, as those endured 
by all of the Third World. Perhaps the effects of cultural domina-
tion are felt more acutely in Latin America for its leading class-
es have always been identified with Western cultural traditions 
and because, proportionatel~ the population influenced by the con-
sumption standards of rich countries is higher than in other regions . 
However, the basic conditions of dependence are the same as with 
the rest of the Third Wor l d for they desire from a situation of in-
creasing inequality in the distribution of world wealth and in the 
opportunities offered by science and technology. 
This is why solutions for the problems of dependence and, in the 
final analysis, of underdevelopment cannot be contemplated in iso-
lation from the efforts which the world is capable of making to 
find new orientations and to conptruct a new international economic 
order which will turn interdependence into solidarity . For the pur-
poses of this paper we are interested in highlighting only some as-
pects of the responsibilities accruing to underdeveloped countries 
in this future action and, basically the need they have to establish 
forms of cooperation among them. 
From the start, I exclude the possibility that the countries of 
Latin America, to break the consumption habits of their privileged 
15) The data for Brazil are not comparable with those covering its 
debt for 1970-73, which refer exclusively to the public debt 
already disbursed . Not enough information is available for 
Mexico to determine if they are comparable . In any case, all 
indicators show very sharp increases of external debt for most 
Latin American countries. 
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minorities, will have to become isolated from Western cultural in-
fluence, to which traditionally they have belonged with no real val-
id alternatives since colonial times. To have this tradition, this 
attitude towards the world does not determine a road towards politi-
cal ideologies such as capitalism, nor to deformations as the con-
suming society . They are forms of an evolution which took place in 
typical historical dircumstances wh'ch our countries cannot re-edit, 
even if they wished to do so . The capitalist countries themselves 
have started to react against consumerism and, sooner or later, the 
IDhird World will have to reflect the change that seems to be in the 
offing. 
What does happen is that since isolation is impossible and un .... . 
desirable for as long as those patterns prevail in the industrializ-
ed countries and persist in our nations' leading groups with their 
present privileges, the phenomenon of ·dependence! will continue to 
evolve through the elements already described and with its whole ac-
cumulate nature. It is evident that to find viable and stable poli-
tical solutions to this need for change is extremely difficult, not 
only because of the internal resistance of the affected groups but 
also because of the support they receive from hegemony centres. 
The terrible conflicts of these struggles, the extremes which might 
be arrived at on either side are a daily event in the Latin America 
of today. The hope is that gradually non-dogmatic attitudes will 
prevail, that do not imply the transfer from one hegemony centre to 
another, that are able to bring about real changes without going 
through chaos and that are capable of developing their own politic-
al and institutional schemes which will give rise to authentic demo-
cratic forms of popular participation . An essential component will 
be economic , scientific and technological policies designed to at-
tain progressively a greater decision-making autonomy . 
However, owing to the same weight of political and economic dep-
endence , it is not only the isolated national action which can as-
sure success in these endeavours which, in themselves, are enorm-
ously complex . The opposition of external centres, be they govern-
ments or enterprises, is a fact of the problem, because many of the 
measures required by this change will inevitably affect their in-
terests. Neither is it in the domain of single national economies , 
which in most cases are not large enough for the scales of activi-
ties required by modern industry, science and technology, where 
the new economic structure required to participate without cumula-
tive imbalances in the international trade of goods and know-how 
may be built. 
These functional shortcomings, vis a vis the political, economic, 
and technological parameters of the sphere where these actions have 
to be deployed, pose the problem of the adequate size of States or, 
more precisely, the scope of governmental jurisdictions. If we as-
sume - and this assumption is the basis for this paper - that with-
in the limitations imposed by interdependence the achievement of 
greater decision-making autonomy is a preference of Latin American 
nations: a public or collective good which they must strive to at-
tain, the question which immediately arises is the scope of govern-
mental jurisdiction adequate for these objectives. In fact, given 
the context in which this action will take place, this objective 
combines two social preferences which can be considered as instru-
mental but which, in themselves, are public or collective goods 
with their own demands with regard to the scope of governmental 
jurisdictions. The first is to increase bargaining capacity in 
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its broadest sense, knowing that both "confrontation" as well as 
cooperation on an international scale impl y negot iations. The sec-
ond preference is the development of science and technology, of 
knowledge in itself and its application, for only they can build 
up the foundations for that autonomy . To the extent that industry, 
efficiently managed, is the activity that better encourages and in-
corporates the production of technology, this option is simultane-
ously a preference for industrialization, determined also by the 
other possible economic effects of industrialization which we shall 
not describe now . 
The first objective, to increase negotiating power, must give 
rise to a diversity of forms of associations of states, some of 
which may go beyond the boundaries of a region, for example, Latin 
America, to link up with the action of developing peoples in other 
parts of the world. A good example would be OPEC . These associa-
tions may have n purely or basically political nature, e.g. the 
"Non Aligned Countries", or pursue concrete economic objectives, 
such as in the case of producers' associations. The scope results 
from the objectives set up and the broadening of the necessary gov-
ernmental jurisdiction is limited to the action needed to attain 
them. To this same extent the degree of conflict among the members, 
unavoidable in this broadening which implies a potential or real 
giving up of sovereignty, is generally less than that implied by 
deeper cooperation efforts, such as the so-called economic integra-
tion schemes and, therefore, make it relatively easier to set these 
groups up. Of course we are not excluding the possibility that the 
objective sought be of such importance and complexity and be so 
demanding as to the increase of the necessary negotiating power 
that it may only be feasible through the close inter-dependence and 
solidarity implied by these forms of integration. An example of 
this would be the action to set up common rules for multinational 
enterprises. But this is a special case of these associations of 
States being inspired by the desire to attain a better internation-
al negotiating position. We shall refer to this later. In general 
terms it can be said that the limited objectives of these associa-
tions give them more flexibility and it could be expected that giv-
en the world situation their number will increase in the future . 
As regards Latin American countries it is obvious that this 
will take place if some of the consequences of dependence are to 
be counteracted. It is not always easy to do so, as is evident 
from the problems found in the creation of UBEC (Union of Banana 
Exporting Countries). But the need is felt and there are many ef-
forts under way in this regard: the creation of SELA (Latin Ameri-
can Economic System), for economic and political objectives, among 
others, and coordination of positions vis a vis negotiations with 
the United States, is a symptom of this trend, which becomes even 
more significant since it is taking place concurrently with the 
crisis of the Organization of American States (OAS) of which the 
United States is a member. 
The problem of the size of nations or states really arises when 
they are related to the second class of preferences mentioned above 
which, to simplify things, we shall call preferences for industria-
lization and technological development. The element becomes signi-
ficant given the relationship of manufacturing industry and techno-
logical development to certain technological factors such as econo-
mies of scale and externalities. Here is when the most complex 
forms of association of states to constitute a single market or a 
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single economic space by means of economic integration , become re-
levant. And it is in dealing with them when the generic name of 
Latin America, which up to this point in this p a per has been used 
as related to phenomena of general scope such as dependence , must 
give way to the diversity of situations of the countries which form 
this continent . 
Initially it can be stated that without the support of schemes 
of this type none of the countries of Latin America has the neces-
sary size to develop its industry and its technology in such a way 
as gradually to reduce the gap between them and industrialized 
countries, that is to say, to attain the relative decison-making 
autonomy which is compatible wit~ the interdependence of the world 
economy. 
It would be futile to try to determine an optimum size for a 
state, even if we limit ourselves to the relationship between the 
size of an economy and the economic development achieved, no mat-
ter how it may be definedl6) . However, in view of the political 
and economic fact of dependence , above all if it is increasingly 
due to technological backwardness , it is reasonable to admit prima 
facie that the advantages favour the large state in terms of eco-
nomic size , regarding which the gross domestic product could be an 
acceptable rough indicator for these purposes . 
This disadvantage of the small state vis a vis the large state 
in its efforts to avoid economic and political dependence is a 
fact which requires no proof . The political effects of this vul-
nerability are evident . It could very well be stated with Leduc 
and Weillerl7) that "a small nation should best be defined as one 
which is unable to resist outside influences and which must accept 
the worst of them together with the best" . 
As is logical , with population growth, economic development and 
technological change , the scales of reference to define large and 
small states, world powers and dependent countries, have changed 
with time . For example, K. J . Be loch in studying XVIIth Century Europe 
and the characteristics of the three major powers which were then 
struggling for supremacy : The Ottoman Empire, the Spanish Empire, 
and Louis XII and Richelieu ' s France, comes to the conclusion that 
about 17 million people was the population level that had to be at-
tained by a State to hope for the role of a major power.18) We v.Duld 
have to multiply this figure many times to be able to arrive at an 
equivalent in population for the major powers of today. Looking 
at the other extreme, the small country, and bearing in mind only 
the economic effects but with similar indicators, by 1960 Kuznets 
called any country of a population of 10 million people or less, 
a small country . He recognizes that this is a rule of thumb and 
highlights the changes in size with time in stating "were I to draw 
16) See, for example, C. N. Vakil and P.R . Brahmananda, "The Prob-
lems of Developing Countries", in E.A.G . Robinson (ed . ), The 
Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, op.cit . , p . 135 
17) C. Leduc and J . Weiller, "The Size of the Economy and its Rela-
tion to Stability and Steady Progress: II", in E.A.G . Robinson, 
(ed . ), The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, op . 
cit . , p.218 . 
18) Quoted by Fernand Braudel, "Capitalism and Material Life, 1440-
1800", Harper and Row, Great Britain, 1972, p.23 . 
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a hundred years hence, the dividing line would be far higher, as-
suming no devastating demographic catastrophe".19) 
Only 15 years after this definition the dividing line must al-
ready be much higher. It is not only a question of a constant in-
crease of the optimum scales of activity of many industries (the 
chemical industry is a case in point) but rather of the developl'ent 
of more complex products, with a high content of scientific and 
technological know-how which is at the disposal only of the larger 
nations. Of course the value of those products is much higherthan 
the value of the products they replace. A good example can be 
found in the armaments industry; on the one hand it illustrates 
this type of innovation while, at the same time, it serves as an 
index of the expenses incurred, rightly or wrongly, by a state for 
its defence and security . A United States fighter plane used in 
the Korean War cost roughly 53,000 dollars; in 1971 a fighter plane 
was worth 5 million dollars . A submarine went from a cost of about 
5 million to 170 million dollars.20) Many other examples could be 
given. As stated by Lluch "(technological) change allows for ef-
fective sovereignty only for those nations who can carry out very 
important economic efforts . This is equivalent to stating that its 
enforcement is re.sErved not only for the rich but also for the 
large. 11 .21) 
As can be seen in Table 1, the largest country in Latin America, 
Brazil, with over 100 million people, has a total product which is 
no more than 50 percent higher than that of Spain. The whole of 
Latin America is equivalent to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Comparisons become even more relevant if they are based on demand 
data which qualifies the rough indicator, the GDP, considering, 
among other elements, the effect of income distribution. Table 2, 
taken from a recent paper by ECLA,22) shows that the demand for non-
electric appliances for the whole of Latin America for 1970 amount-
ed to 65 percent of the demand in France. It was higher than France 
in chemicals, but in that case, even the largest country, Brazil, 
was scarcely higher than 50 percent of French demand. The differ-
ences are enormous, of course, for medium-sized countries in the 
Latin American scale, such as Colombia or Peru, and for the small 
ones, Ecuador or Bolivia. 
It is evident that the fragmentation of Latin America is a power-
ful brake on industrialization and it becomes increasingly more so 
to the extent that technical progress is reflected in more sophisti-
cated processes or in an enlargement of production scales. Comment-
ing on Latin American Industrialization ECLA has the following to 
say: "Production of a large quantity and diversity of goods has grown 
considerably . But all of them definitely depend on a technology 
which is totally generated abroad and which is imported with little 
or no adaptation t through the capital goods in which this technology 
is embodied".23) This even applies to clothing and food products . 
19) 
20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
Op . cit. p.14 . 
Salvador Lluch, Op . cit., pp .2- 3. 
Op.cit. p.3. 
Economic Commission for Latin America, "Integration, Import 
Substitution and Economic Development of Latin America", ECLA/ 
PC/DRAFT/109, April 1974 (mimeographed). 
Economic Commission for Latin America, Op.cit., p.15. 
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Part of the blame for this type of industrialization must be at-
tributed to the import substitution policies restricted to small 
domestic markets which have been referred to before . But even if 
an attempt at specialization had been made, with all the risks in-
volved, these efforts would not have found an adequate environment 
intthe size of a good part of Latin American economies. This is 
due to the fact that to gradually create the capacity for innova-
COONl'RIES 
Bolivia 
Colanbia 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Subtotal 
ANDEAN GROUP 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexi= 
Costa Rica 
TABLE 1 LATIN AMERICA AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
BASIC PARAMETERS - 1973 
Latin Arnerica* 
Gross Popu-
J:O'nes- lation 
tic (Thou-
Product sands) 
y 
l.431 5. 147 
13.672 24 . 327 
7. 932 10. 261 
2. 766 6.649 
8.353 14 . 452 
Gross 
Domes-
tic 
Product 
Per 
capita 
"$TJS 
278 
562 
773 
416 
578 
14.036 11. 524 1. 218 
48 .190 72 . 360 666 
32 . 012 24. 720 1. 295 
58 . 023 103.613 560 
53.630 55 . 460 967 
1.376 1.888 729 
Developed Countries 
Germany 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Spain 
United States 
France 
Italy 
Japan 
England 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Gross 
Domes-
tic 
Product 
y 
Popu- Gross 
lation Domes-
(Thou- tic 
sands) Product 
Per 
capita 
210 . 190 61.967 3.392 
29 . 570 9.742 3. 035 
98.360 22.125 4.446 
17 . 640 5.027 3.509 
39.710 34 . 730 1 . 143 
1136 . 900 210.404 5.403 
171.530 52 . 177 3.288 
103.350 54 . 888 1.883 
252.230 108 . 350 2.328 
134.720 56.021 2.405 
35 . 110 8.138 4. 314 
27. . 780 6 .431 3.542 
Dominican Republic 2.086 4. 795 435 
El Salvador 1.625 3. 860 421 
Guatemala 2. 677 5. 782 463 
Haiti 592 5. 585 106 
Honduras 835 2.831 295 
Nicaragua 956 2. 168 441 
Panama 1.554 1.586 980 
Paraguay 960 2 . 500 384 
Uruguay 2. 640 2. 990 883 
TOTAL 
IA.TIN AMERICA 207 . 157 290.138 714 
Notes: 1/ Gross Domestic Product at factor =st expressed in US$ at 1970 prices 
- and rate of exchange . 
2/ Gross Domestic Product at market prices expressed in US$ at 1970 pric-
- es and rate of exchange. 
* Excluding Cuba and English speaking Caribbean countries . 
Prepared by : Board of the Cartagena Agreerent - Programning Department. 
Sources : E=nanic Ccmnission for Latin America, Latin American Develoµnent 
and the International Economic Situation, 21 February, 1975 (for 
the Latin Arnerican data) • 
O.E.C.D., Observer, No . 74, March-April, 1975 . 
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tion along the lines of some specialization, presupposes having 
available a technological "critical mass" which does not exist in 
most, if not all, of the Latin American countries due, among other 
reasons, to their size. 
The influence of the economic size of a country on technological 
development in its different manifestations: market, governmental 
financial capacity, etc . , is a fact, even though it is difficult 
to measure. Attempts have been made to develop some quantifiable 
elements of this "critical mass" such as the minimum necessary in-
frastructure of research,24) but the evidence derived from the eco-
nomic evolution of the industrial world is so overwhelming that it 
scarcely needs any measurement. 'For example, the information re-
volution caused by cybernetics not only demands enormous expenses 
to continue in constant innovation but its effects have multiplied 
managerial capacities creating new scales in many economic activi-
ties. On the other hand, the development of engineering services, 
which are so important for technological development, requires 
stable demands which will make possible functional specialization . 
25) Lastly, we have the ~conomic capacity of the government and 
of major enterprises which finance the enormous expenses of scien-
tific and technological research which are the backbone of the eco-
nomic growth of industrial countries. 
Among Latin American countries Brazil would seem to be near the 
size in which it is possible to start some activities and to imple-
ment policies designed to gradually create its own capacity for te-
chnological development. Because of its size it can concentrate 
public resources in significant amounts to this purpose and,through 
its rapid growth in the last ten years, it has become a market which 
is sufficiently attractive to pursue consistent policies with regard 
to technological imports, to maintain engineering and consulting 
services of international scope, and to develop activities having 
certain technological content, such as for example, production of 
automobile engines for export . The contract recently signed with 
the Federal Republic of Germany for the installation of an uranium 
enrichment plant emphasises that this country is getting close to 
a threshold of capacity in technological developme~t. For the time 
being and in this area it is the only illustration of national vi -
tality in Latin America . 
Even so, despite its size , Brazil is not a country which has 
been able to significantly reduce its dependence on the centres . 
As stated before, the policies followed have made this dependence 
more evident in certain ways . All of this indicates that intensi-
fying efforts for cooperation and , more properly, for integration 
is one of the conditions for a future dynamic evolution of Latin 
America . 
It has already been pointed out that Latin America's experience 
in its first attempts at economic integration have generally been 
discouraging . The Latin American Free Trade (LAFTA) formed by 11 
24) Amilcar Herrera , Science and Policy in Latin America , XXI Century Editors, 
Mexico, 1971. 
25) F . R. Sagasti, "Economic Inte gration and Technological Policy : 
The Case of the Andean Group," Integration Magazine, Institute 
for Latin American Integration, Vol .VIII, N° 18, January 1975, 
p . 173 
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countries of different sizes and degrees of development was set up 
in 1960 for purposes of establishing a free trade area. At the sarre 
time the Central American Common Market was launched with all the 
countries of that region with the exception of Panama , which are 
certainly much more similar as regards size and economic structure 
than are the LAFTA countries. In both cases the basic integration 
instrument was the opening of markets by means of the gradual lib-
eralization of trade. Basically, both were inspired in the "clas-
sical" integration formulas, conceived both on the theory as well 
as on the experience of developed countries, especially the Europe-
an Economic Community. 
These two integration efforts, after promising beginnings, have 
ended by getting bogged down and, in the final analysis, the major 
cause seems to be the same: neither of the two had effective inst-
ruments to influence in the allocation of the benefits and costs 
of integration. Some countries, the largest ones in the case of 
LAFTA - Brazil, Argentina and Mexico - and those relatively more 
advanced in the Central American Common Market, tended to reap all 
the benefits of integration, which was reflected in the increasing-
ly defensive attitude as well as an increasing resistance from those 
countries which felt deprived. This situation, with only a differ-
ence in timing in both cases, was reflected in a halting or a reversal 
of the process . It is not strange that in both cases the actions 
of multinational enterprises have contributed to this concentration 
of benefits in one or a few of the member countries, given their 
capacity to profit rapidly from the possibilities which these efforts 
could offer them, settling in those areas which were already more 
developed in the countries which were also more advanced . 
It is not the time to evaluate these experiences in detail. It 
is enough to point out that from them a new concept of the charact-
eristics of a formula for economic integration among developing 
countries emerges, a concept which is different from that suitable 
to rich countries. In the case of developing countries, integra-
tion is now beginning to be seen as a means to build an industrial 
base which is totally different from the existing one and to encourage 
a gradual technological development; it is increasingly becoming 
one of the means to reduce foreign dependence. Integration among 
industrial countries may have been partially motivated by political 
objectives, e.g. a defense of their autonomous decision-making capa-
city at an international level - as it was the case in the ECC -
but the system to implement it in the economic field has been di ~ 
rected mainly to bringing about an improvement in the efficiency 
of activities already inserted in a mature industrial structure, 
by means of market enlargement. 
These new concepts have already given rise to two regional groups 
in Latin America: The Andean Group and the Caribbean Community, and 
are also influencing the work which is being carried out at present 
to redesign the Central American Common Market and, to a certain 
extent, LAFTA . The Andean Group can be considered as representa-
tive of this new thesis of economic integration among developing 
countries, a thesis whose scope is certainly not limited to Latin 
America. This is why it would be worthwhile to briefly discuss 
their major elements. 
The Andean Group is formed by six countries of South America : 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela which, by 
1974, had a total population of 73 million people with a total gross 
domestic product of approximately 50 billion dollars, that is to 
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say, the equivalent in economic size of the two largest Latin Ame-
rican countries, Brazil and Mexico . The States which form part 
of it are also members of LAFTA. Both schemes are compatible26), 
and thus the Andean Group is a sub- regional grouping within the 
context of a larger region, in this case nearly all of Latin Ameri-
ca . The six countries are medium or small sized as compared to 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico , their partners is LAFTA . 27) This fact 
led them to join forces in the Cartagena Agreement which was sign-
ed in 1969 and came into operation as of 1970 . 
As a grouping of countries they expressly follow the priorities 
mentioned in previous pages: a) to create a new economic space 
which will make possible a change in the structure of economic ac-
tivities, consistent with the preferences for industrialization and 
technological change; and b) to obtain an increase in the negotiat-
ing capacity in foreign policy, mainly as regards the transfer of 
technology and multinational enterprises. This is the first time 
that an integration scheme among developing countries is directed 
concretely to these latter aspects of foreign relations setting up 
deadlines for the implementation of some common measures, for exam-
ple, the adoption of a co!IUl\on system as regards foreign investment. 
The scars left in these countries by their experiences in LAFTA 
led them to the commitment of maintaning within their integration 
scheme an "equitable" distribution of the benefits and costs. It 
is therefore a question of reconciling efficiency with "equity" in 
the creation .of a new structure of activities. To this end a pre-
ferential system to the benefit of the weaker countries was set . up. 
The purpose is that all member countries, whatever their relative 
strength or weakness may be, participate in the creation of the 
new industrial base and in the opportunities which the new space 
implies for technological developments. This "equitable" partici-
pation was considered essential to maintain the stability of the 
grouping and the priority assigned to this objective meant, as com-
ment2d below, a radical change in the policy instruments which un-
til that time had been usual in integration. 
In effect, the integration effects of the market forces unleash-
ed by the liberalization of trade, has a secondary role in this 
formula, at least as pertains to the most important industrial ac-
tivities . In these, the allocation mechanism is a system of region-
al planning which must set down the allocation of specific manufact-
uring industries among the countries by means of what are called 
the industrial sectorial programmes. In the sectors under program-
ming reduction of customs duties has, therefore, a secondary nature, 
as well as other complementary measures. On the other hand, liber-
alization of trade is a major instrument for the rerraining activities 
which are, above all, those already established in the countries. 
This combination of instruments highlights the originality of 
the Andean Group system and is reflected in its instruments and in-
stitutions. Joint planning cannot exist without a planning organ-
ism which should also be of a collective nature . To perform such 
function, this agency must not only have the required power but al-
so have the exclusive capacity to initiate. This is the Board of 
26) In the sense that, for example, Benelux, is compatible with the 
EEC. 
27) See Table 2. 
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the Andean Group formed by three persons and t hei r staff . The vot-
i ng systems c hosen , which do no t require unanimity, except for some 
limited cases, makes the Board's authority to submit proposals a 
very efficient working tool . 
The system has been in operation for over five years . Customs 
duties reduction has progressed at the rate decided upon in the 
Cartagena Agreement. Trade among the countries of the Group, which 
initially was very l ow, has been multiplied several times and is 
at present close to one billion dollars with a high component of 
industrial products. The weaker countries participate in it . Ac-
tion vis a vis foreign dependence has been translated into the adop-
tion of common regulations for foreign investments, patents and roy-
alties. This is Decision 24, which is very well known in interna-
tional circles. Common regulations on industrial property havebeen 
adopted, as well as a system of Andean multinational enterprises 
and an a greement on double taxation . The Group has furthermore im-
plemented a common technological policy which, for the time being, 
has concentrated on: a) improving the systems for importation of 
technology, not only to save in these transfers, but also to er.cour-
age the development of engineering services and the manufacture of 
capital goods; and bl gaining experience in the adaptation and cre-
ation of technology by means of specific technological development 
programmes linked to the economic priorities of the area . Two of 
these are already under way: one on copper refining and the other 
on the utilization of tropical timbers. Action in the area of te-
chnology is only a modest starting point in such a complex field, 
but this is also the f irst time that a grouping of countries tackl-
es it in a systematic manner . 
As could be expected, industrial planning has been the most con-
tentious and most complex element in the work of Andean Group . The 
first sectoral programme pertaining to the metal working industry 
was approved and is being implemented. Recently, the petrochemi-
cal programme was approved after a long period of negotiations . 
Two very important sectoral problems are under discussion: the au-
tomotive and the fertilizer programmes, and their approval seems 
to be near . In fact, already the Group has overcome the major ob-
stacle to all integration efforts among developing countries: reach-
ing consensus in the allocation of industrial activities . 
This description, which covers only the most significant aspects 
in the evolution of the Andean Group may be used to define the prob-
able direction of cooperation among developing countries in this 
period in which a new international order is being designed. The 
author feels that if the Third World is not capable of getting or-
ganized to overcome the limitations inherent in the present frag-
mentation, it will be very difficult for it to have any significant 
influence on the course the world should take and to fruitfully 
participate in the network o f relationships which is about to be 
built. Integration in regional groupings is only one of the meth-
ods to escape from the present backwardness, and it is not the most 
important one, but it is undoubtedly a prerequisite for change. 
This reference to the integration of the Andean Group has not 
been made with the purpose of suggesting the model which could be 
followed by cooperation efforts of this type in the Third World. 
The experience of the Group cannot be easily transferred . Its major 
elements were designed on the basis of a concrete experience in the 
operation of LAFTA and answer to unique national conditions . It 
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could not, for example, apply to countries whose differences in 
economic size and industrial development were even greater than 
those existing in the Andean Group, where they are at the limits 
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of what is viable as regards heterogeneous conditions. What the 
experience of the Andean Group does indicate is that integration 
efforts among developing countries have to be based on variables 
different from the simple enlargement of markets which were right-
ly criticized by Furtado, if the purpose is really to foster econo-
mic change and reduce foreign dependence. 
COMMENTS ON SALGADO'S PAPER 
(a) H. EDWARD ENGLISH 
It is dangerous to generalise about Latin America . Dr. Salgado 
has, however, focussed on some of the most ubiquitous elements af-
fecting Latin American economic development and this encourages me 
to comment in general terms. 
To oversimplify, Dr. Salgado and many others characterize Latin 
American investment decision-making as historica l ly dominated by 
elite groups which do not reflect social preferences of the Latin 
American people . The impact of foreign influences and in particul-
ar direct investment has been much affected by the role of the do-
mestic elite, and indeed has led to something of an alliance between 
domestic and foreign elites to serve their mutual purposes . 
The question under these circumstances is whether the external 
forces have played a necessary role in frustrating democratizing 
forces in Latin America and the kind of social and economic develop-
ment that would be preferred by the indigenous majority. If the 
social structures of Latin America would be much the same anyhow, 
and are merely somewhat further entrenched by foreign direct invest-
ment then the relevance of dependency theorizing in such circumst-
ances can be challenged . 
The industrial revolution in Europe and North America suggests 
that under these circumstances traditional social elites based on 
feudal institutions need not become identified with and allied to 
the new industrial "class" whether this class is the product o f its 
internal social revolution or external forces . 
In the Latin American case the strategies for industrial develop-
ment that have worked so imperfectly according to Salgado and Wionc-
zek, may well have ensured that historical forces led inexorably 
to the entrenchment of traditional elites. First the policy of im-
port substitution permitted by higher levels o f protection foster-
ed inefficient manufacturing unable to compete outside a restrict-
ed domestic market thus limiting scope for the development of the 
industrial class, and making it easier for domestic capitalists to 
retain control of industrial capital . 
Secondly, the earlier efforts at integration such as the Latin 
American Free Trade Association failed to achieve rationalisation 
of industry because the vested interests that evolved under protec-
tion had no strong incentives to restructure so long as external 
trade barriers remained high . 
Finally, when it came to finding a new strategy in the promotion 
of exports and rationalisation of domestic production it has become 
necessary to impose through more or less democratic political regim-
es explicit agreements for the purpose of distributing industrial 
activity so as to reduce wasteful duplication of manufacturing ac-
tivity, and selection of foreign direct investment. In effect gov-
ernments have found it necessary to intervene in investlllent decisions 
that might otherwise have served only the ends of domestic and for-
eign elites acting collectively in their mutual and individual int-
erests. 
Such intervention may indeed be necessary, at least sometimes 
but t he impor tant point is that it has been the policy of the host 
country that has created the circumstances in which the conspiracy 
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of elites becomes inevitable . A protectionist policy environment 
would have imposed a market discipline on early stages of indust-
rial development and substantially reduced the opportunity for con-
centration of economic power . 
It is now to be hoped that whatever the new strategy of rationa-
lisation it will take place in the context of a commitment to dec-
lining levels of external protection for regional integration schemes 
such as· the Andean group. It is my understanding that this is in-
tended by leaders of that group. 
For its part the United States might, if it were interested in 
the success of this group, promote such rationalisation by offering 
free access (or at least freer) ·access to its market for any region-
al group that became committed to reducing its external trade bar-
riers to levels that eliminated the least efficient manufacturing 
units and expanded the exports and efficiency of those that remain-
ed in operation . 
(b) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the absence of Dr. Salgado the discussion of his paper was 
rather cursory. The thesis that international contact had brought 
about increasing economic, social and political dualism between 
Latin American elites and the poor majority was questioned. It was 
suggested that the paper did not contain persuasive evidence that 
the position of domestic elites was dependent on foreign economic 
activities; and if they had a domestic power base, policy would be 
unchanged and governments just as corrupt. · The desire for greater 
autonomy in decisions and for increasing participation in interna-
tional economic and political decisions was recognised, but to an 
important extent this was within the competence of Latin American 
countries themselves . Dr . Wionczek noted that the problems of dep-
endency could not be viewed solely on economic grounds and that in 
any case Latin America was not satisfied to accept the traditional 
economic order . He agreed that the linkage between internal fact-
ors and external domination was not detailed in the paper but point-
ed out that the colonial heritage was important. There was a Spa-
nish sense of values, a tradition of high consumption and this was 
reinforced by observation of high mass consumption in the United 
States . 
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THAILAND'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH 
JAPAN AND THE U.S.: A STUDY OF TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT INTERACTIONS 
SEIJI NAVA AND NARONGCHAI AKRASANEE* 
I . Introduction 
By international standards, the Thai economy has, since 1950, 
been an "open" one, relatively free of import quotas or other direct 
measures of trade restrictions and closely connected through trade 
with the rest of the world. While tariffs and taxes do affect the 
market price of goods, they have not been prohibitive. As a result, 
Thailand has relied mainly on competitive forces and prices to det-
ermine the size and composition of its imports. Similarly, Thai-
land has traditionally retained an "unctitical" policy toward the 
volume, sources, and objec~s or toreign investment in the post-war 
period . This attitude has allowed a large inflow of foreign capi-
tal to Thailand. This "openness" has thus appealed to the develop-
ed nations of the world, particularly to Japan and the U.S., which 
have been lured by different factors to trade with and invest in 
Thailand. However, as the dominance of these two industrial count-
ries in Thai economic affairs grew, so did antagonistic public sen-
timent against them. Japan, in particular, has more recently been 
the primary target of student demonstrations, owing to her rapid 
ascent to primacy as Thailand's leading trading partner and source 
of foreign investment. Increasing public awareness of and reaction 
to the influence of these industrial nations on the Thai economy 
has often been based on broad generalities . 
Although America's political, military, and economic influences 
in Southeast Asia has already peaked and is likely to decline fur-
ther, its present impact on Thai economic affairs is unmistakable . 
Even as the Japanese made inroads into areas once dominated by the 
United States, pockets of American influence persist, making it im-
possible for the researcher to neglect the latter, especially in 
any discussion of foreign investment. 
Simultaneously, it is the phenomenal worldwide trade performance 
*We would like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation for providing funds for re-
search assistance. We. are also thankful to Alan Murakami and Ornumpai Piyara-
tana for statistical and other assistance; and to the Bank of Thailand and the 
Board of Investment for providing us with sore of the data used . We would also 
like to acknowledge Professor Atsushi Murakami for helpful cx:mrents. 
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of the Japanese during the 1960 ' s that has surfaced as the high-
light of our discussion on Thailand's trade patterns . It appears 
that Thailand's industrialization and import-substitution policies 
have been highly complementary to the responses of the Japanese to 
changing trade and investment conditions . However, it would be an 
oversimplification to say that the Japanese merely stepped in where 
and when the Americans lost ground or could not expand further. 
The contrasting responses of Japanese and American businesses over 
recent years provide a fruitful backdrop for an analysis of differ-
ential export performance, import composition, foreign investment 
behaviour, and trade and investment interaction arrangements of 
these two countries . Despite the increasing attention to the role 
and significance of Japanese economic involvement in Thailand as 
well as in other Asian countries, relatively few studies have been 
made to analyze various effects of this involvement. One of these 
studies has dealt with the tremendous growth and changes to the 
pattern of Japanese trade with and foreign investment in Thailand 
in the 19 6 O ' s • 1) , 
This study laid the ground work for this paper, in which the 
United States has been included in an examination of Thai trade and 
foreign investment relations. In addition, Japanese involvement 
has been evaluated in the light of more recent data . 2) 
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that, as in many developing count-
ries, relevant data, especially on investment, are scanty and in-
adequate. With the use of existing limited data alone, it is dif-
ficult to make a full scale, and meaningful, empirical analysis of 
many of the issues and questions that have arisen. But certain 
broad characteristics and implications of-some of these factors can 
be identified and examined in this paper. The main focus will be 
on trade and investment-trade interactions.3) 
Accordingly, the paper is organized around the aforementioned 
areas in four separate sections. Section II deals with import pat-
terns, concentrating on the contributions of Japanese and American 
commodities to the import requirements of Thailand . For compara-
tive purposes a few other major import sources are also included. 
This section identifies the major commodity sub-groups that exhibit-
ed most growth and utilizes a constant-market-share analytical de-
vice to determine what ~actors were responsible for changes in im-
1) Seiji Naya and Narongchai Akrasanee, Thai-Japanese Econcmic Relations : Trade 
and Investment, The Econanic Cocperation Centre for the Asian and Pacific Re-
gion, Study No . 9, Decenber 1974, Bangkok, Thailand . 
For useful infonnation and analysis on the status, conditions and problems 
affecting foreign investrrent in Thailand, also see two studies prepared for 
the Econanic Cooperation Centre for the Asian and Pacific Region, Themas Al-
len, Direct Investrrent of Japanese Enterprises in Southeast Asia, Study No . l, 
February 1973, and Charles Draper , Private Foreign Investrrent in ASEAN, Study 
No . 7, February 1974. 
2) For a broader treatrrent of various issues, econanic and otherwise, see Naya 
and Akrasanee, ibid, Chapter 1. 
3) This paper h:Jwever anits altogether another important aspect of Thailand's 
external relationship : foreign aid. Two leading sources of aid are the Unit-
ed States and Japan in that order . The security interests of the former and 
carmercialorientation of the latter country have highlighted the contrast be-
tween the two. 
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port volume and composition. Section III highlights the Thai ex-
port performance in Japan and the United States, identifying the 
commodity groups that were most prominent in the changing export 
patterns of Thailand and the major factors involved in these chang-
es. Section IV discusses the size and types of Japanese and Unit-
ed States investment in Thailand and reveals the major differen-
tials in these contributions. Section V is devoted to an evalua-
tion of trade and investment interaction and again highlights the 
major differentials in American and Japanese trade arrangements. 
A final Section contains a summary of the results and implications 
for policy. 
II . The Pattern of Thailand's Imports 
Over the years, Thailand has continued to rely on imports for a 
large part of its requirements of manufactures, both consumer and 
capital goods. Accordingly, Thailand's imports are largely of manu-
factured items (SITC 5 to 8), which comprise about 75% of its total 
imports. In the past 20 years or so, this proportion has remained 
roughly the same. But the industrial structure of Thailand has 
been highly oriented toward the production of consumer goods and 
intermediate products used chiefly for the production of consumer 
goods, with relatively little capacity to produce capital goods . 
Industrialization and import substitution have induced a rapid change 
in the commodity composition of imports in favour of capital goods 
and against consumer goods, but imports have continued to grow rap-
idly, slackening only in 1970-71. 
In the 1950's, during Thailand's initial period of industrializa-
tion, imports of miscellaneous manufactures (SITC 8) as a proportion 
of total imports were reduced substantially. By the early 1960's, 
this proportion became as low as 5%. Even since then, the composi-
tion of total imports has continued to change, and the shift has 
been away from basic manufactures (SITC 6) and toward machinery and 
transport equipment (SITC 7) and chemicals (SITC 5) . The combined 
share of the latter two groups rose from 39% in 1962-63 to about 
50% in recent years. 
The major source of total imports and imports of manufactured 
goods has been the developed countries. For example, combined im-
ports from four developed countries (Japan, the United States, West 
Germany and the United Kingdom) comprise about 70% of the total im-
ports of Thailand. The role of Japan as a supplier has been grow-
ing rapidly, both in absolute terms and in relation to other count-
ries. 
In order to examine Thailand's bilateral trade, especially in 
relation to the country's industrial structure, it is useful to 
classify imports by the end uses of these products. On the basis 
of the Bank of Thailand's classification, the commodity compositions 
of total imports, of imports from the four developed countries and 
of those from the rest of the countries as a group as well as their 
bilateral trade shares are given in Appendix Table 1. The change 
in the commodity structure of total imports is clearly evident in 
the table: a rapid shift away from consumer goods, especially non-
durable consumer goods, towards intermediate and capital goods. 
For example, the proportion of non-durable consumer goods in total 
imports declined from 24.8% in 1962 to 12.9% in 1970 whereas the 
proportion of intermediate and capital goods rose respectively from 
17.1 and 28.2 to 24.9 and 34.7% during the same period. 
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The commodity composition of; iI1\ports from Japan resembles that 
of total imports . But the compositional change in imports from 
Japan is shown to have been even greater than for total imports . 
Only about a decade ago, imports from Japan were most heavily weight-
ed in favour of non-durable consumer goods, comprising as much as 
one-third of its total. Also, this proportion was even larger than 
that of the same commodity group in the total imports of Thailand, 
e . g. 32.2% and 24.8% respectively in 1962. But the reverse has 
been shown in recent years as the relative importance.of this com-
modity group has declined sharply. Non-durable consumer goods are 
the smallest component of imports from Japan. Also imports from 
Japan have become less concentrated in this commodity group than 
in total imports of Thailand (e.g., 8.3% and 12.9% respectively in 
1970) . This is due to a large relative decline of clothing and 
footwear, a sub-item of "non-durable consumer goods" . On the other 
hand, imports from Japan of chemicals, iron and steel and machinery 
have been rising very rapidly. Consequently, intermediate and ca-
pital goods have become the dominant import groups. 
The composition of imports from other developed countries also 
resembles that of total :Lmports but has been more heavily concent-
rated in capital goods and less so in non-durable consumer goods. 
But the proportionate size of capital goods imports from the United 
States has been declining sharply in contrast to those of total im-
ports and those from Japan. For example, the size of capital goods 
in imports from the United States declined from 40% in 1962 to 36% 
in 1970 and further to 26% in 1972. As a result of this, the Unit-
ed States share in Thailand's total imports of capital goods fell 
from 25% to 15% and to 13% during the same periods. 
As mentioned earlier, Thailand's imports of intermediate and ca-
pital goods have been rising much faster than those of consumer 
goods. Japan has been extremely successful in increasing its share 
of fast-growing imports (i.e. capital goods) and reducing the share 
of slow-growing imports (non-durable consumer goods) • The reverse 
is generally shown for other countries, with the exception of West 
Germany. 
II.l Trade Performance - Analytical Procedure 
The previous discussion suggests that the varying trade perform-
ances of Japan, the United States and other countries in gaining or 
losing shares in Thailand's import market are closely related to: 
1) the commodity composition and 2) the "competitiveness" of these 
countries. An attempt is thus made to measure these factors explain-
ing imports of Thailand from these countries, treating these imports 
as their exports to Thailand. The actual growth rate (a) of, say, 
Japanese exports to Thailand, is partitioned into the following com-
ponents . 4) 
Average growth factor, W This is the trend of total imports of 
Thai-land (or world exports to Thailand) measured by its average 
growth rate . Thus, if Japanese exports to Thailand were to grow 
at this rate, Japan's share in Thailand's imports would remain con-
stant. 
Commodity compositional effect, c = (H-W) Japan's exports to Thai-
land may be more or less concentrated in those commodties which are 
growing rapidly or slowly in Thai import demand. In order to assess 
this influence, a hypothetical growth rate of total exports, H, is 
measured by assuming that, for every given product, exports have 
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risen as rapidly as the average growth of Thai imports. 
ference between H and W would show the effect of Japan's 
composition differing from that of Thai imports and this 
ed as the compositional effect. 
The dif-
commodity 
is def in-
The share effect, P = (A-H) = (P1+P2) In H, the effect of favour-
able or unfavourable commodity composition (hence stagnant or buoy-
ant Thai import demand) is taken into consideration. But the ex-
port growth (A) usually differs from the projected rate . This ad-
ditional export growth or the difference between A and H would in-
dicate whether or not Japan has been able, on the average, to ex-
pand its exports of individual products more rapidly than compet-
ing exporters to Thailand. Since this effect reflects changing ex-
port shares of individual commodities in the Thai market this is 
defined as the share effect, and more broadly as the competitive ef-
fect. 
The share or competitive effect of export growth is influenced 
by the size of imports in which the Japanese share of individual 
commodities changes. But the share may be changing in rapidly or 
slowly growing commodities. Thus, the share effect can be further 
divided into two sub-components, one measured with the initial va-
4) The analytical device is known as the constant-market share rrodel. For 
a good theoretical evaluation of this model, see J.D. Richardson, "Constant 
Market Shares Analysis of Export Growth," Journal of International Econanics, 
I (1971), pp. 227-239 . 
The algebraic formula used is 
- 0 0 0 0 ds = s dM + (Zsk~ - s dM) + (ZdskdMk + Zdsk~) •.•.••... .• .• (1) 
where x, M, and s refer to Japanese exports to Thailand, total imports of 
Thailand, and x/M respectively; exponents 0 and ' denote the initial and end 
periods respectively; and the subscript k, comTOdity k . Although the constant 
market share rrodel is usually discussed in terms of the share, it is useful 
to express it in terms of the growth rate as follows : 
dx = gxo + cz~v{ - gxol + r (dx - zrk~l + czrk~ - Zgk{l J •••• (l ' l 
where g and r are the growth rate of imports with MO and M' as the base and 
end periods respectively. The three right hand terms in each equation corres-
pond to W, C and P (=P1+P2) discussed in the text though all of these terms 
in the text are expressed as a proportion of x0 or the growth rate of exports . 
It is useful to rreasure various effects in terms of the end period struct-
ure, especially when there has been a rapid structural change . One could 
then draw certain conclusions about changing structure on the basis of struc-
tural effects at Thiel points in time. The formula for this , corresponding to 
the equation (l') is as follows: 
dx = rx' + (Zrk~ - rx ' ) + (dx - Zrk~) ....................... (2) 
The difference in (l ' ) and (2) is that the different period of the export st-
ructure is applied and import growth rate is measured differently. Also, 
these equations indicate that in (l ' ), the hypothetical exports of the end 
period are measured assuming the constant export structure of the base period 
are (e.g., gxO) whereas in (2), such exports of the base period are derived 
assuming the constant structure of the end period (e .g ., rx ' ) . 
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lues of imports and other with the changes in these values. The 
former is defined as the pure share effect (P1 ) and the latter, 
the interaction effect (P 2 ). 
In examining bilateral export growth it is useful to compare 
the actual growth of exports (A) with the average growth (W) as 
the difference (A-W) indicates how A has deviated from the world 
trend . This difference is referred to as export performance . 
In explaining export performance, it is reasonable to suppose 
that the commodity compositional effect is affected more by exter-
nal (or Thai) than internal (Japanese) conditions, and vice versa 
for the share effect . 5) That is, external factors (e.g. import 
demand and policies of Thailand), favouring or not favouring the 
particular export structure of Japan is regarded as a major deter-
minant of the compositional effect . On the other hand, the share 
effect is regarded as reflecting competitive position and whether 
and to what extent Japan has kept up with external demand. This 
would also indicate the scope for the country to encourage or dis-
courage (directly and indirectly) its exports through appropriate 
policies . There are many factors associated with "competitiveness ~ 
including not only the price variable but also such non-price vari-
ables as the quality of the product, the speed of delivery, and 
financial arrangements. 
II.2 Trade Performance - Results 
Appendix Table 2 gives the numerical values of trade growth ef-
fects of various countries measured in terms of total imports of 
Thailand consisting of the fifty commodity items . Thailand's im-
ports grew at a simple average rate of 16 . 9% (a compound rate of 
11 . 3%) from 1962 to 1970 . This is 'the average growth effect (W) . 
But Japan's exports rose by 25% per year (a compound rate of 15%), 
thus exceeding the average effect by 8% per year (A-W) . As the 
res~lt of this growth differential , Japan ' s share in the total im-
ports of Thailand increased from 29% in 1962 to 37% in 1970. On 
the other hand, the annual growth rate of United States exports 
to Thailand was 13 . 2% (a compound rate of 9 . 4%), less than the av-
erage growth by 3 . 7%, reducing its share in Thailand's imports from 
17% in 1962 to 14 . 9% in 1970 . The export performance of different 
countries suggests that Japan (and W. Germany to a smaller extent) 
have gained at the expense of the United States, the United Kingdom 
and the rest of the world . 
To expla i n the growth of a country's exports, it is as important 
to examine how its commodi ty share changes as to look at the struct-
ure or composition of its exports . There is one notable feature 
that d i stinguishes the export performance of Japan in the Thai im-
port market from those of o t her developed countries, viz . a negat-
ive commodity compositional effect but a positive shar e or competi-
tive effect . It is somewhat surprising that the growth pattern of 
Thailand's import demand has been, on the average, unfavourable to 
5) This interpretation is only a matter of degree and, for example, the ccrrm:x:li-
ty share of a given item can be altered as a result of such factors as a 
change in the country import quota rather than as a change in the competitive 
position of this export . Also, the comrodity structure of exports can be al-
tered by internal conditions and measures. 
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the export structure of Japan and favourable to other developedcount-
ries . This has had the effect of reduc i ng Japanese exports to Thai-
land by 2.2% per year whereas it has raised the export growth of 
other developed countries by 4 to 7% per year. This unfavourable 
composition has not, however , deterred Japan ' s exports at all, since 
Japan ' s share or competitive effect has been large enough to more 
than offset the negative commodity compositional effect to yield a 
favourable export performance . A sharp contrast with Japan's posi-
tive share effect is the negative value of this effect for all other 
countries. This is especially so for the United Kingdom and the 
United States where negative share effects contributed to the fall 
of their exports by 8 to 10% per year and overwhelmed their favour-
able compositional effects. 
The favourable competitive effec·t of Japanese goods in the Thai 
market is comprised of two components . The first component is the 
pure share effect (P1l reflecting the success of Japan in capturing 
a higher fraction of the Thai import market over time. The second 
is the positive interaction effect indicating the success of Japan 
in diversifying and expanding her exports toward more rapidly grow-
ing items and in reducing its share in less rapidly rising imports. 
This second effect has had an especially large role in the rapid ex-
port expansion of Japan (7 . 8% per year). Thus, Japan, despite an 
unfavourable initial commodity structure, has taken full advantage 
of the changing market opportunities available to her. 
Since the above result is based on all products classified into 
50 items, the numerical values of factors accounting for Japan ' s ex-
port expansion may have been influenced more by certain commodity 
groups than by others. In order to examine the relative strength 
of export performance in different products , the fifty commodities 
here divided into six groups, to produce empi.rical results set out 
in Table 3. Although the average growth effect (W) and actual ex-
port growth (A) of different countries differ by commodity groups, 
the results reveal clearly the relative strength of Japanese exports . 
One finds that a positive difference (A-W) or the favourable export 
performance of Japan and also West Germany is recorded in almost all 
commodity groups. Japan has done poorly only in one group, non-dur-
able consumer products, and West Germany only in durable consumer 
products. In four out of six commodity groups, Japan's export growth 
is greater than that of any of the other countries. 
Referring to the commodity and share effects, what has been said 
about total exports of Japan applies to almost all individual commo-
dity groups. That is, the export structure of Japan, even when in-
dividual commodity groups are considered, has not generally been fa-
vourable to expanding her exports. 6) Two groups, durable consumer 
goods and other commodities , do show a positive C effect but it is 
very small, contributing to export expansion by less than one-half 
6) As mentioned there has been a considerable change in the cormodity make-up of 
Japanese and United States exports to Thailand . In view of these structural 
changes, it is useful to measure two explanatory effects (C and P) with the 
end period structure. This has been done though only for Japanese exports, 
which indicates that when individual cormodity groups are considered, the ne-
gative C effect is sh<:Mn in all groups with the only one exception of the oth-
er cormodity group. Furtherrrore, the P effect in enabling Japan to capture a 
larger fraction of the Thai irrport market is still irrportant, although the 
average growth effect (W) becomes the major expansive force. 
S. NAYA AND N. AKRASANEE l 0 l 
of one percent a year. In the remaining groups, this effect has re-
duced Japanese exports by between 1.7 and 3 . 4% per year. Neverthe-
less, Japan has been able to offset this relatively unfavourable com-
modity effect by the positive competitive effects(s) in all but non-
durable consumer products . In terms of growth rate , the share ef-
fect in capital goods is especially large, raising exports of thi s 
group by a simple annual rate of 31% . In fact, the increase in Jap-
anese exports of this group and intermediate products has comprised 
almost all of its total increase from 1962 to 1970 . 
For other countries listed , the signs of their compositional and 
share effects are generally the ·reve rse of those of Japa n . There 
are , however, some deviations among individual commodity groups . 
For example , a favourable export performance of 3.8 % is shown for 
the United States in durable consumer goods and in non- durable con-
sumer goods to a smaller extent . This performance is associa t ed 
with a negative compositional effect (-1 . 7%) but positive share ef -
fect (5.5%) - the only commodity group in which the share effect is 
positive . But the size of the favourable export performance of the 
U. S . in consumer goods is small, and Thailand's import expansion in 
these goods has been among the smallest . 
Of the factors explaining Japanese export performance, its posi-
tive share effect has been shown to be very influential . In our 
discussion, the positive (negative) share effect has been interpret-
ed as an indication of an improved (worsened) competitive position 
in a given country's exports in relation to those of others . It is 
however, very difficult to pin-point the important determinants of 
"competitiveness" . Obviously, price is an important variable . But 
other factors such as the quality and uniqueness of the good , dist-
ance (transport cost) , the speed of delivery , after-sales-service, 
and commerical and financial ties and arrangements can be important 
factors . 
We have been obliged to me a sure the share effect in trade values , 
although quantity shares would be preferable . To explain the share 
effect in terms of price competitiveness, it is necessary to assume 
that quantity demanded of Thai land ' s imports from a giv en country 
in relation to that fro~ other countries responds well to a change 
in their relative price . More precisely, in terms of our analyt i c-
al framework, the elasticity of substitution between sources of im-
ports must be greater than one . If no t , the measure of the share 
effect may move in the wrong direction from what is suggested by 
the change in r elative competitiveness i . e . , an increase in relative 
prices could lead to an increase in shares . 
Due to certain constraints e . g . , insufficient reliable data, a 
comprehensive inve stigation of the price-quantity relationship has 
not been made . But partial evidence on the value of the elasticity, 
based on selected commodities, is presented below . 
The following nine commodities were selected : electric applianc-
es, radio receivers, television receivers , fertilizers, pesticides, 
tractors, tubes and pipes, buses and trucks, and motor cars . The 
quantity-price relationship for each of these commodities imported 
from Japan has been compared with that from the United States and 
West Germany, the two major competitors of Japan in the Thai market. 
Each of the selected commodities tends to be homogeneous and has re-
latively few 7-digit sub-items, thus reducing the errors involved in 
grouping them. The log-linear regression of the form 
= a 
102 THAILAND'S ECONOMIC RELATION WITH JAPAN AND THE U.S . 
has been estimated where the subscript f refers to the United Stat-
es or West Germany and j refers to Japan . 7) The regression coeffi-
cient b indicates a proportionate change in the quantity ratio giv-
en a similar change in relative prices, or the elasticity of substi-
tution between the respective sources of imports . 
The estimated regression equation is presented in Appendix Table 
4, with R2 and t values given in parenthesis . There are 18 estimat-
ed elasticities of substitution, equally divided into those of Jap-
an and the United States, and Japan and West Germany . The value of 
R2 ranges from 0 . 01 to 0 . 81 . In seven, R2 is only 0 . 3 or less . How-
ever, all estimates of substitution elasticities have the expected 
negative sign, and a great majority of them are larger than one (in 
absolute value). Also , all the b coefficients are statistically 
significant, except two fertilizer coefficients and one for televi-
sion receivers (Japan-W . Germany) . The estimated value of substitu-
tion elasticities implies that the import share is positively corre-
lated with relative competitiveness . If the relative price competi-
tiveness of Japan is improved (worsened) Japan will increase (dec-
rease) its value share of Thailand's imports in the selected commo-
dities . On the other hand, the revaluation of the yen in terms of 
the dollar and the baht in recent years causes the price of Japanese 
goods to be higher to Thai consumers and reduces its relative price 
competitiveness with its major competitor, the United States . 
The relatively low value of R2 suggests that factors other than 
price have an influence in determining the relative share of imports 
in Thailand . As analyzed in the investment section, the pattern and 
growth of Japan ' s direct investment in Thailand and its involvement 
in related areas have the effect of increasing its share in the Thai 
import market . Although without a comprehensive study one can say 
ver y little about the relative importance of non- price factors , such 
financial arrangements as supplier's credits tie certain imports to 
Japan . 
The discussion has thus far dealt with Thailand ' s imports from 
developed countries . Since these are the latters ' exports to Thai-
land , we should also l ook at the trade picture from the other side . 
As is well known, Japan ' s exports during the 1960's grew faster than 
any major developed country in the world . Industrial products , es -
pecially machinery and equipment, chemicals and steel and non-ferr-
ous metals grew at an annual rate in excess of 20 %, shifting the 
commodity structure of Japan ' s exports rapidly toward heavy and 
chemical industrial products . Japan's comparative advantage has 
been shifting toward technologically sophisticated goods for which 
world demand has been buoyant and away from consumer and labour-in-
tensive commodities . 
Japan ' s export performance and penetration into the Thai market, 
therefore, corresponds closely to what Japan has been accomplishing 
in the world market . Nevertheless, comparison of export growths 
suggests that Japan has not done as well in the Thai market as in 
the world market . For example , from 1962-63 to 1972-73, her exports 
to the world grew by 20 % per annum but to Thailand by 14 . 2% . Also, 
of the four one-digit manufactured commodity groups of SITC which 
7) The data used are Thailand's import statistics published by the Department of 
Customs for the year 1960-71 . The price (p) and quantity (q) indices are then 
cc:mputed by using the Paasche formula, for the year 1962 as the base. 
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together comprise a large part of Japan's exports, only in chemicals 
did Japan's exports to Thailand expand faster (though only slightly) 
than its total exports . In the remaining three groups, Japan's ex-
ports to Thailand grew considerably less than its total exports. 
Consequently, the proportion of exports directed to Thailand, which 
has not been large, went down considerably (e.g. from 3.2% in 1962-
63 to only 1 . 9% in 1972-73) . Thus, where as Thailand has become 
more dependent on its imports from Japan, Japan's reliance on exports 
to Thailand has decreased . 
U. S . exports to Thailand have been extremely small, only about 
one-third of one percent of the farmer's total exports. Total ex-
ports grew by 10 .4 % per year from 1962-63 to 1972-73, or only one 
half of the rate of Japanese export growth . During the same period, 
American export expansion to Thailand was 9 . 4% a year, or slightly 
less than that of total exports . Thus, the loss of export share for 
the United States was not unique to Thailand's market alone . But 
it was in manufactured groups that United States exports to Thailand 
grew far less than total exports . During the period from 1962-63 to 
1972-73, exports to Thailand expanded only 5.9% a year in contrast 
with 10.8% for its total exports . As discussed earlier, in these 
manufactured products, Japan out-competed the United States (and 
some other countries) , capturing a larger share of the expanding 
Thai market . 
III. Thailand's Exports to Japan and the United States 
In sharp contrast to its imports, Thailand's exports have always 
been concentrated in agricultural and other primary products. Ex-
ports of primary goods still comprise more than 80% of total exports 
and are dominated by a relatively small number of commodities. Dur-
ing the 1960's, two-thirds of exports were accounted for by the four 
items, rice, maize, rubber and tin . But over the years, a consider-
able degree of diversification has taken place . The diversification 
until the late 1960's was largely within the primary products group 
with fish, kenaf, fruits, teak and maize growing substantially to 
offset in part the slow growth of exports such as rubber and rice . 
In recent years, however, the basket of exports has begun to include 
a number of very rapidly growing manufactured products of light in-
dustrial origin e.g. textile fabrics, clothing, and wood products . 
The leading markets of Thailand, as of most other developing Asi-
an countries, are Japan and the United States, together absorbing 
about 35% of total exports. There are, however, substantial differ-
ences in the growth and commodity pattern of Thai exports to these 
two countries. Thai exports to Japan have grown more rapidly than 
its total exports as well as its exports to the United States. For 
example, as indicated in Table 5, these exports rose by 15.4% a year 
from 1962-63 to 1972-73, in comparison to 10.7% for the total exports. 
Consequently, the proportion of total exports directed to Japan rose 
from 16 .8% to 25.6% during the same period, although this is still 
considerably smaller than the degree of Thai import dependency on 
Japan. The size of the United States market is substantially small-
er and less than half that of Japan (i .e. 10 . 2% in 1972-73). Thai 
exports to the United States, as well as these exports as a percent 
of total exports, have been fluctuating much more widely than those 
to Japan (although they have been growing steadily since 1970). In 
the early 1950's, as much as 35% of total exports went to the Unit-
ed States in comparison with only about 11% to Japan. In the past 
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12 years or so, however , these exports have grown relatively fast 
and also faster than have total export, i.e. 13 . 2% and 10 . 7% respec-
tively from 1962-63 to 1972-73 . 
These trends reflect the forces of both complementary and compe-
titive specialization . A vertical trading pattern is implied between 
Japan and Thailand as for other South East Asian countries . The 
primary products of Thailand and Southeast Asia are greatly demand-
ed in resource- scarce Japan, whereas some of these same products en-
counter considerable competition in and from the United States . 
As shown in Table 5 in the Appendix , the composition of Thai ex-
ports to Japan is basically similar to that of total exports and is 
concentrated mostly in food and live animals (SITC 0) and crude mat-
erials (SITC 2) . During the 1960 ' s and since, a large proportion 
of new primary and agricultural commodities belonging to SITC O,i.e . 
corn, fish, fruits, have been directed to Japan . On the other hand , 
rice, once a major export to Japan , has virtually disappeared, as 
Japan ' s rice policy has helped to expand domestic production and 
eliminate imports . 
The commodity make-up of Thai exports to the United States has 
been much more concentrated in crude materials than that of its tot-
al exports and of exports to Japan. Two sub-items of this group , 
rubber and tin, have typically comprised a large share of total ex-
ports to the United States . 
As with other Southeast Asian countries, exports of manufactures 
are still very small. But these products are proportinately even 
smaller in exports to Japan than total exports whereas the reverse 
is shown to be the case for Thai exports to the United States . Ma-
nufactued products in recent years have, nevertheless, shown the 
most impressive growth rate and are emerging as a very important 
source of export expansion . These exports to Japan grew at the re-
markable rate of 73% per year and, to the United States 38% from 
1962-63 to 1972- 73 , although they started from very small values . 
III .l Thai Export Performance in Japan and the United States 
Presented in this section are statistical results on how internal 
and external factors may have contributed to the growth of exports 
to Japan and the United States, using the same analytical device as 
that of Section II . l. In computing various effects of export per-
formance, import data (the three digit SITC items) of Japan and the 
United States are used , i . e ., treating United States imports from 
Thailand as the latter ' s exports to the former . In all computations, 
the standard with which Thai exports are compared is not total im-
ports but only a respective subset of Japanese and United States im-
ports or those commodities which these countries imported from Thai -
land . 8) 
Table 6 gives a summary finding on Thai exports to Japan and to 
the United States . Two sets of computational results are presented : 
set A based on the export structure of the initial period (1962 - 63) 
and set B based on the end period (1972-73) . Also, each set contains 
the result based on total exports (SITC 0-9), on exports of primary 
8) The reason is that since Thailand exports only a limited range of cormodities 
it is m::ire meaningful to canpare Thai perfonnance and structure with those 
supplying similar goods to these two countries . 
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products (SITC 0-4) and on exports of manufactured products (SITC 
5-8). 
Referring first to total export performance given in set A, a 
number of interesting points are shown in the table. Total imports 
of Japan and also of the United States have grown very rapidly, serv-
ing as an expansionary factor for Thai exports. Pulled by this high 
average growth effect (W) , Thai exports have risen by a very respect-
able rate, a simple average annual rate of 28.6% (a compound rate 
of 14.5%) to Japan and 24.5% (a compound rate of 13.2%) to the Unit-
ed States. The average growth effect of Japan has been substantial-
ly larger than that of the world average, especially in primary pro-
ducts. This has been a major factor behind the faster expansion of 
exports of Thailand (and other countries) to Japan than to the U. S . 
and the rest of the world . Nevertheless, Thai export growth to Ja-
pan falls short of Japan's average effect by 12% ( a compound rate 
of 3 . 2%) whereas the reverse is shown in the United States market, 
or A exceeds W by 4 . 9% (a compound rate of 1.8%) . Consequently, 
the share of Thai goods in total imports has declined in Japan but 
risen slightly in the United States . 
The most revealing aspect is the large negative value shown in 
the commodity compositional effect in sharp contrast with the large 
positive value of the share effect for both countries . The pattern 
of Japanese and American import growth has been unfavourable to the 
structure of Thai exports, deterring its export expansion . Thai ex-
ports are highly concentrated in relatively slow-growing items of 
their imports . The unfavourable commodity compositional effect has 
reduced the growth rate of Thai exports to Japan by as much as 24% 
(a compound rate of about 12%) and td the United States by 10.6% (a 
compound rate of 5.7%) per year. 
One might suspect that this extremely unfavourable commodity com-
positional effect has been due to the combined treatment of both 
primary and manufactured products. After all, the pessimistic view 
concerning export prospects is often related to the contrasting 
growth trends of these two commodity categories. Surprisingly, how-
ever a proportionateJy greater deterring influence of this effect 
is shown in exports of primary products than in all products . This 
effect has lowered exports of primary products to Japan by as much 
as 18.8 percent per year (a compound rate of 2.3%) and to the Unit-
ed States by 5.9% (a compound rate of about 3.7%), i.e., even when 
primary products alone are considered, the growth pattern of Japan-
ese and American imports has been unfavourable to the structure of 
Thai exports. It is interesting that this negative effect is con-
siderably larger for Thai exports to Japan than to the U.S. This 
large deterrent effect indicates that the problem of increasing 
Thai exports is extremely difficult, especially because this effect 
is influenced more by economic factors and forces originating from 
Japan and from the United States than from Thailand. · 
In contrast to the unfavourable compositional effect, a large 
positive share or competitive effect is encouraging. As previously 
noted, the positive (or negative) share effect measures the impact 
of the growth rate of exports in individual commodities exceeding 
(or falling short of) that of respective Japanese and American im-
ports. Thai exports to Japan and the United States have grown as 
much as 12% and 15.6% (a compound rate of about 2.9% and 4.5%), re-
spectively, due to the share effects. Of total export increases to 
Japan and the United States 40% ~nd 63% respectively, are accounted 
for by this effect. The share effect has, to a large extent, off-
set the unfavorable commodity effect and had a great influence in 
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sustaining export growth . In short, given the unfavorable commodity 
effect, the ability of Thailand to keep up with foreign import demand, 
or to increase the market shares of individual commodities, appears 
to be a very important factor behind its export growth . The inter-
action term comprises almost one half of the total share or competi-
tive effect for Thai exports to Japan and even a larger percentage 
for Thai exports to the U.S . , reflecting the success of Thailand in 
raising (lowering) its export share in more rapidly (slowly) growing 
items. 
The share effect in exports to Japan is found to be positive for 
almost all individual commodities (SITC three digit). Among primary 
commodities, those which have made a relatively large contribution 
to the share effect of total exports include such items as meat, 
fish, fruits, vegetables, rubber, rough wood (SITC 242) and jute. 
Japanese imports from the world of such items as fish and vegetables 
have grown very rapidly while others, e.g., rubber and jute, have 
been stagnant. For each of these items, Thai exports to Japan have 
grown faster than the respective imports of Japan from the world. 
In several other commodities, however, Thailand has failed to main-
tain its export share, e.g. in maize, and skin, wood simply worked 
(SITC 243) and oil seeds, nuts and kernels (SITC 221). In the case 
of rice, total Japanese imports and imports from Thailand have fall-
en absolutely . 
A similar result is found in the share effect of Thai exports to 
the U.S . as of those to Japan . Among individual commodities, fish, 
fruits, vegetables and tin have accounted for a large part of the 
positive share effect of primary product exports. On the other hand, 
United States imports of rubber and crude vegetable materials have 
been stagnant while these imports from Thailand have grown even less, 
thereby reducing the value of the share effect. 
Turning now to a brief analysis of manufactured exports, an im-
pressive rate of Thai export growth is clearly revealed by the data. 
Not surprisingly, the average trend factor W, which is 121% for Jap-
an and 27.8% for the United States (a compound rate of 29% and 14% 
respectively), has played a large expansionary role. But unlike pri-
mary products, exports of manufactures to Japan and the United Stat-
es have risen at a simple annual rate of over 400% and 200%, respec-
tively, which far exceeds the average trends. Although the composi-
tional effect is not shown to be favourable for both Japan and the 
United States, its negative influence is small in comparison with 
that of primary products. The export performance is (mainly) explain-
ed by the strikingly large share effect, accounting for about 90% of 
the total increase in manufactured exports to Japan and the United 
States. 
An examination of individual commodities reveals that exports of 
Thai manufactures to Japan began to include such products as wool 
products, paper, textile and woven fabrics, clothing and precious 
stones in the late 1960's and have been rising rapidly since then. 
The exports of these products have grown faster than have the respec-
tive imports of Japan, accounting for the positive share effect of 
Thailand . In terms of individual commodity make up, the share effect 
of Thai exports to the United States is basically similar to those 
to Japan. As previously mentioned, Thai exports to the United Stat-
es contain a greater proportion of manufactures than do Thai exports 
to Japan. But, as in the case of primary products, manufactured ex-
ports to the United States are more concentrated in a few items than 
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those to Japan. For example , in 1972-73, clothing accounted for 47% 
of total manufactured exports to the United States whereas this item 
was no more than 2% of such exports to Japan . 
Discussion has so far been based on results given in Set A measur-
ed with the export structure of the initial period. But in this per-
iod values of many export products, especially those of manufactures, 
were very small or did not exist at all. This tends to give an up-
ward bias to the share effect . Also, to assess future export growth 
patterns, it is more relevant to examine various effects measured 
with the present or end period structure . When this is done, as 
shown in Set B of Table 6, a somewhat different picture emerges . 
First, one finds a large improvement, though still negative, in 
the compositional effects of total and primary exports to Japan and 
to the United States. Also, this effect in manufactured exports to 
Japan is, though small, no longer negative. In other words, the 
Thai export structure has been shifting and becoming less unf avour-
able in relation to the import pattern of Japan and of the United 
States . Secondly, the favourable share or competitive effects, es-
pecially of manufactured exports to both countries, are not as domi-
nant as in the first set of the computations . Finally, referring 
to manufactured exports , the average import growth effect (W) of Ja-
pan and the United States is shown to be the most important factor 
for export expansion. 
IV Size and Type of Japanese and American Investments in Thailand 
The overall presence of Japanese and American economic influenc-
es on the Thai economy is felt, not only in bilateral· trade, but al-
so in the large inflow of Japanese and American capital (both private 
and official), as well as in the interaction of trade and capital . 
Japanese and American businesses and enterprises have been partici-
pating in production and service activities in Thailand through 
their ownership of capital investments and lending of financial ca-
pital . The influence of Japanese and American investment has spread 
out over many types of business activities, e.g., manufacturing,con-
struction, banking , and hotel and restaurant operations. They are, 
however, different in their areas of interest. This section describ-
es the size and types of Japanes e and of American private investment 
and capital flow. Implications of the impact of these investments 
on Thailand's trade with Japan and the U.S. are considered in the 
next section . 
IV.l Japanese and American Capital in Promoted Industries 
It is commonly held in Thailand that Japan has been the leading 
source of private foreign investment. This is often confirmed by 
the data published by the Board of Investment. As shown in ~able 7 
registered capital owned by all fdreign sources accounts for 28.8% 
of total (domestic and foreign) registered capital of all firms 
granted promotional certificates from October 1960 to December 1974 . 
9) The size of foreign registered capital is less than in some of 
Thailand's neighbouring countries . But the Japanese share is sub-
stantilly larger than any of the individual foreign sources. Of all 
foreign registered capital, 41.6% is comprised of Japanese capital, 
9) This percentage declined slightly ~ran that at the end of the previous year, 
which was 31%. See Naya and Akrasanee, op.cit., p . 44. 
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while this share for the United States is 14.6% and for the Republic 
of China, 12.3%.10) American capital ranks second, but is less than 
one-half of Japanese capital. In terms of total (domestic and for-
eign) registered capital of all promoted firms, Japanese capital 
comprises only 11.96% . Table 7 also shows that most of Japanese 
registered capital is in joint ventures . Registered capital owned 
solely by Japanese is 15.2% of total capital and 5% of total capital 
owned by one country . But when the registered capital of these pro-
moted manufacturing firms in which Japanese investment entered be-
tween October 1960 to June 1973 is considered, the Japanese share 
increases to 54 .3% (see Table 8). Also, 74.1% of total Japanese 
capital is in those enterprises in whi9h the Japanese share exceeds 
50% or more. When registered capital from the United States is con-
sidered, the share in joint ventures is larger than that of Japanese 
registered capital, i.e. 93%. For the United States, registered 
capital solely owned by one country is less than 1% of the total . 
But for promoted firms in which American investment entered, the 
proportionate shares of registered capital are on the average even 
greater than those of Japanese, whereas the United Kingdom share is 
smaller. 
Given the overall Japanese and American shares, there is a con-
siderable variation in individual industries. In Tables 9(a) and 
(b), the registered capital and total investment (assets) of manu-
facturing firms with Japanese and American participation are classi-
fied according to the four digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification . In 10 cases out of 30, the Japanese share of regis-
tered capital exceeds 50 % (as of June 1973). In the remaining 20 
industries the share falls below 50%, although in four of them the 
share is 49%, and only in five cases is the Japanese share 30% or 
less. These figures do not refer to individual firms . Neverthe-
less, they do suggest that, in most cases in which Japanese firms 
have invested, they hold a large share of registered capital. But 
when firms with United States investment are considered it is found 
that they hold an even larger share of registered capital. Out of 
the 25 industries listed in Table 9(b), the United States share of 
registered capital exceeds 50% in 18 industries; in only one indust-
ry is the United States share less than 30%. These findings imply 
that, in industries in which the United States and Japan have in-
vested, they tend to hold a larger share of registered capital. 
Although Japanese investments are found in a variety of indust-
rial sectors, they have been concentrated in certain selected in-
dustries . The largest investment has been in textiles and apparel, 
followed by chemicals (including tyres and tubes in this group) and 
by fabricated products. These three industries accounted for 87% 
of total Japanese registered capital, although the share of textile 
and apparels alone was 52% (as of June 1973) . Japanese firms have, 
thus far, tended to concentrate their investments on those activiti-
es commonly regarded as traditional and small scale industries, e.g . 
textiles. On the other hand, American firms have tended to concent-
rate relatively more of their investments on chemicals and basic 
metals, and far less on textiles than Japanese firms.11) In terms 
10) Note that despite the anti-Japanese rrovement and the talk about declining Jap-
anese interest, the share of Japanese registered capital in all foreign capit-
al increased fran 37% at the end of 1973 to 41.6% at the end of 1974. See 
Naya and Akrasanee, ibid., p.40. 
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of sub-sectoral or four digit classifications, thread and yarn, and 
textile fabrics accounted for 20 . 1% and 26.3%, respectively, of the 
total registered capital owned by Japanese firms. The next twolarg-
est were synthetic resins and related products, 10.2% and motor ve-
hicles , 7.6% (followed by iron and steel, fertilizers, radio and 
communications equipment and tyres and tubes) . For United States 
investment non-ferrous metal accounted for 23 . 1% of the total regis-
tered capital. This was followed by tyres and tubes (15 . 9%) and 
petroleum refinery (10 . 6%) . 
The above discussion suggests that Japan has been the leading 
source of foreign investment in Thailand. But what has been compar-
ed is the size of foreign investments in terms of registered capital 
of only promoted firms . When the record of the balance of payments 
statistics compiled by the Bank of Thailand is examined, a somewhat 
different picture of the relative size of foreign investment is re-
vealed . According to this record (to be presented in the next sub-
section) the United States is shown as the leading source of net 
direct foreign investment with Japan being a close second . 
The discrepancy in these two sources of data ar i ses from the use 
of different definitions of foreign investment as well as the d if f -
erent purposes for which such data are collected. The coverage in 
the balance of payments statistics is broader and more inclusive 
than that of the Board of Investment data. Registered capital ref-
ers to the approved amounts of capital of those business enterpris -
es receiving investment promotion certificates . It is related to, 
but falls short of, the concept of stockholder ' s equity or netv-urth . 
Registered capital indicates, albeit incompletely, certain shares 
in ownership by the holders of such capital. But for various rea-
sons, the extent to which individual holders will have actual cont-
rol over management, operational and other business decisions can 
not be easily determined by the relative size of their capital hold-
ing alone. For example, the foreign ownership of the registered 
capital in a joint venture may be comparatively small but a large 
amount of loans may come from the same foreign source. In such a 
case, the foreign participant may have a greater degree of control 
over the policies of the firm than is implied by the size of the 
equity holding . 
IV.2 Flows of Foreign Private Capital 
From the Bank of Thailand's balance of payments statistics, the 
flows of private medium and long term capital, classified by broad 
types, are shown in Table 10 . They refer to accumulated values of 
capital flows from 1965 to 1974 . Although there have been consider-
able yearly fluctuations, Thailand has received a large amount of 
foreign capital over the years . From 1965 to 1974 total inflow 
(credit) was 47 . 5 billion baht, offset by total outflow (debit) of 
27 . 5 billion baht, to yield a net inflow of 20.0 billion baht. The 
two largest foreign sources are the United States and Japan respect-
ively, accounting for 31 . 7% and 30 . 9% of the total net balance of 
11) For corrparison on the scale of manufacturing between Japanese and American 
firrnp, see Lawrence R. Krause, Evaluation of Foreign Direct Investment : the 
U. S. and Japan, Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1973, and Donald R. Sherk, For-
eign Investment in Asia: Cooperatiop and Conflict between the U.S. and Japail, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, October, 1973. 
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capital flow . Although the i n flow of capital has taken different 
forms, direct investment has been the s ingle largest contributing 
item for net total capital inflow from all foreign sources as well 
as from Japan and the United States . This investment (including 
equity and loans) accounted f or 60 .. 4% o f total capital , whereas the 
Japanese component of this capital is smaller at 59 . 5% and the Unit-
ed States component larger at 70.1% than the national average. As 
in the case of total capital inflow, the accumulated net inflow of 
direct investment from the United States (4.4 billion baht) is larg-
er than that from Japan (3.7 billion baht) by almost a billion baht . 
This finding is rather surprising and contrary to our expectations . 
It is the equity investment (not total direct investment) given 
in Table 10 tha t is most comparable to the registered capital of 
promoted firms in Table 7 . The comparison of these two investments 
indicates that total Japanese ownership of the registered capital 
(1.544 billion baht) is substantially smaller than the 49.8% of ac-
cumulated net inflow of equity investment from Japan from 1965 to 
1974 (3 . 101 billion baht) . This proportion for Japan is, however, 
larger than that of the national average (39.3%) and in particular, 
larger than that of the United States (15 . 1%) . 12) Since the defini-
tion and coverage. of these two investment statistics differ, these 
proportions do not indicate the relative size of foreign capital re-
ceiving investment privileges . The registered capital is only that 
of promoted firms and does not include paid-up capital, whereas the 
equity investments are those of all firms and individuals and for 
accumulated flows only from 1965 to 1974 . But they do suggest that , 
as a whole, Japanese firms have been concentrating their investment 
effort relatively more on those business ventures receiving promot-
ional certificates and encouraged by national investment policies 
than have other foreign firms as a group . This is so, not only re-
latively, but also absolutely . As mentioned before, the size of 
promoted registered capital owned by Japanese is the largest of all 
foreign sources and is twice as large as that of the second leading 
investor, the United States . 
There is another interesting aspect of capital transactions when 
their credit and debit balances are examined separately . Unlike the 
case of the net balance, it is Japan, not the United States, which 
has the top position in the size of these balances . Japan has been 
the leading supplier o f gross capital into, and also the leading re-
cipient of capital outflow from , Thailand, accounting for 35.6% and 
39 . 0% respectively, with the United States shares being 25 . 1% and 
20.2%. The explanatio n for this is found in the composition and 
movement of different forms of capital flows , especially in the flow 
of suppl i ers' credit from Japan . 
As seen in Table 10 a flow of capital is stimulated not by direct 
investments but by loans and credits . By direct investment, a " pe r-
manent" interest in the operations of a business enterprise is pre-
sumably being established . Reflecting this and other factors, e . g . , 
a favourable investment climate in the past , the movement of direct 
and especially equity investment has mostly been a one-way flow in-
to Thailand. For example , from 1965 to 1974, 3 . 2 billion baht of 
equity capital came in from Japan but only 64 million baht went to 
Japan . The latter is only 2% of the former . The national average 
is 5 . 9%, while the United States average is 6 . 7% . The same cannot be 
said for the other two major categories of cap·i tal flows, namely 
12) The United States ratio is unexpectedly and surprisingly low. 
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loans and suppliers' credits. They are of a transitory nature, and 
repayments have to be made s oon, although the maturity may be more 
than one year . This is well reflected in the movement of these two 
types of capital - a large inflow combined with a large outflow and 
each flow exceeding that of direct investment by an overwhelming 
margin. Especially noteworthy is the movement of suppliers' credit 
from and to Japan . It is in this field of suppliers ' credit that 
Japan has surpassed all . Of total capital inflow from Japan between 
1965 and 1974, 67 . 4% was suppliers' credit, and the repayment of 
such credits accounts for 90 . 9% of total capital outflow to Japan . 
Also, suppliers' credit from and to Japan, respectively comprises 
about 54 . 3% and 57.1% of total flows of capital into and out of Thai-
land . 
These observations on suppliers ' credit as well as on other capi-
tal flows are based on accumulated yearly flows from 1965 to 1974. 
This is, misleading, however, especially for the movement of Japan-
ese suppliers' credit since they appear to have been discontinued 
in 1973 . After reaching a peak value of over 2 billion baht in 1970 
and 1971, the inflow of this capital from Japan fell drastically , 
being only 111 . 7 million baht in 1973 or only about 5% of the peak 
value . But it went up again to 665 . 8 million baht in 1974 . On the 
debit side, repayment declined from 1 . 6 b i llion baht in ' l970 to800 . 7 
million baht in 1974 . As the outflow has begun to exceed the inflow, 
there has been a net debit balance with Japan in suppliers' credit 
for the first time, minus 235 and minus 876 million baht respective-
ly in 1972 and 1973. However, the net debit balance fell to minus 
134 . 9 million baht in 1974 . It is not yet known whether the inflow 
of supplier's credit will continue to grow after its ~evival in 1974 . 
If that is the case, the role of suppliers' credit will become im-
portant again, just as it was during the period from 1967-1972 . 
V. TRADE AND INVESTMENT INTERACTION 
It has been concluded earlier that Japan has been successful in 
riding with the changing structure of Thailand ' s imports while the 
United States has not done so well . Imports from Japan have chang-
ed considerably over the years. They now consist mostly of indust-
rial raw materials , and of machinery and equipment, which support 
Thailand ' s growing domestic industries . Imports from the United 
States are quite similar to those from Japan, but the United States 
has not been able to compete with J apan i n capturing the Thai mar-
ket . Perhaps , as will be discuss e d below, this is due to the compe-
titiv e stre ng t h of Japanese products, but this can explain only part 
of the story . A more important f ac t or is the link between imports 
from Japan and its investment . The content of financial flows from 
Japan and its l arge investment in promote d industries hav e had an 
obvious impact on Thailand ' s bilateral trade pattern with Ja~an . 
The complaint is often heard that Japanese direct investments 
have contributed to import growth but have not done very much to ex-
pand Thai exports. There is a great deal of truth in this complaint , 
but this depends very much on the period under consideration . As 
much as one half of imports under suppliers ' credit is known to be 
related to those enterprises receiving privileges of investment pro-
motion . Also , as indicated below, a large amount of imports is re-
lated to Japanese direct investment. Exports of promoted industri-
es as a whole have been relatively small, although certain items , 
e . g . textile products, are beginning to be shipped abroad . Japanese 
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trading firms are highly linked to, and directly involved in, invest-
ment ventures. With their trading networks well established all 
over the world, they can play a significant part in export expansion. 
It appears, however, they have just begun to do so within the last 
2-3 years.13) 
American firms have tended to invest relatively more in industri-
es for exports . American investment in import-competing industries 
does not appear to have a link to Thai imports from the United Stat-
es. 
Decisions on foreign investment are influenced not only by domes-
tic conditions but also by conditions and government policies of the 
host country. In the 1960's, Thailand pushed policies of development 
biased toward import substitution, by means of investment incentives 
and tariff protection . As a result investment was heavily concent-
rated on products chiefly for consumption, and on the assembly of 
consumer durables. Most of the firms awarded promotion certificates 
had proposed to produce goods for the domestic market. It is import-
ant to recognize that all of the promoted investment projects with 
foreign participation were approved by government authorities. Thus, 
the pattern and effects of Japanese and American investment need to 
be viewed in this · over-all policy context, which Thailand is current-
ly reassessing . 
V.l Suppliers' Credit and Direct Investment 
Suppliers' credit channels imports of various products without 
requiring immediate payment for them. These credits have been grant-
ed mainly for the purpose of financing imports of raw materials, 
plant and equipment for promoted industries and of motorcars. As 
shown in Table 11, 8.5% of total imports of Thailand during the per-
iod from 1966 to 1973 were financed by suppliers' credit . At the 
peak level of these credits in 1969 to 1971, they supported over 12 % 
of Thailand's total imports. Considering the fact that close to 60% 
of total credits had come from Japan, they could have very well fi-
nanced more than 20% of the total imports from Japan.14) Subsidized 
by the Japanese government, suppliers' credit has clearly been a pow-
erful means to promote exports . Since the practice is not used by 
the United States to the same extent, suppliers' credit has been a 
relatively less important source of financing Thailand's imports from 
that country. 
To the extent that interest rates charged on suppliers' credit 
are lower than those on commercial loans, there is an aid element 
in such credits as well as for other subsidized loans . There is an 
economic gain accruing to individual Thai recipients of such credits . 
But there is a resource allocation effect which may not be socially 
desirable. The benefits mostly go to relatively large investors 
13) M:lre recently, as sh= earlier, there has been a rapid expansion in ffi31lufac-
tured exports (of a relatively S!!13.ll number of items) fran Thailand to Japan 
and the United States . It is not known whether these exports were carried 
out by Japanese or American invested firms . 
14) The Japanese share of imports was about 30%. Since suppliers' credit from 
Japan financed about 7% (12 x 60) of Thailand's total imports, and assuming 
that it only financed imports from Japan, then it should ac=unt for about 
23% of imports from Japan. 
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(e . g . those investing in large-scale manufacturing for import sub-
stitution, transportation, heavy construction, and modern hotels) 
at the expense of small investors, and to consumers of imported dur -
ables, e.g. passenger cars . Since imported capital goods, e.g . , 
equipment and machines, are financed by suppliers ' credit , the use 
of capital is subsidized and encouraged . 15) Another questionable 
long-run effect is that, even after the practice has been disconti -
nued, imports tied to a given source often sustain their own . demand , 
due to the need for new replacements and spare parts . 
Direct investment does not imply the type of trade dependence 
that suppliers' credit does . But it does imply a different degree 
of control over industry . Japanese firms probably tend to have 
more indirect control and American firms more direct control over 
the businesses in which they hav e inv ested . 
V . 2 Japanese and Amer·ican Investment and the Foreign Trade of Thai-
land 
The motivations of Japanese firms inve sting 
vestigated by the Export-Import Bank of Japan . 
tical summaries, "Sales Objectives of Japanese 
East Asia, East Asia and Developing Areas", is 
below. 
abroad have been in-
One o f its statis-
Investment in South-
shown in ' the table 
Sales Objectives of Japanese Foreign Investment in Manufactures* 
Objectives S . E . Asia E . Asia Developing Asia 
1 . Market protection related 
to exporting difficulties 
2 . New ventures 
3. Sales expansion 
4. Exports 
to Japan 
to other areas 
5. Others 
Total % 
(Number of enterprises) 
31. 3 
16 . 4 
35.8 
15.0 
7.5 
7.5 
1. 5 
100 . 0 
(67) 
12 . 0 
16.2 
24 . 8 
45.3 
12.8 
32 . 5 
1. 7 
100.0 
(117) 
19.3 
17 . 4 
30.0 
31. 9 
10.6 
21. 3 
1. 4 
100 . 0 
(207) 
* Based on approved investment ventures by Japanese government in 
1968 and 1969 . 
Source: JETRO, White Paper on Overseas Market 1972: Present Condi-
tions of Overseas Investment, p.8, quoting Export Import 
Bank of Japan Information 1971 . 
Two interesting and relevant points stand out . First, the domi-
nant motives for investment in Southeast Asia are either to maintain 
or to increase exports. The extent of these motives is shown to be 
considerably larger for their investment in Southeast Asia than that 
in East Asia or in developing areas as a group . Secondly, exports 
back to Japan or to other areas played a very small role in their 
15) The Japanese policies of using suppliers' credit as a means to prorrote ex-
ports fran Japan and the concentration of Japanese investment in import sub-
sti tution industries have been criticized by Atsushi Murakami . See his pa-
per, Econanic Policies of Japan toward Developing Asian Countries - The Role 
of Japan in Economic Cooperation , Paper presented at SEADAG Conference , Bang-
kok, 20-22 January , 1972 . 
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decision to invest in Southeast Asia, althoug h this factor is shown 
to be the most important consideration fo r their inv estment in East 
Asia . What is suggested by these two points is that Japanese invest-
ment in Southeast Asia tends to be import- but not export- inducing 
to the region.16) 
This finding relates to the whole Southeast Asian region and not 
to Thailand alone . Variables considered are not only loosely defin-
ed but also interdependent on each other, and no statistical signi-
ficance is given . But the finding confirms the partial evidence 
available about Thailand . 
Table 12 shows the value of domestic and imported raw materials 
and machinery used by a selected grou~ of 53 firms with Japanese in-
vestment participation in 1971 . From the Table it is apparent that 
the production of commodities in these industries had to rely heavi-
ly on imported raw materials which, most likely, came from Japan . 
For example, 61.7% of raw materials in iron and steel industries 
were imported . The proportion of imported materials was 70% for 
rubber products, 74 . 2% for consumer electrical goods, 80 . 9% for 
glass products, 82.4% for the motor vehicle industry, and as high 
as 97 . 4% for chemical materials . The textile industry, the largest 
Japanese investment, also imported a large proportion of raw mater-
ials . For exampie, 41 .8% of the raw materials in the production of 
textile fabrics and 33 . 3% in thread and yarn industries were import-
ed . In the textile articles industry, however, domestic materials 
constituted 91 . 0% of the total . 
In addition to imported raw materials , imported machinery and 
spare parts for Japanese-invested firms also registered a very large 
volume (see Table 12 (a)) . For example, 9 firms producing textile fabrics .i.rrq:ort-
ed 709 million baht or 78% of the total value of machinery and spare parts 
used by these firms. Most machinery and spare parts in other firms 
were also imported. This, together with the import demand for raw 
materials, has contributed significantly to the increase in demand 
for imports during the last decade . 
We have not been able to obtain comparable data on the sales ob-
jectives o f American foreign investors. American firms appear to 
rely on imported raw materials and machinery just as much as Japan-
ese firms . Table 12 (b) shows the value of raw materials and machi-
nery used by selected industries with United States investment in 
1971 . For raw materials, the proportion in value terms of imported 
raw materials ranged from 53% for iron and steel to 100% for synthe-
tic fibre, if we exclude the food industry. The use of imported ma-
chinery and spare parts was also large in these industries, as ex-
pected (see Table 12 (b)) . 
That Japanese investments in Southeast Asia have thus far not con-
tributed much to the region ' s exports appears to be the case for Thai-
land alone . In 1972, total exports of all promoted industrial firms 
(both domestic and foreign) were reported to be 3,728.3 million baht 
according to the Board of Investment. Of this total only 18.6% was 
destined to Japan in contrast with 34 . 4% to the u.s . 17) Although 
16) This was true at the end of the 1960's . In recent years it seems the export 
rrotive has also beccrne rrore .i.rrq:ortant in_Japanese investment in South East 
Asia. Unfortunately the authors have not yet been able to obtain data to 
verify this observation. 
17) Udom Kerdpibule, "Thailand ' s Experience with Multinational Corporations," 
Department of Econanics, Kasetsart University, June 1974, p . 2 (mimeo.) 
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these figures refer to exports of all firms (e . g . , including exports 
of Japanese trading firms to the United States), they do indicate 
that exports of promoted firms directed to Japan were small both 
relatively and absolutely . 
According to surveys by the Board of Investment and by the Japa-
nese Chamber of Commerce, exports comprised only about 5 . 5% of to-
tal sales made by Japanese firms and Japanese ventures in 1972 (see 
Table 13). This contrast rather sharply with exports of United Stat-
es firms and joint ventures, which shipped almost 40% of their total 
sales abroad in the same year . But this high figure comes almost 
solely from a high export-sales ratio of 49 . 77% of a single commodi-
ty group , mineral and ceramic products . (The ratio for Japanese-
based firms in the same commodity group is only 6 . 6% . ) 
The Japanese have invested heavily in textile and related indust-
ries, not only in Thailand but also in other Asian countries. Ex-
ports from this type of relatively light and labour- intensive indus-
try can be potentially very large . They have been a dynamic source 
of export expansion for countries such as Korea and Taiwan. As shc:Mn 
earlier, Thailand ' s manufactured exports , consisting largely of such 
products as textiles , wood products and precious stones , have just 
begun in recent years, and a large volume went to Japa~ and to the 
United States . But a more detailed investigation is required to 
identify the types of firms which have carried out these exports . 18) 
Nevertheless , based on the data shown in Table 13, it appears that 
the proportion of exports to total sales of textiles by Japanese 
firms in 1972 was still less than 10% . · 
The findings that Japanese firms induce -imports and do not export 
their products very much does not , of course, mean that they do not 
contribute to the Th~i economy . One case study on the textile in-
dustry finds that the relative contributions of foreign firms, as 
measured by indices such as output, local employment, the use of 
scarce resources and taxes, was larger than that of purely domestic 
firms . 19) The group of those textile firms with a foreign majority 
capital share, mostly Japanese-controlled firms , was the most effi-
cient user of a given amount of scarce resources . However, whatever 
the efficiency or economic contribution of Japanese firms may be, 
there is one important drawback : Japanese direct investments have 
been serving as a means of import substitution rather than export 
promotion for Thailand . 20) 
Another i nteresting aspect of Japanese investment is the amount 
of profits and dividends remitted abroad , although it may be too 
early to evaluate the profit experience of Japanese investment with 
any certainty . The inflow of Japanese investment has been compara-
tively large , but there is little indication that an especiallylarge 
amount of profits and dividends is being sent back to Japan . In 
fact , according to balance of payments statistics, of a total com-
bined outflow of profits and dividends (a sum of annual flows) from 
18) The export boom of textile products from Thailand to the United States in 
1973 could perhaps be due largely to the country quota inp:Jsed by the United 
States, which forced foreign investors to invest in Thailand . 
19) Ruchada Buddhikarant, "A Case Study on the Economic Contribution of Private 
Direct Foreign Invest1nents in the Textile Industry", M.A. Thesis, Faculty of 
Economics, Tham:nasat University, June 1973 . 
20) With regard to the export boom in a few manufactured products in 1973 it re-
mains to be seen whether there has been a real structural change . 
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1968 to 1972 , of 2,575 million baht , only 17.1% went to Japan, where-
as 34.6% and 29.6% were directed to the United States and the United 
Kingdom respectively . 21) 
One possible explanation is that American and British firms start-
ed earlier and many of them are now well established . On the other 
hand, Japanese investments are newer ventures which take some time 
to turn a profit. It is true that profit conditions of firms can 
not be inferred from the balance of payments statistics alone. Never-
theless, the comparative remittance of profits and dividends does 
suggest that criticism of foreign investment making a large amount 
of money and sending most of it home is exaggerated in the case of 
Japan. American and British firms see~ to be better targets for 
such criticism . Some may argue that profits of Japanese firms are 
concealed in their pricing practices or other transactions . But 
without evidence, such arguments remain speculative and not empiri-
cally justified . 
v.3 Trade, Investment and Industrialization 
Several factors have combined to produce a sharp increase in Jap-
anese foreign investments . As shown in the table below, the avail-
Host Country Factors Associated with Japanese Foreign 
Investment in Manufactures* 
S.E.Asia E.Asia Developing 
Protection - Subsidy Policies 62.5 19.0 36.5 
Availability of 20.3 67.2 47.3 
Labour 10.9 65.5 42.4 
Natural resources, raw 
materials and energy 9.4 1. 7 4.9 
Consumption market orientation 15.6 8. 6 11. 8 
Trading links between host and 
third countries 1. 6 5.2 3.9 
Others 
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Number of enterprises) (64) (116) (203) 
* Based on approved investment ventures by Japanese government 
and 1969. 
Areas 
1968 
Source: JETRO, White Paper on Overseas Market 1972: Present Condi-
tions of Overseas Investment, p.9, quoting Export-Import 
Bank Information, 1971. 
ability of labour is listed as the most decisive host-country fact-
or associated with Japanese foreign investment ventures in East Asia 
(65 . 5%). In the case of Southeast Asia, however, Japanese invest-
ment in search of inexpensive labour is shown to have played a re-
latively small role (10.9%) . Rather, it is the protection-subsidy 
policy that had been the most crucial host country factor in South-
east Asia. This was also found to be the most important factor af-
21) Information supplied by the Bank of Thailand. 
22) Thorras W. Allen, Direct Investrrent of U.S . Enterprises in Southeast Asia, 
ECOCEN Study No.2, March 1973, Bangkok. 
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fecting American investment in Thailand . 22) An examination of in-
dustrial and trade policies in Thailand during the 1960 ' s and in 
the early 1970's shows that protection- subsidy was an important 
feature of investment promotion policy and of the tariff structure . 
In a study carried out by Narongchai Akrasanee, the incentives 
provided by the system of taxation and industrial promotion policy 
were quantified for the year 1969, using the concept of effective 
protection.23) It was found that protection-subsidy policies in 
Thailand during the 1960 's were creating incentives for investment 
in import-substituting industries, and were strongly biased against 
exports . They were also encouraging imports of intermediate inputs 
and machinery, through the exemption of import tariffs and business 
taxes on these items. Towards the end of the 1960 's, the incentiv-
es under the industrial promotion policy were revised . Tax privi-
leges were reduced , and more privileges were given to manufactured 
exports . In the Third Development Plan the development of maufact-
ured exports was given high priority. The investment promotion 
scheme was revised in 1972 to create higher potential benefits for 
exports. In addition, several tax and credit subsidy schemes were 
put into effect to promote manufactured exports.24) 
The existence of the bias in favour of the domestic market and 
against exporting manufactured goods in the 1960's due to the pro-
tection of outputs of products to be used as inputs, and the cur-
rency over-valuation, could partly explain why there was no appreci-
able development of non- traditional manufactured exports during the 
period , save for some processing of raw materials, while import sub-
stitution did not slow down the rate of' growth of imports . In a 
study on sources of industrial growth during the period 1960-1972, 
the process of industrial growth in Thailand was discussed in terms 
of the three sources, i . e . export expansion, import substitution, 
and the increase in domestic demand . 25) The results, a summary of 
which is reproduced in Table 14, show clearly the relative signifi -
cance of each source of growth . From the results the author conclud-
ed that, 
" ... for the whole period under study , which covers the two de-
velopment plans and ~he beginning of the third plan, industrializa-
tion of Thailand was characterised by import substitution and pro-
duction for the domestic market, with a growing contribution from 
export expansion in a number of industries in the early 1970's . Im-
port substitution was not effective during the period 1960-66 because 
of the rapid increase in domestic demand for manufactured products , 
both domestically produced and imported . In the second sub-period, 
the import substitution effect became more effective as the domestic 
market was expanding less rapidly. As for the export expansion ef-
fect, more traditional exports became relatively less important in 
the second sub- period, while the development in many new manufactur-
23) See Narongchai Akrasanee, The Manufacturing Sector in Thailand : A Study of 
Grc:wth, Import Substitution and Effective Protection, 1960-69, Ph. D. disser-
tation, Johns Hopkins University, Baltirrore, 1973 . 
24) For a detailed discussion of the develoµrent in industrialization policies 
in Thailand since 1970 see Narongchai Akrasanee, The Structure of Effective 
Protection in Thailand : A Study of Industrialization and Trade Policies in 
the Ear 1 y 19 70 ' s, rnirnec . , Tharmnasat University, March 19 7 5 . 
25) Narongchai Akrasanee, "Import Substitution, Export Expansion and Sources of 
Industrial Grcwth in Thailand, 1960-1972," in Prateep Sondhisuwan, ed., Es-
says in Honour of Khunying Suparb Yossundara, Sarpong Press, Bangkok, 19'74:"" 
118 THAILAND'S ECONOMIC RELATION WITH JAPAN AND THE U.S. 
ed exports took place . "26) 
When we con sider the overall effect of i ndustrialization policy 
(which is ref erred to as the system of protection) upon the develop-
ment of trade and investment with Japan and the United States, we 
observe certain significant developments which were consistent with 
these policies. The system of protection in the 1960's encouraged 
imports of intermediate inputs and machinery and substitution for 
imports of products usually at the final stage. This co.uld partly 
explain the structural change in imports discussed earlier, parti-
cularly in the case of Japan. The structure of Thai imports from 
Japan became more concentrated in machinery and transport equipment . 
Foreign investment was also concentrated in import-substituting in-
dustries, which received high incentives from tariff protection and 
industrial promotion . 
For some industries, protection effectively (but not necessarily 
efficiently) curtailed or prevented imports . For example, imports 
of rubber products, textile fabrics, consumer electrical goods, con-
sumer chemical products, dairy products, and gourmet seasoning, most 
of which faced competition from domestic firms established with sig-
nificant foreign investment, increased by only a small percentage. 
The discrimination against exports due to the system of protect-
ion in the 1960's corresponded to the period of minimal development 
of manufactured exports. It was only recently that the structure 
of Thai exports began to change, perhaps partly due to a new set of 
export promotion policies. 
Thus through its influences upon imports, exports, and domestic 
production, protection contributed to the growth and structural chang-
es of trade and industrialization. Owing to the relationship between 
protection and import substitution, the influence of protection was 
most apparent in intermediate products at higher levels of fabrica-
tion, consumer durables, machinery, and transport equipment indust-
ries. Almost all i ndustries in these categories had several common 
characteristics: their effective protection rates were relatively 
high, except for paper products; they benefitted substantially from 
the industrial promotion policy because of a large proportion of im-
ported inputs and machinery; increases in outputs went mostly into 
import substitution, with few exports; and finally the heavy invest-
ment in these industries did not slow down the demand for imports . 
Foreign and domestic investment continued to require more imported 
inputs, thus exerting pressure on the balance of payments . 
The above description only relates industrialization to trade and 
to foreign investment in general . What appears certain is that in-
dustrial development in Thailand has induced structural changes in 
trade and has attracted foreign investment to mostly import- substi-
tuting industries . The changes in trade could have been with any 
country according to the law of comparative advantage, and foreign 
investment could have come from any country . But in the 1960's, Ja-
pan was actively promoting exports through various means, including 
foreign investment. In more recent years, Japan began to encourage 
imports of non-durable consumer products . Japan tends to execute 
both of these trade strategies through their own companies overseas. 
So in the case of Thailand, Japanese.trade and investment have been 
closely related, and Japan has been able to capture a larger share 
of Thai imports as well as of exports. On the other hand, the Unit-
26) Ibid., pp.275-276 
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ed States does not seem to have the Japanese type of trade and in-
vestment relationship . Although American investment in Thailand 
has responded to industrail development policies, United States 
firms have invested relatively less in promoted industries than 
have Japanese firms . Furthermore , when products are exported to 
the United States, they need not come from firms based on United 
States investment . Thus American investment does not seem to lead 
to the pattern of Thai imports and exports followed by the Japanese. 
The United States therefore has been losing its share in trade with 
Thailand, even though the volume of trade between the two countries 
has been growing rapidly. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we have analysed trade and investment aspects of 
Thai economic relations with Japan and the United States. It has 
been found that Thailand has become more and more dependent on Jap-
an for her imports as well as for her exports. Imports into Thai-
land, which have been concentrated in intermediate products, raw 
materials, machinery and equipment, have come largely from Japan. 
Thailand has also been exporting a growing volume of primary products 
to Japan. Only very recently have there been more exports of manu-
factured products to Japan. As a whole, Thai products still repre-
sent a very small proportion of Japanese imports. 
A similar picture has been found in the case of Thailand's trade 
with the United States, except that the . United States has not been 
able to increase its trade with Thailand as rapidly as has Japan. 
Consequently the United States' share in Thailand's imports shrank 
during the period under study; and her share in Thailand's exports 
has likewise declined. We have also found that there has been more 
fluctuation in Thailand's trade with the United States than in her 
trade with Japan. 
The success of Japan in capturing an increasing volume of foreign 
trade of Thailand has been due to several factors. During the 1960's, 
Japan was exporting ~ostly capital and intermediate goods which were 
in high demand by Thailand for the latter's industrialization . Jap-
anese products were found to be very competitive. The Japanesepoli-
cy of export expansion, coupled with the policy of foreign invest-
ment expansion was implemented at a time when Thailand was encourag-
ing industrial investment. Thus, a large inflow of capital from Ja-
pan was recorded. A significant proportion of the inflow was in the 
form of suppliers' credit, a method which the Japanese government 
used to promote exports of capital and intermediate goods from Japan. 
(These were also encouraged by the Thai industrial promotion policy . ) 
Japanese trade and investment with Thailand were, therefore, close-
ly lin*ed . Unfortunately for Thailand, during the period 1960-72, 
the linkage was largely in terms of imports and investment i:n produc-
tion for the domestic market, with relatively small export expansion 
from enterprises with Japanese investment. The Japanese trade poli-
cy during the 1960's was also restrictive, thus discouraging exports 
from Thailand as well as from other developing countries.27J 
27) For excellent review of Japanese trade policy, see Kiyoshi Kojima, "Reorgani-
sation of North-South Trade: Japan's Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's", 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, February 1973 and Ippei Yaniazawa, "Indust-
rial Growth and Trade Policy in Japan", Hitotsubashi University, July 1973. 
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The changing pattern of Thailand's trade with the United States 
cannot be explained in terms of the interaction of trade and invest-
ment policies of the two countries . Thailand's imports from the 
United States have been similar to those from Japan, responding to 
the industrialization needs of Thailand, but the United States has 
not been able to compete with Japan. Thai exports to the United 
States have been concentrated much more in crude materials. In ad-
dition, when Thailand began to export manufactured products to the 
United States, most of them were clothing and precious stones. 
Our findings on foreign investment indicate that Japan was the 
largest foreign investor in promoted industries. But for the whole 
economy the United State has had more direct investment in Thailand . 
A larger proportion of Japanese investment has gone into promoted 
industries of Thailand than into those of other countries . These 
investments should be regarded as "approved" by the Thai government. 
In contrast, American investment has gone relatively more to non-
promoted industries, and to exploit natural resources for exports. 
It was pointed out that Japanese investment in Southeast Asia 
was responding significantly to the protection-subsidy policies of 
these countries . In Thailand, the structure of protection-subsidy 
policies, especially in the 1960 ' s was found to have encouraged invest-
ment in import substituting industries, a nd encouraged imports of 
capital goods and industrial raw materials. These commodities have 
come mostly from Japan , thus completing the circle of Thai-Japanese 
trade and investment . 
A conclusion implicit in the preceding discussion is that Thai-
Japanese economic relations in terms of trade and investment, which 
show Thailand to be very much linked to Japan, have been the outcome 
of trade and industrial policies of both countries, and of their 
stages of industrial development. It is difficult to deny that Thai-
land was partly responsible for the close relationship she enjoyed 
with Japan at the end of the 1960's. To a certain extent this is 
also true in the case of the United States. This has led to several 
problems to which both trading partners have contributed. Problems 
related to management and ownership, labor relations, transfer of 
technology and its cost have surfaced. These have been manifested 
in the form of an anti-Japanese movement, and, more recently, an an-
ti-American movement. Most of these problems, however, were not un-
expected since Thailand still lacked many important conditions and 
the infrastructure needed for foreign investment and rapid indust-
rialization. The system made it very attractive for foreign invest-
ment to concentrate on the domestic market, and very easy for it to 
dominate the business in which it was involved. The situation thus 
appeared as one in which a weaker partner, Thailand, was being ex-
ploited by stronger partners such as Japan and the United States. 
The recent developments and recommended changes in policies affect-
ing trade and investment outlined below, came in response to the 
problems created by foreign investment and the industrialization in 
the 1960's. 
First, the Board of Investment realized as early as 1967 that the 
incentives given under the Promotion Act of 1962 were too generous, 
and in many cases were not justified. Thus, in 1967, the 100 per 
cent and 50 percent exemptions from tariffs and business taxes on 
raw materials and machinery were dropped. In 1972, the government 
announced a new Investment Promotion Act which gave tariff and busi-
ness tax exemptions only to machinery imports, except for promoted 
industries, in specified areas. But for promoted export industries, 
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complete exemptions from tariffs and taxes on material inputs and 
machinery are allowed.28) 
The encouragement of exports provided for in the new Investment 
Promotion Act is consistent with the overall development plan of the 
early 1970's, which adopted export promotion as one of its hia.h prio-
rity activities. In recent years, an important development in trade 
and industrial policies aimed at promoting exports occurred. Export-
ers of industrial products are now entitled to receive several kinds 
of benefits, such as refund of business and excise taxes, exemption 
from import duties on material inputs, credit subsidization and pro-
vision of credit facilities by the Bank of Thailand and by the In-
dustrial Finance Corporation of Thailand. These combined provisions 
create considerable incentives for exports . For example, only pro-
moted export industries now receive complete exemption from import 
duties on material inputs. The tax refund for domestic material in-
puts given by the Ministry of Finance is also quite substantial . 
Within two years of operation, the amount of tax refund given by the 
Fiscal Policy Office was 58.5 million baht.29) The discount rate 
charged by the Bank of Thailand was as low as 5%. The IFCT charges 
10.5% for its loans in Thai currency, 9.5% for foreign currency, 
strong preference being given to export industries.30) In addition, 
procedures for obtaining th~se benefits have been greatly simplifi-
ed. 31) 
Parallel to the developments of manufactured exports, Thailand 
has adopted a more protective attitude towards local ipdustries and 
businesses and a more cautious attitude towards foreign investment 
and participation. The changes stern from concern over and criticism 
against foreign domination in the new industries. Japanese compani-
es have most often been singled out for attack , simply because of 
their over-representation in the Thai economy. The new attitude is 
demonstrated by the Alien Business Law of November, 1972, and the 
Alien Occupation Law of March, 1973 .32) These two laws specify cer-
tain kinds of industries and activities in which foreign-owned com-
panies and foreigners are not allowed to be engaged or allowed only 
to a certain extent. The intention is to encourage joint-ventures, 
to reserve certain activities for Thais, and, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, to keep a close watch on foreign participation in the Thai 
economy . 
Further evidence demonstrating the concern of Thailand about for-
eign investment was the appointment of a Foreign Investment Commit-
tee in early 1974 to discuss problems of foreign investment and to 
make recommendations to the government on foreign investment polici-
es. Several issues were discussed, and it was generally agreed that 
foreign investment problems must be taken seriously. Concern was ex-
pressed over the domination of Japanese investment, and a preference 
expressed for diversification of the nationality of foreign capital . 
Investment in the form of joint ventures was strongly recommended, 
but the degree of participation could vary according to the nature 
28) See the Section on Thailand in Draper, op .cit. 
29) Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance, as of July 9, 1974. The rate is 
nCM 10.5% for all =ency. 
30) The amount of loans ccmnitted (signed) by the IFCT increased rrore than 5 tim-
es since 1970, totalling 1 . 14 billion baht as at the end of 1973. 
31) For a rrore detailed discussion on recent develoµnent in industrial policies, 
see Akrasanee, The Structure of Effective Protection in Thailand, op.cit . 
32) For a detailed discussion of these laws see Draper, op.cit., pp.164-167. 
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of the industry . For example, an electronic product assembly in-
dustry for export could be entirely foreign owned . Industries should 
also be classified according to the need for foreign investment,and 
to the extent of foreign participation allowed . Finally, it was 
felt strongly that if privileges were to be given to an industry 
with foreign investment, a thorough benefit-cost analysis of the 
project should be made . Factors such as cost of technology , market 
control, pollution, utilization of resources, etc., should be taken 
into consideration to identify the full benefits from foreign invest-
ment, and to avoid political problems. 
The Japanese economy and economic policies themselves have been 
undergoing a series of readjustments following a decade of rapid 
economic growth, and of reactions to its overseas expansion and in-
volvement . It is expected that the pace of industrialization in Ja-
pan will slow down . In addition, owing to a growing concern over 
environmental conditions, some of its heavy industries will be mov-
ed overseas. As Japan adjusts its industrial structure to concent-
rate on the production of more sophisticated, knoledge-intensive, 
goods and more fashionable products, the demand for consumer good 
imports will grow. The United States is also moving in the same 
direction as Japan . Thus it can be expected that there will be a 
good opportunity for Thai exports of these products to the United 
States. 
These recent developments will have important effects on Thai in-
ternational economic relations. For Japan, the growing complaint 
in Thailand about anything Japanese must be recognized . The point 
is that "anything Japanese" often refers only to "business". For 
the United States the complaint is that it has been too concerned 
with politics. Since there are many other aspects of the relations 
between any two nations that are social, cultural, and educational 
in nature, they should be explored and encouraged . In the past they 
have been given too little attention, especially in the case of Jap-
an. Even the business relationship could be improved. In terms of 
trade and investment, Japan could play an important role in the de-
velopment of Thai manufactured exports, through her worldwide net-
work of trading firms . 33) The United States could also help in the 
development. Investment in the form of joint ventures should be en-
couraged, with increasing participation from the Thai side in as 
many aspects as possible. This will help Japan and the United Stat-
es in their competitive position on investment projects since Thai-
land is likely to adopt a policy to diversify sources of foreign in-
vestment . 
It may be expected that the role of Japan in. the Thai economy 
will grow rather than decline, whereas United States business involve-
ment may decline, following recent political developments, especial-
ly the newly-established Thai-Chinese relations. The Thai policy 
of export promotion during the 1970's coincides with the new attitude 
towards "better living" in Japan. Thus there is a strong tendency 
for Japan to invest in Thailand in the production of commodities to 
be exported to Japan by companies with Japanese investment . Some 
industries in Japan considered to be enviionmentally "dirty" may be 
33) According to the existing Alien Business Law this is inconvenient. Export 
trade is considered to be "corrrnission trade" and a foreigI) cc:rrpany with rrore 
than 50% foreign participation is prohibited from such trade. HO\Vever Japan-
ese companies have been forming companies with a Thai majority. 
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set up in Thailand . Therefore, to prevent the ill-effects of these 
industries, and ill-feeling against Japanese investment , Thailand 
must lay out guidelines, set up rules and regulations , for the in-
dustries to follow . Thailand should also take advantage of Japanese 
trading firms in the promotion of her exports . 
For the long run, one should take a multilateral approach to Thai -
land's economic relations with countries like the United States and 
Japan. In short, relations should be v iewed in the context of ASEAN , 
East Asia, and North and South trade . For example , foreign invest-
ment in ASEAN could be made complementary among ASEAN countries in-
stead of competitive if inter-ASEAN trade in manufactures could be 
developed . With a growing interest in regional cooperation , this 
seems a very interesting prospect for further investigation . 
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Appendix Table 3 
ExpJrt Performances of Selected Countries in Thailand 
by Corrrrodity Groups from 1962 to 1970 (%) 
Actual Aver- Cormo- Share Effect ExpJrt 
Growth age di ty Total Pure Inter-: Perform-
growth Compo- action ance 
Ef- sition-
fect al Ef-
feet 
(A) (W) (C) (A-W) 
Based on exp:irt structure of 1962 
Annual growth rate, simple rate 
(canpound rate) 
Non-durable consurrer goods (2.5) 
Japan -2.8(-3.2) .2.8 -3.1 -2 . 6 -2 . CJ -0.3 -5 . 6 
U.S . 4.() (3.5) 2.8 4.2 -3.0 -2.7 -0.3 1.2 
West Germany 15 . 2(10.5) 2 . 8 6.8 5. 8 4.0 1. 7 12.5 
U.K. 8.9 (7 .0) 2 . 8 6.7 -0.6 1. 7 -2.3 6.2 
Others 5.8 (4.9) 2. 8 0. 5 2.6 2.6 * 3.1 
Durable consumer goods (11.8) 
Japan 25.6(14 . 9) 18.0 0.1 7.5 3.4 4.1 7.6 
U.S. 21.8(13 . 4) 18.0 -1. 7 5. 5 2.8 2.7 3. 8 
West Germany 13.9 (9 . 8) 18.0 -4.1 -1.9 -2 . 1 -4.1 
U.K . 1.5 (1.4) 18.0 -1.1 -15.4 -6.5 -8 . 9 -16.5 
Others 14 . 8(10.3) 18.0 1.5 -4.6 -2. 7 -1.8 -3.1 
Intennediate products 
chiefly for consumer goods (15.5) 
Japan 39.2(19.4) 27.1 -1. 7 13.8 4.7 9.2 12.1 
U.S. 21.7(13.4) 27.1 -2.2 -3.2 -2.7 -0.5 -5.4 
West Germany 31.8(17.1) 27 . 1 5.3 -0.6 0.4 -1.0 4.7 
U.K. 17 .0 (11.4) 27 .1 -0.2 -9.9 -2.6 -7.3 -10.1 
Others 21.3 (13.2) 27.1 * -5.8 -2.2 -3.6 -5.8 
Intennediate products 
chiefly for capital goods (18.6) 
Japan 38. 8 (19 . 3) 36.4 -3 . 4 5.7 1.6 4.1 2.4 
U.S. 30.5(16.8) 36.4 -0.4 -5 . 5 -3.8 -1. 7 -5.9 
West Germany 47.7(21.7) 36.4 6.5 4.7 1.6 3.1 11.3 
U.K. 45 . 5(21.2) 36.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 9.0 
Others 31.3(16.9) 36.4 6.4 -11.5 -2.0 -9.5 -5.l 
Capital goods (14.1) 
Japan 51.9(22. 7) 23.6 -2.6 30.9 10 . 1 20 . 8 28 .3 
U.S. 10 . 6 (8 . 0) 23 . 6 0.4 -13.4 -4 . 8 -8.6 -13.() 
West Germany 24.1(14.4) 23 . 6 4.7 -4.2 -0 .8 -3.4 0.5 
U.K. 13.7 (9.6) 23.6 2.9 -12.8 -3.4 -9.4 -9.9 
Others 17 . 5 23.6 -2.4 -3. 7 -1.5 -2.2 -6.1 
Other cormodities (9.5) 
Japan 26 .5 (15.3) 13 . 4 0.4 12.6 2.2 10 . 4 13.1 
U.S. 12.6 (9.1) 13.4 8 . 2 -9.0 -3.2 -5.8 -0.8 
West Gennany 15.6(10.7) 13 . 4 1.9 0. 3 0.5 -0.3 2.2 
U.K. 10.1 (7 .6) 13 .4 7.2 -10.5 -1.5 -9 . 0 -3.3 
Others 9.2 (7 .3 13 .4 -3.1 -1.0 0.2 -1.2 -4.1 
* Less than 0.05 
S. NAVA AND N. AKRASANEE 
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Appendix Table 4 
The Estimated Elasticity of Substitution between 
Japan, t~e U.S. and W. Germany in Nine Selected Commodities 
Commodity Group Constant 
Elasticity of R2 
Substitution 
I. Electric Appliances 
1. Japan - U.S. 0.05 -1. 32 0.68 
(1. 44) (-4. 60) 
2. Japan - W. Germany -0.01 -0.83 0.30 
(-0.32) (-2. 07) 
II. Radio receivers 
3 . Japan - U.S. 0.70 -1.12 0.21 
(4 . 07) (-1. 64) 
4. Japan - w. Germany 0.15 -1. 20 0.46 
(1. 70) (-2.90) 
III. Television receivers 
5 . Japan - U. S. -0.85 -9 . 85 0 . 62 
(-4.18) (-4.06) 
6. Japan - w. Germany -0.21 -0.83 0.15 
(-2 . 15) (-1.34)· 
IV. Fertilizers 
7 . Japan - U.S. -0.02 -0.21 0 . 01 
(-0.21) (-0 . 33) 
8 . Japan - w. Germany -0.11 -0 . 30 0.09 
(-2. 31) (-0. 30) 
v. Pesticides 
9 . Japan - U. S. -0 . 02 -1. 26 0 . 46 
(-0 . 16) (-2. 94) 
10. Japan - w. Germany -0 . 29 -1. 46 0 . 65 
- (-5. 92) (-4. 34) 
VI. Tractors 
11 .. Japan - U. S . - 0 . 08 -0 . 87 0.29 
(-0 . 57) (-2. 00) 
12. Japan - w. Germany -0 . 03 -0.97 
(-0 . 46) (-2 . 74) 
VII. Tubes and Pipes 
13 . Japan - U.S . -0 . 31 -2.64 0 . 63 
(-2. 75) (-4 .15) 
14. Japan - w. Germany -0 . 32 -2 . 77 0 . 44 
(-2 . 31) (-.2 . 84) 
VIII. Buses and Trucks 
15. Japan - U. S . -0 . 13 - 1. 67 0 . 81 
(-1. 50) (-6 . 46) 
16 . Japan - w. Germany 0.09 -3 . 31 0 . 68 
( 0. 83) . (-4. 63) 
IX. Motor Cars 
17 . Japan - U.S . -0 . 56 -1. 34 0.21 
(-4. 59) (-1. 64) 
18. Japan - w. Germany -0 . 24 -3 . 59 0 . 55 
(-3 . 50) (-3 . 5ll 
Note: The value in parentheses is the t-statistic. 
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Appendix Table 7 
Registered Capital of Finns Granted PrCXTDtionCertificatesClassified 
by Nationalities from October 26, 1960 - December 31 , 1974 
Se- Registered cap- Registered cap- Total Register- Foreign 
ri- Nationality of ital ovmed by .ital of joint ed capital Regist-al ONnership one nationality ventures ered Num-- capital 
ber Thousand Thousand Thousand 
Baht % Baht % Baht % % 
1 Thailand 4, 326,038 93.66 4,851,066 58 . 86 9,177 , 104 71.22 
2 Japan 234,194 5. 02 1,309,836 15 . 89 1, 544,030 11 . 96 41.57 
3 U.S.A. 39,740 0. 85 500,526 6. 07 540,266 4 . 19 14.54 
4 Republic of China 3 , 000 0. 06 453 , 228 5. 51 456,228 3. 53 12 . 28 
5 United Kingdom 11,000 0. 24 126,085 1.54 137,085 1.06 3. 69 
6 M:tlaysia 102,855 1.26 102 , 855 0. 80 2. 77 
7 Israel 80 . 750 0. 98 80,750 0 . 63 2. 17 
8 Hong Kong 175,863 2. 13 175 , 863 1.36 4. 73 
9 France 60,000 0. 73 60,000 0. 46 1.62 
10 Singapore 11,138 0. 24 42 , 557 0. 52 53,695 0. 42 1.45 
11 West Germany 16,750 0. 36 35,942 0. 44 52 , 692 0. 41 1.42 
12 Netherlands 50,226 0. 61 50,226 0. 39 1.35 
13 India 8,000 0. 17 41,787 0. 51 49,787 0. 39 1.34 
14 Switzerland 39,646 0.48 39,646 0. 31 1.07 
15 Panama 35,151 0. 43 35,151 0. 27 0. 94 
16 Philippines 18,705 0. 23 18,705 0 .14 0. 50 
17 Australia 19 , 134 0. 19 19,134 0.15 0.52 
18 Denrrark 15,935 0. 19 15,935 0. 12 0. 43 
19 Portugal 13,128 0. 16 13,128 0. 10 0. 35 
20 Others 269,534 3. 27 269,534 2. 09 7. 26 
Total 4,649,860 100 8,241,954 100 12,891,814 100 100 
of which : Foreign 323,822 6. 96 3,390,888 41.4 3, 714, 710 28 . 8 
Source : Board of Invesbnent 
Appendix Table 8 Foreign Share of Total Registered Capital 
October 1960 - June 1973 (percentage) Y 
Average Share of Registered Composition of 
Ca12ital Registered Capital 
Foreign OthersY Total Foreign OthersY Total 
Japanese Share 
Exceeding 50% 60 . 6 39 . 4 100 74.1 57 . 2 66 . 4 
Less than 50% 41.9 58 . 2. 100 25 . 9 42 . 8 33 . 6 
Total 54.3 45 . 7 100 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 
(,0 1,000,000) (l,077 . 0). (905 . 0) (1 ,982 . 9) 
The U.S. Share 
Exceeding 50% 66 . 9 33 . 1 100 95 . 1 85.3 91.6 
Less than 50% 37 . 4 62 . 6 100 4.9 14 . 7 8 . 4 
Total 64 . 4 35 . 6 100 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
(,0 1,000,000) (609;0) (336 . 0) (945 . 0) 
The U.K. Share 
Exceeding 50% 88 . 4 11 . 6 100 29 .7 3. 5 1.4 
Less than 50% 31.9 68 . 1 100 70 . 3 96 . 5 86 . 2 
Total 39 . 1 60 . 9 100 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
(,0 1, 000, 000) (156.6) (244 . 0) (400.6) 
Y Compiled from the Board of Invesbnent data. The number of finns included was 
96 Japanese, 46 U. S., and 27 U.K. 
Y /vbstly Thai ovmed . 
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Appendix Table 10 Flows of Private Foreicm Medium and IDng Tenn Capital 
Cumulative Total from 1965 to 1974 
-----------·----------·--·--··-·- supph-
Total 
Direct Investment 
IDans er's Others Total Equity IDans Credit 
- ------·----· ... _._ .. ___ __ -··-·--------- ---·-- ---·~-- -·· ··· --·--- ·· ----- -·--· 
A. Values in ~l,000,000 
Net Balance 
Total 20,000 12,086 9,469 2,616 2,615 3,908 1,400 
U. S. 6,338 4,442 3,586 855 751 540 604 
Japan 6,182 3,678 3,101 576 704 1,650 149 
U.K. 2,347 610 387 223 1,478 219 40 
Others 5,144 3,356 2,395 962 - 318 1,499 607 
Inflow (credit) 
Total 47,463 14,328 10,060 4,268 10,450 20,979 1,706 
U.S . 11,892 5,429 3,846 1,582 4,085 1,728 650 
Japan 16,897 4,021 3,166 855 1,204 11,394 279 
U.K . 4,825 689 456 233 2,364 1,712 60 
Others 13,850 4,190 2,592 1,598 2,797 6,145 717 
outflow (debit) 
Total 27,451 2,241 590 1,651 7,834 17,070 305 
U.S . 5,552 986 259 726 3,333 1,187 46 
Japan 16,716 343 64 278 499 9,743 130 
U.K. 2,478 79 69 11 885 1,493 20 
Others 8,705 833 198 636 3,117 4,647 109 
B. Country Distribution (%) 
Net Balance 
Total 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 
U. S. 31. 7 36.8 37 . 9 32.7 28 . 7 13. 8 43.1 
Japan 30 . 9 30.4 32 . 7 22 . 0 26.9 42 . 2 10 . 6 
U.K. 11. 7 5.0 4.1 8 . 5 56.5 5.6 2 . 9 
Others 25.7 27.8 25 .3 36 . 8 - 12.1 38 . 4 43.4 
Inf lo.v (credit) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
U.S. 25.1 37.9 38.2 37 . 1 39 . 1 8 . 2 38.1 
Japan 35.6 28 .1 31.5 20 . 0 11.5 54.3 16.4 
U. K. 10.1 4 . 8 4 . 5 5.5 22.6 8 . 2 3.5 
Others 29.2 29 . 2 25 . 8 37.4 26.8 29.3 42.0 
OUtf lo.v (debit) 
Total 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
U.S. 20 . 0 44 . 0 43.9 44.0 42.5 7.0 15.1 
Japan 39.0 15.3 10.8 16 . 8 6.4 57 . 1 42.6 
U.K. 9.0 3. 5 11. 7 0.7 11.3 8.7 6.6 
Others 31. 7 37 . 2 33 . 6 38.5 39.8 27 . 2 35.7 
c. Ccrnposition (%) 
Net Balance 
Total 100 . 0 60 . 4 47.3 13 .1 13.1 19.5 7.0 
U.S. 100 . 0 70.1 56.6 13 .5 11.8 8.5 9.5 
Japan 100.0 59.5 50 . 2 9.3 11.3 26 .7 2 . 4 
U.K. 100.0 26.0 16 . 5 9.5 63.0 9.3 1. 7 
Others 100.0 65 . 2 46.6 18 . 7 - 6. 2 29.l 11. 8 
Inflo.v (credit) 
Total 100.0 30 . 2 21.2 9.0 22.0 44.2 3.6 
U.S. 100.0 45.6 32.3 13.3 34.4 14.5 5.5 
Japan 100.0 23 . 8 18 . 7 5. 1 7 . 1 67.4 1. 7 
U.K . 100.0 14.3 9.5 4.8 49.0 35 . 5 1.2 
Others 100.0 30.3 18 . 7 11.5 20.3 44.4 5.2 
OUtf lOW' (debit) 
Total 100.0 8.2 2.1 6.0 28.5 62 .2 1.1 
U.S. 100.0 17.8 4.7 13.1 60.0 21.4 0 . 8 
Japan 100.0 3 . 2 0. 6 2.6 4.7 90.9 1.2 
U.K. 100.0 3.2 2.8 0.4 35.7 60.3 0.8 
Others 100 . 0 9 . 6 2.3 7.3 35.B 53.4 1. 3 
----·····------------ ··- --- -···--·-···--·····• -<- .. - ··--- · ·---·------·- -- ---
Source: Bank of Thailand 
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Appendix Table 13 
Export of Foreign-Based Promoted Firms as Percentage of 
Total Sales by Commodity Group, 1972 
U.S. firms and joint ventures 
All items 
Agriculture-based products 
Mineral and ceramic products 
Machinery 
Textiles 
Rubber 
Japanese firms and Japanese joint ventures 
A. Board of Investment Survey 
All items 
Mineral and ceramic products 
Rubber products 
Textiles 
B. Japan Chamber of Commerce Survey* 
All items 
Chemical products 
Motor vehicles 
Textiles 
Steel and iron products 
Food products 
Other manufactures 
39.56 
9.14 
49.77 
5 . 36 
3.83 
2.16 
l. 91 
5.40 
6.60 
l. 09 
8 . 79 
5.5 
6.2 
0.1 
7.3 
6.3 
19.4 
5.9 
* covering firms that are promoted as well as non-promoted. 
Source: Udom Kerdpibul, "Thailand's Experience with Multinational 
Corporations," Department of Economics, Kasetsart Universi-
ty, June 1974, Table 3 (mimeo.) 
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COMMENTS ON NAYA/NARONGCHAI PAPER 
(a) DAVID LIM 
I find the paper interesting in spite of its great length . How-
ever, I find it also a frustrating paper . 
The authors have made use of the constant-market share model to 
provide a useful analytical framework with which to assess first, 
Japanese and American economic performance in Thailand and second, 
Thai economic performance in Japan and the United States . 
Actual export growth is seen to consist of three parts : 
(a) Average growth effect - the trend component; 
(b) commodity compositional effect and 
(c) competitive or share effect, which is broken into two parts : 
(i) the pure effect 
(ii) the interaction or diversification effect . 
In their analysis of Japanese export performance in Thailand they 
find, whether at the aggregative or the disaggregated level, that 
Japan has the competitive edge over her competitors . Their conclu-
sion is based on the finding that the competitive or share effect 
is the most dominant one among the three effects . Japan's ability 
to expand its exports in rapidly expanding items and areas (or the 
diversification effect) is found to be especially remarkable . 
These results are all very interesting and it is therefore all 
the more frustrating that the authors do not go into the factors 
behind Japan ' s competitiveness in great detail . 
They recognise the need to "pin-point what the competitiveness 
is comprised of or what it means", and indeed suggest factors such 
as relative price, quality, distance, speed of delivery, after-sal-
es-service , and commercial/financial ties (such as supplier's cred-
its). 
However , apart from conducting simple regression analysis on the 
relationship between relative price and quantity exported and some 
discussion on the relevance of supplier's credit in determining im-
ports from Japan, nothing was offered . The omission is especially 
serious if we examine the results of the simple regression analys i s . 
The R2 1 s will be much smaller if adjustment is made for the degrees 
of freedom. The number of observations is only 12 . Shortage of 
statistical data is mentioned for not carrying the analysis a bit 
further . Perhaps one may say that certain variables cannot be quan-
tified . Yet unless we make an effort to collect the data and attemp 
to quantify more of these variables we can only go a limited distance 
in saying why Japan has been more successful than other competitors 
in the export market . 
These comments are made not as criticism but rather as suggestions 
for further work. I think that these suggestions have special re-
levance in the discussion in Part III of the paper where they ana-
lyse the performance of Thailand in the Japanese and American import 
markets. Again the constant-market-share model is used and they 
find that the share/competitive effect is very important for the 
period 1962-63 . What lies behind this? When the period 1972-73 is 
analysed, we are told of a change in the relative importance of the 
various effects. The share effect is less important and the trend 
effect more. Why? 
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In Sections IV and V of the paper, the authors discuss the types 
of Japanese and American investment in Thailand and the interaction 
between trade and investment . This is a useful discussion. It pro-
vides useful data, and leads to an interesting and necessary discus -
sion on the costs and benefits of foreign investment in Thailand . The 
study of Thai dependence on Japan and on the United States must ot 
necessity refer to the costs of Japanese and American investment in 
Thailand . However, in this discussion I encounter the same frustra-
tion that I had in reading the earlier sections . They found that 
Japanese firms "induce imports and do not export their products very 
much" and went on to say that this did not "establish the fact that 
they do not contribute to the Thai economy". 
However, nothing is established by the authors either way . A 
case study is quoted but one is not quite sure what are being compar-
ed . 
(i) Is the greater "output" mentioned, output per se or producti-
vity? If the former, it is hardly surprising since foreign 
companies are usually larger than local ones . 
(ii) What does "local employment" refer to? K/L or employment per 
se? Or is it the willingness to employ and train Thais? 
(iii) Mention is also made of "efficiency" in the use of given scarce 
resources . What is "efficiency"? Is it X-efficiency in the 
sense meant by Leibenstein? 
(iv) Lastly, the authors mentioned transfer pricing and remittances 
of profits . I think that their comment (suggestion) that Jap-
anese firms remitted less profits and dividends than did Bri-
tish and American firms, might have been due to greater transf-
er pricing on their part sums up, I think, both the limitations 
of the study and the frustrations of the authors . 
(bl GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Participants pointed out that one factor in the different pattern 
of United States and Japanese activity in Thailand was that the Thai 
market was far more important to Japan than it was to the United Stat-
es . It was also remarked that there had perhaps been a too uncriti-
cal acceptance of foreign investment especially from Japan and the 
United States . The increasing volume of imports of intermediates 
was however a sign that industrialization was progressing, but per-
haps Thailand was in too much of a hurry to industrialize - a process 
that in Japan had been proceeding for over 100 years . 
Commenting on the technical aspects of the paper it was suggested 
that the Vernon model for constant market share analysis might have 
been preferable and that insufficient attention had been given to 
the effects of devaluation of the Japanese yen and the United States 
dollar which could affect the results. 
6 
SMALL ISLAND ECONOMIES: PROBELMS OF EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE 
AsHOK V. DESAI 
The propositions are well-established that small countries are 
more dependent on trade, that their exports are l ess diversified 
and that their trade is geographically less concentrated than of 
large countries.l) However, the inference that the greater tr~de 
dependence of small countries makes them more vulnerable to exter-
nal schocks has been disputed on theoretical as well as empirical 
grounds.2l -
The object of this paper is to examine how far these propositions 
apply to certain small island economies of the south Pacific. The 
evidence is drawn from three countries: Fiji, Western Samoa and Pa-
pua New Guinea; and most of it refers to Fiji. Whilst the South 
Pacific has a large number of small countries or colonies, their 
value for case studies must depend on the avai lability of statis-
tics. The three economie s selected here are among the better plac-
ed for data, though as will emerge in the course of this paper, sta-
tistical data available for even them are unequally abundant. 
I. GOODS AND FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 
Economic theory separates international trade in goods and ser-
vices from movements of factors of production. We have a theory of 
trade which assumes that factors are immobile between countries; in-
ternational capital movements are dealt with separately, as is the 
international migration of labour. 
This treatment is inappropriate for small countries. Some of 
them derive sizeable receipts from the export of labour. Others 
occasionally receive substantial foreign investment and use it to 
finance current imports. A f~w receive foreiqn aid with the same 
effect. In 1972 for instance, Western Samoa received WS$2.7 milli-
on from remittances and pensions against WS$7.2 million from exports 
of goods and services (Table 3). Papua New Guinea earned A$157 mil-
lion from visible and invisible exports, A$158 million of foreign 
investment and A$142 million of official grants and loans in 1971-
1972 (Table 2). Fiji was not so dependent on export of labour as 
WesternSamoaor on import of capitai as Papua Ne~ Guinea; but a ca-
pital inflow of F$24 million was recorded in 1972 against current 
receipts of F$117 million; and there is a suspicion that the large 
1) Kuznets, S., "Economic growth of small nations'' in E . A.G. Robin-
son (ed.) Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations , Macmil-
lan, London, 1960, pp.18-23. 
2) Tarshis, L., "The size of the economy and its relation to stabi-
lity and steady progress" in E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), Economic Con-
sequences of the Size of Nations, Macmillan, London, 1960, pp. 
190-199. See also MacBean, A.I.; Export Instability and Econo-
mic Development, Allen and Unwin, London, 1966 . ~--~--~-
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entry of F$19.5 million for errors and omissions consisted mainly 
of unrecorded capital imports . (Table 1) . 3) 
TABLE 1 BALANCE OF PAYMENI'S : FIJI, 1968-1972 
F$ Million 
1%8 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr 
Merchandise 39 . 9 55 . 3 43 . 9 63 . 4 50 . 8 73 . 6 51.8 97.3 54 . 7 114 . 9 
Nonrronetary Gold 3. 5 3.4 3. 3 2 . 7 4.0 
Freight & Insurance) 0. 3 13. 4 0.1 15.7 
Freight ) (0 .1) (12 . 8) (O . l) (15.0) 
Insurance ) (0 . 2) (0.5) (0 . 7) 
Other Transport )9 . 2 16.7 10.3 18 . 4 11.6 21.0 12 . 5 5.9 12 . 3 5 . 6 
Passenger Fares ) (3 . 2) (3. 8) (3.3) (4.4) 
Port Disbursanents) (8 . 5) (0.2) (8 . 5) (0 . 2) 
Other ) (0.8) (1.9) (0 . 5) (1.0) 
Travel 13. 9 1.8 18 . 5 1.8 23 . 4 2. 2 33 .1 3. 1 37.0 4. 3 
Income 1.6 8. 4 2. 2 10.1 2 . 4 10 . 6 3. 3 13.4 4. 7 13 . 9 
Private (1.1) (12.6) (2 . 1) (13 . 2) 
Government (2 . 2) (0 . 8) (2.6) (0.7) 
Other Government 1.6 0.4 1.8 0.5 1.8 0. 3 3. 1 0.6 3.3 7 . 7 
Military (n) (n) (n) (n) 
Other (3 . 1) (0 . 6) (3 . 3) (0.7) 
Other Private 1.2 1.5 0. 9 1. 7 1.9 1.9 7. . 0 1. 7 1.3 2.4 
Unrequited Transfer 2. 5 4.2 2. 4 8 . 9 5.9 12 .1 5.0 
Private (0 . 9) (0.9) (1.6) (4 . 6) (5.9) (4 . 7) (4 . 0) 
Government (3 .4 ) (5 . 1) (3.8) (4 . 3) (1.0) (7 . 4) (1.1) 
Net Goods (12 . 0) (16 . 1) (19.5) (45 .5) . (60 . 2) 
Services 1.3 1.2 5. 1 18 . 1 20 . 2 
Transfers 2.5 4.2 2. 4 2 . 9 7.0 
CUrrent Account 10 . 8 10.7 12 . 2 24 . 5 33 . 0 
Private Long Term 4. 7 5. 5 5. 6 12.4 1.6 24.1 2. 1 
Short Term 
Government Liabi-- 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.0 lities 
Assets 0.8 7. 7 3.1 
0 . 2 0. 6 
funks 3.6 2. 3 1.2 2.4 
Assets 0.4 9.2 
Central 0 . 2 1.4 3. 9 
SDRs 1.2 
_y _y _y 7.0 21.8 
Reserves 
Gold 
SDRs 
IMF Position (2 . 0) (0 . 1) 
CMA (3 .5) (19 .2) 
Other (1.5) (1.1) 
Errors & emissions 5.3 16.5 8.3 17 .6 19.5 
Net CapitalA=ount 10.8 10.7 12 . 2 24.5 33.0 
.Y Included in government assets . 
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Suva. 
1 46 SMALL ISLAND ECONOMIES 
By and large, export of labour is governed by demand and immig-
ration policies of New Zealand and the United States . It is sub-
stantial from the eastern islands whose Polynesian people find 
readier acceptance in those two countries . For instance, 24 per 
cent of the population of American Samoa migrated to Hawaii and 
mainland USA between 1950 and 1960.4) New Zealand has a larger po-
3) Errors and omissions have long been a large credit entry in Fi-
ji's balance of payments, and attempts to track down their ori-
gin have hitherto fail ed . Our guess is that they consist large-
ly of retained profits and loans from Australian parent compani-
es to their subsidiaries in Fiji. Much of the subsidiaries' bu-
siness is in the nature of trade and storage with consequent 
need of working capital . 
4) Economic Development Program for American Samoa, Wolf Management 
Services, New York, 1969. 
TABIB 2 BALANCE OF PAYMENT'S : PAPUA NEW GUINEA, l967-1973 
A$ Million 
1967-8 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 ____ __....._._ __ 
Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr 
Merchan- 58.2 122 . 6 64.1 136.2 70.7 193.2 76.8 242.0 93.4 218.5 229.1 209.8 dise 
Non none- 0. 8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0. 6 
tary gold 
Transport 6.0 22.2 7.4 27 .1 9.3 35 . 3 11.9 41.4 12 . 9 47.5 15 . 0 60 .1 
Travel 9.1 14 . 2 10.4 15.3 14 . 1 16.5 17.8 17.5 21.2 18 . 5 17.8 19.5 
Inv.incare 9. 9 19.3 12 . 8 18 . 6 17.6 22.1 21.6 25 . 1 22.6 39 . 2 23.0 138 .3 
Private 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.8 2 . 0 transfers 
Other 5. 8 19 . 3 3. 1 6.6 3. 7 22.8 5.3 33.6 6. 1 20.2 6. 1 24 . 4 services 
Net 
gocxls 64.4 72 .1 122.5 165.2 125.1 19.3 
transfers 0. 2 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.8 2.0 
Current 108.1 105.3 Account 174.fl 216.3 
188.7 162.5 
Investment 34 . 7 5.1 43 . 0 1.9 130.3 14.1 230.9 8 . 4 158.1 5.0 n.a. 
Ranittan- 38.2 112 . 6 n.a. ces 
Private 60 .6 80.3 147.2 
n.a . 
Missions 5. 7 5.9 6 . 2 6.4 6.6 n.a. 
Govern- 110.9 119.0 ment 
131.9 134 . 6 141.6 n.a. 
Net 
capital 108 .1 105.3 174.0 216 .3 188.7 n.a. 
A=unt 
Source: Australia (1973) : Compendium of statistics for Papua New Guinea. Prepar-
ed by the Statistics Section, Departnent of External Territories, canber-
ra. 
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pulation of Cook Islanders than has the Cooks, as well as substan-
tial populations of Samoans and Tongans. On the other hand, Mela-
nesian and Micronesian populations of the South-west Pacific do not 
have easy access to the Anglo-Saxon countries around the Pacific . 
Canada has admitted a few thousand migrants from Fiji in recent 
TABIB 3 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: WESTERN SAM)A, 1967-1972 
.Merchandise 
Non rronetary gold 
Freight & insurance 
other Transport 
Travel 
Investment incorre 
Non-merchandise insurance 
other 
Trade Balance 
other goods and services 
Unrequited Transfers 
Pensions & remittances 
other 
Goverrurent 
Net requited transfers 
Net current ac=unt 
Net CaEital Flows 
Private investrrent 
Private short term 
Goverrurent allocation of 
SDRs 
Reserve 
Creation 
Net change in reserve 
MJnetary gold 
SDRs 
Foreign Exchange CB 
Government ) 
Change due to revaluation 
Net errors and emissions 
Net capital Ac=unt 
Sources: 
WS$ Million 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Cr Dr Cr Dr er Dr er Dr Cr Dr Cr Dr 
3.2 5. 6 3.8 5.5 4. 8 7. 4 3.5 9. 8 4. 7 9.6 3.5 15.7 
0 .2 0.1 
0.2 0.3 
0.2 
1.1 0.5 
2.4 
~:~ 0. 5)1. 8 
1. 7 
0.1 0. 2 0.5 0 . 6 
0. 9 0.3 1 . 3 0. 3 1.6 0.3 1.9 0.5 
0.1 0.1 0. 1 0.1 0.2 0. 1 
0.1 0. 1 0. 3 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.7 
2.5 6.3 4.9 12 . 2 
0. 5 0. 7 0.6 1.5 
2.4 0.3 2.6 0.6 2. 9 0.7 4.1 1.2 
) 0.5 1. 8 0.3 2.0 0.3 0.2 ) 1.6 0.2 
0.3 0. 6 0.6 0.4 0. 8 0.3 1.2 0.3 
1.3 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.9 
0. 8 0. 2 3.7 2. 0 7.8 
1.4 4. 0 2. 4 6. 3 
0.5 1.0 1.5 4. 2 
0.6 1.9 0.2 1.3 
0.3 0.4 0.9 0. 8 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 1.4 0. 4 0.3 1. 7 
0.3 
0.1 
0 . 7 1.4 
0. 1 0.1 1.1 
0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 
0.2 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0.8 0.2 3.7 2.0 7.8 
Western Sarroa (1968) : Satistical yearbook, Prime Minister's Department. 
Western Sarroa (1971) : Annual statistical abstract 1971, Department of Statis-
tics. 
Western Sarroa (1972) : Annual statistical abstract 1972, Department of Statis-
tics. 
Western Sarroa (1974): Quarterly statistical bulletin, 1st quarter 1974. 
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years, mainly Indians; but the number of potential migrants to Ca-
nada greatly exceeds the number admitted. The net earnings of the 
south-western islands from remittances are therefore negative - sub-
stantially so in the case of Papua New Guinea whence A$113 million 
was remitted in 1971-72 (Table 2). 
Import of capital is closely related to the growth of export in-
dustries based on natural resources. The discovery of copper on 
Bougainville island attracted a heavy flow of foreign investment 
from 1969 onwards into Papua New Guinea (Table 2) . The development 
of hotels and other tourist facilities simiarly attracted invest-
ment into Fiji from 1971 onwards (Table 1). 
Investment into the development of natural resources tends to 
be distributed very unevenly in the region. Although the boom of 
the early seventies in primary materials led to feverish explora-
tion and the consequent discovery of bauxite, copper and phosphates 
on a number of islands in the Pacific, the major discoveries were 
confined to Papua New Guinea and Fiji. It might be thought that 
the natural resources required for tourism - sun, sea and sands -
are more uniformly distributed among the tropical islands. But 
even here Fiji has seen far more development than all other islands 
together, because it sits astride the main air route bet~een Hawaii 
and Australia-New Zealand: the supply 0£ tourists to a country is 
governed by air services, and owing to the high overhead costs of 
aircraft as well as ground facilities, airlines tend to concentrate 
traffic into narrow channels and a small number of airports. It is 
noteworthy that al though Papua New Guinea is on the path of Australi-
an tourists travelling to the Far East, tourism has bypassed it; 
airlines prefer instead to stop over in Singapore and Bangkok. 
Statistics of remittances and of capital movements are neither 
available for such long periods nor so~accurate as trade statistics, 
and it wo~ld be idle to trv to make a precise estimate of the rela-
tive instability of exports and of other sources of exchange receipts . 
Migrant labour tends to concentrate in unskilled jobs and is there-
fore less securely employed . Hence its remittances are sensitive 
to the trade cycle. But the available statistics do not suggest 
greater instability in labour export earnings than in commodity ex-
port receipts . Even a casual study of tables 1-3 is however enough 
to show the extreme instability of capital imports; and this impres-
sion would be strengthened if more recent payments statistics were 
available, for investment in the Bougainville project tapered off 
after 1972, and investment in tourism in Fiji collapsed with the 
fall in tourist arrivals in 1974. The South Pacific economies are 
subjected to large fluctuations in exchange receipts owing to fluc-
tuating capital inflows; their commodity exports would give a very 
misleading and inadequate impression of the external instability 
faced by them. 
II. THE MULTIPLIER 
Let us now look at the argument that although the exchange re-
ceipts of a small country may fluctuate, their impact on the econo-
my will be small owing to leakages. TarshisSlwrote, 
" (_-AJ small region is likely to be specialized to one or a 
5) Op.cit., p.194. 
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few types of economic activity; from this standpoint, it is likely 
to show somewhat greater instability than a larger one. But its 
very smallness is also likely to mean that its marginal propensity 
to import will be high, and this will mean that, other things being 
equal, most of the effect of any de-stabilizing development that 
has it s source inside the region will be passed on to other regions 
which will find their 'exports' changing . " 
This argument was given a quantitative form by MacBean6lwho modi-
fied the multiplier formula as follows : 
1 - p - m - t ·· x x x 
m + .s t 
(W 
6X + = 
y y y 
where 6Y is the change in income, 6X is the change in exports, Px 
is the proportion of export proceeds repatriated to foreigners, mx 
is the proportion of export proceeds paid for re-exported imports, 
tx is the proportion of export proceeds taxed away, and my, sy and 
ty are the proportions of the change in domestic income that are 
spent on imports, saved and paid in taxes . 
McBean applies the formula to average values for six relatively 
small trade-dependent countries, and gets a mu l tiplier value of 1.02. 
If we put average 1972 values for Fiji, the multiplier works out to 
be . 7 8. 7) 
However, MacBean's f ormula strongly underestimates the multipli-
er effect. The multiplier is the sum of an infinite series whose 
first terms is one; it cannot therefore be less than one. The Mc-
Bean multiplier comes to less than one for Fiji because its numera-
tor is l ess than one: it is equal to the fraction of exports that 
is spent on domestic goods. This fraction would be different for 
di~ferent types of autonomous expenditure , such as exports, invest-
ment, change in stocks or government expenditure. The multiplier 
can however hardly varv accoring to the tvpe of autonomous expendi-
ture: it is j ust ihe r~ciprocal of the ratio of leakages to change 
in income. It is therefore clear that it is onlv that part of au-
tonomous expenditure which is spent on domestic goods and services 
that can have a multiplier effect. 
Second, the Keynesian convention of regarding taxes as a l eakage 
is j us tified only when government revenue and expenditure are unre-
6) Op . cit., pp.93-96. 
7) The r elevant figures are -
Exports F$65.6 millional 
Re-exports F$13.8 millional 
Imports F$131.5 millional 
Savings F$30.9 millionbl 
National Income F$238.2 millioncl 
Sources : a) Fiji: Current Economic Statistics, April 1975, Table 
39. 
b) Calculated from Fiji: The Na tional Accounts of Fiji 
1968-1972, Table A4, and Current Economic Statistics, 
April 1975, Table 38. 
c) Calaculated from GDP of F$247.3 million by deducting 
net outflow of overseas investment income of F$9.l 
million . 
Profits repatriated by export industries were assumed to be 10 
percent of exports. There were no export taxes in 1972. 
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lated. If the government's expenditure depends on its revenue, a 
change in revenue can hardly be regarded as an equivalent change 
in savings; instead, one should work out the government's propensi-
ty to save out of revenue . The appropriate term ty would then be 
the product of tne proportion of income taxed away and of the gov-
ernment's propensity to save . If the government ' s propensity to 
save is low, ty can be ignored without much error in the multiplier . 
Third, it would be a mistake to take the propensity to import as 
equal to the ratio of total imports to national income : it should 
appropriately be the ratio of consumer goods imports to national 
income . The two can be very different for a trade-dependent count-
ry. 
After the necessary modifications, the multiplier becomes 
M = __ l __ 
- Sy + my 
which works out to be _ approximately 3 . 28 for Fiji in 19728land 3.39 
for Papua New Guinea in 1971-72 . 9)The values, while undoubtedly low-
er than for less open economies, are not so low as MicBean's calcu-
lations suggest . -
It may be stressed that only domestic expenditure has multiplier 
effect; if exports or other autonomous expenditure has a high im-
port content, its impact on domestic demand will be lower . But 
countries which are more dependent on imports are also more depend-
ent on exports, foreign investment or aid, and the lower the multi-
plier effect of a change in autumomous expenditure, the greater, by 
and large, will be the first-round effect. Consider, for instance, 
a country like Nauru where almost all economic activity is oriented 
to phosphate exports and virtually all consumer goods are imported 
apart from serv ices that cannot be imported . The multiplier in 
Nauru may well be a little different from unity ; but a f luctuati on 
in exports will nevertheless lead to an almost proportional change 
in incomes a nd employment. 
A low multiplier effect is therefore just a reflection of heavy 
dependence on exports or c apital imports, and cannot be taken to 
mean a low level of vulnerability to external shocks . The general 
conclusion must be that small countries are highly sensitive to ex-
ternal disturbances . 
III . INFLATION AND DEFLATION 
Even if it is conceded that the multiplier in small economies is 
appreciably large, its relevance may be contested. The multiplier 
would indicate the effect of changes in autonomous expenditure on 
output and employment if there are no supply bottlenecks: how far 
does it work in underdeveloped economies with a limited stock of 
capital? 
8) Consumer goods imports into Fiji in 1972 were estimated to be 
F$41.7 million. (Source: Fiji Current Economic Statistics, April 
1974, Table 40.) 
9) In 1971-72, the national income of Papua New Guinea was A$574 . 7 
million, savings were A$69.7 million and imports of consumer 
goods were approximately A$100 million. 
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The multiplier effect of a fall in autonomous expenditure faces 
no obstacles in a less developed economy. The fall in the demand 
for labour may be disguised in the form of underemployment; but it 
can be argued that this is not the case in the economies of the 
South Pacific. For in these economies the commercialized sector is 
an enclave which has few linkages with the subsistence sector. In 
fact, one of the conditions of emergence of the commercial sector 
was the breaking of the links between the worker and his rural con-
nections by indenture (which prevailed in Papua New Guinea till re-
cently and still continues in New Caledonia) and transportation 
far away from home. Commercialization in the South Pacific is dif-
ferent from the commercialization of peasant agriculture such as is 
encountered in Asia or Europe: it is more akin to plantations or 
mines, whose work force subsists on purchases of subsistence goods. 
There is thus no adjunct of subsistence agriculture to absorb work-
ers released by the commercial activities during slumps.10) There 
are urban workers who live on subsistence farms in surrounding areas, 
but the farms are far ~oo small to give work to the workers if they 
lose their jobs: they are rural dormitories with a subsistence side-
line.lll 
In upturns, a progressive increase in demand would normally en-
counter an increasing numbe~ of supply bottlenecks, and would re-
sult in a progressively smaller increase in production and employ-
ment and a correspondingly larger rise in prices. Decelerating in-
creases in output and accelerating rises in prices are the charac-
teristic outcome of an upswing. In a highly trade-dependent econo-
my however it is possible that an upswing would affect the balance 
of payments rather than prices: that the domestic price level would 
be determined by import prices and the exchange rate, and that do-
mestic supply bottlenecks would be circumvented by imports, which 
would rise faster than GNP. 
However, evidence does not support the view that the price level 
is determined by import prices. Only 24 percent of the private fin-
al consumption in Fiji in 1972 consisted of imported goods.12) The 
import content of consumption in Papua New Guinea also was approxi-
mately 25 percent in 1971-72. 
More direct evidence is given in Table 4, which compares the 
food price index for Fiji with an index of food import prices. 
Whilst both rose considerably in the period 1971-74, the pace as 
well as the timing of the rise differed. The overall price index 
was rising in 1971 when the import price index was stable, and rose 
sharply after the hurricane in November 1972: in the two following 
10) Open unemployment in Fiji was estimated at about 20 percent of 
total surplus labour in 1966. But underemployment consisted of 
(a) potential female workers and (b) surplus labour in sugar 
cane farming, which was a fully commercialized export sector. 
See Desai, A.V., "The unemployment problem in Fiji", Economic 
Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, XXIV (2/3), 1973, pp.23-25. 
11) Desai, A.V., "Commercialization of the subsistence sector in 
the South Pacific" in J.B. Hardaker (ed.), The Subsistence Sect-
or in the South Pacific, University of the South Pacific, Suva 
and University of New England, Armidale, 1976 (forthcoming). 
12) Fairbairn, I.J., R. Jofre and P.H. Kruck, A Survey of Industry 
and Its Potential in Western Samoa, Final report, UNIDO/IPPD, 
1973, p. 69 
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TABLE 4 FOOD PRICE INDICES, FIJI 1971-1974 
Imported food All food 
Year and quarter (Av 1969=100) (July 1968=100) 
1971.1 112 117 
2 110 117 
3 113 117 
4 111 122 
1972.1 112 126 
2 115 126 
3 120 129 
4 124 145 
1973.1 131 159 
2 148 152 
3 158 156 
4 193 166 
1974 . 1 216 169 
2 244 180 
3 248 189 
4 256 195 
Source: Fiji (1975): 'Cnrrent economic statistics, April 1975, Bureau 
of Statistics, Suva, Tables 53 and 58. 
quarters the food price index went up by 22 percent against a 9 per 
cent rise in the .import price index. In the two years 1973 and 
1974 however import prices nearly doubled while the food price in-
dex rose by only about a quarter . In spite of the import depend-
ence of food consumption therefore food prices in Fiji retained 
considerab l e independence of import prices. Thes, prices in small 
economies are substantially subject to domestic influences; infla-
tion is not entirely imported into them. Hence increases in capital 
inflows or exports can have strong inflationary effect owing to the 
sectoral unbalances they create . 
Investment has a high import content in small economies: the pro-
portion of capital goods imports to investment in Fiji was 72 per-
cent in 1972. Whilst its high jmport content may be expected to 
reduce its domestic impact, most of the domestic content of invest-
ment consisted of building and construction. The demand it generat-
ed for construction was reinforced bv demand from local savers, who 
find residential and commercial buildings the most attractive form 
of investment in the absence of a local financial market. Consequ-
ently there were grave shortages of labour and construction materi-
als in the 1969-73 boom which delayed construction , raised construc-
tion costs and slowed down investment. There was a particularly 
serious shortage of skilled labour; construction firms were not pre-
pared to train workers since they did not know how long the boom 
would last, and they found it easy to attract workers away from oth-
er firms; they thereby reduced the returns on investment in training 
still further. 
Further, imports as well as exports have strong sectoral effects. 
For foreign trade depends on four ac tivities that are normally mono-
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polized or oligopolized and are spatially concentrated - docks, 
airlines and airports, banks and telecommunications. An increase 
in imports raises the demand for these services and increases their 
profitability . Even if they are public monopolies whose profits 
are controlled , they are easy to unionize, and unions push up wages 
during booms . Thus, airline and dock workers are among the highest 
paid in Fiji; and cable and wireless workers achieved the highest 
rate of wage increase - 72 percent - between December 1973 and Janu-
ary 197s .13) 
IV. MICRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
Historically, the countries of the South Pacific have never had 
a feudal or a trader class which could have initiated indigenous 
capital accumulation. Insofar as the countries have entered the 
world trading system - and they are more commercialized today than 
most Asian and African countries - it has been through foreign en-
terprise . Their markets are small in relation to available supply, 
and their exports in relation to world markets . Hence it is easy 
to monopolize imports and exports . Even where an industry begins 
with a competitive structure, it tends to get monopolized over time . 
In the early days of the Fiji sugar industry for instance there was 
a large number of cane growers who made their own sugar for sale; 
in time however economies of scale and control of refineries in Au-
stralia enabled the Colonial Sugar Refining Company to monopolize 
production . Similarly, there has been keen competition in the hotel 
industry in recent years . But hotel development in Fiji is highly 
land-intensive, and the best sites are being rapidly exhausted . 
The current slump in tourist arrivals has led to some takeovers, 
and it is likely that as the more lucrative investment opportuniti-
es get exhausted, hotels will become more dependent on the patron-
age of airlines and of travel agents, and the industry will be oli-
gopolized. 
The tendencies towards monopoly were reinforced until recently 
by colonial regimes which excluded foreign enterprises from outside 
their respective empires. It was not necessary to restrict entry 
by law, for the state had other powers to ensure or deny success to 
an enterprise. Most of the industry in South Pacific countries was 
based on natural resources . Some of them, like copra, were put un-
der the control of semi-official bodies on which the existing enter-
prises had powerful representation. Others, such as minerals, re-
quired public investment in roads and infrastructure which could be 
used to ensure that an incoming investor had the government's appro-
val. It is no accident therefore that almost all foreign investment 
in Fiji and Papua New Guinea is Australian. 
Once a country becomes independent, the power of business inter-
ests from the erstwhile mother (or sister) country is weakened. 
Soon after independence for instance Fiji allowed an Indian company 
to set up a flour mill. Althouqh Carpenters and Burns Philp control 
the bulk of Fiji imports, the share of local importers ha.s been on 
the increase since independence, especially in duty-free goods and 
textiles. In banking services also the share of the Big Two, the 
13) Fiji: Inflation in Fiji. A Further Account of the Work of the 
Prices and Incomes Board, Prices and Incomes Board, Suva, 1975, 
p.3 
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Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of New South Wales, has declined. 
In 1974 Fiji introduced a one-line tariff; the abolition of Common-
wealth preference is likely to erode monopoly positions (Western 
Samoa, Tonga and Papua New Guinea however continue to have two-line 
tariffs) . 
Foreign enterprises do however still have a number of instruments 
for maintaining monopoly of production and imports. First, they 
exert pressure on suppliers abroad to give agencies to their branch-
es in Fiji or not to give franchises to potentia l competitors in 
Fiji. A number of instances are given in Howie.14) Such restric-
tive practices continue to be common . For instance, the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company used to export molasses produced in Fiji to 
its alcohol plants in Australia at throwaway prices. After nation-
alization of CSR's Fiji interests, the Fiji government opened nego-
tiations with Mitsubishi in 1973 to set up an industrial alcohol 
factory in Fiji. Late in 1974 Mitsubishi contracted to buy molass-
es from CSR (Australia) , and at about the same time broke off nego-
tiations with Fiji government . 
Second, foreign enterprises buy up competitors in Fiji. With 
the setting up of a flour mill in Fiji in 1972, the Australian 
flour millers lost a large part of their export market; even the 
bakeries in Fiji affiliated to them had to buy flour from the local 
mill as a result of a ban on imports. Periodically since then, Suva 
Bakery, the major affiliate of an Australian miller, has carried 
out campaigns in the press, the radio and the 9overnment to create 
the impression that the locally produced flour is of poor quality 
- and each time been proved wrong by tests made by the Government 
in local as well as Australian laboratories. In early 1974, Suva 
Bakery and Cope Allman, a large biscuit producer, ran their flour 
stocks sharply down and threatened to throw their workers out of 
employment unless their stocks were imediately replenished. The 
FlourMillsof Fiji did not have enough capacity to meet their de-
mand, and they were given import licences . Throughout the period 
since 1973 the flour mill has from time to time received takeover 
offers from Australian millers. 
Finally, legislation to promote industry can itself become a 
strong protector of monopoly . The Fiji government has passed legis-
lation which enables it on discretion to give new investors cheap 
land, a tax holiday, concessions in import duty on machinery and 
raw materials and a promise not to allow competing enterprises to 
be set up for a number of years. The concessions are so powerful 
that no one thinks any more of setting up a large industry wjthout 
getting at least some of them; the government's discretion regard-
ing concessions therefore acts more or less like industri~l licens-
ing powers. When they come to know that the government is consider-
ing the application of a potential competitor for concessions, im-
porting firms either submit a proposal of their own to set up the 
industry or promise to do so. The proposal is never implemented, 
and the import monopoly is maintained. This is how glass production 
in Fiji has been prevented by the importer. 
14) Howie, I . , "The effects of foreign investment" in Fiji: A Deve-
loping Australian Colony, International Develcpment Association, 
North Fitzroy (Victoria, Australia), 1973, pp.59-70. 
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What is the resu]t of these monopolistic practices? They un-
doubtedly maintain and augment the prof its of enterprises that are 
,;ither owned abroad though situated in Fiji or are exporters to 
Fiji. No estimate can be made of the profits, however . No infor-
mation is given out which would permit the separation of profits 
in Fiji from the total profits of the foreign enterprises. There 
are no provisions for public disclosure of annual accounts in any 
country of the south Pacific such as one finds in any developed 
countries. The corporate income tax returns submitted to Inland 
Revenue authorities are not even available to other departments of 
the government, including the price control authorities in Tonga 
and Fiji. Foreign businesses in these countries pay taxes more or 
less as voluntary contributions, and any scrutiny is prevented by 
extreme secrecy in all financial matters . And since most of them 
export to or import from parents or affiliates abroad, there is con-
siderable scope for transfer pricing . 15) 
Whatever happens to profits, however, the major effects of for-
eign monopolies are undoubtedly the fi·ustration of the growth po-
tential and' the high foreign exchange cost of whatever growth does 
take place. It has often been noticed how backward the resource-
based industries in the south Pacific are . Although coconuts have 
probably been growing almost since the islands emerged, the produc-
tion of coconut byproducts is virtually unknown. Whilst starchy 
foods have been the staple for centuries, the production of starch 
from manioc is not undertaken although it is well established else-
where in the world . The blame for the general lack of dynamism is 
placed on the culture of the local population. The truth is, how-
ever, that foreign enterprise has proved to bE a particularly inef-
fective dynamizer of south Pacific economies . 
V. CONCLUSION 
The external dependence of small economjes, described in some 
detail in this paper, is implicitly assumed in most discussions of 
development in the south Pacific. Typically the argument runs like 
this: the population of country X is rising rapidly, and it will 
need to create Y jobs by the year Z . Its savings rate is quite in-
sufficient, and it has little managerial or technological expertise. 
Hence it must attract foreign capital. In order to do so it must 
give a series of concessions such as tax holidays, duty-free imports, 
freehold land etc. 
Now, this model of deve lopment is not all that different from 
the actual arrangements in colonial days . Nowadays concessions are 
written into laws and formally negotiated between governments and 
enterprises. In the earlier days the mechcnism was more informal . 
The CSR could get the gover nment to build roads and do other servic-
es on the strength of the CSR's economic importance to Fiji . The 
Emperor Gold Mines obtained an unconaitional subsidy from the gov-
ernment to keep it going in the sixties. The Australian government 
made considerable infrastructure investment in Bougainville. The 
colonial governments assisted large foreign enterprises in the in-
terests of imperial prosperity; the newly independent governments 
15) Fairbai~n, I.J., R. Jofre and P.H. Kruck, A Survey of Industry 
and Its Potential in Western Samoa. Final report, UNIDO/IPPD, 
1973, p.69. -
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are asked to do so for domestic employment and production. What-
ever the differences in motivation, the policies are the same. And 
they will have the same effect of perpetuating vulnerability and 
long-run stagnation . 
Is there an alternative to this instability? It should be said 
straightaway that alternatives are not equally available to all 
countries and islands . The population of many small islands does 
not permit anything beyond a Robinson Crusoe economy; their people 
face the choice between a permanently limited mode of subsistence 
and migration, and the greatest contribution to their development 
would come from freer migration across the Pacific. The migration 
opportunities could be created by the metropolitan countries around 
the Pacific : it might be politically easier to do so, although eco-
nomically it would be undersirable insofar as ~he immigrants end up 
as racially distinct underprivileged minorities . The economically 
optimum solution would be the creation of two or at the most three 
federations in the Pacific within each of which labour and capital 
could move freely : politically however this would be more difficult 
to achieve . The point is that unless larger and more viable nations 
or federations emerge from the jumble of countries and territories 
emerging from the piecemeal decolonization of the South Pacific, 
many territories have no development prospects to speak of . 
Assuming that the islands can be regrouped into more viable fede-
rations, policies would be required to increase their autonomy. 
They would not be policies of import substitution : in fact, the cur-
rent policies of import substitution have enabled many foreign en-
terprises to tighten their hood on markets behind the shelter of ta-
riffs and quotas. The areas where greater local participation and 
control is required are services and investment. 
The direction of foreign trade and the terms on which it is con-
ducted is strongly influenced by the ownership of services - ship-
ping, airlines, banking and insurance . The countries of the south 
Pacific cannot diversify their trade relations unless regular trans-
port services are developed with the USA, Canada, Japan etc . , and 
unless they are supported by ancillary financial services. 
Whether in those services or in other sectors, foreign and domes-
tic capital are not substitutes . International capital is highly 
mobile, and dependence on it of a country whose labour does not have 
the same opportunities of movement entails unemployment and economic 
distress . It is therefore necessary to make capital formation more 
autonomous and to bring it under greater local control. This could 
be done in a number of ways. 
One is greater state finance (as distinct from control) of capi-
tal formation . The proportion of government current revenue to GDP 
in 1973 was 28 percent in Fiji and 30 percent in Papua New Guinea. 
The high share of the government permits substantial finance of ca-
pital formation . It may take the-form of direct infrastructure in-
vestme~t or of indirect investment in industry and agriculture. 
Fiji as well as Papua New Guinea have development banks, and Western 
Samoa has recently set up a finance corporation. Their operations 
have remained limited in scope because there has been no preference 
for domestic as against foreign capital . If such a preference is 
introduced into policy, local demand for finance wj .11 grow, and the 
development banks will need greater funds which could be provided 
from government revenue. 
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Finally, south Pacific countries need a type of institution that 
would channel domestic savings into local risk investment . Hither-
to the major form of financial investment available to savers has 
been bank deposits which give a low rate of return . Some foreign 
companies have issued s h ares locally, but the demand for shares 
has been dependent on the public ' s estimate of the management which 
has often not been high . Whilst the Government of Fiji offers its 
bonds for sale and is prepared to buy them at periodically announc-
ed prices, their yield is not much higher th~n of bank deposits . 
The resuJ.t is that in the absence of attractive channels of final 
investment local savings go largely into housing and real estate . 
To attract domestic savings into risk investment a type of institu-
tion is needed that would spread the risks by diversifying invest-
ment . The development banks could serve the objective if they issu-
ed equity shares to the public; but they would have to shed a good 
deal of their conservatism if they are to participate substantially 
in risk investment . Another alternative would be unit trusts . Ei-
ther way, the countri~s of the south Pacific should get away from 
a situation where domestic savings are channeled into low-yield 
fixed investment or property speculation while high-yield risk in-
vestment in new industries is financed from imported capital . 
COMMENTS ON DESAI'S PAPER 
(a) JOHN MACRAE 
I can see four main themes emanating from Professor Desai's pap-
er: 
1. The economic instability question. 
2. The limits of diversification imposed by the small market size 
of mini-states and the associated question of foreign monopoly 
capital. 
3. The question of regional integration or co-operation, or the 
search for a more rational basis for resource allocation across 
the region as a whole. 
4. The need for a rationalisation of the capital market. 
I shall make comments on the first three of these themes, but 
will preface these by two general critical comments on the paper. 
The first general comment is my disappointment that the paper 
did not attempt to categorise mini-states more adequately, or to 
recognise the variety or diversity, even amongst the small island 
economies of the South Pacific. This is important because new pro-
jects and new industries will naturally move towards the already 
more developed areas, in terms of infrastructure and other faciliti-
es. Hence the response of other mini-states to new projects will 
be strongly influenced by their relative position as it currently 
prevails. 
A second comment that can be made is the failure of Desai's pap-
er to recognise strongly enough the likely long-term importance of 
migration from mini-states . With their consumption aspirations and 
expectations rising and rising faster than their consumption possi-
bilities, which are constrained by size, uncertain terms of trade 
and feudal land tenure systems, then the obvious and quickest way 
out is by the spatial relocation of the factors of production parti-
cularly labour, to economies where such constraints do not exis~ . 
Thus to specific themes: 
1. Economic stability: the theme is that small countries are highly 
sensitive to external disturbances . Shock waves of a greater magni-
tude are felt throughout the entire economy and to a degree relative-
ly greater than that felt in large countries. The effects, to a 
greater or lesser extent, of this instability are reflected in pric-
es, the factor markets and construction investment. I felt a little 
unconvinced that this was either a major problem or one of the major 
problems confronting these states~ It is not clear from the evid-
ence that instability is either more of a problem in mini- than in 
maxi-states, nor that it is greater currently than it has been his-
torically, nor is it more amongst mini- than maxi-states for those 
commodities or substitutes produced by both. Evidence suggests that 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement has had a strong influence in re-
ducing the export price instability of Fijian sugar . The actions 
of Metropolitan France have had a dominant and determining influence 
in reducing the fluctuations in the New Caledonian economy imparted 
by the vagaries of the nickel market . 
Even if the case is accepted, what policy conclusions can be drawn? 
The obvious response-diversification has been noted by Professor 
Desai particularly in relation to the role of migrant labour remit-
tances as an extra source of foreign exchange receipts. But, if 
158 
ASHOKA DESAI 159 
these new sources are (a) as variable as traditional sources and 
(b) have strong co-variability, then one is jumping out of the fry-
ing pan into the fire . The point is surely not, as Professor Desai 
considers, that the variability of labour earnings remitted is less 
or greater than commodity export receipts, but whether together the 
two five greater variability overall. 
Another point is that undue stress on export instability can be 
an excuse for movement to inward looking policies, biased away frDm 
true sources of efficiency . I would like to ask whether such poli-
cies of diversification as have been undertaken have had determined 
effects on traditional exports . Has it meant less attention being 
paid to the possibility of processing further these traditional com-
~odities, to the clawing back of more value ad~ed from these, and 
to the generating of more linkages? 
2. The limits of diversification . The argument here is clearly that 
the limits to any policy of diversification, based on inward-looking 
policies, are reached much more quickly in a mini-state than else-
where . There is often room for only one or two producers and thus 
the potential for exploitation is high. 
One's immediate response is to recommend more outward looking 
policies, not based on market size . But we all know the problems 
associated with that option . Another comment is that if these stat-
es must have domestic import substitution, then most of these poli-
cies listed in the paper seem quite sensible because they do not in-
volve a tax on trade. But why should governments be interested in 
maintaining monopolies? Is there some pay off? Does the inducement 
package have to be much greater for mini-states? The obvious goal 
seems to be to get as much competitive private foreign investment 
as possible . Perhaps some form of market concentration norms or 
more discrepant choice procedures are necessary . 
3 . The question of Regional Integration or Co-operation . The major 
points of the paper under this theme are a stress on easier migra-
tion as the greatest contribution to the development of many small 
island economies , the possibilities of regional integration with 
metropolitan powers aLd the preferred option of two or three region-
al federations of small Pacific states amongst themselves . The pro-
blem with integration or federation amongst the islands themselves 
is that they will cut across existing economic and political ties. 
The South Pacific still divides up into three ' ex- colonial ' spheres 
of influence: New zealand, Australian and Common Market (U . K. and 
French) spheres . Economic and other relations take place along 
these lines . There is very little intra-regional trade amongst the 
s t ates themselves. These states are scarcely competitive in e~ono ­
mic structure or have complementary resource endowments. There are 
conflicts of interest amongst them. 
Thus, I do not see any future in any grandiose ideas for politi-
cal integration in the South Pacific. But areas of potential bene -
fit exist where collaboration on some scale could assist . Some of 
these areas where pooling of resources could reduce costs to each 
are in: 
(1) common facility developments : transport, infrastructure, infor-
mation industries. 
(2) bulk purchase arrangements 
(3) joint ventures - say in simple component manufactures. 
(4) cartelisation - cannot the OPEC model be adapted to fit the 
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case of copra? 
The main problem with all these possibilities is, of course, that 
of the fair distribution of gains. 
I will conclude with a few comments on migration. This is basic-
ally a problem in optional location - should the Islander be brought 
to the jobs in Auckland or should the jobs be exported to the Is-
lands. A full scale cost-benefit analysis remains to be done, but 
for the moment there is no choice. The Islander must come, and the 
distribution of gain for the moment seems rather unjust. The skills 
received are of little long run value, while Islanders suffer dis-
crimination in economic and social life and lack protection and re-
cognition of their qualifications. For me, much closer attention 
needs to be paid to a fairer distribution of benefits to the minori-
ty immigrant. 
(bl JoHN VuLUPINDI 
Professor Desai draws c:.ttention to commonly held vJews that: (a) 
small countries are more dependent on trade; (b) their exports are 
less diversified; and (c) their industries are geographically less 
concentrated than those of larger countries. He goes on to say, 
however, that the inference that small economies are more vulnerable 
to external shocks has been disputed both on theoretical and on em-
pirical grounds. In the rest of the paper, Professor Desai explor-
es these issues with special reference to Fiji, Western Samoa and 
Papua New Guinea. 
Professor Desai conducts his examination under the following 
broad headings: 
(1) Goods and factors of production. 
(2) The Multiplier. 
(3) Inflation/Deflation. 
(4) Microeconomic effects. 
As the paper (in my opinion) appears to have been very soundly 
researched, I have no great argument with the broad conceptf' which 
are developed in its main body. In this connection, I do not intend 
to examine the issues in question in terms of their wider philoso-
phical implications. Instead, I wish only to address myself to the 
conclusions which Professor Desai draws from his research. Prior 
to this, however, I must draw attention to a few errors of fact re-
lating to Papua New Guinea. First, Professor Desai lists Papua New 
Guinea among other countries which operate a two-line tariff. This 
is incorrect. Although Australia does apply preferential treatment 
to certain exports from Papua New Guinea, there is no reciprocal 
treatment of Australian exports by Papua New Guinea. Second, in 
the discussion under "inflation/deflation", Professor Desai states 
that" .... evidence does not support the view that the price level 
is determined by import prices". In Papua New Guinea, there is a 
very close correlation between domestic price levels and movements 
in import prices. This has been particularly conspicuous in recent 
times when price increases in the rest of the world were closely 
fellowed by price rises in the domestic market. It clearly reflects 
the fact that most consumption goods one finds in urban areas are 
almost entirely imported. [Even in the case of fresh foods where 
domestic production is possible, the structure of production is such 
that prices tend to be based on imported foodstuffs. In the subsist-
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ence sector, pricing is obviously a non-issue - being quite detach-
ed from the market economy and hence not entering the relevant cal-
culations.] 
With respect to the conclusions which Professor Desai draws, I 
would make the followinq observations. [I find Professor Desai's 
analysi~ of ~he motives-for seeking foreign investment both under 
colonial rule and in newly independent countries most enlightening 
and interesting, to say the least!] I am a bit wary of the alter-
native suggestion for greater State financing of capital formation . 
Taken in isolation, this would be a great improvement. However, 
when one looks at Sri ~anka, a country where the Government has 
State Corporations in almost every sector of the community, the re-
sults are not too encouraging . Papua New Guinea appears to be fol-
lowing the same path in that the Government has•taken options in 
various large foreign firms, some of which it has exercised. From 
another angle, the Government buys established foreign enterprises 
and sells them (over time) to indigenous interests. These develop-
ments in Papua New Guinea are very recent and hence it may be too 
early to judge whether Papua New Guinea will make a success of it . 
Professor Desai's proposal for an institution for channelling 
domestic savings into local risk (high return) investment is a sound 
one . I should mention that in Papua New Guinea such an institution 
has been established in the form of the Papua New Guinea Investment 
Corporation, which operates as a unit trust . It acquires shares 
from various operating firms and resells them in "packages" to indi-
genous Papua New Guinean nationals . The system is organized so 
that a person who holds shares in the Corporation in effect has in-
terests in at least eight different concerns at any one point in 
time, thereby limiting the risk element substantially while keeping 
dividends well above what one would get from the same amount of in-
vestment in ~ savings bank account. 
Finally, I should like to ask what is meant by choosing be-
tween foreign capital and domestic capital, mentioned in connection 
with the Development Banks in Fiji and in Papua New Guinea. If it 
means borrowing from any source by the Development Banks and lending 
in turn to indigenous entrepreneurs, then I should point out that 
Papua New Guinea is already doing this. Although the Papua New Gui-
nea Development Bank has had to rely on government grants initially, 
the current policy is to borrow on commercial terms and then on-lend 
to local clients. 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The first participant in the discussion suggested that, in the 
past, developing countries had been badly informed a.s to the true 
value of natural resources and hence exploited (in various degrees) 
by multinationals. The situation now was radically changing. Agree-
ments such as those in Papua New Gui nea on the mining of copper and 
in New Caledonia on the mining of bauxite were 19th century anachro-
nisms . Developing countries were bound to rebel against the nega-
tive effects of such agreements by forming producers' cartels such 
as OPEC. They were also increasingly concerned about the question 
of who makes critical political and economic decisions in develop-
ing countries: their governments, or interfering multinationals . 
Recent interference by multinationals in Latin American political 
and economic decision making was cited as an example. 
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others challenged the refe rence s made to Papua New Guinea and 
the Bougainville Copper Agreement . One member said that, while he 
was not happy with the init i al agreeme nt, rece nt modifications to 
the copper Agreement following unheard of peaks in coppe r prices in 
the early 1970 ' s had made the agreement qui t e a cceptable . He sug-
gested that pric e stabi l ity a nd h igh prices we r e in the inte rests 
of both multinationals and developing governments and did not sup-
port the exploitation thesis . The effectiveness of cartels in se-
curing a higher share of the p roceeds from sale s of a commodity 
depended on the supply and demand conditions of that commodity . 
Certainly in the short run, OPEC had b e nefited from a producers' 
cartel, but oil was a commodity with very low cross elasticity of 
demand and producers ' cartels in other commodities might only re-
sult in substitution . 
An Australian participant adamantly denied that the Bougainville 
Copper Agreement in any way r e sembled a 19th century-style agree-
ment. The Papua New Guinea Government revenue had doubled by taxa-
tion of the Company and revenue arising from the development. The 
Papua New Guinea Government had a 20 % equity share in the mine . 
It could have had full ownership, but it had felt valuable admini-
strative staff could not be s pared for the running of the mine. 
Papua New Guinea was a special country and general judgements that 
might apply to other countries could not be made in this case. 
A New Zealander suggested that South Pacific economies could be 
classified in a manner analogous to residential accommodation - fur-
nished, semi-furnished and unfurnished . Australia and perhaps New 
Zealand were the only furnished economies, and the remaining deve-
loping economies in the South Pacific wer.e of the semi-furnished 
or unfurnished type . Whether these island economies were viable or 
not, they were political units 'par excellence' in so far as each 
island group was very nationalistic . He agreed with Desai that 
their options were very limited economically - the people of these 
islands faced the prospect of a subsistence standard of living or 
migration . However, migration need not be of the uni-directional 
type now in existence - e . g . from the Islands to New Zealand. Two-
way migration cquld be encouraged. When there was a demand for la-
bour in New Zealand, Islanders could migrate to New Zealand, but 
when there was a demand for labour, for example in the Cook Islands 
during the orange harvesting season, labour could return to the 
Cooks. 
One of the participants from t he Sou th Pacific emphasised that 
the problems of South Pacific island economies could not be analys-
ed through Western (or Latin American) eye s. Whereas the average 
developing country may want per capita GNP of $US800-900 he sugg e st-
ed that if the level of per capita income was lifted from its pre-
sent level of $US200 to US$250-300 this c ould prove quite satisfac-
tory. He also pointed out that there were two types of migrants to 
New Zealand - those who had free access to New Zealand and could 
achieve permanent status as New Zealand citizens and those on a 
temporary (3 months) basis. Migration, therefore, needed to be an-
alysed in a two-fold manner. 
In reply to a question why competition was not encouraged by Fi-
ji, Desai said that foreign monopolies were promoted because Island 
Governments hoped that inflows of foreign capital and job creation 
would help with their problems of unemployment. Historically, for-
eign investment had not been the dynamizer of economic growth in 
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the South Pacific Island economies to the extent it had been else-
where . This did not mean that it would not be a dynamizer in the 
future. 
Desai emphasised that, while it might be possible to have suc-
cessful producers ' cartels in the production and sale of oil, and 
perhaps bauxite this was not the case in the sale of coconut oil 
and bananas (for example), because of different conditions of sup-
ply and demand . 
Dealing with migration, Desai drew an analogy between exports 
of goods and exports of labour in the migration question. He sug-
gested that Pacific Islands' labour forces should become more mobile, 
but for this to happen Australia and New Zealand would have to lib-
eralise their controls on labour movement in the same way as free-
dom of movement for goods was desirable . 
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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 
THE PROBLEMS OF A LARGE DONOR, THE UNITED STATES 
LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE 
On~ may well question why another paper on United States develop-
ment assistance - or foreign aid for short - is worth writing. While 
there are many possible answers, the most cogent one from my point 
of view is that the world has changed so drasttcally and quickly in 
recent years that a reassessment seems desirable. There is no reason, 
however, to have another normative paper on foreign aid . Poverty is 
still "bad" and if rich countries can help alleviate it in poor count-
ries, it would still be "good . " I thus make no effort to review the 
issues involved in the redistribution of world income . Rather my 
purpose is to explore the positive aspects of foreign aid within a 
realistic political setting in an effort to discover what are the 
sustainable bases f or foreign aid primarily b i later al in character 
from the po i nt of view of a large donor countr y . Such an asses s ment 
is useful in evaluating the p rospects fo r a continuing programme by 
the United States . Underlying this discussion is the belief tha t 
the central issue of development assistance is not economic develop-
me nt which is not greatly influenced by bilateral.programme , but 
rather the relations between countries which is greatly affected. 
Changes in the World Environment 
For many years it has been said that the world economy was deve-
loping a structure of greater interdependence among countries. This 
was not surprising since it conformed to the expectations of econo-
mic theory, was the natural result of trends in industrial technolo-
gy and was actively sought through the policy measures of most gov-
ernments. Nevertheless the implications of an interdependent world 
economy were not well understood . In developed countries, policy 
makers tended to consider world economic problems within a decision-
making frame dominated by developed countries. The United States 
was no exception, but by no means the worst in ignoring the less de-
veloped countries (LDCs) . One has only to think back to how inter-
national monetary problems were handled in the 1950s and 1960s to 
be convinced of the correctness of this observation . One did things 
for developing countries, not with them . Meetings like those of 
UNCTAD, which were specifically designed to include . both developed 
and developing countries as participants, were relegated to talking 
forums in which rhetoric was expected and as a result nobody listen-
ed . Negotiations within an UNCTAD-like setting were excludedbecause 
of the "unwieldy nature" of the group, and, of course, decision-mak-
ing there was out of the question. 
Developing countries showed little better understanding of inter-
*The views are those of the author and should not be attributed to other staff 
rranbers, officers or trustees of the Brookings Institution. 
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dependence . They knew full well that they were greatly affected by 
developments in other countries, but they considered themselves as 
objects, not participants in the world economy . There was little 
recognition of the positive and negative power they possessed to in-
fluence and even to shape world events. Some LDC spokesmen decried 
the fact that their countries were controlled by the actions of for-
eigners without recognizing that all countries in an interdependent 
system are so controlled even if in greatly differing degrees.l) 
Thus developing countries forsook forming coalitions for bargaining 
purposes and instead relied upon the goodwill of developed countri-
es and their cold-war inspired political leverage to attain economic 
ends. 
The lack of participation of LDCs in the trade negotiations under 
the sponsorship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade illus-
trates the point. Developing countries requested and received spe-
cial treatment in GATT negotiations. They were not required to of-
fer tariff concessions and as a result had no means to direct the 
negotiations to products of special interest to themselves. It soon 
became evident that non-reciprocity meant non-attention. Furthermore, 
developing countries overlooked the opportunities of forming coali-
tions and alliances among themselves because the benefits appeared 
small. Indeed the most untended foreign relations of developing 
countries were amongst themselves . 2) One might dispute this conten-
tion by pointing to the formation of common markets among LDCs . In 
fact most of these efforts have explicitly failed or simply atrophi-
ed . One common market after another has been formed in Africa only 
to be quickly dissolved . Even in Latin America, where a great deal 
of intellectual and political capital has been expended in such en-
deavours integration efforts have falled well short of their promise 
because of the absence of a long run commitment.3) 
Thus developing countries made little use of their collective 
economic power. In the face of obvious motivation to do so, one 
can conclude that it was caused by a lack of understanding of the 
nature of interdependence . An interdependent world economy has ex-
isted for some time, but its meaning was not recognized. Thus it 
is the perception of interdependence which is new and which funda-
mentally affects the relations of rich and poor countries and is 
the prime reason why a reassessment of development assistance is 
required . 
Watershed in International Economic Affairs 
Another reason to reassess development assistance, I believe, is 
that the world economy has reached a kind of watershed and may oper-
1) Osvaldo Sunkel, "The Patterns of Latin Arrerican Dependence," in Victor L . Ur-
quidi and Rosemary Thorp, editors, latin Arrerica in the International Economy, 
Proceedings of a =nference held by the International E=nanic Association in 
M=xi= City [John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973] pp.3-25. 
2) H. Jon Rosenbatnn and William G. Tyler, "South-South Relations: The Economic 
and Political Content of Interactions Arrong Developing Countries," inc. Fred 
Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause, editors, World Politics and International 
Econanics, The Brookings Institution, 1975 . 
3) Miguel S. Wionczek, "Latin Arrerican Growth and Trade Strategies in the Post 
W~ Period," in Kiyoshi Kojima, editor, Structural Adjustrrents in Asian-Paci-
fic Trade, Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Develoµnent 
Conference [JERC, 'Ibkyo, July 1973], Volurre I, pp . 191-229 . 
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ate quite differently in the immediate future than it has in the im-
mediate past. The watershed has been caused by the confluence of a 
number of factors affecting all countries and some other factors pe-
culiar to the United States . 
The oil crisis of 1973-74 was not just another disruption of the 
world economy like the monetary or trade upsets of the past, but 
rather the most important economic event in the postwar period. It 
is the equivalent of a world war in its power of disruption and in-
volves a transfer of income and wealth among countries that is un-
paralleled in the history of the world . As James W. Howe has argu-
ed, oil developments herald the beginning of a new era in the global 
economy . 4) The oil crisis in particular will affect the relations 
between rich and poor countries. The fourfold Eise in the oil price 
in a single stroke shifted some countries from the column of the 
have-nots to that of the haves. The loose association of LOCs in the 
Group of 77 has been solidified into a strong coalition under the 
initiative of OPEC countries and the resource leverage they command. 
The full implications of these changes are yet to be seen . 
The world economy has gone through an inflation and is currently 
in the midst of a recession that exceeds any experienced in the post-
war period. One consequence is that world trade volume is actually 
shrinking in 1975 . When a cyclical swing of this size occurs, it 
indicates that a great deal of basic adjustment is required and is 
taking place. Large relative price changes, for instance, improve 
the profitability of some industries and destroy the prospects of 
others, and correspondingly aid the trade position of some countri-
es, while undermining it for others. Within domestic economies, the 
structure of investment must be adjusted to the new economic reali-
ties which may require and lead to institutional changes of entre-
preneurship and ownership . It would be surprising if such far-reach-
ing changes were not reflected in alterations in the world economy . 
For the United States, two additional factors need to be cited 
which require a reassessment of development assistance : the end of 
the war in Vietnam and the political changes resulting from Water-
gate . The prosecution of the war in Vietnam had eroded some poli-
tical support in the United States for aid.5) The belief that the 
United States had sufficient resources and desire to decisively in-
fluence affairs in Vietnam also had supported the idea that U.S . aid 
could have a measurable impact in advancing the economies of poor 
countries . The questioning of American power by Americans led to a 
decline in support for foreign assistance since the military and 
economic issues had become linked in the minds of the questioners -
if the United States could not achieve one target, it also could not 
achieve the other . Furthermore a direct link was seen between eco-
nomic assistance and military involvement .6) If the United States 
Government became committed to a particular foreign government through 
economic assistance, it would only be a short step to direct U. S . 
military involvement to support that government against enemies both 
foreign and domestic. The end of the Vietnamese War may have improv-
ed the political climate for aid by reducing the virulence of the 
anti-aid feeling within the country, but it has not necessarily add-
4) Janes W. Howe, Interdependence and the World Economy, Headline Series, No.222, 
[Foreign Policy Association, October 1974]. 
5) Frank Church, "A Farewell to Foreign Aid" in Robert E. Hunter and John E. Riel-
ly, editors, Developrent Today, [Praeger, New York, 1972], pp . 249-261 . 
6) J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, [New York : Randan House, 1966]. 
170 THE PROBLEMS OF A LARGE DONOR, THE UNITED STATES 
ed to pro-aid sentiment. 
Watergate has had a very important effect upon American politics 
which will affect foreign policy in general and foreign assistance 
in particular. The American political system is properly character-
ized as a two party system, but for some issues, the parties of in-
terest are not the Democrats and the Republicans, but rather the 
party of the President and the party of the Congress. Democrats 
and Republicans are found in both of these parties. Watergate seri-
ously undermined the party of the President in favor of the Congress . 
One major area that a stronger Congre s s has moved into is foreign 
policy. On the one hand this improves support for foreign assist-
ance since Congress need no longer fear the link between aid a nd 
military involvement; Congress has asserted itself directly in con-
trolling military actions. On the other hand, foreign assistance 
will be the major foreign policy instrument of the Congress in deal-
ing with LDCs. It is to be expected that no aid legislation will 
emerge from Congress without encumbrances which the Secretary of 
State will find constraining in the conduct of foreign relations 
with developing countries. · 
Aid Recipients 
If the central issue of foreign assistance is the relations arrong 
countries, as I contend, then some characterization of aid recipi-
ents need be kept in mind in order to set the stage f or detailed 
analysis . Theodore Geiger has described LDCs as countries experi-
encing profound change in all their constituent institutional sys-
tems including economic, political, governmental, and educational 
and in the cultures of their societies.7) The current rate and ex-
tent of sociocultural change differs greatly among these countries. 
For instance, the changes are more extensive in the newer countri-
es of Africa and Asia than they are for· the Latin American Republics 
such as Mexico where much stability has existed for some time. Nev-
ertheless the transformation of all these countries is profound and 
is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. These changes 
are so complex tha~ they cannot be guided from the outside and cer-
tainly not through the single instrument of foreign assistance. 
This provides some insight into the possible role of aid as a for-
eign policy instrument. 
While deveioping countries show some similarities in sociocultur-
al change, in most characteristics, they are diverse. They are at 
very different levels of national and per capital incomes. They 
have great diversity in their natural resource endowments. Further-
more they differ greatly with respect to population and physical 
size. Over one half the developing countries are quite small with 
populations of less than 10 million. Indeed the seven largest de-
veloping countries with populations each in excess of SO million 
contain more people than the combined total of all the rest. Thus, 
with diffferent levels of natural and human resources, individual 
countries have different roles to play in the international system 
and different power bases for those roles. 
Furthermore world price developments in the last three years 
have had different effects among developing countries. Obviously 
the OPEC countries have benefited greatly. Many other raw material 
7) Theodore Geiger, "Why Have a U.S. Foreign Aid Effort?," in Looking Ahead, Vol. 
16, No.10, January 1969, (National Planning Association). 
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producers made gains during the price upswing of 1972-74 which have 
not been completely eroded by subsequent declines. Yet there is a 
further group of countries - the so-called fourth world or most se-
riously affected countries (MSAs) - that have lost on all counts 
from recent developments. They have had to pay more to import oil, 
food and fertilizers and many of them have not been able to obtain 
external financing from commercial sources because they were among 
the poorest countries to begin with. On a world basis, therefore, 
a new urgency has evolved for foreign assistance . 
In the face of these diversities, it is quite remarkable that 
the developing countries have forged a strong coalition through the 
Group of 77 (now actually including close to 100 countries) for con-
certed action in various bodies of the United Nations. Their unity 
has been based on the belief that through the coalition they can 
obtain gains at the expense of developed countries. This has creat-
ed the era of confrontation that has permeated recent special and 
regular sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. It is becoming quite 
evident, as Stanley Hoffman has observed, that North-South relations 
(the rich and the poor) are becoming the biggest issue on the world 
scene.8) It is thus with a group of diverse and complex countries 
within a confrontational setting that one must analyze the role of 
foreign assistance. 
The Politics of Economic Assistance 
Making sense out of any economic process, whether domestic or in-
ternational, requires an analysis of the political and institution-
al setting . If the structure has been in place for some time, well 
understood, and without serious challenge, then an explicit analy-
sis of the structure can be dispensed with . But this is clearly not 
the case with foreign aid. Indeed the structure of bilateral for-
eign aid has been in a constant state of flux so that one could con-
clude that much can be learned from a political analysis . Aid is a 
quid pro quo process involving costs and benefits for both donor 
and recipient . It th~s makes sense to examine basic political fact-
ors with respect to both the United States and the recipients of 
U. S. foreign aid . 
In an effort to discover the continuing and secure bases for for -
eign assistance, I will examine in turn national security, other 
political factors, and economic interests . Following that is a brief 
description of U. S. foreign aid programme and some lessons from that 
experience. Then the prospects for future U. S. foreign aid efforts 
are discussed. 
National Security 
The original purpose of foreign aid was to improve the national 
security of the United States by helping selected foreign countries 
enhance their security against attacks by hostile powers . In the 
words of William S. Gaud, former administrator of the Agency for 
International Development, "Foreign aid was originally fashioned as 
a prime weapon in the Cold War. The purpose of the Marshall Plan, 
the Truman Doctrine, U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey - the purpose of 
8) Stanley Hoffman, "A New Policy for Israel," in Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, No.3, 
April 1975, pp.405-431. 
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all the early foreign aid programmes - was clear and unequivocal: 
to help buttress the Free World against Communism. 
"Development assistance as we speak of it today - giving assist-
ance to the countries of the Third World for the express purpose 
of enabling them to get on with their development plans and improve 
the lot of their citizens - was not our objective . "9) 
National security is the most obvious and important political 
factor involved in foreign assistance . To deny that national secu-
rity is a major focus, or to suggest that it should not be so, is 
equivalent to suggesting that aid is not a part of foreign policy 
which is nonsense on the face of it . 10) In this context national 
security s hould be considered rather broadly to include defense 
against hostile acts other than just military attacks and thus for-
eign assistance includes more than just aid for military establish-
ments. 
Security issues were also clearly of great importance in U. S . 
foreign assistance for developing countries at the inception of 
that programme . The debates in the United States in the 1950s and 
early 1960s made this quite explicit . It follows directly that 
aid would be distributed to countries like Turkey, Greece , Iran, 
Pakistan , Korea and Taiwan because of their geographic position 
and the international politics of the time . 11) 
Can foreign assistance promote the security interests of the 
United States or other donor countries? The answer is yes as long 
as the limitations of the instrument are clearly kept irl mind . To 
repeat , the basic evolution of developing countries cannot be guid-
ed from the outside through the instrument of aid nor through any 
other single instrument. Thus aid can make a marginal contribution , 
but will fall far short of determining the coloration of a regime. 
It can be helpful to a donor country for instance in the short run 
in securi ng overseas military bases and military cooperation . Aid 
can a l so be useful at times in maintaining a particular regime in 
power over a longer period of time . 12) 
The relationship between aid and national security has sometimes 
been misrepresented or misunderstood, particularly in the United 
States in the 1960s . At that time it was argued that aid would 
lead to economic development; that development would lead to the 
emergence of stable and democratic governments ; and that the exist-
ence of these governments would ensure peace and cooperation among 
countries . Whether all of the links ~n this chain of reasoning are 
defective or only most of them i's a matter of contention, but it is 
obviously not a correct theory . 13) National security can be furth-
ered by aid, but not guaranteed . 
Can aid improve the national security of recipient countries? 
The answer is also yes, but probably a d istinction need be drawn be-
9) William S. Gaud, "Rethinking Foreign Aid," The Conference Board Record, Vol. 
12, No . 7, July 1975, p . 43 . 
10) For an excellent and concise discussion see Samuel P . Huntington, "Foreign 
Aid: For What and For Whan?" in Hunter and Reilly, Develoµrent Today, pp . 21-
79 . 
11) Charles R. Frank, Jr . and Mary Baird, "Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past and 
Future Prospects" in Bergsten and Krause, W::Jrld Politics and International 
Econanics, pp.133-167. 
12) Stephen Kaplan, "United States Aid and Regine Maintenance in Jordan," in Pub-
lic Policy, Spring 1975. 
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tween the short and long run. In the short run a developing count-
ry by accepting foreign military assistance can build up its milita-
ry forces to provide minimal security needs without diverting resourc-
es from other uses in the country and can more easily obtain deve-
lopment assistance as well . By identifying itself with a stronger 
military power, it can also deter pressure or outright blackmail 
by a hostile power . Furthermore foreign assistance can help main-
tain the stability of a regime by providing resources to the govern-
ment which can be utilized to satisfy certain claimants who would 
otherwise be dissatisfied . But again the limitations are obvious. 
Foreign ·aid cannot long maintain a government in power that in its 
absence would be unsustainable because of insufficient indigenous 
political support . Nevertheless, national security may be the sound-
est and most secure basis for bilateral foreign assistance . The 
donor and the recipient receive benefits which are mutual, under-
standable, visible, and self-contained . 
In the long run the situation may be somewhat different for a 
recipient country . Foreign military privileges which may have been 
granted as part of the quid pro quo , while beginning as an asset, 
may grow into an embarrassment. Unilateral abrogation of a milita-
ry treaty at best will cause strained relations and at worst consid-
erable hostility with the other partner . Over time security inter-
ests between countries can diverge as the politico-military situa-
tion in the world changes . This does not suggest that arrangements 
for foreign assistance based on national security should not be en-
tertained, but only that they s hould not be longlasting. The long 
run can be converted into a series of short runs . Failure to renew 
a contract at time of termination may make one of the parties unhap-
py, but it should riot yield hostility . A series of short term ar-
rangements can provide protection for both parties, but the need 
for frequent renewals or renegotiations adds uncertainty and risk 
to the relationship . 
The involvement of national security with foreign assistance has 
been subjected to criticism, some justified and some not justified . 
It has been argued, for instance, that national security has sub-
verted the true purpos~ of foreign aid, namely economic development . 
This criticism turns reality on its head . Foreign assistance began 
as a national security measure and it is those who want to turn it 
into an engine for growth that have changed the rationale; butthere 
is no basic inconsistency between the two goals and thus no reason 
why both cannot be pushed simultaneously . Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, some critics have charged that foreign aid may lead the 
United States down the slippery slope into direct military involve-
ment as it is alleged to have done in Vietnam. But it should be 
obvious that foreign assistance to promote national security and 
direct military involvement are very different commitments. The 
United States can make foreign assistance agreements without com-
mitting itself to direct military involvement as it has done with 
many countries including some who have engaged in hostilities, e . g . 
Israel and Jordan . One might also note that the Soviet Union has 
provided foreign assistance and much of it of a direct military na-
ture without engaging in direct military conflict since the Second 
13) Frank and Baird, "Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past •.• .... . " They cites .M3.x 
F . Millikan and Walter W. Rost.CM, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign 
Policy, [New York : Harper & Brothers, 1957] for a developrent of these ideas. 
Not all observers were convinced at that time. See Hans J. 1'brgenthau, "A 
Political Theory of Foreign Aid," The Arrerican Political Science Review, June 
1962 (Vol . 56, No.2), pp.304-5. 
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World War. (It is not clear how one should count the Russian inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.) 
Some criticisms of foreign assistance for national security are 
justified and need be addressed. It has been argued, most forceful-
ly by India and recently by Greece, that American military assist-
ance has been used by recipients for purposes not intended by the 
United States. An aid recipient can become so militarily powerful 
as to constitute a threat to its peaceful neighbor. Without making 
a judgement as to the actions of Pakistan and Turkey, it must be 
recognized that military assistance can be overdone and encourage 
offensive intentions among recipients. Care to limit direct mili-
tary foreign assistance to reasonable levels must be part of a na-
tional security programme. 
A second criticism with merit points out that some foreign as-
sitance for national security has been masquerading as promoting 
economic development. While there is no reason why aid could not 
both enhance national security and promote development, it is im-
portant not to mislabel the package. It is more than a concern over 
truth in advertising . Programmes create expectations which, if un-
fulfilled, can lead to frustration and disillusionment. If Cong-
ress is told that economic progress will result from foreign aid 
and none occurs, then support will be lost.14) One of the most im-
portant elements in sustaining a foreign aid effort is creating re-
alistic expectations and thus mislabeling national security assist-
ance is serious and should be avoided. ' 
A third criticism related to the second, charges that the United 
States has misused its position in international organizations to 
promote its narrow security interests. Organizations such as the 
World Bank (IBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), etc. 
have been created for the specific purpose of promoting economic 
development . It would be an abuse of power and not in its long run 
interest for the United States to use its great leverage in these 
institutions to direct loans and grants only to those countries in 
which it has a security interest. These institutions have set up 
a system for disbursing their resources that is based on criteria 
such as need, development potential and absorptive capacity and it 
would be a great disservice to these institutions to undermine Lheir 
professional judgements. However the point should not be pushed 
too far. The United States is not and should not be indifferent to 
the country distribution of loans and grants by international orga-
nizations . An organization that concentrates its resources in count-
ries hostile to the United States cannot expect support from the Unit-
ed States. The overall interest of the United States either in the 
short or long run should be served by the operations of an organiza-
tion or else it will not long command support in the Congress or 
among the American people. 
What I conclude is that bilateral foreign assistance can be used 
successfully to promote the national security of the United States 
and recipient countries. The foreign assistance should be direct, 
open, limited in scope and directed only to those countries where 
a strong security interest exists . Selectivity is important to 
avoid unnecessary entanglements and needless military proliferation. 
Under these circumstances foreign assistance for security is defens-
ible and will likely command support in the Congress. The amounts 
of money devoted to foreign assistance for security will have to be 
14) Robert E. Asher, Developrent Assistance in the Seventies: Alternatives for 
the United States, [Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1970]. 
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tested against other uses of the defense budget, but a claim can 
clearly be established. It is important for its supporters to re-
cognize, however, that security is not the only purpose of aid. 
Other Political Interests 
Providing foreign assistance to poor countries has come to be 
regarded by the international community as a responsibility of rich 
countries. The United States by its actions and pronouncements 
since the Second World War has been the leader in creating this in-
ternational consensus . It is still recognized that economic assist-
ance programmes are an essential element in the foreign policy of 
the United States.15) The status which countries command in the 
eyes of other countries will result in part from whether they are 
seen as carrying out their proper role in helping the poor of the 
world. Thus aid programmes help enhance the status of donor count-
ries and the United States in particular . 
Status is a rather abstract concept which is perceived in reali-
ty in more specific terms . The United States has political interests 
in other countries beyond narrow security or economic concerns . I 
have in mind neighbouring countries in the Western Hemisphere and 
other countrie~ ~ith historical ties such as the Philippines. The 
U. S. Government has a political interest in invoking sympathetic 
responses in these countries to American aims. Foreign aid is seen 
as an instrument to help bring this about and, if possible, to fost-
er institutions such as political democracy and libertarian ideals . 
Individual Americans and the Congress perceive status in somewhat 
different terms . As people, Americans want to be respected abroad 
rather than held in contempt, liked rather than despised, and wel-
comed rather than rejected when going to other countries. Being 
generous in providing foreign aid is thought to further the creation 
of positive images and responses . Furthermore Americans harbour 
strong humanitarian interests . Their concern with poverty and starv-
ation does not stop at their country's border and provides support 
for foreign assistance along with strong backing for disaster relief. 
Problems arise in trying to convert this sentiment into continu-
ing support for foreign assistance in the Congress . Americans desire 
to maintain respect for the United States in other countries, but 
they are less eager now than they were a decade ago . 16) In 1964 in-
ternational affairs and defence were at the top of the list of con-
cerns of the American public. These concerns were reflected in large 
and growing foreign assistance programmes. The size was extraordi-
nary as measured by the share of U. S . gross national product devot-
ed to them anu in relation to the efforts of other countries as seen 
in Table 1. The United States provided well over half of all the 
aid classified by the OECD as official development assistance and 
was second only to France in aid as a percentage of GNP . (The French 
figures need to be interpreted with some care as is true of other 
countries as well.) By 1974 international concerns among 'Americans 
were at the bottom of the list after having slipped rather steadily 
15) 
16) 
Donald M. Fraser, "The Politics of Aid Legislation," in Hunter and Rielly, 
Developrrent Today, pp.239-248 . 
William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, State of the Nation, [Washington, D.C., Po-
tonac Associates, 1974). The surveys for this study were taken in the Spring 
of 1974; after the oil crisis but before the resignation of President Nixon . 
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Table 1 Official Development Assistance Net, 
In Felation to Gross National Products,~ 
1960 - 1974 
1960-64 1965-69 
Australia 0 . 45 0 . 56 
Canada 0.20 0.29 
France 1.14 0.70 
Germany 0 . 41 0 . 39 
Japan 0 . 18 0 . 27 
Netherlands 0.36 0.46 
Sweden 0 . 11 0.28 
United Kingdom 0 . 54 0 . 43 
United States 0.55 0 . 40 
1970-74 
0 . 54 
0 . 45 
0.62 
0 . 32 
0.23 
0 . 60 
0 . 51 
0 . 37 
0.27 
a/ At market prices and net of repayments. Preliminary for 1974. 
Sources : OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Development Assist-
ance Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development As-
sistance Committee, 1969 Review . Also 1973 Review and 1974 Re-
view . 
over the decade . The reasons for the decline relate both to great-
er public awareness of domestic problems and a rather sophisticated 
recognition of changes in the world . As seen in Table 1, the Ameri-
can aid effort mirrored this sentiment . 
. Public views of the state of the world and the role that the Unit-
ed States should play in it have changed drastically during the last 
decade, a decade marked by the Vietnamese War and detente. Because 
of publicity about detente with the Soviet Union and China, Ameri-
cans see international tensions as having been substantially relax-
ed and the Vietnamese War has sharply reduced their willingness to 
become directly involved in another military conflict abroad . Because 
of the progress made between 1969 and 1974 in furthering detente and 
ending U.S. participation in the Vietnam War , the American public 
approved of the foreign political and military policy conducted for 
the country. Quite perceptively they were dissatisfied with U.S . 
foreign economic policy as well as being unhappy over domestic eco-
nomic policy. They perceived the United States as the most power-
ful country in the world, but recognized that the relative position 
of the United States had eroded over the last decade and expected 
further erosion during the next decade.. Americans believed that re-
spect f or the United States in o~her countries had declined and the 
U.S . prestige was at a fairly low level in other countries . While 
Americans are unhappy with this situation , their concern does not 
get translated into a desire to spend more money for foreign assist-
ance because of competing demands on the budget for domestic needs. 
In response to a question concerning U. S . aid to less developed 
countries, only 9% of the public thought it should be increased, 43% 
thought it should be kept at the present level, 33% believed it should 
be reduced, 11% wanted it ended altogether and 4% did not know . 17) 
The weak support given for aid to developing countries was still 
greater than that suggested for the political work of the United 
Nations, maintaining U. S. military bases abroad, or military aid to 
some of our allies . Foreign aid and foreign military expenditures 
17) Watts and Free, State of the Nation 1974, p . 250. Also chapters VIII and IX. 
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are closely associated in the minds of the public so that disenchant-
ment with military expenditures may be weakening support for aid . 
The opinions of the American public in 1974 can be summed up as 
moving away from the internationalist views of a decade earlier, but 
this does not mean that Americans are reverting to isolationism . The 
American public still supports ideas of freer trade, still supports 
the United Nations, still wants to maintain troops abroad in critical 
countries to maintain peace and is interested in third world countri -
es . With respect to foreign assistance, a statistically significant 
increase.in support was recorded in 1974 as compared to two years 
earlier . This resulted from the sympathetic response of Americans 
to the more difficult plight of poor countries stemming from the food 
and energy crises . It was also reflected in the Congress through a 
redirection of the aid programme to concentrate it more directly on 
the problems of the poor . 
Capitalizing on political and humanitarian motivations brings its 
own problems to the American foreign assistance programme . In view 
of the limitations of aid as an instrument in affecting policies of 
rapidly changing developing countries, how can aid be used to help 
the poor and to further political democracy and libertarian ideals? 
For instance, should aid be maintained or reduced to a country gov-
erned by a repressive military regime? Recognizing which groups in 
the society might suffer from an aid cutback, a good case can be made 
on both sides, particularly if a distinction is drawn between the 
short and long run. Furthermore , if the purpose of the aid programme 
is to help the poor in developing countries , can aid be used for in-
dustrial development which most developing countries want? Evidence 
seems to support the belief that industrial development improves the 
position of the urban middle class and leaves untouched the rural 
sector where poverty is the worst . Studies of income distribution 
show incomes in developing countries to be much less equally distri-
buted than they are in the United States . 18) The trickle- down theory 
may ultimately be verified , but it is of little help in answering the 
the cri tics of aid who claim that foreign asssitance helps the rich 
in other countries at the expense of the poor at home . 
Moreover the politi cal impact of foreign assistance is totally 
asymmetric . Wh i le foreign assistance enhances the status of govern-
ments of donor countries, it has the reverse effect on recipient count-
ries . No government wants to be seen as maintaining itself on foreign 
largesse or selling its sovereign rights over policy for foreign aid . 
Being on the dole undermines the self-respect of countries as well as 
individuals . Thus the recognition that donor countries desire often 
cannot be given . Some countries seek foreign aid in private while 
taking a public stance of indifference . In some extreme cases , count-
ries have even denied the reality of starvation within their borders 
rather than publicly seek foreign help . Thus political concerns on 
the part of recipients may stand in the way of a bilateral aid prog-
ramme . 
The political difficulties of aid recipients suggest either that 
bilateral aid programmes should be quite modest or that they be co-
ordinated in a regional setting to reduce the visibility of the con-
trol by the donor country . The United States utilized the Alliance 
18) Roger Hansen, "The Errerging Challenge : Global Distribution of Incrne and E=no-
mic Opportunity," in James W. Howe and the staff of the overseas Developrent 
Council, The U.S. and World Developnent: Agenda for Action 1975, [New York : 
Praeger, 1975], pp. 157-188. 
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for Progress for Latin America for this purpose and presumably New 
Zealand is similarly employing the South Pacific Forum.19) Alter-
natively aid could.be channeled through multilateral institutions 
which can more fully serve the political needs of recipient count-
ries, but because the process is so very different from bilateral 
programmes, they may serve the short-term political interests of 
donor countries less well . In summary, status and other political 
interests will be importantly involved in the bilateral foreign as-
sistance programmes of donor countries and, because of these concerns 
there will be much contention and difficulty with recipient count-
ries. 
Economic Welfare 
As a general rule, when one country experiences rapid economic 
advance, other countries also benefit. This is one of the manifes-
tations of an interdependent world economy. Thus donor countries 
have reason to provide development assistance to increase economic 
growth of developing countries. Economic welfare is more like na-
tional security than political status in that it provides a mutual-
ly satisfying basis for the extension of aid by donors to recipients . 
Nevertheless the economic self interest of donor countries in deve-
lopment assistance should not be overdrawn. Resources devoted to 
foreign assistance cannot be utilized domestically and thus the eco-
nomic wellbeing of donor countries is reduced, at least, in the short 
run. Two exceptions can be cited. First, no loss occurs if the 
rate of return on a foreign aid loan is equal to or greater than 
could be earned on alternative domestic investments, but I would 
not consider such a hard loan as containing any aid component, even 
if the interest rate charged is below what the recipient country 
would have to pay in the commercial market. Second, if the resourc-
es provided by foreign assistance are utilized to expand the prod-
uctivity of an export activity, then the donor country might receive 
benefits through an improvement in its terms of trade equal to the 
resources it provided, assuming no losses in competing domestic in-
dustries. Such a complete offset is unlikely. 
The economic burden to the donor of providing aid will be increas-
ed if balance-of-payments problems are created; (the classical trans-
fer problem). During the period of fixed exchange rates, this was 
a serious problem for the United States . As a result the United 
States began tying aid to AmeriGan exports which did not solve the 
problem of the overvalued dollar, but did manage to reduce the value 
of U.S. aid to recipient countries. 
The American aid programme has been accused by its foreign critics 
and, at the same time, claimed by its supporters as promoting U. S . 
exports in general (beyond tying) and furthering the interests of 
American private investors. There seems to be very little support 
for the charge (claim) other than through the indirect route of in-
creasing the economic growth of recipient countries. American ex-
ports and direct investment have been directed primarily to develop-
ed countries rather than to aid receiving developing countries . Fur-
thermore, among developing countries, little relationship exists be-
tween importance of a country as a market for American exports or 
host to American investment and receipts of American foreign aid. 
19) Norman Kirk, "New Directions in New Zealand' s Foreign Policy," Millennium, 
Vol.3, No.2, Autumn 1974, pp.91-99. 
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A distinction, of course, need be drawn between using the aid pro-
gramme to promote new private investment in developing countries 
and using the programme to secure just compensation for private 
American investors for property nationalized by governments of de-
veloping countries . The latter use of aid has occurred and is pro-
bably strongly supported by the American public as legally and rroral-
ly correct. 
The economic welfare basis for economic assistance rests on the 
bel i ef that aid does promote the economic advancement of developing 
countri e.s . But is this measurably the case? To be effective in 
promoti ng growth, aid must increase the amount of resources and/or 
improve t he efficiency o f resource use within developing countries . 
From the outset i t is clear that for other than exceptional cases , 
aid cannot have made much of a difference in the evolution of these 
countries. The amount of additional resources provided through aid 
has simply been much too small relative to total resources to have 
made a significant difference except for a few cases such as Taiwan, 
South Korea and - with respect to aid from the Soviet Union - pos-
sibly Cuba . Even magnifying the importance of aid because of its 
ability to relieve foreign exchange constraints cannot make it com-
parable to the myriad domestic factors impacting on the complex 
growth process through their effect on the efficiency of resource 
use . It is thus wise to recognize the limits of the potential of 
aid programmes . 
Some extreme critics of foreign assistance have charged that aid 
has made no difference whatsoever . This is conceivable if, for in-
stance , aid flows lead to offsetting governmental policies by deve-
loping countries that reduce domestic savings by an amount equival -
ent to the aid or distort markets and investments and reduce over-
all efficiency . 20) I find these highly critical arguments to be un-
convincing . Some leakage from domestic savings to consumption is 
possible and maybe likely, but not a complete offset . Furthermore , 
some evidence exists f rom case studies that seem to point strongly 
in t he opposite direc t ion . Aid may no t make all that much differ-
ence , but the sign is pos i tive . 
United States Programmes of Foreign Assistance 
A mixture of motivations has provided the basis for American ef-
fo r ts at foreign assistance and they can be identi fied within t he 
various programmes . There are four ma j or components of these pro -
grammes ; mi litary assistance , economic programmes administered by 
the AI D (and predecessors) , the Food for Peace programme (PL 480) , 
and contributions to international lending organizations . In Table 
2 a summary is presented of expendi tures under the programme begin-
ning in FY 1953 . Total expenditures over the 21-year span 1953 
through 19 7 3 exceeded US$100 billion . Average annual obl i gations 
and loan authorizations for economic and military assistance were 
US$3 . 5 billion in 1953-61 , rose to about US$7 billion in 1962- 70 , 
and amounted to about US$8 billion in recent years . All of these 
figures are in current dollars so that when a correction is made for 
20) Keith B. Griffin, "Foreign Capital, Donestic Savings and EconomicDeveloprent~ 
Bulletin, Oxford University, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 32 (M:ty 
1970) pp.99-112 and Peter T . Bauer, Dissent on Develoµrent : Studies and Debat-
es in Development Economics, [Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 
1972]. 
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the effects of infaltion , it is clear that assistance as a whole 
has actually declined in real terms in recent years . In terms of 
the budget of the U. S . Federal Government, foreign assistance has 
declined from over 5% to less than 3% of the total . 
The distribution of American foreign assistance tended over time 
to go more toward military and less to economic assistance . In the 
1953- 61 period, two-thirds of all programmes were in economic assist-
ance and only one-third military . The military programmes rose some-
what in the 1962- 70 period and in the early 1970 ' s were taking over 
half of total effort . The reason for the rising mi litary share was 
more than just the Vietnamese war although the war was obviously of 
great import . National security has simply been a more stable basis 
for bilateral foreign assistance than political and economic bases . 
Security assistance need not be primarily of a military character, 
but it tends to be so . Thus the military programme was sustained , 
but the economic programmes eroded in response to changing domestic 
and international conditions . Within the last few years official 
development assistance has taken only slightly more than 1% of the 
U. S . government budget . 
Within economic assistance, a great of programme stability is 
seen, although important changes have occurred in the way the AID 
has utilized its funds as different views became persuasive on issu-
es such as loans versus grants , programmes versus projects, and re-
source transfers versus technical assistance . The Food for Peace 
programme maintained its support because of its importance to the 
American farmer and the humanitarian instincts of the American peo-
ple . The world food crisis has given further impetus to this prog-
ramme in 1974-75 (not reflected in Table 2) . U. S . contributions to 
international organizations have tended to rise as more reliance has 
been placed on multilateral lending institutions, but the amounts 
are subject to great year-to-year variance because of the U. S . le-
gislative process and the multi - year nature of replenishments to 
international lending agencies . 
The regional distribution of U. S . foreign assistance is shown in 
Table 3 . One is struck by the fact of continued concentration of 
the U. S . effort in Asia . In earlier years, the major recipients were 
South Korea , Taiwan and India . In more recent years South Vietnam 
and , to a much lesser degree, Indonesia grew in importance . Also 
seen in Table 3 is the chequered history of U. S . relations with Latin 
America . During the early years of the U. S . aid effort, Latin Ame-
rica received a relatively small share of the total . This might be 
defended on egalitarian grounds since Latin America is quite advanc-
ed relative to the countries of Africa and most of the developing 
countries of Asia , but the more likely explanation is nothing more 
than the inattention (or indifference) of the United States to the 
problems of Latin America . In the 1960s under the challenge of Cuba, 
the United States mounted a greatly expanded effort under the Alli-
ance for Progress, but as time passed and exaggerated expectations 
were disappointed , enthusiasm for the programme waned . 
Lessons from U. S . Experience 
While there were many bases for establishing foreign assistance 
programmes, in one way or another they were all supposed to further 
the wellbeing of recipient countries . A review of U. S . experience 
in promoting development through foreign assistance yields some in-
teresting lessons . The major lesson learned in the early years of 
the programme was that LDCs are not like European countries; hence 
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Table 3 
u.s. Foreign Assistance, 
Regional Summary - Less Developed Countries 
Total Economic and Military Assistance 
(Millions of Dollars - U. S . Fiscal Years) 
Region 
Near East and South Asia 
Latin America 
East Asia 
Africa 
Europe 
Oceani~ 
Interregional 
1953-61 
11,089 . 6 
2,076.4 
12,625.4 
1,161. 7 
3, 029 . 4 
47 . 0 
1,510 . 2 
31,539.7 
% 
1953-61 
35 
6 . 6 
40 
3.7 
9 . 6 
0 . 1 
4.8 
100 
1962-70 
15,868 . 2 
9,598 . 6 
21,271.5 
3,472.0 
849 . 9 
229.0 
5,598 . 7 
56,887 . 9 
% 
1962-70 
27.9 
16.9 
37.4 
6.1 
1.5 
0 . 4 
9.8 
100 
1971-73 
4,487.5 
2,133.7 
13,378.0 
993 . 2 
179 . 6 
175.4 
2,805.4 
24,152.8 
% 
1971-73 
18 . 6 
8 . 8 
55 . 4 
4.1 
0.7 
0.7 
11.6 
100 
(percentages round to 100%) 
a/ Economic assistance only 
u.s. Agency for International ceveloµrent, U. S. overseas Loans and Grants - Ob-
ligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945. June 30, 1973 . Pub. May 1974. 
pp . 10, 33, 66, 84, 130, 134, 138. 
the successes of the Marshall Plan could not be expected . In the 
European case, all the U.S . had to do was to make resource transfer . 
The United States did some urging to get the Europeans to reduce 
their trade barriers and make their currencies convertible with few-
er r e strictions so as to take advantage of larger markets, but es-
sentially the Europeans did the rest. It soon became evident that 
LDCs could not make efficient use of additional resources without 
further help and thus began the trend toward greater involvement of 
the U. S . in the economics and politics of recipient countries . 
Surprisingly no attempt was really made to apply the European ex-
perience with discriminatory trade liberalization to developing 
countr i es. The United S t ates permitted (and probably urged) Europ-
eans to libe ralize partia lly amongst themselves even if they felt 
they had to ma i ntain restrictions against the dollar area . LDCs were 
never encouraged to discr i minate against developed countries in favor 
of other de veloping countries so as to promote i ntra- LDC trade and 
specialization . As a result, import-replacement strategies were not 
properly challenged . Apparently the infant industry argument for 
trade restrictions overwhelmed the more basic theories of Adam Smith 
concerning wealth and the size of markets . 
In attempting to administer programmes in the field, Americans 
found that developing countries generally lacked the technical ex-
pertise to formulate overall development plans and to design effici -
ent development projects in a way to satisfy AID in Washington . Since 
Americans know best what Americans want, it was rather natural to 
move into the requesting function to match the giving function. Fur-
thermore development turned out to be a very complex business . Un-
predictable and uncontrollable factors persistently intervened . It 
also became evident that development depended crucially on recipient 
government policies, local institutions (both private and government), 
available technologies and the culture of the country in addition to 
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resources. It appeared that some of these factors could be made 
more development oriented and it was discovered that resource trans-
fers provide some leverage to the donor government over the polici-
es of recipients . Thus given the need and the ability, Americans 
began to get even more involved in the recipient countries. Econo-
mic performance criteria set by the United States began to be added 
as a condition of receiving foreign aid. As time went by develop-
ment strategies became more sophisticated and were focused more on 
politically potent broad resource-use qeustions.21) 
David Denoon has examined U. S . foreign assistance programmes and 
developed an analytically useful typology to examine foreign rela-
tions of bilateral aid programmes.22) He has characterized bilater-
al aid relationships as being either High Politics , Technocracy, or 
Farce . His example of High Politics in the U. S. programme in India 
in the mid-l960s, Technocracy marked the programme in Indonesia in 
the latter 1960 ' s; and Farce is used to characterize the incidents 
in Ghana at the end of the 1960's . Some interesting lessons grow 
out of his examination, particularly of India and Indonesia . 
In the mid-l960s the United States along with some other aid don-
ors and international institutions was heavily involved in trying 
to improve the economy of India . The U. S . had committed a substan-
tial amount of aid funds already and was prepared to put up more . 
Many economists , both foreign and Indian , believed that the effici-
ency of the economy could be improved if India would correct the 
overvaluation of the currency, liberalize various restrictions on 
internal and external trade, and give higher priority to agriculture . 
Devaluation of the rupee and economic liberalization were resisted 
because of the difficult adjustment burden involved and its adverse 
effects on politically important segments of the Indian population . 
After much 3tudy, discussion and negotiation at the very highest 
levels of government (thus High Politics) , a deal was negotiated in 
which India would make the policy changes in return for a substan-
tial aid package . Almost simultaneously with the scheduled execu-
tion of the deal, political relations between India and the United 
States soured and the structure of the deal fell apart . India quick-
ly aborted the liberalization programme although the devaluation was 
effected . The lesson from this experience is that developing count-
ries cannot sustain politically sensitive decisions without the pro-
per domestic political support and leverage from the outside is not 
sufficient to overcome the problem . 
The Indonesian case was quite different . Immediately after the 
fall of Sukarno, foreign experts also became heavily involved in the 
economy because of a substantial aid package . The foreign experts 
thought a stabilization package was needed which ultimately includ-
ed a devaluation, but in this case, the main discussions and nego-
tiations were at the technical level (ergo Technocracy) . Foreign 
experts could make common cause with national experts because they 
were communicating at a technical level (i . e., what is the problem 
and what is the best solution . ) The stabilization package could be 
implemented despite its great impact and short run adverse consequ-
ences for some of the population because of the strong political 
position of the regime. In fact Indonesian economists became import-
21) Joel Bernstein, "Thoughts on Developrrent Assistance," Processed paper dated 
November 25, 1974. 
22) David B.H. Denoon, Aid: High Politics, Technocracy, or Farce?, Unpublished 
thesis, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1975. 
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ant actors in the government despite the absence of a politicalbase . 
Essentially policy could be made without political constraints. 
Such a situation cannot endure forever because of the basic incong-
ruity of making important political decisions at a technical level . 
Furthermore aid relationships between a donor and recipient cannot 
be sustained at a technical level because important issues of for-
eign relations are involved and will require attention at the poli-
tical level . The strong position of the technocrats will collapse 
if their policies fail, but their role might still erode even if 
they are successful as in Indonesia. Once macro policy issues are 
settled, then attention will turn to micro programmes which have 
more visible distributional consequences and thus even greater poli-
tical content . Such decisions will not be left to technicians and 
thus even success at policy making may be a self-limiting constraint 
on the role of technocrats. Thus from the Indian case we learn that 
a large aid effort is very difficult to maintain precisely because 
of the difficulty of sustaining understanding at the highest poli-
tical level and the Indonesian case suggests that it is hard to sus -
tain at a technical level also . 
The high water mark for U. S . involvement in the workings of de-
veloping country economies came in the mid-1960s . The generally 
disappointing economic outcome of direct interferences by the United 
States led to the recognition that programme change was needed . A 
painful lesson was learned that no one can relieve developing count-
ries from making the fundamental political decisions on use of re-
sources available to them . Development is such a complex business 
with so many domestic vested interests involved that Americans can 
not make the decisions or even get too closely associated with the 
decision making process . Even if foreigners are really given some 
decision making authority, it may not be wise to exercise it because 
it will undermine the process of creating decision making capacity 
in the developing countries upon which success at development will 
ultimately depend . Furthermore foreigners unfamiliar with the nuanc-
es of life in developing countries may not have the correct solutions 
to development problems . It is clear that developing countries will 
not for long accept solutions to problems that others have determin-
ed for them;. they must do it for themselves . In a similar vein even 
certain apparent successes like creating new institutions will ul-
timately wither and possibly die after foreigners leave leadership 
positions if there is insufficient national identification with the 
institution . Furthermore it is clear that there are few if any im-
ported technological fixes that can really solve a significant deve-
lopment problem (like inadequate food production). 
Some of the problems that necessarily grow out of a bilateral aid 
relationship can be overcome or moderated through multilateral ar-
rangements . Frank and Baird summarize the arguments for multilater-
al assistance as follows : 
1. Multilateral aid prograrmes avoid the political antagonisms and conflicts 
that cane about in bilateral prograrrrres when the donor atterrpts to impose per-
formance criteria in giving aid. 
2. Mµltilaterl donor agencies are rrore efficient in stimulating developrent 
because they make decisions based on rrore technical and objective criteria . 
3. Less developed countries are likely to be rrore receptive to the advice of 
policy experts when that advice erranates from multilateral institutions, since 
they will be less suspicious that the advice is politically rrotivated. 
4. With the use of multilateral institutions, less developed countries can 
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feel a sense of greater participation in the aid process and are, therefore, 
rrore likely to cooperate with donor countries . 
5 . Channelling aid through multilateral institutions prorrotes a feeling of 
cooperation rather than canpetition arrong major aid donors and reinforces 
the humanitarian as opposed to the strategic objectives of foreign aid . 23) 
There is force in these arguments, but they should not be overdone . 
Development inevitably has poli t ical dimensions which cannot be de-
politicized . Leverage exerted by an international orga nization may 
be more accepted than that by a single donor country , but it is still 
unlikely to be acceptable for important policies in developing count-
ries . For continuing aid relationship , developing countries will 
resist external pressures; they want their checks slipped under the 
door with no questions asked . Of course international organizations 
cannot oblige the demand for reasons of economic efficiency as well 
as politics. International institutions cannot be apolitical ; they 
must know who are their constituents and what they desire if they 
are going to survive . For instance the U. S . Congress will demand 
some check on these institutions to make sure the money will be well 
spent . 24) Moreover all participating countries are going to use po-
litical, not efficiency criteria in determining the resource distri -
butions of these institutions . Thus while some gains are made through 
multilateralizing the process, some of the basic problems remain . 
There are also many positive lessons that Americans have learned 
as a result of giving foreign asssistance . One of the most import-
ant lessons is that the focus of the aid programme should be direct-
ed to countries where good leadership exists for they will have the 
greatest potential for development since success is based on the be-
havior of decision makers in the developing countries themselves . 
Second, problem-solving resources are transferable through technical 
assistance even when specific answers to problems are not . Thus aid 
can be provided through technical people, through training and re-
search and development facilities, through access to others ' e xperi-
ences when combined with local people under local control . Third , 
that the best e xperience for the United States grows out of concent-
rating in areas of mutual interest with recipient countries, often 
in joint problem solving efforts . Fourth, food aid can play a spe-
cial and important role in development by keeping the cost of liv-
ing from soaring during periods of rapid growth . Food aid bridges 
the time gap between increasing food demand and supply . Fifth, the 
U. S . comp arative advantage seems to be in helping developing count-
ries grow more food, provide health and educational services and in 
improving their techniques of problem analysis. Finally, cultural 
factors should be recognized, but not considered unchangeable since market 
incentives have at times been able to alter traditional nodes of behavior . 
Special effort was made to learn the lessons of the U. S . aid ef-
f ort i n South Korea because of its success . It is believed that 
aid did make a substantial contribution to increasing the Korean 
rate of growth . 25) In addition to relatively large amounts of re-
source transfers, a number of other characteristics were found to 
23) Frank and Baird, "Foreign Aid : Its Speckled Past ........... ", p . 158. 
24) Charles Paolillo, "Developrrent Assistance : Where Next," in James W. Howe and 
the staff of the Overseas Developrrent Council, The U. S . and the Developing 
Vbrld: Agenda for Action 1974, [New York: Praeger, 1974], pp.107-123 . 
25) Charles R. Frank, Foreign Trade Regirres and Econanic Developnent: Scuth Korea, 
[New York : National Bureau of Economic Research , 1975], forthcoming . 
186 THE PROBLEMS OF A LARGE DONOR, THE UNITED STATES 
be of importance which relate to the Korean people and which support 
the proposition that developing countries must do it for themselves. 
Success in development was found to depend on strong worker disci-
pline, the relative openness of the society to change, the ingenui -
ty of the people, their achievement motivation, and their resilience 
in the face of adversity. These characteristics cannot be trnasf-
erred from abroad and make all the difference. 
The Future of American Foreign Assistance 
Some important elements of American foreign assistance are in 
the process of change while others are being maintained. National 
security remains important, but even here the amounts of money re-
quired in direct military ·support and support assistance are sharp-
ly reduced because of the end of fighting in Indochina. The chang-
es in U. S . foreign assistance reflect a new realism about develop-
ment and the American role in the world. Grandiose schemes promis-
ing that aid will radically increase the rate of economic growth of 
developing countries are no longer given credence . Americans no 
longer believe that they can or should determine the destiny of de-
veloping countries . The most obvious sign of the new less-intrusive 
U. S . role in LDCs was the closing of the U. S . aid mission in India . 
Furthermore Americans have become painfully .aware of the limitations 
of U.S . resources available for both domestic and foreign purposes . 
While these realizations call for a smaller American aid effort, 
they are counterbalanced by the recognition that grinding poverty 
still grips many people on earth and some of them are at the point 
of starvation . 
Despite common international practice, the appropriate size of 
the American aid effort cannot be related to the size of the U. S . 
gross national product . Rather foreign assistance must compete for 
resources allocat ed through the Federal budget and thus must be re-
lated to b udget a ggregates . Periods of budget stringency will be 
reflec ted in lean foreign assistance programmes which can only be 
reversed when budget ease becomes possible. Furthermore elements 
of U. S . foreign economic policy in addition to aid are related to 
development such as international trade opportunities, access to 
capital market facilities, availability of export credit and private 
direct investments and must be considered in an overall legislative 
framework . 
Significant revisions in the bilateral American aid programme 
have been determined by the Congress in the 1973 legislation . 26) 
The legislative directives can be summarized as requiring AID to 
concentrate on the problems of the poor in recognition of the need 
for social justice . Thus something more than just an increase in 
growth is being sought . The problems of poverty should be attacked 
directly through help in the provision of basic necessities like 
food and shelter; through spreading the benefits of development more 
widely; through helping reduce population growth as well as trying 
to accelerate overall economic growth. Thus America·n bilateral aid 
efforts are to be concentrated in agricultural projects, in rural 
development schemes, in support of improved nutrition and better 
health and in promoting population control and education. Problems 
of course will arise in trying to promote more equal distribution 
26) Charles Paolillo, "Developrrent Assistance: Where Next?", Agenda for Action 
1974. 
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of incomes while at the same time maintaining a less intrusive U. S. 
presence but problems are endemic in an aid programme. 
Moving bilateral aid toward a people oriented programme seems to 
be in conflict with a lesson of U. S. experience regarding the irrport-
ance of concentrating efforts in developing countries with greatest 
potential . This is not the case, however, since major resource trans-
fers are to be left to multilateral development organizations . Sup-
port for international organizations is a basic ingredient of U. S . 
policy . How large the American contribution should be is related 
to competing budgetary demands and to the amounts provided by other 
countri e s . The U. S . contribution should not dominate an institution 
or else the institution will necessarily have to become an agent of 
American policy . Strings have to accompany resource transfers . At-
taching strings, some of which may appear to be pol i tical rather 
than economic or technical , is the best procedure to ensure conti-
nuity of contribution and in reality is the only procedure possible . 
Thus the American contribution should be diluted by appropriate con-
tributions from other countries . 
New procedures were also set up in the 1973 legislation which in-
cluded the creation of a Development Coordination Commi t tee within 
the Executive. The Committee will present an annual report to the 
Congress and through this mechanism greater coordination in American 
development efforts is to be sought . In his letter of transmittal 
of the first report to the Congress, President Ford stated : "Our po-
licies must continue to reflect our belief that American wellbeing 
is intimately related to a secure and prosperous international envi-
ronment and humanitarian and economic concerns that have for so long 
motivated our assistance programmes. 11 27) If this belief is fully 
incorporated into American policy, then the new legislation will 
mark a new direction for U.S. foreign assistance . Executive requests 
for aid funding will likely rise and Congress will be forthcoming . 
Nevertheless I have a feeling of some unease . There seems to be 
remarkably little publ i c understanding of the importance of the in-
ternational environment to American wellbeing and slight recogni-
tion of the importance of developing countries in the world environ-
ment . Before a new foreign assistance programme can be brought into 
full operation, greater understanding of international interdepend-
ence will be required in the United States. Only then can the Con-
gress give proper budget support to foreign assistance . 
27) Developrrent Coordination Corrmittee, Developrrent Issues: First Annual Report 
of the President on U. S. Actions Affecting the Developnent of Lo.v-In=ne 
Countries, Washington, D.C., May 1975, p.i. 
COMMENTS ON KRAUSE'S PAPER 
(a) SE!Jl i~AYA 
The experiences and problems of the United States, as the larg-
est donor of foreign assistance, are discussed in this paper . The 
analysis, largely devoid of sentimentality, is concerned with what 
has been and is likely to be. A number of factors affecting the 
United States and the recipient countries are generally well present-
ed, permitting a coherent interpretation of events and circumstanc-
es . Many arguments are also presented which would provide the Unit-
ed States with a more rational policy of foreign assistance than in 
the past. But the author's discussion of national security as the 
primary basis of bilateral assistance is highly contro~ersial, and 
it is on this point that I shall focus . 
Beginning aptly with an historical sketch of the changing politi-
cal climate both at home and abroad in which the United States has 
sought to administer its aid programmes, the a~thor covers a wide 
range of topics . They include the heterogeneity of receiving count-
ries, the role of national security as the central focus of foreign 
aid to developing countries, the marginal effect that aid has impart-
ed on economic development, and negative as well as positive lessons 
of the United States experience . In discussing prospects for the 
future of American foreign assistance , several practical and ration-
al approaches to maintain a viable programme are suggested : less 
paternalism, less domination, fewer expectations of grandiose deve-
lopment schemes, and also moLe support for international organiza-
tions, more attention to the plight of poor countries and to social 
justice, and recognition of the importance of national security as 
an element of foreign assistance . But the writer concludes on a 
note of pessimism, citing a lack of understanding of international 
interdependence on the part of the American public and, hence, the 
United States Congress , who must deliberate on the Federal budget . 
He maintains that national security may be the soundest basis for 
bilateral foreign assistance, 'though he properly cautions it is not 
the only purpose for aid . He answers two related questions affirma-
tively : (1) can foreign assistance promote the security interest of 
the United States? and (2) can it promote the security of recipient 
countries? His criteria for aid are that it should be "direct, open , 
limited in scope, and directed only to those countries where a strong 
security interest exists". 
However, the author neither clearly distinguishes between econo-
mic and national security objectives nor defines national security 
interests. This weakness permeates the paper because the reader 
senses that significant overlap exists between economic, political, 
and national security interests. To be sure, he mentions a possible 
relationship of these ends, but there is no mention of what consti-
tue a national security interest. Indeed, the term has been vastly 
expanded in past years to justify both economic assistance, e.g., 
for construction of the Panama Canal, as well as military involve-
ment, e.g., for pursuing the Vietnam War. As a result, I remain 
confused as to the significance of this interest in foreign assist-
188 
LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE 189 
ance programmes . Undoubtedly, a grey area exists in this regard, 
but the author seems clearly to distinguish between economic and 
national security interests . Perhaps a typology analogous to the 
one by David Denoon as presented in this paper would be a helpful 
framework from which to proceed . Otherwise, different readers may 
interpret differently the references made to national security vis-
a-vis political or economic interests of the United States . 
Secondly, development assistance is not defined nor its carq::onents 
identified . Hence, not separating military aid from all assistance , 
for ex~mple, seriously confuses the discussion because of differenc-
es in the management of funds for economic assistance and for mili-
tary operations . A dinstinction is especially critical in light of 
the author's insistence on the importance of national security in 
United States foreign assistance objectives . 
Although the author contends that assistance can be granted with-
out a commitment to direct military involvement, I wonder whether 
he has thoroughly evaluated the possible reaction of the United Stat-
es in countries where substantial aid or investment commitments are 
threatened . Furthermore, it may be appropriate to discuss the cas -
es of Korea and Taiwan in this context . Would the threat to the pre -
sently endorsed regimes in these two nations and the loss of the 
commitments made to them be considered a national security threat? 
The question is indirectly posed but receives no treatment . Where 
is the line drawn when national security, as undefined, is at stake? 
Finally , if national security is stated to be the main purpose of 
aid how do the others temper this primary interest? 
(bl MosESE QroNIBARAVI 
Dr. Krause has presented a very candid paper on United States 
development assistance and although he prefaced his remarks by say-
ing that his paper presents an American view, one gauges from dis-
cussions in the Unite~ Nations and other international forums that 
the tone of the paper reflects fairly well the current American 
view on development assistance . The paper highlights the predomin-
ance of national security in the consideration of American aid . 
Coming from Fiji, a small island territory in the South Pacific, I 
now appreciate why United States development aid to Fiji has not 
been significant . 
The paper also reflects the air of disenchantment about aid which 
emerged in the earlier discussions . This feeling is based on the 
view that several decades of development assistance do not appear 
to have made any significant impact on the development of less de-
veloped countries . This view is to my mind based largely on assess-
ment of development in purely quantitative terms . Development how-
ever involves essentially the betterment of the way of life of peo-
ple . Thus while aid may not have made any significant contribution 
to accelerating the growth of G.N . P . , to the extent that in many 
countries it has meant better water supplies, improved means of com-
munication, the opportunity for better education , it has in my view 
contributed significantly to development . ·· 
In assessing the impact of aid on growth of less developed count-
ries one ought to take account of the directions to which aid has 
been channelled . In most countries aid has been directed to the 
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provision of basic infra-structure. The presumption seems to be 
that given such infra-structure, investment to exploit the resourc-
es of a country would follow. But as pointed out by Dr . Krause the 
development process is much more complex . Systems of values, socio-
cultural factors , administrative constraints, lack of know-how and 
many other factors could slow the development process. In this con-
nection the Marshall Plan succeeded because Europe had the requisite 
socio-cultural environment and systems of values to utilise such 
aid for reconstruction and post war economic expansion . 
The disenchantment about aid could also arise from the high ex-
pecta t ions of its results. The non-economic constraints to deve-
lopment were not appreciated. But this should not in my view lead 
to too much disillusionment. After all it has taken developed count-
ries centuries of change to.be where they are today. It would there-
fore be unreasonable to expect less developed countries to go through 
the same process within a few decades. 
With the current disenchantment about aid it seems to me that 
less developed countries could look more to promoting foreign invest-
ment in their countries. But in order to avoid resentment and gain 
greater benefits from such investment it would be prefe~able that 
they be in the form of joint-ventures between local and foreign en-
terprises. Such forms of assistance could introduce technical know-
how and overcome the problem of status mentioned by Dr . Krause . 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
There was some criticism that the details of aid given in the 
paper included items such as military assistance which could not 
properly be regarded as aid at all . More fundamentally it was sug-
gested that while the paper recognised the existence of growing ten-
sions between the developed and the developing world, a reduction 
in large international transfers as seemed to be proposed would not 
help in reducing international inequalities which were at the root 
of these tensions. 
There was also the question of tied aid and the effects this had 
on recipients, though participants disagreed as to whether the ef-
fects in the United States case were as bad as often represented . 
A more important policy issue in the view of one participant was 
the need for greater recognition by the United States of the close 
links between trade and aid. Trade access was most important for 
developing countries . · 
Replying to these points, Dr. Krause supported by other partici-
pants asserted that his paper was intended to show the way in which 
thinking and action on aid was heading in the United States. It was 
not concerned with the question of what policies should be . The Unit-
ed States public is no longer persuaded by the old arguments for 
aid programmes and the links with United States security interests 
were part of the political requirements for securing continuing sup-
port for aid. Humanitarian aspects in the United States had weaken-
ed and this was in part the result of inflation and disenchantment 
with foreign involvement generally . Humanitarian issues would how-
ever arise again and perhaps the emphasis on security decline. One 
had to face the fact however that what do-gooders wanted is not ne-
cessarily what the political system provides. The world crisis was 
not going to be solved simply by large international resource trans-
fers. Bargaining processes over a range of inter-related issues were 
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involved. Dr. Krause added that for a large country such as the 
Un i ted States it was difficult to make a clear cut distinction be-
tween what was national security and economic assistance. In any 
case in democratic political systems aid competes for resources with 
domestic and other programmes and aid policy had to recognise this . 
It was true that GATT had not conceded much to developing count-
ries because they were not part of the system . They must develop 
bargaining positions and become part of the system . The main point 
is that one cannot take normative stands on public issues and stay 
in touch with reality. He also did not think multilateral institu-
tions are apolitical . They could help but it was wise not to becorre 
too enamoured with them . 
8 
USSR: ECONOMIC (0-0PERATION WITH THE DEVELOPING 
NATIONS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AREA 
ANDREI I. CHEKHUTOV 
Economic cooperation of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries with the developing nations of Asia and the Pacific area 
comprises an ever-increasing part of modern international economic 
relations. This cooperation marks the making of a new type of eco-
nomic ties between highly developed industrialized countries and 
nations with lower levels of economic development which in the past 
were colonies of the Western powers . Principles of equality, mutual 
benefit, respect for national sovereignty and providing all-round 
assistance in the struggle for political and economic independence 
were taken, at the initiative of the socialist states as a basis 
for relations with the newly independent nations. These principl-
es are observed by the socialist countries irrespective of which 
geographic area a particular developing nation belongs to, whether 
that nation is big or small. Such principles are unprecedented in 
the history of economic relations between countries with different 
levels of economic development. 
Economic cooperation of the USSR with the newly independent stat-
es proceeds along various directions. It covers foreign trade, eco-
nomic aid, scientific and technical assistance. In recent years 
USSR economic relations with the developing countries were persist-
ently expanding beyond the confines of foreign trade. Mutually be-
neficial trade relations are added to and strengthened by broadening 
economic and technical co-operation. The latter two form the prin-
cipal focus of the present report. 
Characteristic features of economic and technical co-operation 
As part of economic and technical co-operation with the develop-
ing countries of Asia and 'the Pacific area, the USSR participates 
in a range of development projects including geological prospecting, 
and provides equipment and materials for newly constructed or mod-
ernised enterprises. Soviet experts are sent to provide assistance 
in the construction and operation of new enterprises. Schools for 
professional training and higher learning establishments are organ-
ized and large-scale training of national personnel is done with 
Soviet assistance. The volume of economic and technical cooperation 
keeps increasing from year to year as the following table demonstrat-
es : 
1965 
100.0 
192 
Growth of the USSR Economic Cooperation 
with the Developing Countries of Asia 
(percent) 
1970 1971 1972 
166.1 173.9 194.1 
1973 
215.0 
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Average annuai increase reached 10 . 7 percent during the years 
1966-1970 and 9 . 0 percent in 1971-1973 . In terms of growth, Soviet 
economic and technical assistance to the countries of Asia and the 
Pacific area exceeds bi-lateral official development assistance 
provided to those countries by the Western states . According to 
the OECD 1974 Review the average annual increase in Western assist-
ance was 6 . 5 percent during the period 1971-1973 . High rates of 
increase in economic co-operation were characteristic for the USSR 
not only at the initial stages of co-operation, but also in the 
period when the volume of Soviet economic assistance became rather 
substantial . 
Some particular features had been present in USSR economic co-
operation with the developing countries of Asia since the very be-
ginning . Subsequently these features have become even more appar-
ent, contributing to greater efficiency of co - operation for both 
the newly independent states and the USSR . 
Among those features one should first notice the inter-state na-
ture of economic relations . Direct participation of states as eco-
nomic partners allows for large-scale projects which would exceed 
the capabilities of even the biggest private companies . In India, 
metallurgical plants in Bhilai and Bokaro, heavy machine-building 
in Ranchi and heavy electric engineering in Hardvare can be cited 
as examples . All those plants are the largest of their kind in 
Asia . 
The inter-state nature of economic relations allows for another 
significant advantage, namely the harmonisation of the aims and 
goals of co-operation with the national objectives of the partici-
pating states . Thus, Soviet economic assistance to the developing 
nations is closely co-ordinated with their national plans and pro-
grammes and contributes to the solution of the most difficult tasks 
of their national development : strengthening economic independence , 
increasing rates of national industrial development , changing its 
structure and implementing progressive socio-economic reforms . 
The fact that the Soviet Union assists fi r st of all in strength-
ening the position of the state -owned sector in the economies of 
the developing countries is another way in which economic co-opera-
tion is a means of fulfilling national aims. As a result the mat-
erial base for further strengthening the role of state in economic 
constructio n is broadened , which plays a decisive role in economic 
and social progress of the newly independent states. Experience of 
these states demonstrates that narrow mercenary motives of private 
e nterprise are an obstacle to overcoming economic backwardness and 
social inequality in a short period of time . 
Another important feature of USSR economic co-operation with the 
developing countries of Asia is the increased use of bilateral in-
tergovernment agreements covering major aspects of the USSR econo-
mic and technical co-operation . Thus, in 1955 the Soviet Union had 
intergovernment agreements on economic and technical co-operation 
with just Afghanistan and India . By 1973 the number of Asian count-
ries with which co-operation was based on intergovernment agreements 
had reached 20. They include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Iraq, Arab Republic of Yemen, People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen, Cambodia, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Syria, Turkey and Sri Lanka. 
The rapid increase in the number of developing countries which 
have intergovernment economic agreements with the Soviet Union, il-
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lustrates the persistent expansion of the geographic area of mutual-
ly beneficial co-operation . At the same time it proves the effica-
cy of the instrument of intergovernment agreements in relations be-
tween countries with different levels of economic development and 
different socio-economic systems. These agreements provide favour-
able conditions for dovetailing short and long term plans of nation-
al development of each of the partners with their mutual co-opera-
tion . They provide a reliable legal foundation for development of 
economic relations between the two groups of countries and allow 
for this task to be solved on the basis of overall state interests 
of the co-operating countries . 
Arising from the system of bilateral intergovernment agreements 
is another significant feature of co-operation, namely a trend to-
wards establishment of close co-ordination between different ele-
ments in foreign economic ties . An evergrowing number of the deve-
loping countries combines their trade relations with the USSR with 
the use of Soviet economic , scientific and technological assistance 
and financial aid . As a result, foreign trade relations, participa-
tion in construction of various projects and in training of local 
personnel, providing credits and so on are not separate and indep-
endent directions of USSR economic co-operation with the developing 
countries, but make a single complex of economic co-operation. This 
is in line with the ideas of the "International Strategy for the 
2nd Development Decade", adopted by the XXV General Assembly of the 
United Nations in October 1970. That document considers the prin-
ciple of co-ordination as the leading method in promoting the eco-
nomic relations of the developing nations with other countries. 
Another important feature is the favourable terms of credits 
provided by the USSR to the developing countries of Asia. The tot-
al sum of Soviet credits to all the developing countries is at pre-
sent about 6 billion roubles a substantial part being provided to 
the newly independent states of Asia. In intergovernment agreements 
the USSR usually provides loans for a period of 10-15 years at 2 . 5-
3 percent interest rates . Soviet credits are favourable not only 
in respect of their terms. They do not imply any additional demands, 
neither open nor latent, which would increase the price of credit 
or interfere with the political sovereignty or economic independence 
of the receiver. Repayment conditions are also favourable. Repay-
ment of capital sums and interest is effected mostly by deliveries 
of goods including those produced by enterprises constructed with 
Soviet credits. This mode of repayment places no additional burden 
on the balance of payments, but on the contrary, contributes to in-
creasing exports of the developing countries. 
Structure of Economic and Technical Co-operation 
With all the diversity of needs of the developing countries of 
Asia it seems obvious that the expansion of the foundations of their 
economies is of decisive significance for them . By this is meant 
the creation of production capacities capable of solving major tasks 
of newly independent states - those of increasing industrial output 
and employment , forming domestic sources of capital accumulation 
and strengthening economic independence . These very current and 
prospective tasks facing developing nations shape the structure and 
material composition of economic and technical assistance of the 
Soviet Union. A breakdown of such assistance is given in the fol-
losing table : 
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USSR Economic and Technical Assistance 
to the Developing Countries 
by purpose 
(at the beginning _of 1973, per cent) 
InGustries and power engineering 
Transportation and communications 
Agriculture 
Geological prospecting and surveying 
Education, science, culture, health care, etc. 
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76.6 
7.6 
5 . 9 
5.4 
4.5 
As will be observed, about 90 percent of resources provided under 
economic and technical co-operation agreements between the USSR and 
the developing countries, is for the development of basic product-
ion industries. 
It should be noted that distribution of Soviet assistance between 
particular branches and enterprises of production lies within the 
competence of governments of the developing nations. Taken into 
consideration is the role and significance of every object of co-
operation in manufacturing products that are most important for a 
particular country. Naturally, efficiency of an enterprise, wheth-
er a new or a modernized one, depends on the availability of basic 
raw materials and components of domestic origin and on the existence 
of sufficient domestic or prospective foreign markets . All that, 
of course , is taken into consideration. At the same time, when 
choosing objects for co-operation, preference is given to those en-
terprises and industries which could marked1y contribute to general 
growth of the national economy by either processing local natural 
resources or providing power, raw materials, semi-manufactured pro-
ducts, machines and equipment for other branches of the national 
economy . 
A major part of Soviet economic and technical assistance to the 
developing countries of Asia is directed to various industrial pro-
jects . Those are the key (and most dynamic) branches of modern in-
dustry capable of making major contributions to increasing national 
production . Formation of a stable industrial base makes it easier 
for the national governments of these countries to fulfil the his-
torical task of consolidating all forces of national reconstruction . 
Depending on more rapid industrial development also is the general 
improvement of the position of liberated countries in the system of 
international division of labour and, in the final end, their econo-
mic independence. 
Industrial infrastructure and agriculture are also given serious 
consideration, along with industry, in USSR economic co-operation 
with the developing countries of Asia . 
Practical economic co-operation of the USSR with the developing 
nations of Asia is determined by a desire to increase their produc-
tion potential as well as to provide assistance in overcoming major 
imbalances in their national economies. As examples of such imbal-
ance one can cite underdevelopment of industries, - above all heavy 
industries, - weak connections between various branches of the eco-
nomy and individual enterprises, and the low technological level of 
many industries. For that very reason creation of production - te-
chnical complexes of national or sectoral significance has a notable 
place in Soviet economic assistance to the developing nations of 
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Asia . Such complexes are usually formed on the basis of large in-
dustrial or power enterprises within the framework of a state- owned 
sector. They normally include several enterprises organised on the 
basis of either "vertical" integration (survey, prospecting and ex-
ploration of a particular type of raw materials up to the stage of 
finished product) or "horizontal" one (participation of various in-
dustries in manufacturing a particular kind of product) • Construc-
tion of industrial projects is combined with training personnel for 
them . 
Organization of such complexes is a difficult and time- consuming 
task . Its success depends not only on the USSR but also on the vol -
ume of co- operation already achieved and on the reciprocal efforts 
of governments of the developing countries . That is why the most 
valuable experience in organizing production- technical complexes 
with Soviet parti cipation was accumulated in co- operation with India , 
Afghanistan and Iran . 
In India , a complex was built - and is now being expanded - for 
extraction of raw materials for the metallurgical industry , pig iron 
and steel production and manufacturing of machines and equipment . 
This complex covers iron ore extraction , coal mines and quarries and 
a lime- pit . Pig iron and steel produced at metallurgical combines 
in Bhilai and Bokaro, are made use of by machine- building plants in 
Ranchi, Dorghapour and Hardvare . Forty thousand people were profes -
sionally trained while constructing and operating these objects . 
With Soviet assistance , an industrial-and- power complex is being 
set up in Afghanistan on the basis of huge deposits of natural gas . 
In Iran , an industrial complex is under way on the basis of a metal-
lurgical plant in Isfagan and linked to local resources . Also sev-
eral enterprises are being established for natural gas extraction 
and transportation . Specifically, the coke and chemi cal division 
of the Isfagan metallurgical plant produces such items as phenol , 
toluol and various resins . Production of cement is bei ng organized 
on thebasisof coke waste products of this plant . 
Resu l ts and Prospects of Co- operation 
Economic and technical co-operation with the Soviet Union is get-
ting stronger and playing an increasingly positive role in the life 
of the developing countries of Asia . In a number of newly independ-
ent states enterprises constructed with Soviet assistance take a lead-
ing place in the output of major industrial products . In India, for 
example, they account for production of 60 percent of metallurgical 
equipment, 60 percent of power turbines, more than 50 percent of oil 
production, 30 percent of oil refining, 30 percent of steel, and about 
20 percent of electric power . 
The positive impact of co-operation with the Soviet Union upon 
socio-economic processes in liberated countries is further strength-
ened by the fact that enterprises constructed with Soviet assistance 
belong mostly to the state-owned sectors of these countries' econo-
mies . More rapid development of this sector makes it possible for 
the national governments to concentrate in their hands commanding 
levers of economic construction, to more successfully counteract 
private capitalist chaos of market competition and expansion of in-
ternational monopolies . Strengthening the position of the state 
sector is a necessary precondition for shaping the socio-economic 
structure of the newly independent states, for making possible their 
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progressive domestic and foreign policies . 
Owing to the equal and mutually beneficial nature of relations, 
USSR economic and technical assistance to developing nations in con-
struction of industrial projects serves, together with foreign trade 
and other types of economic relations, to bring about a more corrplete 
satisfaction of the needs of Soviet economy as well. This co-opera-
tion stands as an important factor in the rapid growth of exchange 
between the USSR and the developing countries and contributes to 
broadening the range of Soviet imports and exports . The USSR receiv-
es from the developing countries large quantities of raw and other 
materials and finished products including those manufactured at en-
terprises built with Soviet assistance . 
The mutually beneficial nature of the USSR economic relations 
with the developing countries of Asia, and the increase in mutual 
demands for economic exchange raises new tasks in further increas-
ing the scale and efficiency of economic co- operation . Equal inter-
national division of labour between the USSR and the developing na-
tions of Asia can develop both through greater exchange of traditional 
goods and joint organization of production of new products . A numb-
er of measures could contr i bute to a new, higher level of mutual co-
operation . The following ones deserve consideration : concludingcorn--
plex long-term economic agreements between the USSR and the develop-
ing countries of Asia, which would cover both foreign trade , econo-
mic and technical co-operation . An example of these is the Agree-
ment on further development of economic and trade co-ope ration be-
tween the USSR and the Republic of India, signed in November 1973 
for a period of 15 years . Furthermore, it would appear useful to 
supplement bilateral agreements by multilateral ones , with several 
socialist and developing countries participating . Co- ordination of 
plans of p r oduction for mutual exchange by interested coutries could 
become another stimulating factor of co-operation. Strengthening 
the organizational structure of co-operation - such as improving 
operation of the permanent i ntergovernment commissions on economic , 
scientific and technological relations - as well as making use of 
new and prospective forms of economic co-operation, could also con-
tribute to this development . These and other measures, in my opinion, 
are capable of broadening the scale of mutually beneficial co-opera-
tion, and of ensuring the even more stable, long-term and efficient 
nature of that co- operation. 
COMMENTS ON CHEKHUTOV 'S PAPER 
(a) V. YAKUBOVSKY 
supplementing Dr. Chekhutov's remar~s Professor Yakubo~sky s~id 
that there is now more mutual cooperation between the Soviet Union 
and developing countries, as these countries have changed in recent 
years. Foreign trade is important betwe~n the Sov iet Un~on and the 
Asia and Pacific countries, especially with the South Asian group 
which have been the main recipients of Soviet aid. New directions 
of trade are being opened up, e.g . Phillipines. Due to rapid trade 
growth in respect of Latin America and Africa the share of Soviet 
trade with the Asia and Pacific region has dropped slightly. 
The initial trend was for the Soviet Union to export machinery 
and to import raw materials. This is changing, particularly in re-
spect of Pakistan and India which are now sending finished goods in-
cluding some machinery and equipment. Trade barriers to imports of 
finished and semi-finished goods have been removed since 1965. 
The Soviet Union also enters production cooperation agreements, 
e.g. in Afghanistan, fruit produced on land irrigated with Soviet 
assistance is imported into the Soviet Union. Joint enterprises 
are also being established, e.g. fish products in Singapore . 
Multilateral arrangements are a possibility, bringing in other 
members of CMER (COMECON) . These arrangements would be useful in 
cases where there was a considerable trade imbalance between the 
Soviet Union and the developing country involved . The Soviet Inter-
national Investment Bank has a special fund of 1 billion roubles 
which it can invest on medium (5 year) or long (15 year) credits in 
transferable roubles which can be utilised in any CMER country and 
for international settlements . 
Problems are the distances involved, the lack of cultural ties, 
lack of knowledge of markets in developing countries and, on the 
other hand, of the system of operation in the Soviet Union, the dif-
ficulties in raising the export capacities in line with developing 
countries' requirements, political factors, e.g . end to the Indo-China 
War . A rapid development of trade is not foreseen but it will grow . 
Countries which felt caught between Japan and the United States 
could seek an alternative outlet in the Soviet Union. 
(b) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A number of questions were raised seeking elaboration of points 
in the paper. These included whether there were any limits on Soviet 
Union aid, whether there were any links between economic and milita-
ry aid and what was the attitude of the Soviet Union to aid through 
multilateral or regional development institutions . In reply Dr . Che-
khutov said that the limits to assistance were primarily those of the 
Soviet Union's resources and the situation in particulalr develop-
ing countries . Absolute figures were available here only for some 
Asian countries which might be misleading. Only economic assistance 
is given; the links with military aid are not close . The importance 
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given to the role of the public sector hinges on marxist theory. 
In practice, this importance is accepted in many developing countri-
es, and it is believed that this is the only way to achieve reconst-
ruction and overcome economic backwardness . The objectives of aid 
are to co-ordinate and achieve planned targets, subject to the needs 
of developing countries, and to promote radical changes and revolu-
tionary movements . If the aim is to establish sound peaceful rela-
tionships, it could be described as anti-military. The Soviet Union 
dislikes the character and the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and 
the development banks, but is not against multilateralism as such. 
9 
PROBLEMS OF THE SMALL DONOR : THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
NANCY VIVIANI 
In considering the general question of the problems of the small 
donor, there is at the outset the implication that these are notsirrr 
ply similar problems to those experienced by large donors writ small , 
but that small donors as a group face a different set of constraints 
that derive from the scale of their aid . 
Some of these constraints are self- evident : small donors haveless 
money to spend , and they swing less weight in international councils 
on aid . To this extent at least , small donors face common problems, 
of a kind that differ from those of large donors. Yet in this con-
text the more interesting and more useful question can be posed : are 
the problems that arise from the small scale of these donors' aid 
more or less important than those deriving from other factors such 
as geopolitical location, historic and political links with recipi -
ents , and so on . Further, it is not clear on the face of it that 
the effects of small size are overwhelmingly negative . Such limita-
tions may be balanced by opportunities related to the scale of aid . 
Within the confines of this paper, an examination of Australia's 
recent aid experience can throw some light on this question, and 
some comparison with other small donors will broaden this narrow 
focus . 
The question of what is a small donor is not unimportant . Donor 
size is relative first to the scale of other donors' aid. Is size 
to be related to number of dollars , percentage of GNP or to some 
other measure of political or economic power? For the purposes of 
this paper, absolute size of official development assistance (ODA) 
will serve as the most useful criterion of size . ll Here , only those 
countries which are DAC members are compared, because of the prob-
1) Official developrrent assistance as a percentage of GNP is not a useful neasure 
of size, however broadly defined . This ODA/GNP ratio was intended as a target 
and also as neasure of relative national effort devoted to aid . There is no 
apparent relationship between the number of aid dollars spent and ODA/GNP ra-
tios for particular groups of =untries (see table I column 2) . On the other 
hand, it seems clear that the ~ of size of aid depends not only on the 
number of dollars, but importantly on the political and e=nanic characteris-
tics of the donor . Generally, large donors are powerful politically, econo-
mically and militarily, and small donors are weaker in these respects . It is 
the differentiation of power within such groups that is interesting in rela-
tion to size of aid (for example, Germany and Japan, or the UK and Canada) . 
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lems of data with communist bloc countries, the OPEC countries and 
also those other developing countries< like India and Singapore, 
which are donors in their own right . 21 Using a fairly arbitary cut 
off point, the class of large donors will include the bi0 six (in 
descending order) : the United States of America, France, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada . 3) All of these donors gave 
more than US$500 million in calendar year 1974, the smallest donor 
in this class being Canada with US$713 million. It is worth noting 
in passing that were the criterion of total net flows (which includ-
es private investment) used to discriminate between large and small 
donors, the large group would have the same membership.4) One is 
inclined to classify the rest of the DAC countries as small donors, 
but there is a case to be made for a middle range of donors (US$200-
500 million) including (in descending order), Australia, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Belgium, and Italy.SJ 
While it might well suit Australian predilections to be regarded 
as a middle power in international political terms, its peers in 
aid are those countries with which more recently it has sought to 
identify itself - the small European countries . This identification 
has some importance in relation to the question of scale . It is 
not clear that this middle range of donors regard the scale of their 
aid as an unrelieved handicap . Their perception seems to be rather 
that they can avoid some of the more oppressive features of large 
donors, and through innovation and co-operation with similar donors 
have an effect disproportionate to the size of their aid both on 
recipients and other donors . 6) 
2) The following table sets out disburserrents fran DAC countries, canmunist coun-
tries, OPEC countries, and others for 1973 and 1974 . These figures are all 
estimates . A rrore reliable ~sure for OPEC countries is that of comnitnents . 
In 1974 OPEC carrnitnents were A$8 million (excluding A$2 . l billion to the 
World Bank and A$3 . 2 billion to the IMF oil facility) . 
Flows from Principal Donor Groups 1973 & 1974 (US$ million) 
1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 
Total FlCMS ODA Total FlCMs ODA 
DA.C ll , 995 9,408 14 , 000 
Conmunist countries 1,400 1,100 1,400 
OPEC countries 850 531 4,800 (a) 
Other countries 40 40 50 
14,285 ll,079 20,250 
Notes : (a) IMF oil facility contribution of $3 . 2 billion excluded. 
(b) excludes Portugal 
Source : The OECD Observer, No . 74, March/April 1975. 
3) See Table I. 
ll,400 
1,100 
2,500 
50 
15,050 
(b) 
4) See Table I. In 1974, ranking of members of the large group for both ODA and 
total flCMs levels was the same . In previous years, the high level of Japan-
ese private investnent overseas has generally placed Japan close behind the 
US in total flCMs . The significant reduction in Japanese private investnent 
in 1974, due to recession conditions follCMing a period of rapid grc:Mth in 
overseas invest111ent explains this coincidence . 
5) See Table I. 
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Table I 
NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND TOTAL FLOWS OF RESOURCES 
FROM D.A.C. COUNTRIES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country 
united States 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Australia 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Italy 
Denmark 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Austria 
Finland 
New Zealand 
Total D.A.C 
Countries 
AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES, 1974 
O. D.A . 
US$ m. as % of GNP 
3,439.0 
1,638.4 
1,434.6 
1,126.2 
721. 8 
713. 4 
430.3 
428 . 8 
401.7 
263.4 
204 . 4 
168.3 
131.4 
67 . 3 
59.9 
37.9 
37.2 
11,304.0 
0 . 25 
0.60 
0.37 
0 . 25 
0.38 
0.50 
0 . 55 
0.62 
0.73 
0.49 
0.14 
0 . 54 
0 . 57 
0 . 14 
0.18 
0.18 
0.30 
0 . 33 
Total Flows 
US$ m. as % of GNP 
9,931.0 
3,385.9 
3,177.3 
2,962 . 3 
1,500.4 
1,677.0 
543.8 
899 . 1 
640.4 
590.2 
405.8 
190.8 
186 . l 
(300.0) 
202.8 
60.l 
46.0 
26,699.0 
0. 71 
1. 23 
0.83 
0 . 65 
0.79 
1.18 
0 . 69 
1. 30 
1.15 
1.11 
0.27 
0 . 61 
0 . 81 
(0 . 64) 
0.61 
0 . 29 
0.37 
0.78 
Source: OECD Resources for Developing Countries 1974 
Australia ' s position at the top of the middle range, though sig-
nificantly below Canada at present, should be seen in the context 
of its expectation that its aid programme will grow rapidly in the 
next five years. Thus Australian aid administrators are tending to 
see Australian aid in a state of transition from relatively small 
to relatively large, and the emerging problems in Australian aid 
relate in part to this perception . 
As a general rule of thumb, the smaller the donor the greater 
the need to concentrate aid on a limited number of recipients, and 
within these recipients to concentrate on a limited number of prog-
ramme. 7) 
While donor size is importantly related to the distribution and 
6) Because the volurre of aid of the middle range donors is of significantly dif-
ferent order from that of large donors, their rrodels in the experience of aid 
administration tend to be each other. Further they have more scope for colla-
boration in the prograrmes and for collaboration with multilateral agencies. 
Politically, because their carrnitments are weaker, they can and do serve a 
useful bridging role in developed/developing country conflicts in internation-
al discussions. 
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concentration of aid, the extent to which particular recipients are 
dependent on aid, in their economy and their capacity to attract a 
number of rival donors, tend to offset the influence of concentra-
tion by particular donors . The point of relative size and influence 
is simply illustrated : a great power with a small aid programme may 
wield influence disproportionate to the number of dollars employed 
(for example, China ' s aid to Tanzania); conversely a small donor, 
like New Zealand, can, by concentrating its aid to the South Pacific , 
enjoy important influence . Australia is a particularly interesting 
example in this regard . As a small donor to Indonesia it supplies 
some four percent of Indonesia ' s aid receipts,8) but it is the do-
minant donor in Papua New Guinea supplying more than 95 percent of 
that country's aid. Both Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea are dep-
endent on foreign aid - the latter of course to a more marked extent . 
The impact and influence of particular donors in these cases relate 
as much to the recipient having available alternative sources of 
aid (as a countervailing bargaining power) as it does to the abso-
lute size of any donor ' s aid . 9) 
This consideration of Australia's experience as an aid donor re-
lated to questions of scale, is concerned with Australian aid poli -
cy and administration, rather than with its impact and effectiveness 
within developing countries . This is admittedly a somewhat parochi-
al view, but one which is relevant to the framework of this general 
discussion. 
Successive Australian governments, since the inception of Austra-
lian aid in the early 1950 ' s have sought with varying energy a poli-
cy rationale for aid which would sit more easily with their interna-
tional political preoccupations than the purely humanitarian justi-
fication . One early Minister justified aid through the argument 
that aid would produce economic growth, which would increase peo-
ple's incomes , which would make them less susceptible to the siren 
calls of communism . 10) Later Australian Ministers, informed by the 
experiences of countries in their region, eschewed this simple wis-
dom, and looked to aid to achieve more modest goals : to reinforce 
their diplomacy; to show that Australia was doing its share in the 
international effort; to assist Australian trade with some particu-
lar developing countries; to contribute modestly to the development 
(however vaguely defined) of poorer countries . 11) 
7) DAC countries tend less to concentrate their aid geographically ~an either . 
OPEC or conmunist countries (excluding China) . Arrong DAC countries geographi-
cal distribution is rrore concentrated arrong smaller donor~ truu:1 larger, a~­
though the i.nµ)rtance of post-colonial links arrong countries like France is a 
mitigating factor . . . · th I a, 
8) This is not to assert that Australia's influence is neg~igil;'le in e . n .one-
sian aid scene. It can be cogently argued that Austrahc:m ii:itluence is in 
fact greater than might be expected from the arroilllt of aid ~sbursed, beca1;15~ 
of the kind of aid given, because of the strength and longevity of the fX?l~ti­
cal relationship between Australia and Indonesic;t, and i;iecause c;if A~traha s 
willingness to intercede on Indonesia ' s behalf in p~icular situations, for 
example in the Inter Governrrental Group for Indonesic;t . . . . . 
9) Perhaps a classic example in this regard was Indonesian i;>argc;tining witi: US aid 
in the early 1960s. See Ambassador H.P. Jones' accoilllt in his Indonesia: the 
Possible Dream, N. Y.: Harcourt, 1971 
lO) Mr. P. spender, camonwealth Parliarrentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
9 March 1950, vol.206, p . 628 ff . 
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More recently, while the political and economic interests per-
sist the Australian government has begun to pay more serious at-
tention to the grievances of developing countries and in this ~ight 
has come to a more realistic view of the worth of its aid and its 
place in the set of its relationships with developing countries. 
Further, Australian aid has undergone a significant reassessment to 
the extent that as a donor Au3tralia has asserted a new interest in 
the purposes of its aid and the distribution of the benefits that 
flow from that aid . 12) This reassessment derives from a recognition 
that changing economic and social policies within developing count-
ries will be needed if there is to be an improvement in people's 
welfare. 
This progression in Australian aid thinking follows similar trends 
in other Western countries, albeit with time lags, due partly to Au-
stralia's derivative stance and the relative dearth until recently 
of critical Australian thought on aid policy . It is also, in part, 
a consequence of the scale of Australia's aid. Aid to Papua New Guinea, 
earlier some three-quarters of total Australian aid, and in this 
year some half of it, has been until recently properly regarded as 
colonial aid, administered by Australians on Australian priorities . 
While there has been an important continuing discussion on develop-
ment in Papua New Guinea, the remainder of Australia's aid has been 
so small as to hardly merit the application of a great debate as to 
dependence and distribution. 
This situation is changing. It is not a coincidence that the as-
sertion of an Australian interest in the purposes and distribution 
of its aid has arisen in conjunction with substantial increases in 
aid to countries other than Papua New Guinea. The adoption of such 
a stance can be in potential conflict with the doctrine of "aid with-
out strings" (which probably applied only to small amounts of aid) 
and with the political doctrines of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of other countries - again a doctrine more often observed in 
the breach than in the reality. 
This is emerging as an important preoccupation in Australian aid. 
It relates not to the small scale of aid, but to its growing signi-
ficance in some particular countries in Australia's region. It in-
volves a balancing of the assertion of an Australian interest in 
the uses of its aid with its political relations with some countri-
es . There are several ways of going about this problem. The Swed-
es have stated generally that their assistance will be directed to 
countries which pursue policies of 'independence and social and eco-
nomic justice' .13) The Dutch have announced conditions on the use 
of their aid to Indonesia within a particular time frame . Austra-
lia, because of the perceived importance of its political relation-
ship with Indonesia, has taken the view that Australian interests 
in the use of its aid are in broad accord with the objectives stat-
ed in Indonesia's second Five Year Plan, and that, through a process 
of dialogue, a shift in Australian aid can be attained. This pro-
11) 
12) 
13) 
See statements by Mr. W. McMahon, 3 Sept.ember 1970, Australia's External Aid, 
and Mr. N. ~, 21 September 1972, Australian Foreign Aid. 
Senator D. Willesee, statements in Australian Foreign Affairs Re=rd, June 
1974, p . 369 ff and May 1975, p.233 ff. 
Sweden's Policy for International Developrent Cooperation, Ministry for For-
eign Affairs, 1974. 
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cess is still in its infancy, but it will be a valuable experience 
as, in the long run, Australian aid to countries other than Papua 
New Guinea increases. In Australia's aid to Papua New Guinea, the 
shift to the status of a post colonial donor will pose similar kinds 
of problems for Australia. 
It may be inferred that where small donors give aid that is sig-
nificant in volume terms to a particular recipient, they will per-
ceive opportunities to further their interests , whether in aid or 
political terms. For a small donor the extent of the impact and in-
fluence of its aid depends, not on its classification as a small 
donor, but on the significance of its aid compared with that of oth-
er donors in particular countries . For their part, recipients gene-
rally will be able to resist the assertion of such interests to the 
extent that they can find alternative, more congenial sources of 
aid supply , or they can use other aspects of the bilateral relation-
ship to offset such pressures . Countries like Indonesia and Malay-
sia have these countervailing powers at their disposal to a reason-
able extent, while other countries such as Papua New Guinea and some 
South Pacific nations lack them . Clearly scale, in terms of politi-
cal power is of significance in the bargaining opportunities of re-
cipients . 
It is possible that small donor like Australia, Sweden and the 
Netherlands see more opportunity for asserting an aid policy inter-
est in the distribution effects of their aid than do the larger don-
ors . Sweden's emphasis on "justice" in its aid, and the Netherlands ' 
emphasis on the extent to which recipient policies benefit the en-
tire population can perhaps be forwarded strongly - precisely be-
cause they are not large donors, which feel their political interests 
more heavily, and which lack strong public support for such policies. 
In terms of total volume of aid, Australian aid has grown quite 
rapidly from a small base of A$109 million in 1965-6 to A$377 milli-
on estimated for 1975-6 . 14) Prior to 1972, growth in the aid budget 
Table II TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON OVERSEAS AID, AUSTR!>.L:!:A 
1965-66 to 1975-76 
Multilateral Bilateral Papua New Total 
Prograrnrnes(net) Programmes Guinea (net) External 
A$000 A$000 A$000 A$000 
1965-66 8,545 25,717 75,362 109,624 
1966-67 13,166 28,175 84,321 125,662 
1967-68 14,633 34,242 92,432 141,307 
1968-69 13,419 37,499 100,829 151,747 
1969-70 11,934 39,541 116,248 167, 723 
1970-71 12,261 43,285 125,040 180,586 
1971-72 13, 012 50,971 136,536 200,519 
1972-73 14,495 60,038 144,302 218,835 
1973-74 17,969 65,712 177,076 260,757 
1974-75 49,568 109,740 168,835 328,143 
1975-76 58,279 108,950 209,711 376,940 
(estimated) 
Aid 
Source: Senator D.R. Willesee: Austral1a 1 s Overseas Development 
sistance, 1975-76. 
14) See Table II. 
As-
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appeared to be related to several factors, principally by the growth 
in total government expenditure together with increases for new aid 
initiatives . The aid budget grew very fast in 1973-4 and 1974-5, 
mainly because of the Labour government's commitment in 1973 to move 
towards an ODA/GNP target of 0.7% by 1980. However, these were years 
of high inflation, so that in real terms the aid budget increased 
less rapidly and was hard put to improve on previous ODA/GNP levels . 
In 1975-6 the aid budget in total is a no growth budget , maintained 
in real terms, due to government restraint on expenditure. As the 
Australian aid budget becomes a significant item of government ex-
penditure it appears to become more vulnerable to the slings of do-
mestic economic misfortune . 
If Australia ' s internationally announced commitment for aid to 
reach 0 . 7% of GNP by 1980 is to be fulfilled, then some fairly rapid, 
and possibly indigestible increases in the volume of aid will have 
to occur . A very rough guess, in the absence of GNP projections 
for 1980, might indicate that aid will have to approach A$300-l,OOO 
million to reach this target . 
This may bring Australia to the lower rungs of the big league 
aid donors and it i s clear that many of the nascent problems being 
talked about now by Australian administrators will soon become in-
sistent realities . This reassessment derives primariy from the rea-
lisation that Australian aid is in a state of transition as a mat-
ter of conscious policy choice . 
In the past, one of the distinguishing marks of small donors has 
been the high grant commponent of their aid, and Australia has been 
no exception in this regard . More recently the trend among large 
donors has been for the grant element of their aid to increase sig-
nificantly . 15) 
In Australia , until recently , there has been relatively little 
argument that aid should, with minor exceptions , continue to be grant 
aid . The Treas ury has desultorily attacked this principle , but ha s 
been unsuccessful for the most part . The chief bureaucratic argu-
ment in favour of grant aid has been that since half goes to Papua 
New Guinea, which is clearly unable to repay it, and since the rest 
is so small when split among a number of recipients, then grant aid 
is the simplest way of giving aid, and one which has political bene-
fits . However, as the aid budget grows significantly, then the pres-
sure for a mix of grant and loan funds increases . One might expect 
the outcome of the dispute over this to depend at least in part on 
the future relative strengths of the Treasury and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the former looking to stretch the aid dollar fur-
ther ; the latter seeking to maintain the political advantages of 
grant aid . 
. Again, until quite recently, Australian aid has been overwhelm-
ingly bilateral, with only a small multilateral component, some 6 
percent in 1972-3 . 16) This derived again from the large share of 
bilateral aid directed to Papua New Guinea and the importance plac-
ed on the remainder of bilateral aid by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs for its potential political impact. This situation was 
quite unlike that of other similar sized donors - such as Sweden , 
Norway and the Netherlands who give large proportions of their aid 
multilaterally.17) Australians tend to explain this in terms of 
contrast to their position : unlike Australia these countries do not 
15) See OECD Develoµrent Cooperation, 1974 Review, p . 121. 
16) See Table II . 
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live in the region to which they give aid; therefore they do not 
have the incentive to gain political benefit that Australia has. 
This explanation of Australia's position is broadly true . Proximity 
to the region of desired policical influence reinforces bilateralism 
for small donors and the converse is also true . More recently, the 
proportion of aid directed through multi lateral channels has increased 
to 16 percent . This is the result of a conscious governrrent policy to 
strengthen the Australian presence in mul tial teral institutions, and 
to make an effort, wider than its traditional recipient areas, to as-
sist those countries most seriously affected by recent economic chang-
es . In this, Australia reflects a more general shift arrong larger do-
nors to channel more resources through multilateral institutions. 
With a rapidly expanding aid programme, with the Papua New Gui-
nea proportion at least held constant and declining proportionate-
ly in the long term, it will be possible for Australia to increase 
both its multilateral aid and its aid to countries other than Papua 
New Guinea. But Australian geopolitical perceptions and the signi-
ficance of aid to Papua New Guinea will restrict the growth of mul -
tilateral aid to proportions smaller than those of its peers. Aust-
ralia's emphasis on bilateral aid derives principally from the exi-
gencies of its geopolitical perceptions. For other small donors 
lacking these incentives, the move to multilateralism is far easier . 
While the questions of grants v . loans, and multilateral v . bila-
teral give indications of the relative importance of aid and other 
political and economic factors in shaping donors' aid programs, the 
question of the geographical distribution of aid is a litmus test 
in this regard . It is generally true that small donors tend to use 
need as a principal criterion in the distribution of their aid . 
Apart from Italy and Australia in the middle donor group, all other 
countries gave more than 60 percent of their aid to countries with 
per capita incomes of less than US$200 in 1973.18) 
The geographical distribution of Australia's aid has not been a 
subject for important discussion until quite recently . Aid to Papua 
New Guinea has always been budget support aid (although a rose by 
a variety of other names) . Until self government in Papua New Gui-
nea in 1973, this gap was calculated by Australia, then filled by 
Australian aid . For the rest the principle of regional concentra-
tion sufficed, in which Indonesia was the principal recipient fol-
lowed by Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and South Vietnam.19) Fre-
quent exceptions to this principle occurred in the shipping of large 
amounts of food grain to India, Bangladesh and occasionally Pakis-
tan, but these countries have never been seen as important foci for 
Australian aid . The principle of regional concentration was also 
applied, on a much smaller scale to the South Pacific. In the last 
year or so, the geographical distribution of Australia's aid has 
become perhaps its most vexed problem. 
The Labour government, soon after coming to power, set up the 
Australian Development Assistance Agency, to reassess Australian 
aid policy and gather in the aid functions which had previously been 
scattered among a number of government departments. Before this, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, either in collaboration or in 
17) In 1973, the multilateral proportions of ODA were 45% for Sweden, nore than 
50% for Norway and 29% for the Netherlands . OECD, r:eveloµnent Cooperation, 
1974 Review, p.215. 
18) DAC, Geographical Distribution of Official r:eveloµrent Assistance, 1975. 
19) See Table III . 
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Table III 
Geographical Distribution of Australian Bilateral Aid 
Year ended 30 June 
(A$' 000) 
---· ··-·-··· .. ··------- ----------.. .. . . .. _l ~_?.-~---·- --·--- ··· .  _;L~_Ii_ ____ __ l_9_7_5_ 
Europe 
Africa 
America 
Asia 
Middle East 
South -
Bangaldesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Other 
Far East -
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Vietnam, Rep . of 
Other 
Oceania 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
Other 
Unspecified 
Total 
5 
1,344 
65 
56,490 
83 
13,048 
5,691 
1,312 
1,688 
4,357 
42,414 
23,248 
3,418 
1,528 
3,724 
6,262 
3,834 
146,379 
1,277 
144,302 
800 
57 
204,340 
8 
2,955 
44 
58,499 
64 
20,116 
10,598 
1,358 
2,617 
5,543 
36' 911 
21,367 
2,875 
1,923 
3,119 
3,728 
3,898 
181,207 
2,629 
177' 076 
1,502 
75 
242,788 
159 
7,812 
100 
93' 710 
65 
43,886 
15,436 
10,732 
4,606 
13'112 
48,342 
22,866 
3,858 
5,114 
4,423 
5,557 
6,524 
175,847 
3,418 
168,835 
3,594 
947 
278,575 
Source: Australian Development Assistance Agency, Australian Offi-
cial Development Assistance, Financial Statistics, 1975. 
conflict with the Treasury, had controlled the major decisions, in-
cluding those of distribution . There were good practical reasons, 
as well as good political reasons, for a policy of regional con-
centration and the new body did not find these unpersuasive. How-
ever the arena of dispute was widened in bureaucratic terms and 
also in the number of issues brought to bear on the question of 
distribution in the context of a rapidly expanding volume of aid . 
First, the "needs " criterion arose, and this was given much 
point by the emergence internationally of the "most seriously af-
fected" (M . S . A. ) category of developing countries. Two kinds of 
argument, usually unsupported by hard facts, were heard: Papua New 
Guinea should not receive as great a proportion of Australia's aid , 
as it does because on grounds of need, defined usually as GNP per 
capita, it was clearly better off than the African drought-strick-
en countries or the subcontinental countries . Therefore aid to 
Papua New Guinea should at least not be increased, thereby releas-
ing resources to poorer countries . Again, i t was argued that since 
Indonesia ' s oil resources had doubled its domestic revenue and the 
economic situations of Malaysia and Thailand were clearly improv-
ing, then their aid should not grow, and funds should be diverted 
to other poorer countries . These arguments were resolved in the 
negative in 1974-5 when an additional A$40 million was found for 
NANCY VIVIANI 209 
the UN Special Fund for M. S . A. countries (including A$6 m. for Papua 
New Guinea). This year, in a time of budget stringency, it will be 
extremely difficult to increase aid to the poorest countries . 
Second, the political arguments have become more pointed . Leav-
ing aside the question of Papua New Guinea, there is now an import-
ant political discussion in the process of resolution, concerning 
the relative balance of aid as between the ASEAN countries in the 
subregion, the new Inda- China states and the subcontinental states 
of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh . 
The outcome of this argument probably depends as much on the 
assessment of Australia ' s foreign policy objectives as on the ap-
plication of reasonably consistent aid criteria . The Australian 
government has announced a commitment to "generous reconstruction 
and rehabilitation aid to Indo- China . 20) The experience so far with 
the Inda-China states of Laos and the PRG of South Vietnam is that 
these countries, like North Vietnam, are considerably more critical 
of foreign aid than previous governments, and that the process of 
coming to some kind of mutual agreement is likely to be a slow one . 
Aiding the Inda-China states will be a new kind of experience 
for Australia. The umbrella of United States bilateral aid has gone, 
and regional multilateral associations may suffer from a loss of 
United States support . Australia may have much to learn from its 
Scandinavian peers who have been operating successfully in Inda-China 
and hopefully the experience will be mutually enriching for Austra-
lia ' s aid to other countries. 
In all, the distribution of Australian aid is a response to his -
toric circumstances and present perceptions of geopolitical necessi-
ties, which happen also to satisfy the criteria of need to a great-
ter or lesser degree and the necessity for not spreading the jam too 
thinly. In this, Australian aid distribution is related in part to 
the scale of aid, but more importantly to Australia's character as a 
post-colonial power and one resident within a region of the Third 
World . Australia belongs not to the North but is anchored firmly in 
the South . It is this which differentiates Australia most markedly 
from its peers in development assistance. 
If Australia perceives itself to have little flexibility in the 
geographical distribution of its aid, it has in fact even less in the 
forms of its aid . The half of its a i d that goes to Papua New Guinea 
is of course budget support aid, and al though some Australians thought 
a major conversion from budget support aid to a large concentration 
of project aid would somewhow make Papua New Guinea less dependent 
on Australia (and allow Australia to control its aid more closely af-
ter Papua New Guinea's independence), it has become increasingly clear, 
that Papua New Guinea ' s primary needs are not for capital works with 
recurrent high maintenance costs, which would distort the whole direc-
tion of its development, but for maintenance extension and redirection 
of existing and new types of government services . This lesson of past 
aid is widely recognised in Papua New Guinea and is at last penetrat-
ing slowly in Australian thinking . 
Not only is Australia atypical of other small donors in the amount 
of budget support aid it gives deriving from its post-colonial rela-
tionship with Papua New Guinea, but it is atypical in that it is a 
significant food donor,21) albeit on a far smaller scale than the 
20) See Australian Foreign Affairs Reccrd, May 1975 . 
21) See Table IV, Bl. 
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United States or Canada. 
Australians are well aware of the problems associated with food 
aid, but as a major grain-producing and exporting country, they 
expect, and are expected to be, significant food aid donors . The 
World Food Conference drew attention to the need for reform of the 
international trading and aiding systems of food supply and distri-
bution. The system, as is well known, is a self-fulfilling disast-
rous one . Shortages of food grains in developed countries usually 
lead to major purchases on the world market followed by increases 
in the price of food grains. Developing countries with food gaps 
are unable to afford to fill these gaps at high commercial prices . 
They therefore look in part to increased food aid on concessional 
terms. Because of the increased world price, the Australian food 
aid dollar buys less wheat and Australia is unable to respond to 
the extent that it would normally wish to . Senator Wriedt, the Au-
stralian Minister for Agriculture, announced at the World Food Coun-
cil that Australia's food aid in 1975-6 would be of the order of 
305,000 tonnes. At present prices, the present allocation for food 
aid will fund less than 300,000 tonnes. Australian food aid is only 
a minute fraction of Australian grain exports. Yet it is a major 
continuing problem for Australia to devise, on its own or in concert 
with others, a system of food aid reserves which could mitigate this 
continuing problem. The experience of the recent World Food Council 
Meeting is absolutely depressing in this respect. 
A large proportion of Australia's project aid is aid associated 
with physical infrastructure - the design and construction of major 
public works . 22) This is not surprising for a number of reasons : 
it is what Australians have learnt to see as "development" within 
their own country; Australians are perceived to be successful in 
carrying out such projects and because of this and the thrust of 
prevailing development strategies, developing countries have sought 
Australian aid for these purposes . '.IWo circumstances have combined to dis-
turb the complacency with which Australians have regarded their project aid . 
The international criticism of development strategies pointed, 
in part, to an unnecessary concentration on capital works to the 
neglect of support for increasing productive assets and the more 
Table v AUSTRALIAN BILATERAL AID CONTRIBUTIONS ALLOCABLE 
BY SECTOR IN SELECTED SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 
1974-5. A$'000 
Econcrnic Develop- Agricul- Industry Trade Education Health 
Planning rrent & ture, Mining Banking 
& Public Public Fishing Construe- Other 
Adrninist. Utilities Forestry tion Services 
Indonesia 224 9, 704 2,181 9 1,296 182 
M:ilaysia 1,537 123 300 38 1,139 
Philippines 760 2, 724 94 9 225 
Thailand 1,122 1,657 26 2 921 137 
Vietnam 4,383 29 1,070 
(Rep . of) 
Source: Extracted from, Australian Develoµnent Assistance Agency, Australian De-
veloµrent Assistance Financial Statistics, 1975 
22) Table IV sets out bilateral aid allocated bv sector . These allocations in-
clude aid to Papua New Guinea. If Papua New Guinea is excluded, the prepond-
erance of developrrent of public utilities in aid, other than food aid, is ap-
parent. See Table v . 
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equitable distribution of the fruits of increased productivity . 
This has had some impact on the Australian conventional wisdom about 
projects . The second is the realisation that to attain the distri -
butive objective of Australia ' s aid policy new kinds of projects and 
programmes and a reassessment of the purposes and benefits of the 
old kind of projects is necessary . This kind of view has met resist-
ance within the aid agency itself and also from other government 
departments concerned to continue a practice that suits Australia 
admirably, in terms of control and accountability . 
Further a new emphasis on agricultural production in Australia ' s 
aid will need a new assessment of Australian skills in this area, 
and an understanding of how the bias against funding local costs and 
tying procurement to Australia can handicap such programs . 23) This 
is a fertile field for the aid administration and one which could 
change the face of Australian aid substantially . 
Administratively , the two major problems with Australian project 
aid are those of indicative planning and project size . The annual 
budget process in Australia has had the effect of inhibiting aid 
planning over several years and has led to severe unevenness of ex-
penditure and adhoccery in choice of projects . It has been realised 
that forward country programming is essential to avoid inefficienci -
es and ineffectualness for both donor and recipient, and it is to 
be hoped that the Australian Treasury will take a broader perspective 
on this issue given its importance . 
Again , one of the costs (particularly in terms of administration) 
of a small aid programme is a large number of small projects . Given 
the increase in the volume of Australian aid, it is expected that 
there will be a shift to larger programmes and projects, concentrat-
ed in regions within particular countries . 
The problems associated with these kinds of reassessment of pro-
ject aid appear to be shared by a number of countries pursuing simi-
lar kinds of strategies . The reform of the purposes of Netherlands 
and Swedish aid has not occurred without some strains . These derive 
in part from conflicting expectations from donor and recipient . They 
derive also from the search for a new development ideology which can 
bridge the chasm between the former concentration on economic growth 
and the new emphasis on distribution . 
A similar reassessment is occurring with Australian technical as-
sistance. Generally, the use of experts in conjunction with projects 
is seen to have been successful, and Australian techniques in using 
agency arrangements for this are developing well . The picture with 
the use of individual experts is less clear . This is an expensive 
process, yet one in which particular pay-offs can justify the whole 
exercise . However, while Australia has expertise in some important 
fields, for example, some particular aspects of agriculture, the 
supply of expertise in Australia for overseas assignment is becoming 
less available as the demands of the aid programme increase . This 
imposes real limits on the expansion of this type of aid. 
The more noticeable need for action is in the student training 
field. Considerable change has occurred in the shift from undergra-
duate training to short course specialised training in Australia, 
but it is proving difficult to place a greater effort in education 
23) At present Australian aid is tied in a variety of ways: food aid and techni-
cal assistance is generally tied, while procurement of goods labours under 
the 66 2/3% Australian content rule. 
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in recipient countries . Many countries in Southeast Asia still 
wish to have their students trai ned in Australia, either pr i vately 
or under government sponsorship . Some 10 , 000 of both kinds are 
presently studying at Austral i an i nsti tut ions . However, whi l e both 
Australia and the home countries recognise the problems with this 
kind of training , they have yet to devise workable arrangements for 
an upgrading of recipient country institutions . 
The most important problem in Australian aid at present and for 
the foreseeable future is that of aid to Papua New Guinea. The 
present difficulties in the aid relationship between Australia and 
Papua New Guinea derive on the one hand from the way in which the 
colonial financial and administrati ve relationship operated and on 
the other, from a failure , mainly attributable to Australia, to re-
cognise that its post-colonial role requires a radically different 
approach to aid to Papua New Guinea . 
In recent weeks24) the first major public breach between the 
Papua New Guinean and the Australian governments has appeared . Giv-
en the history of previous post-colonial relationships one should 
not be surprised that this has occurred over the question of aid 
and in particular over the question of colonial pensions . In 1974 
the Australian government promised the government of Papua New Gui-
nea A$500 million over the three years 1974/5- 1976/7 as support for 
its economic development and i t s independence . At the time of its 
announcement , this commitment was primarily political, but the Papua 
New Guinea government took away from the meet i ng the understanding 
that this sum would not include employment security scheme (ESS) 
payments for Australian public servants (totalling some A$100 milli-
on) . Australian Ministers and officials on the o t her hand believed 
firmly that these payments were included in the A$500 million . This 
issue has been a running sore in the a i d and political relationship , 
and it has erupted in the last month because of i ts impact (A$50 
million) on this year ' s aid to Papua New Guinea . The Papua New Gui -
nea government argues that the "golden handshake " is demonstrably 
not development assistance . The Australian government ' s response 
is that it i s always included in the international accounting of 
development assistance . The Papua New Guinea government argues fur -
ther that the large sum for ESS payments has distorted the level of 
other aid and that there has been a decline in other aid in real 
terms . 25) This dispute is at present at a standoff , and apart from 
its effect on the bilater al political relationship, it has serious-
ly inhibited the consideration of the framework of a long- term aid 
relationship . 
The problem of setting a level of aid to Papua New Guinea is an 
extremely difficult one given three factors : the importance of Au-
stralian aid to the budget of Papua New Guinea where it provides 
some 45 percent of revenue; its importance as a proportion of Aust-
ralian aid budget (in this year it is 55 percent of total aid) ; and 
the difficulty of finding a method of setting the figure which can 
encompass the interests of both countries . 
It would be surprising if the figure set upon in the context of 
Australian budget discussions bore a close relationship to the needs 
of Papua New Guinea in its present stituation , and it is this insti-
tutional method that leads to problems in the aid relationship . It 
will be necessary to remove this process from the Australian domes-
24) Written in August, 1975 . 
25) See Table VI . 
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Table VI 
AUSTRALIAN AID TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Grant in Aid 
Development Grant 
ASAG Salariesa 
Terminationb and retirement benefits 
Other items (not including transfer 
and sale of assets) 
Impact on Australian Budget 
Actual 
1972-3 
30 . 0 
48 . 2 
78.2 
41. 3 
2.8 
21. 0 
143 . 4 
Actual 
1973-4 
25 . 0 
52 .1 
77 . 1 
53.8 
14.1 
30.7 
175.7 
(A$ Million) 
Actual Es ti-mated 
1974-5 1975-6 
41. 2 56.0 
40 . 0 41. 3 
81. 2 97 . 3 
(ioi;;l, defence) 
51. s 53 . 0 
29.5 49 . 0 
7.2 10.7 
169.4 210.0 
Note: a Payments to Australians working in Papua New Guinea Admi-
nistration. 
b Benefits for Australians terminating employment in the 
Papua New Guinea Administration. · 
Source : Extracted from Australian Budget Statements, 1973-4 , 1974-
5, 1975-6. 
tic political arena, and to find some new arrangements, more firmly-
based, for Australian-Papua New Guinean cooperation in aid. 
Both governments have agreed that a long-term aid working group 
should be set up to work out the criteria on which the aid level 
might be based. This should be the first step in a long period of 
actual de-co lonisation. 
In this outline of the composition of Australian aid and in the 
explication of its most pressing problems , it has become clear that 
most of these problems are related only indirectly to the notion 
of scale. The major problems spring directly from Australia 's post-
colonial relationship, from its geopolitical location and from the 
previous structure of its aid programme. Scale is a factor in most 
problems, but not a preoccupation for Australian administrators. 
In fact, it is in the range of choices opened up by a rapidly ex-
panding aid programme that the problems lie - a static, small pro-
gramme offers few of these diff iculties. 
Further, this discussion has indicated that apart from some as-
pects of ideology, Australia ha s relatively little in common with 
its aid peers . There is no doubt that Australia is now more inter-
ested in the aid programmes of its European and Scandinavian col-
leagues, but the necessities of Australian aid are quite unlike 
th.ose of these other countries. It may be that in ten years or so 
when Papua New Guinea looms less large on Australia's aid horizon, 
more commonalities will become apparent, and even then Australia 
may be a large donor of quite different character. 
COMMENTS ON VIVIANI'S PAPER 
(a) GRAEME THOMPSON 
Dr. Viviani ' s paper addresses a number of current Australian aid 
issues, seen from the standpoint of the aid policy maker and admini-
strator . It is a very useful paper, carrying Dr . Krause's analysis 
a shade further because it clearly exhibits the practical political 
view of what aid is about , in the donor's own context . 
The word "donor" can be misleading. Lender, or perhaps soft lend-
er, is a more accurate representation of what most aid involves . 
However, the description fits Australia because it provides aid in 
the form of grants, not loans. This is felt to be generous, but it 
is not always an unmixed blessing . The provider of a gift expects 
some gratitude, while the recipient has very little standing in the 
aid transaction. With development loans, even if they include a 
large grant element, the borrower is incurring an obligation and 
has the right to bargain . The bargaining is often quite hard and 
the recipient ends up getting, or thinking he is getting, the aid 
he wants. 
Another point is that donors have few reservations about provid-
ing tied aid . Lenders are usually less adamant. Significantly, Dr . 
Viviani hardly mentions tied aid. I think the Australians might 
ask the recipients whether they would prefer tied loans to outright 
grants , if they have not already done so. 
There is a large emphasis in the paper on aid performance, using 
the ratio of ODA/GNP as the measure . This has not much significance 
except for Australia itself, particularly when such a large propor-
tion of its total bilateral aid is directed to Papua New Guinea. 
The same issue bulks large in New Zealand ' s debate on aid, half of 
which goes to the small South Pacific economies (The New Zealand 
ratio is currently around 0.5% of GNP and rising with 35% going to 
the agricultural sector.) The main practical effect is that a good 
aid performance by a relatively small country gives it standing in 
those forums in which the issues of international development are 
discussed. 
While Dr. Viviani's paper is strong on aggregates it is rather 
short on the discussion of the composition of aid, especially tech-
nical assistance, which is in some ways what I think countries like 
Australia and New Zealand do best . She deals with distribution is-
sues (the orientation towards agriculture, rural development and 
things for people) but in the main demostrated that the state of 
play in Canberra is behind that in some other aid-giving countries 
and in institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
I do not think that her paper does full justice to Australia's 
role in international development. Australia provides the resourc-
es for the economic development of Papua New Guinea, which in terms 
of the inner Pacific is a big country. Furthermore, it has the ca-
pacity to make a large impact wherever it decides to concentrate 
its aid . 
I was involved for a period with the Inter Governmental Group 
on Indonesia (the Aid Consultative Group) . Although Dr . Viviani 
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says that only 4% of Indonesia's aid comes from Australia, I can 
assure you that Australia was considered, by the Indonesian Govern-
ment and by the IGGI as a whole , to be a ma j or member of that group . 
One reason, perhaps, was the composition of its aid. Food aid (which 
Australia could readily provide) a nd specific types of other prog-
ramme aid, were particularly helpfu l at certain stages of the Indo-
nesian recovery. Furthermore, Aus tralian aid had a reputation for 
flexibility and good timing . Australia was responsive to urgent 
needs, and its influence was corres pondingly large . So, where it 
wants to be, Australia is in the category of a major donor . 
Let me speak very briefly about New Zealand aid because it com-
pletements some of the discussion this morning . New Zealand's aid 
programme is divided into three parts. It has very direct respon-
sibilities for certain Pacific Islands - the Cooks, Niue and the 
Tokelaus. It finances development in these Islands to the point 
of extravagance, meeting perhaps two-thirds of public expenditures 
in the Cooks, over 80% in Niue and practically the lot in the Toke-
lau Islands. Per capita incomes there remain low, b u t levels of 
living, in terms of the main welfare indicators, are rather good 
by the standards of developing countries. Those in Rarotonga, for 
example, are good enough to be viewed by some Pacific Islanders as 
models for their region . Furthermore, people in those islands have 
the opition of moving to mainland New Zealand. Many have exercis-
ed the option - over half the population of each territory now liv-
es in this country. This two-pronged approach viz. to the most one 
can to help develop small island economies, but-ret the people con-
cerned transfer to a high-income country if they so desire offers 
in my opinion a viable solution to the problem of micro-states. 
The second area of special involvement for New Zealand aid is 
the rest of the South Pacific . Here New Zealand is also a major 
donor. But its aid is probably less important than its other poli-
cies affecting the Islands . Trade, transport and tourism, invest-
ment and immigration policies are also relevant . For example, Pro-
fessor Desai showed that migrant worker's remittances from New Zea-
land to Western Samoa and Tonga are an important resource for those 
islands and could be significant for others . 
In the wider Pacific zone, New Zealand is a very small donor but 
its contribution in specific areas of technical assistance is both 
valuable and significant . The transfer of technology is a very im-
portant aspect of international aid, yet I did not find any mention 
of it in the paper under discus sion. 
In the broader context, the flow of financial resources that can 
be generated by a country of New Zealand's size, or Australia's, is 
indeed small in relation to the dimensions of international develop-
ment. Apart from their relatively small size, countries like this 
have a structural problem over capital aid. Mainly because they 
have uncompetitive industrial sectors, they find difficulties in 
transferring real resources other than food, or people . Capital 
aid is thus expensive in terms of net foreign exchange costs . As 
importers of capital, also, they find it costly to transfer funds . 
Before oil prices escalated, the industrial economies were not 
bound by the sort of balance of payments constraint which limited 
the financial aid of small donors . Now they are transferring re-
sources with a vengeance and finding it a fairly painful process, 
not least because the transfers are to developing countries with a 
balance of payments surplus. Oil-importing developing countries, 
and the small donors, are of course doing the same. 
NANCY VIVIANI 217 
In the new international environment devised by OPEC, capital 
transfers have become a different and much more urgent issue . While 
the question of commodity trade remains vital , the soluti on to new 
problems of development and external balance are l i kely to be found 
mainly on capital, not current , account , and through foreign borrow-
ing, not conventional aid - borrowing which has as its source, di -
rectly or indirectly, the surpluses generated by oil . 
This seems to me to put a new dimension on the development pro-
cess which was not noted in either the Krause or Viviani papers . 
The importance of conventional bilateral aid is diminishing - though 
still significant - and much greater stress now has to be placed on 
the capacity of developing countries to manage for themselves and 
attract a flow of resources on the open market . This seems to me 
a promising and overdue development . 
(b) GRANT REUBER 
I cannot comment on the details of Dr. Viviani's interesting 
description of Australian aid policy, about which I know little . 
Instead, I shall focus on a number of more general issues raised in 
the paper . As one who several years ago assisted in making a reap-
praisal of Canadian aid policy, I found myself meeting several old 
friends as I followed Dr . Viviani's paper from page to page . 
Before proceeding to my general remarks , I should like to raise 
one quibble about the classification of donors into two groups : 
"Large" and " Small" . I do not find this basis of classification 
very useful from an analytical standpoint. For example, although 
Canada is marked as "large" and Australia as "small", Canadian aid 
policies in my view have far more in common with Australian aid po-
licies than with those of the U. S . and Western Europe . 
Dr . Viviani, quite rightly , I believe, mnphasized that smallness, 
in so far as it plays a role at all , does so because small donors 
face a different set of constraints due to their smaller scale of 
activity. One major constraint is the lack of talent available for 
the effective planning and administration of aid - as distinct from 
the number of persons engaged in aid-giving activities, of which 
there is an abundance . Thus, the policies followed by smaller don-
ors have frequently been weak conceptually; broad concepts have not 
been converted into operating principles very effectively; and day-
to-day administration has often been unimpressive . 
These difficulties have been compounded by confusion about why 
aid is being given . Few seriously believe that the future of the 
world will be much affected by the marginal contribution made by 
any small donor to the resources available to the L.D . C.' s . For 
some aid is seen mainly as a way of subsidizing exports; for some 
it is a way of increasing the value of the country's diplomatic cal-
ling card ; for some it is essentially a humanitarian activity, in 
many ways comparable to the annual United Appeal for charitable pur -
poses; for some it is seen as a way of buying off pressure from the 
L. D. C. 's to liberalize domestic trade and immigration policies ; for 
some it is a method of recognizing national political pressures, 
(e . g . , Canadian aid to Francophone Africa); and for a few, foreign 
aid is seen as a way of hastening economic development among the 
L . D. C. Is. 
The perceived purposes of aid obviously influences the administ-
ration of aid . For example, those who emphasize export promotion 
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are more interested in contributions to the richer rather than to 
the poorer L.D . C's; exactly the opposite is emphasized by those 
focussing on humanitarian purposes. As a result of the ill-defined 
and complex purposes of aid in most small donor countries, the poli-
cies pursued in such countries have frequently been lacklustre and 
deficient from various points of view. 
The policy of concentration , referred to by Dr. Viviani, reflects 
the limited capacity of smaller donors to handle aid policies as 
well as an attempt to achieve a greater impact in a few selected 
areas . Over time such programmes have generally become less con-
centrated because of both internal and external political pressures . 
As a consequence resources tend to remain severely stretched even 
though the level of contribution increases. Furthermore, it is 
frequently discovered that by concentrating aid even a small country 
can in fact become too visible and, as a result, provoke much the 
same adverse political reaction in recipient countries as has fre-
quently been directed against the United States and other large don-
ors . 
Our obvious alternative to bilateral aid that might be employed 
to relax the constraints of size is multilateral aid . Such aid, 
however, avoids many of the parochial interests that influence bi-
lateral aid-giving . This, of course, is one of the main reasons 
why multilateral aid receives only limited support and remains small . 
Another major reason is the generally low and diminishing confidence 
most donors have in the capacity of most international agencies -
with the poss ible exception of the World Bank group - to plan and 
administer aid effectively . 
A second alternative to conventional bilateral aid is simply to 
turn over aid funds to those recipient countries to be helped, leav-
ing the planning and administration entirely in their hands . Many 
national administrations among L.D.C's now are probably as capable 
of planning and administering aid as most multinational agencies . 
Moreover, even in situations where national administrations are 
weak, one can argue that turning the resources over to the L.D . C's 
and relying entirely upon them for planning and administration will 
promote a process of "learning by doing" that in time will give rise 
to a strong administration able to manage not only foreign but also 
local resources more effective ly . One major difficulty with this 
approach is that in the short- run it can give rise to serious dif-
ficulties that might result in a serious erosion of public support 
generally for aid in donor countries. Moreover, domestic interests 
in donor countries who gain from the subsidies offered by convention-
al bilateral aid are likely to find such a policy less acceptable . 
A third alternative which conceivably might be p ursued is to de-
velop aid-giving consortia of middle-rank, like-minded donors - e.g . 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries . By 
pooling resources in this way, the constraints of size might be re-
laxed. Such consortia would, however, be feasible only if there 
were general agreement among the participants upon the scope and pur-
poses of aid-agreement which is far from evident . 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSS ION 
The paper provoked discussion on the definition and fo rms of aid. 
It was contended that loans should not be counted as aid, and that 
what mattered was the quality and form o f aid . A decline in United 
States military aid would pose no problems . The suestion was rais-
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ed whether Australia might have unused capacity for technical assist-
ance in a~id zone agriculture or agricultural technology generally. 
An Australian replied that Australia could make a good contribu-
tion in technical assistance but there were problems, particularly 
of recruitment and administration . The cost was not cheap . Admini-
stration was also difficult for project aid, both for donor and re-
cipient, and small projects could have administrative costs out of 
proportion to their size . The policy of small donors entering into 
small projects should be reconsidered . In general, the new think-
ing on aid might be limited to a few and not have penetrated far in-
to official or public consciousness. It might therefore be a tempo-
rary phase, not without some long term influence . A Thai partici -
pant felt that consideration should be given to using more people 
from the recipient countries in aid projects, as this would ease 
problems of administration and probably give better results . 
The possibility was also raised of negotiating international cod-
es of behaviour for investment overseas on a bilateral or regional 
basis (e.g . possible N. Z. involvement with a shipping line in the 
Pacific} . A politically accountable watchdog organisation concern-
ed with investment in the South Pacific might be helpful. 
Other questions were asked about the goals of aid in Papua New 
Guinea . In reply , it was pointed out that aid spending in Papua 
New Guinea had risen as administration extended to more difficult 
terrain and independence approached . The new government wanted pri-
ority given to maintaining the services already on the ground . This 
had led to some conflict with Canberra where there were pressures 
to shift assistance to Papua New Guinea in the direction of project 
aid . Papua New Guinea had been trying to convince Australia of the 
need to maintain aid in its present form until there had been time 
to develop its national resources . 
Summing up, Dr . Viviani said that Australia had been handicapped 
by lack of knowledge about experience of other decolonising countri-
es. There had also been bureaucratic conflict within Canberra . 
Grants were preferred to loans, but this did not deprive the reci -
pient of bargaining power. There was a flexible rule on tied aid 
that there must be a 2/3 Australian content . There were physical 
limits on the availability of technical assistance, and on training 
facilities within Australia. Financing part of a project along with 
a multilateral organisation provided a chance to spread overhead 
costs in large projects. 
10 
FOREIGN AID AND INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT 
ADRIANUS Moov 
Introduction 
Before 19£6, foreign aid had contributed little to Indonesian 
economic development. This was partly due to the type and terms 
of aid received, but mainly to policies of the Government which 
had grossly negelected economic considerations in favour of purely 
political motives . Despite the sizeable amount of aid received, 
the Indonesian economy deteriorated progressively, particularly 
during the first half of the 1960's . 
Political upheavals were also frequent during this period, cli-
maxing in the abortive coup d'etat attempted by leftist elements 
in late 1965. When the new Government took over in 1966, the eco-
nomy was beset by a huge budgetary deficit, runaway inflation, bal-
ance of payments crisis, accumulating foreign debt repayment obli-
gations, and little real growth . The economic system which had 
developed in the late fifties and early sixties had excessive gov-
ernment interference and control . Foreign aid which came in this 
context had impeded rather than assisted economic development. 
The new economic policy adopted in 1966 placed stabilization and 
rehabilitation at the top of national priorities. A set of measur-
es was introduced in October 1966 aimed not only at overcoming the 
financial and economic crisis but also at the reorganization of the 
economic system. The immediate concerns were to halt the runaway 
inflation as soon as possible and to get the economy running again 
after years of stagnation and neglect. Under the new rules, a much 
larger role was given to free market forces . 
The inflation was brought under control with remarkable speed. 
This enabled the Government to undertake a more serious programme 
of .economic rehabilitation and development. The First Five Year 
Development Plan was launched on April 1, 1969. This Plan, more 
popularly known as REPELITA I, was basically a public investment 
programme with two objectives: first , to emphasize agricultural re-
habilitation and development and second to rehabilitate the infra-
structure, particularly the part connected with agricultural pro-
duction and the marketing of its output. 
Considerable progress was made during the First Plan period with 
respect to both growth and stability. With these achievements, In-
donesia started its Second Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA II) 
on April 1, 1974 with the much broader objectives of accelerated 
economic and social development and a more equitable distribution 
of development gains among all sections of the community. By nece-
ssity, the task of the First Plan dealt with the urgent needs of 
national stabilization, rehabilitation, and early stages of develop-
ment . It was fully recognized that constraints on available resourc-
es necessitated inadequate attention to other urgent problems such 
as employment, equitable distribution of income, balanced regional 
growth, education and health. The accomplishment of the First Plan, 
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however, laid a strong foundation which enabled the Second Plan to 
focus on not only further general economic growth but also social 
and regional problems and to set the order of priorities according-
ly . 
On the external front, it was recognized that the internal rreasur-
es introduced in 1966 had to be supported from abroad, on the one hand 
by postponing international debt repayments, on the other by secur-
ing new capital . Decreasing exports and very low national savings 
made foreign debt repayments an impossibility . In addition, there was 
an extreme shortage of essential goods, raw materials, spare parts , 
etc . Additional foreign financing was required to achieve stabili-
zation and start rehabilitation within a reasonably short time . 
Confidence in the new Government economic policy began to at-
tract foreign capital in the form of both official aid and private 
foreign investment. A group of donor countries met in February 
1967 and formed the so- called Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
(IGGI) . It has been an informal group which has served since then 
as a forum for raising and coordinating international assistance 
to Indonesia . Through IGGI, Indonesia has been assured of additio-
nal funds to overcome deficiencies in foreign exchange, domestic 
savings, project formulation and implementation, and human skills 
and technology . In this way, foreign aid provided within the . frame -
work of IGGI has played an important role in the stabilization and 
development of the Indonesian economy. It is expected to continue 
to contribute importantly to Indonesia's efforts to accelerate eco-
nomic and social development under the Second Plan, although provid-
ing a smaller proportion of total investment . It has always been 
recognized that development has to be based increasingly on domes-
tic capacity and capabilities, and that foreign aid is an important 
supplement but in no way a substitute for domestic efforts . There-
fore, Indonesia's own savings effort has steadily been stepped up . 
Since 1973 , the rise in oil prices has increased domestic savings 
markedly . 
In this p aper we will try to identify the main features of Indo-
nesia's stabilization and development policies since 1966 which 
have been the basis fer the achievements made so far . These are 
then related to the foreign aid received during the period . We 
will also discuss some aspects of aid provided with respect to 
amount, type, terms and conditions , and other relevant factors and 
how they fitted into and met the changing requirements of Indone-
sia's stabilization and development . 
In this paper, discussion will be confined to official aid pro-
vided within the framework of IGGI . This corresponds closely to 
the DAC definition of Official Development Assistance provided by 
foreign governments and international institutions, under conces-
sionary and semi-concessionary terms, for the promotion of economic 
development and welfare . Technical assistance will not be included 
directly, since reliable and unambiguous estimates for this type of 
assistance are not yet available. 
Economic situation up to 1966 
During the period preceding 1966, a series of attempts had been 
made, with no success, to achieve greater economic stability, reha-
bilitation and development. In fact, economic decline and stagna-
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tion had started as early as the 1930's, when Indonesia's major 
exports crumbled because of the Great Depression . Over the years, 
Indonesia lost its position as a major exporter of sugar, copra, 
tea, and rubber . 
Aside from the Great Depression and the Second World War , the 
most dramatic event had been the hyperinflation of 1963-1966. 
This started out as a creeping inflation in the 1950's, but gra-
dually picked up speed, reaching its peak in 1966 when the cost 
of living index in Jakarta rose by more than 635 percent . This 
rampant inflation brought industrial production to a halt, deplet-
ed infrastructure, and drastically reduced normal trade . 
Although no adequate statistics are available to evaluate the 
economic performance of the 1950 ' s, economic growth was roughly 
estimated at a moderate annual rate of 3.7 percent, mostly due to 
investment and growth in import substituting industries during 
1955-1958 . The year 1958 was a turning point for the worse in In-
done sian economic affairs due to rebellion in Sumatra and the ex-
pulsion of the Dutch over the West Irian controversy . The growth 
rate declined throughout the early part of 1960's averaging only 
about 2 . 5 percent per annum during the period 1960-1966 . 
State interference with economic life was substantial during 
the early 1960 ' s, partly as a reflection of ideological convictions 
and partly because of the necessity to secure large funds to carry 
out the political programmes through direct control of the slowly 
growing economy. Under the slogan of "guided economy", the Govern-
ment increasingly interfered with the normal workings of market 
forces t h rough a system of rationing and price control and alloca-
tions of scarce foreign exchange . 
Facing increasing expenditures, but unable to raise adequate 
revenues, the government budget ran huge and increasing deficits . 
Since these budgetdeficitswere financed by Central Bank advances, 
they were the immediate cause of the increase in the money supply, 
and the major cause of the inflation. 
On the external front, exports were discouraged because of in-
flation, artificially low fixing of prices of many commodities, 
and unrealistic foreign exchange rates . Imports on the other hand 
showed a strong tendency to expand, partly because of the general 
increase after the war and partly because of rising domestic pric-
e~ and fixed exchange rates. With continuous deficits in the net 
services account, the balance of payments was in -chronic deficit . 
Indonesia's net foreign exchange reserves, which had accumulated 
during the Korean War, dwindled rapidly . They were practically 
exhausted in 1964, and became negative in 1965 . 
Since export earnings were low, part of imports had to be fin-
anced by credits, particularly short-term trade credits and foreign 
aid . By June 30, 1966, Indonesia's foreign debt amounted to about 
US$2.l billion. More than 40 percent of this debt was owed to the 
Communist countries because of the credits previously extended for 
the purchase of military goods. While the magnitude of the debt 
was not overwhelming, the terms on which it was incurred, includ-
ing the speed of amortization, made it very onerous. 
The emergency period of 1966-1968 
In October 1966, the new Government introduced a set of measur-
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es aimed at overcoming the financial and economic crisis and reor-
ganizing the economic system. The immediate concern was to combat 
inflation. These measures were preceded by fiscal action at the 
beginning of September 1966 consisting of a tax intensification 
programme and austerity measures which formed the basis for an 
overall balanced budget policy. In the monetary field, a restric-
tive but selective credit policy was pursued, the bulk of new bank 
credits being directed to financing exports and various productive 
sectors of the economy. 
Aside from the measures to put in order the financial manage-
ment of the State, steps were also undertaken to correct the dis-
torted price structure caused by the prolonged inflation. A gene-
ral policy of decontrol was adopted. A much larger role was given 
to free market forces and private initiative. The old slogan of 
"guided democracy" was replaced by "economic democracy". The sys-
tem of price controls and its accompanying quota and license sys-
tem were dismantled. Most state enterprises were allowed to ad-
just their selling pricP.s, previously fixed by the State, in ac-
cordance with their productive costs. Most subsidies on imported 
goods were abolished or limited to only essential items. Interest 
rates for loa n s from Government banks were also adjusted upwards 
to approach the real rate in the free market. 
In the field of international trade, import and export procedur-
es were simplified and clarified. A new foreign exchange system 
known as the BE (Bonus Export) system was introduced. The obiect-
ive was to improve the balance of payments by stimulating ex-
ports. Through the BE system, a greater share for exporters was 
secured and direct interference in foreign trade was lessened. Im-
port licensing was abolished and the new system was used to limit 
total imports to the amount of foreign exchange available as well 
as to ensure that the limited amount of foreign exchange was used 
to the maximum extent possible for the improvement of the economy. 
This BE system played a big role in the foreign assistance efforts 
of the IGGI countries during the stabilization period. 
Since the main source of foreign exchange was exports, exporters 
were required to hand in their foreign exchange proceeds, which 
were calculated by multiplying the quantities exported with a 
"check-price". In return they received BE certificates for acer-
tain portion of these surrendered proceeds depending on the nature 
of goods exported. BE certificates were made freely negotiable for 
a price in rupiah which was determined by supply and demand. Thus 
the foreign exchange rate, or specifically the BE certificate rate, 
was floated . Importers could purchase the BE certificates to im-
port goods included in an approved list of commodities. Aid and 
credits received by the Government were also sold under the name 
of Credit BE. Aside from these two markets there was also the DP 
(Devisa Pelengkap) or Supplementary Foreign Exchange market. Here, 
supplementary exchange could be obtained from proceeds arising from 
the "check-price" being officially established somewhat below the 
actual international market price. The DP exchange was meant to 
provide an additional incentive to exporter s. It was less restric-
tive than the BE exchange because it could be used to import serv-
ices and a wider range of goods than were included in the BE list. 
In order to control the type and the financing of imports, import 
items were divided into various lists according to their essentiali-
ty and tariff rates adjustments were made accordingly. 
Since 1966 the BE system has been modified and simplified seve-
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ral times as the foreign exchange situation has improved. In April 
1970, the "overprice" system was abolished and the DP and BE mar-
kets were merged into a General Foreign Exchange market except for 
the sales of aid funds . Later, the Credit or Aid Foreign Exchange 
was also integrated into the General Foreign Exchange . The multi-
ple exchange rate structure was, thus, gradually simplified, and 
Indonesia finally adopted a unified exchange rate system in Decem-
ber 1970 . 
Finally, as part of the stabilization programme, steps were tak-
en to reschedule the debts incurred during the previous regime, to 
attract private foreign capital to help exploit natural resources, 
and to seek foreign assistance to support the balance of payments . 
Paris Club and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
When the internal stabilization measures were taken in 1966, it 
was realized that, to be successful, those measures had to be sup-
ported from abroad; on the one hand, by rescheduling international 
debt repayments and, on the other hand, by obtaining new capital 
in the form of foreign official aid as well as foreign private in-
vestment . 
In 1966, the Government of Indonesia suggested discussion with 
its creditors about arrears in debt repayments and the heavy pay-
ments due in the near future . It soon appeared preferable to have 
the discussion and negotiation of the t e rms of a possible debt re-
scheduling in a multilate ral forum to avoid discrimination among 
the creditors . The first meeting with the western creditors was 
called by the Japanese Government and held in Tokyo in Sep tember 
1966 . Bilateral agreements were later conclude d with eastern coun-
tries resulting in the rescheduling of all debts to thes e countri-
es . Although the subject of the Tokyo meeting w&s the need of In-
do nes i a f or balance of payments support, including rescheduling of 
foreign debts, the meeting decided to separate the debt discussions 
from the aid d iscussions, giving priority to the former . The se-
cond creditors' meeting was held in Pari s in December 1966, when 
it was agreed to reschedule Indonesia's debts contracted before 
July 1966 and falling due in 1966 and 1967 . Subsequent debt meet-
ings were he l d annually in the "Paris Club", chaired by France , to 
discuss the rescheduling of debt repayments falling due in the fol-
lowing y e ar . By 1968, it was felt that this year to year approach 
was too costly and created too much uncertainty . The German bank-
er, Dr . Herman Abs, was asked to work out a long term solution. 
At the beginning of 1970, the Paris Club accepted Abs' recommenda-
tions for a long term solution of all outstanding debts as of July 
1, 1966 . The repayment of the principal of US$1 . 7 billion was 
spread out over 30 years beginning in 1971 . No moratorium interest 
was to be charged for the the rescheduling . The loan interest of 
US$0 . 4 billion was to be repaid within 15 years after 1985 . A por-
tion of the first 8 years' debt repayment could be rescheduled to 
the last 8 years of the 30-year period. 
The Tokyo meeting in September 1966 did not succeed in obtaining 
new aid for Indonesia. In October 1966, the Government of Indone~ 
sia made known its stabilization measures and after the Paris Club 
meeting in December of that year, the Government of the Netherlands 
offered to invite all donor countries willing to assist Indonesia 
to a conference to be held in Amsterdam in February 1967 . At this 
meeting, it was estimated that Indonesia's need for direct balance 
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of payments support in 1967 amounted to US$200 million. This first 
meeting in Amsterdam was called the Inter-Governmental Group on In-
donesia (IGGI). Since then, the IGGI has conducted a series of 
meetings to discuss Indonesia's economic plans, to estimate aid re-
quirements and to formulate policies of assistance to Indonesia. 
The Group is informal . It meets twice a year, in December to dis-
cuss the Indonesian economic situation, its plans and its foreign 
aid requirements for the following fiscal year, and in April to 
consider actual aid commitments and plans announced. In 1974 there 
was only one meeting in April . 
Aid has not been aimed solely at the support of Indonesia's eco-
nomic programme . Each donor country has its own aid policy based 
on its experience, its views and its own national self-interest. 
Indonesia, like other developing countries, has therefore been con-
fronted with the problem of how to adapt the different forms of 
aid to its particular situation - hence the need for an internatio-
nal coordination of aid . For Indonesia, IGGI has been an extreme-
ly useful forum : 
1 . To review Indonesia's performance and needs, 
2. To discuss economic and financial policies, and 
3 . To get donors to pledge amounts of project and programme aid to 
meet the needs . 
Aid during the stabilization period 
Aid to Indonesia has been in the form of both programme aid and 
project aid . Programme aid has not been restricted to imports of 
commodities tied to a specific project designated in advance. Pro-
ject aid is restricted to such projects . Programme aid consists 
of Aid BE, now called Credit Foreign Exchange, and food aid . Both 
are sold through the market mechanism and generate counterpart ru-
piah funds for the budget . Project aid is used to finance import-
ed goods for specific projects and does not generate counterpart 
funds. 
Indonesia's total aid request for 1967 amounted to US$200 milli-
on, all consisting of programme aid . Total commitments amounted 
to US$167 million . Of this, US$23 mi llion consisted of food, but 
there was a carryover of about US$38 million from bilateral assist-
ance committed in 1968 . Thus, altogether, total aid available was 
a little over the requested amount . No project aid was requested, 
partly because no prepared projects were available and partly be-
cause programme aid was considered the best and quickest way to 
support the stabilization programme. 
The process of negotiations took much time, and aid disburse-
ments during the first part of 1967 were very low, partly because 
of the hesitation of the donor countries in accepting the new for-
eign exchange system, whil e Indonesia proposed that foreign aid 
should be integrated into the foreign exchange market . This meant 
that the use of funds for imports would not be decided by bilateral 
negotiations with the donor countries, but by the Indonesian market . 
The Indonesian delegation finally convinced the donor countries of 
the necessity of the new system as the quickest way to disburse aid 
and therefore the best way to support the stabilization programme . 
For 1968, the Indonesian aid request amounted to US$325 million, 
consisting of US$250 million programme aid and US$75 million pro-
ject aid but there was a delay in aid commitments. The expectation 
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of a bad second rice crop in late 1967 caused speculative rice 
price increases . This again generated uncertainty among the donor 
countries about the soundness of the stabilization programme. But 
when the crisis was brought under control, total commitments for 
1968 reached US$292 million in programme aid, (including US$103 
million for food) and US$71 million in project aid. 
By the end of 1968, the stabilization policy had taken hold. 
The inflation rate was brought down from 635 percent in 1966 to 
113 percent in 1967 and 85 percent in 1968. Exports also increas-
ed from around US$475 million in 1966 to about US$872 million in 
1968. In 1967, part of the government routine budget was still 
financed by foreign aid, but in 1968 all the proceeds from foreign 
aid were utilized for the development budget . Total money supply 
which had increased by 770 percent in 1966, increased by 130 per-
cent in 1967 and by 121 percent in 1968. There were still three 
factors that posed a threat to stability. First, gross foreign ex-
change reserves were still low and net reserves were negative . Se-
cond, foreign debts were still rescheduled annually. And third, 
rice production remained below rice consumption. 
Amount and composition of aid in development 
Since 1967, the amount of aid to Indonesia through IGGI has been 
growing and the composition has been changing. This development 
goes hand in hand with Indonesia's requirements for stabilization 
and development. 
When stabilization took hold in 1968 many of the donors seemed 
inclined to reduce the programme aid progressively. But after a 
long debate, it was accepted that programme aid should be continu-
ed, since it was needed both to provide imports for the development 
of the private sector and to generate counterparts for the develop-
ment budget of the public sector. 
Food aid was an important part of programme aid. The serious 
drought in 1967 affected rice production and the general cost of 
living index went up . Therefore, in the aid request of 1968, which 
amounted to US$325 mil lion, in addition to the general commodity 
aid, food aid was a l so added to obtain required wheat, flour, bul-
gur , and rice imports. Food aid has provided additions to domestic 
rice production and hence dampened price fluctuations. On the oth-
er hand, food aid is al so a form of programme aid, not tied to a 
specific project although consisting of specific commodities. It, 
therefore, diminishes the need to import food out of free foreign 
exchange. It is also sold in the foreign exchange market and gene-
rates counterpart rupiah to finance the Government development bu-
dget. Beginning in the fiscal year of 1969/70, food aid was iden-
tified as a separate category of aid to Indonesia. 
While stabilization efforts were in full swing, efforts were al-
so gradually moving toward the direction of rehabilitation and de-
velopment particular ly after 1969/70. In this framework, project 
aid moved into the foreground. From US$71 million committed in 
1968, it has been increasing every year in line with Indonesia's 
increasing effort of rehabj. litation and development. 
In the initial stages of 1968, project aid was used for rehabi-
litation of projects. Gradually, however, it moved toward expans-
ion and development of new projects. The growth of project aid re-
flected Indonesia's st~p into its First Five Year Plan in 1969. 
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It is now in the second year of the implementation of its Second 
Plan . If during the stabilization period the programme aid became 
an integral part of the stabilization programme, during the deve-
lopment period project aid became firmly integrated into the deve-
lopment plans . This means that the type, nature, and priority of 
the projects -were determined by the Indonesian Government forming 
a part of the annual programme in line with the priorities and ob-
jects delineated in the annual plans . Proposals for projects suit-
able for foreign aid financing were assembl e d in an annual project 
aid list and submitted to the December IGGI meeting . Aid commit-
ments generally followed the projects in the list . 
The Planning Agency (Bappenas), with the Departments, has been 
responsible for the pr eparation of the project list. The project 
aid programme has been based on the foreign exchange cost of pro-
jects although it has, in some cases, also covered some local costs . 
The development budget has accordingly allocated rupiah funds for 
the development projects and programmes covering the local cost of 
projects financed by fo~eign aid. The project aid programme has 
been a part of the development budget in that the rupiah fund re-
quired to cover the local cost of aided projects hav e been a regu-
lar part of the budget . 
With the growth and the increasing role of project aid in Indo-
nesia's development, Indonesia is also assited by the IMF and by 
the World Bank, which set up a permanent mission in Indonesia in 
late 1968. 
Total international payments have increased during the past 
eight years, mainly be cause of the increase in imports which accom-
p a nied increasing economic activity . The total volume of aid also 
increased but its role in f i nancing import payments (See Appendix 
Ta~le 1) has declined . While in 1968 foreign aid still constitut-
ed about 22 percent of total payments, its share had declined to 
only 6.9 perce nt by 19 74/75 . The role of aid as a source of sav-
ings to finance the d evelopmen t programme has also declined. 
The composition of aid has also changed . Total IGGI commitments 
increased from about US$363 million in 1968 to about US$956 million 
in t he fiscal year of 1974/75 . The percentag e share of project aid 
in the total increase d from 20 percent to about 81 percent in 1974/ 
75. 
Building up of public investment programmes required careful 
identification and selection of projects . The capacity of the Gov-
ernment organization to prepare economically sound projects and 
programme had been eroded during the long years of inflation. The 
need for technical assistance therefore grew with the growing in-
vestment and project aid prog ramme. Thus in addition to the offi-
cial aid programme there was also the technical assistance program-
me. Initially, the technical assistance programme was concentrat-
ed more in the fields of fellowships, library programmes, and those 
activities closely related to the transfer of skill and knowledge 
proper. Gradually its purpose became broader and was integrated 
with the development plan. The technical assistance programme now 
provides skills and equipment which are geared to meet the need for 
surveys and feasibility studies, to develop projects, do project 
designs, etc. A technical assistance list has also been prepared 
every year. In order to keep the project assistance in line with 
the development priorities, there has been further integration of 
the development budget, the project aid list and the technical as-
sistance list . 
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Terms and Conditions of Aid 
While the volume and composition of aid are important in Indone-
sia's development effort, the terms of aid are no less important. 
Indonesia received part of the IGGI aid in the form of grants, but 
in many cases aid was given as a loa_'n and must be repaid in ac-
cordance with the terms of the loan . 
Given the old debt settlement scheme it was recognized that new 
debt should not be made without regard to Indonesia's economic re-
payment capabilities. The new debt should be made with proper terms 
that did not burden the economy too heavily in the future, given the 
prospective growth of exports . 
In general, I ndonesia has received loans on the so-called DAC 
terms, i . e . 30 years for repayment with 10 years grace, at the rate 
of interest of 2 percent per annum . In several cases, Indonesia 
obtained much more favourable terms from the creditor countries, 
such as complete grants from Australia or the Netherlands for com-
modity aid . The United States, while making no grants in total 
commitments, accorded very soft terms on all types of aid namely 
40 years maturity, 10 years grace, with interest at 2 percent dur-
ing the period of grace and 3 percent during the repayment period . 
Up to 1974, ADB and IDA charged interest, or the equivalent, at 2 . 5 
percent and 0 . 75 percent respectively . ADB loans had 25 years amor -
tization and 7 years grace period. IDA credits were for 50 years 
maturity with 10 years grace and 10 years reduced amortization pay-
ments. These terms have been helpful in allowing aid funds to pro-
duce significant results, and in nursing the economy into higher 
growth . 
In various instances, the Indonesian Government passed along 
soft loans to recipients such as state enterprises on much harder 
terms . The logic behind this was to impose a realistic cost struc-
ture on the enterprise, but without involving the country in a sup-
plier ' s credit arrangement on hard terms . 
Both budget performance and the balance of payments position im-
proved in 1974/75 owing to a substantial increase in oil prices as 
well as significant but smaller increases in the prices of other 
export commodities . Fiscal revenues increased , and the deficit in 
the current account of the balance of payments became smaller than 
previously . This strengthening of the balance of payments position 
enabled Indonesia to look for semi-concessionary funds beyond what 
is commonly referred to as Official Development Assistance . By semi-
concessionary terms we mean those with a repayment period of around 
10 to 20 years, including a grace period of around 2 to 5 years, and 
bearing interest of between 4 and 8 . 5 percent . Thus, beginning in 
1974/75, some of the World Bank ' s loans were obtained with a 15 to 20 
year repayment period, at a rate of interest between 7 .25 and 8 . 5 per 
cent a year . Some of the ADB loans were also obtained from ordinary 
funds carrying an interest rate of 8. 25 percent and a repyarrent period of 
20 years . Indonesia also began to look for a mixture of semi-=nces-
sionary and commercial loans, under export credit facilities frcm Unit-
ed States, Netherlands, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and 
France, to finance telecommunications, electricity , irrigation, roads, 
bridges, and other priority projects. Efforts were also directed to-
ward East-European and Middle-Eastern countries . The problem of debt repaynent , 
however, is a constraint that is constantly borne in mind in arriving at an ap-
proximate mix of concessionary, semi- concessionary and other types of capital. 
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In addition to the softness of the terms of the loan, the untied 
nature of the loan is also important . In most cases, aid must be 
used for imports from a specific aid giving country, for financing 
specific projects or the foreign exchange component of those projects . 
Such an arrangement, without the possibilitv of world wide competi-
tive bidding, may lead towards higher costs-of projects and, thus, 
lower the real value of aid . Untied aid would also benefit the de-
veloping countries if aid from a donor country to Indonesia, for ex-
ample, could be used for imports from another developing country . 
The desirability of untying aid has been brought up at the IGGI 
meetings . So far there are about five project aid donors to Indone-
sia - ADB , World Bank, Germany, Japan and the United States - that 
provide assistance in greater or less degreee on a basis which per-
mits suppliers in low income countries to compete . 
Utilization of Aid 
Disbursement of programme aid takes place more rapidly than that 
of project aid . Of the total aid committed in the 1968-1974/75 peri-
od, more than 88 percent of the programme aid has been disbursed. 
In the case of project aid , only about 39 percent had been disbursed 
by the end of March 1975 . 
The terms of aid and the contribution of aid to development are 
affected by the rate of disbursement . It is therefore important for 
both the recipient country and the donor to strive to accelerate the 
utilization of aid, particularly project aid . Since the rate of uti-
lization depends on the process of project identification and prepa-
ration, as well as the implementation and procedures, steps have been 
continuously undertaken to improve each of these elements . Although 
the size and scope of programmes are significantly expanding, Indone-
sict' s implementation performance has also been steadily improving . 
A recent internal review indicates that the rate of growth of loan 
agreements, contracts, letters of credit, and disbursements has gene-
rally surpassed the rate of increase in general commitments . This 
means that, while undisbursed funds have naturally grown in absolute 
amounts, they have increased at a declining rate through the past 
three financial years . The Government has been reviewing procedural 
and other steps that would further improve project aid and financial 
utilization . As part of this programme , it is reviewing methods to 
expedite the processes of project preparation, approving contracts, 
and project procedures, since these factors seem to be the critical 
elements in terms of timing of project implementation . 
Aid and Domestic Resource Mobilization 
Indonesia is now in its ninth year of receiving aid under the new 
Government . The last eight years have shown an increase in aid vo -
lume and a broadening of the composition of aid with terms that suit 
Indonesia's repayment capacity . Foreign aid has formed an integral 
part of the Indonesian stabilization and development efforts . This 
does not mean that aid has no shortcomings or disadvantages. Apart 
from the technical problem of tied aid, it may also be argued that 
aid can affect a country's freedom of political and economic deci-
sion making . As such obtaining aid invites risk . 
Realizing this, the problem is how to maximize the positive while 
minimizing the negative aspects of aid, either technical or politi -
cal . Indonesian experience so far has been generally favourable. 
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The essential reason for this has been that Indonesia's own resourc-
es, plus the amount of foreign assistance, have generally been ade-
quate and in accordance with the objectives of the Indonesian Gov-
ernment . While the volume of aid was increasing, efforts were also 
undertaken to step up domestic resource mobilization . Various sav-
ings schemes were introduced after 1968, and several measures were 
introduced during the past eight years to increase government reve-
nues. Domestic sav ings, both public and private, have thus been 
increasing to finance an increasing proportion of the development 
programme . No adequate data are available to compare domestic sav-
ings with total investment, but looking at the governmental develop-
ment budget one sees that public savings have been f inancinq an in-
creasing proportion of the public sector development programme. 
In 1967 foreign aid was still used to finance government routine 
expenditures but in 1969/70, the first year of the First Five Year 
Plan, the Government managed to finance 23 percent of the develop-
ment budget from public savings . Five years later in 1974/75, the 
first year of the Second Five Year Plan, public savings financed 
about 75 percent of the development budget. 
The above review indicates that, while foreign aid has served 
as an important source of technical and financial assistance in In-
donesian development over the post-1966 period, it has been used as 
an important supplement to national efforts and plans, and as a pro-
grammed part of them. This has been due to the planning efforts of 
the Government and to the cooperation of the IGGI and the donors. 
Overall Review and the Future Outlook 
The above review of the role of foreign aid in Indonesian deve-
lopment since 1966 suggests that it has served three important func-
tions. 
First, it has helped increase resources and flexibility. Initi -
ally, when domestic finance and exports were extremely limited, it 
allowed investment and basic consumption to increase and enabled 
domestic efforts in stabilization, rehabilitation and development 
to change the overall picture from one of inflation and stagnation 
to one of stability and growth. Then as domestic revenues, savings 
and exports expanded, programme aid - at the margin - allowed domes -
tic investment to increase faster than domestic savings and tax re-
venues would have permitted. However, the emphasis of aid - follow-
ing Government direction - shifted increasingly toward pro j ect aid . 
Project aid centred upon reconstruction and, then, further develop-
ment of capacities in agricultural estates, irrigation, transporta-
tion and communications, power and other infra-structure . More re-
cently, the emphasis has been on fertilizer capacity, ports, ship-
ping, mining and industry . And with Government aiming in Repelita 
II at social and regional development, more and more emphasis on 
project aid and technical assistance is being programmed and commit-
ted in these fields. 
Secondly, the process of aid has provided experience in techni-
cal project formulation and analysis, preparation, contracting, ten-
dering and implementation. While again there hav e been problems in 
some of these aspects, Indonesians are playing a larger role in aid-
ed projects and a determining position in new projects for semi-con-
cessionary financing. 
Lastly, with Indonesia's own resources increasing in 1975 large-
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ly as a result of the increase in prices and quantities of oil and 
other exports , IGGI has recognised that Indonesia's pace of deve-
lopment must be sustained and possibly accelerated to meet its needs 
for investment, employment and social and regional development . 
Thus at the 17th IGGI meeting in Amsterdam last May, there was an 
understanding that ODA assistance would continue and possibly ex-
pand, and that Indonesia should seek additional semi-concessionary 
and mixed commercial credits . 
These three elements have meant that in general aid has beengear-
ed to and has adapated to meet Indonesia's changing development re-
quirements over the past nine years and promises to continue to do 
so in the future . 
A word is needed regarding the future . At the last IGGI meeting , 
a review of Indonesian external financing requirements for future 
growth indicated that a larger amount of foreign capital inflow for 
the public sector was needed . It was estimated that an amount of 
about US$2 billion is needed for 1975/76 . 
Recent balance of payments developments indicate that, as a re-
sult of the recession and slow recovery in the world economy , the 
volumes and prices of timber, rubber , tin and almost all other ma-
jor export commodities have fallen while prices of most of Indone-
sia ' s imports have continued to rise . Oil exports and production, 
which contribute about 60 percent of both total exports and govern-
ment revenues have declined . These developments have led to a fall 
in Indonesia ' s net foreign exchange assets. Thus while development 
demands continue to increase , the resource situation - both foreign 
and domestic - has grown much tighter . And while Indonesia is ex-
panding its semi-concessionary borrowing , there are limits to non-
ODA foreign financing since higher interest rates and shorter grace 
anj maturity periods involve much harder terms and conditions for 
this financing . The Government is assessing this situation, along 
with its programmes for further raising domestic resources and ex-
ports. These uncertainties mean that the level, flexibility and 
terms and conditions of ODA assistance remain important at the mar-
gin, even though the Government's own resource capabilities have in-
creased. 
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COMMENTS ON MOOY'S PAPER 
(a) SABURO 0KITA 
My first visit to Indonesia was in 1955 to attend the First Asi-
an African Conference held in Bandung and my second visit was in 
1962 with ECAFE's mission on regional cooperation . I have visited 
Indonesia several times since 1966 . Because of this experience I 
can compare Indonesia of pre- and post-1966 . In 1962 I stayed at 
the Hotel Des Indes in Jakarta. In the toilet there was just one 
shabby towel and the eclectric light was as dark as candle light. 
I felt this was really an economy of disinvestment. As I have ob-
served the stage of rehabilitation and development since that time 
I feel the case of recent Indonesia was a successful one. Rice 
production, for exmaple, increased from 8.3 million tons in 1965 
to 14.0 million tons in 1974. Capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP increased from 8% in 1965 to 15% in 1972. Those are remark-
able improvements in a relatively short span of time. 
When I visited Jakarta in 1968 President Suharto told me that 
his government would concentrate on economic issues and the priori -
ty policy areas were: 
i) to stop inflation, 
ii) to increase rice production, 
iii) to repair infrastructure such as road, railways and irriga-
tion, and 
iv) to promote export trade. 
I felt the President's idea was most relevant for an economy of dis-
investment. As the economy recovered policy priorities have natur-
ally shifted to broader areas. 
Concerning Japanese aid to Indonesia, the terms of lending had 
been gradually softened and in 1973 and 1974 government to govern-
ment loans were mostly on the basis of 2 . 75% interest rate, 10 year 
grace and 30 year repayment period. Recently the terms of lending 
were slightly hardened to 3% interest rate due to the increased oil 
revenue of Indonesia. The volume of aid from Japan to Indonesia is 
also increasing and the principle of the IGGI to have "one third 
each from Japan, the United States and Western Europe" has more or 
less been maintained, though for the latest commitment Japan's share 
is greater than one third. Out of the total lending during the 1974 
fiscal year of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund nearly 45% was 
directed to Indonesia as this lending included the oil and natural 
gas projects which are outside the IGGI arrangement. Most loans 
from Japan to Indonesia are LDC-untied, that is the money can be 
spent either for local bidders, or for bidders from other develop-
ing countries and Japan . It can be said that when the national in-
terests of both the donor and the recipient coincide the volume of 
aid tends to expand. Such a relationship exists in the case of Jap-
an and Indonesia. 
Concerning the types of aid project, the Indonesian Planning Ag-
ency seems to give preference to concrete projects such as fertiliz-
er factories, dams, power stations, etc. while leaving projects for 
social development in the hands of the government. This is partly 
due to the difficulty of preparing projects of social development 
type suitable for foreign loans . 
It is sometimes said that the big projects undertaken with for-
eiqn aid or with loans from international institutions have little 
236 
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effect on employment creation , but we should not forget about the 
secondary effects of these projects enabling the country to spend 
a larger amount of money for projects directly creating employment 
opportunities by easing the foreign exchange constraints of the 
economy . 
Concerningthe future of the Indonesian economy continued care 
will be needed to ensure the use of capital for productive purpos-
es, particularly those which will benefit the majority of the popu-
lation . It should also be desirable through fiscal measures to sy-
phon back part of the income and wealth which tends to concentrate 
in big cities in market oriented private enterprise economies , to 
rural district. In this way some of the social and political pro-
blems often accompanying the widening gap in income and wealth be-
tween the urban and rural areas might be avoided . 
(b) PETER DRYSDALE 
First let me say how very much more comfortable I feel making 
my comments on Dr . Mooy ' s very informative paper up here alongside 
Dr . Okita . Down there , sandwiched between Professor Arndt on my 
right and Dr. Viviani on my left, I was bound to give offence to 
someone . Alongside Dr . Okita I can pretend to be Robin Hood, tak-
ing from the poor in rich countries and providing for the rich in 
poor countries , without giving offence to anyone , even Dr . Narong-
chai . 
In my comments I want to take up some general issues for aid re-
cipients t hat have been ra i sed by Dr . Mooy ' s paper and in the dis-
cussion so far , rather than focus specifically on the Indonesian 
case . Doing that would be about as intorrnative as a conversation 
between Dr . ~ionczek and Professor Arndt on the Bougainville Cop-
per Agreement . 
What I want to say may be seen as a retreat from the grand them-
es of discussion earlier today : but in fact what I want to attempt 
i s to give some precision to the more important questions raised 
before . 
Three key issues are raised in Dr . Mooy ' s paper quite explicit-
ly . The fi r st issu e concerns the appropriate channel for aid (bi-
lateral , multilateral , multilateral/bilateral) from the viewpoint 
of protecting t he i nterests of a recipient country in sound develop-
ment programming . The second is the issue of aid tying . A third 
and related issu e i s the heavy project- orientation in donor aid 
progr ammes . 
The f i rst questi or. - the question of the appropriate channel for 
aid - was taken up to some extent in earlier discussion . I think 
that Dr . Mooy is absolutely right in stressing , both in his paper 
a nd i n his comments , that multilateralisation of the approach to 
Indonesian rehabi l i tation and recovery and subsequent development 
aid operations has been very valuable in the more effective use of 
avai l abl e aid resources . In the case of such a large recipient in 
wh i c h several donors have a significant interest, the consortia ap-
proach and the i nvolvement of the multilateral organisations adds 
to a i d effectiveness and limits interference with the development 
objecti ves of a i d . At the same time, we need to heed Dr . Krause ' s 
wa r ning t hat mul t i lateralisation does not eliminate politics . None-
t heless , my judgment is that multilateralisation encourages eleva-
tion of the a i d objective over other objectives and , bluntly , that 
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it makes the politics more open and less dirty. 
The second question, of aid tying, is also much more important 
than the casual remarks made about it in earlier sessions or Dr . 
Mooy's polite reference to it in the paper would both suggest. Aid 
tying can reverse the concessional flow of resources from donor to 
recipient country . It is not true, as was suggested earlier, that 
major donor country tying is unimportant because major donors are 
generally competitive suppliers of industrial commodities. Both 
the United States and Japan have indulged in tying at what has al-
most certainly been massive cost to developing countries. There 
is too little hard evidence, but what evidence there is - for exam-
ple, the work of Mahub ul Haq and others - provides a damning in-
dictment of major donor performance. Estimates of the excess cost 
of tied aid range between 20 percent and 150 percent and more. The 
United States food programme, and transport requirements and Japa-
nese industrial export credit programmes, both have been costly to 
poor countries. Tied aid programmes, involving concessional loans, 
can easily turn into rich country taxes on poor countries. It is 
thoroughly naive to suggest that because big donors are generally 
competitive suppliers of industrial commodities that such commodi-
ties will be supplied competitively under tied aid arrangements. 
Tied aid provides institutionalised monopoly power by developed 
country suppliers over developing country consumers. Australian 
aid officials defend tying of grant aid to countries other than Pa-
pua New Guinea on the grounds that at least, with grant aid, the 
concessional flow of resources must be in the right direction, from 
Australia to poorer countries, even if the flow is considerably 
smaller than it nominally appears. But even tied grant aid can be 
associated with reversal of the concessional flow of resources. 
A tied grant is often associated with a continuing stream of 
costly services and supplies on bad commercial terms - indeed, this 
is quite common experience - the excess cost of the whole package 
of which can offset the concessional element in the initial grant. 
Even tied grants can thus reverse the direction of the concessional 
flow of resources. 
The third question is closely related to the second and also an-
other question, the question of onshore versus offshore cost financ-
ing. It is the question of project orientation in aid programmes, 
which Dr. Mooy touched upon in his paper . The term 'project aid' 
can mean many things but usually project aid, as Professor Arndt 
observed, involves a distortion in development planning towards 
large infrastructural investment. 
Pressures from Australia to convert Papua New Guinea's aid prog-
ramme to a project basis illustrate the damage project orientation 
in aid can inflict in a particularly extreme form. Project orient-
ed aid tends to force recipients into expenditure on large identi-
fiable but wasteful physical capital formation using tradeable com-
modities and diverts public expenditure away from crucial non-phy-
sical infrastructural investment and services. 
The record of donor countries in their development assistance 
efforts is open to serious criticism on these grounds. They are 
not insignificant in the context of the moral imperatives that are 
now emerging as the focus of debate about the conduct of the inter-
national economic system. For, despite the reminder of the hard 
world of real politics in our discussion of the American approach 
to foreign aid policy, questions of justice and generosity as well 
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as power do insert themselves into the conduct of economic and po-
litical relations between nation states. The criticisms do not re-
commend a retreat from the objective of making aid work for deve-
lopment but they do recommend considerable re-direction and reform 
in developed countries ' aid policies . 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The discussion began with questions to Dr . Mooy in clarification 
of certain points in his paper . These included the level of Japan-
ese aid, the influence of the World Bank and the Inter-Government-
al Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in guiding development, and the role 
of Eastern European countries as donors. Dr . Mooy confirmed that 
the Japanese aid levels quoted in his paper did not include assist-
ance for oil and natural gas development . 
Dr . Mooy accepted that in the early period, 1968/69, Indonesia 
had to step up its applications for technical assistance and had to 
draw on World Bank expertise in the formulation of development pro-
grammes . He cautioned against giving undue importance to the ini-
tial accommodation of foreign experts in Bappenas premises ! The 
numbers of foreign experts in Indonesia have declined over recent 
years . 
As for the apparent lack of Eastern "donor" countries to Indone-
sia, Dr . Mooy pointed to the deterrent posed by the considerable 
burden of old debts, over $2 billion , which Indonesia had yet to 
discharge in the earlier years . Some countries were concerned with 
rescheduling of debts rather than joining IGGI . Others offered as-
sistance but on harder and less acceptable terms . Indonesia is how-
ever currently looking to other countries including Eastern Europe 
and Russia as sources of assistance, not necessarily reflecting a 
political change of attitude but more a refocus of economic consid-
erations . 
Dr . Mooy accepted also that Indonesia, like other developing coun-
tries , has been confronted with problems of adaptation to different 
forms of assistance given the objectives of the donor but he empha-
sised the mutual benefits that both the donor countries and Indone-
sia, as a recipient, have enjoyed particularly with the formation 
of IGGI. The policy of integrating foreign aid into the foreign ex-
change market , while met with initial hesitation on the part of don-
or countries, has meant that the use of such funds for imports has 
been determined by the Indonesian market and not by bilateral nego-
tiations with the- donor countries . Dr . Okita also pointed out that 
the customary pract~ce was for donors to select a project from an 
Indonesian project list . 
The discussion then turned to more general considerations. The 
possibility of channelling aid through groupings such as ASEAN was 
raised . This had been done by Australia but it had been found that 
competition for resources was keen with the consequence that the 
aid was split up into uneconomically small amounts instead of pursu-
ing a policy of development priorities between countries. 
Participants then pursued the question of tied aid. It was point-
ed out that there has been an appreciable increase in real transfers 
on concessionary loans to the developing countries given the rate 
of inflation . A 2% interest rate could only be considered minus in-
terest lending. 
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The opinion voiced earlier in the conference that the question 
of tied aid was of little importance in the United States case giv-
en their competitive position was questioned. Rice was given to 
Indonesia on a 40 year loan but was valued in U.S. prices at 3 or 
4 times as high as Indonesia could have purchased the rice in Asia. 
A more serious point for consideration was that the transport of 
all United States supplies in United States ships added greatly to 
the cost of the supplier. It was noted, however, that it was a 
percentage of United States aid, approximately 60-70%, that was 
subject to such constraints and then only if the ships were avail-
able. The devaluation of the U.S. dollar to a certain extent un-
dermined this tying aspect in addition to rendering United States 
aid more valuable. 
Referring to the question of possible distortions from the in-
fluence of donors on projects, one participant felt it right to 
point out that such distortions very often arise from pressures 
within the recipient countries; for example, the bureaucratic infra-
structure in Indonesia . He felt it was too easy to criticise the 
large donor countries on the grounds of a foolish preference for 
capital intensive Western technology. One must also consider the 
question of what can efficiently be done and very often many unde-
niably worthwhile projects do not lend themselves to assistance. 
In a final comment, Dr. Okita stressed the importance of seeking 
appropriate policies for different categories of developing count-
ries. He distinguished four: 
(1) Oil rich countries with no financial problems but who still 
need technical assistance. 
(2) Those primary producing countries who may benefit from buffer 
stock and other stabilization schemes. 
(3) Those who, as exporters of manufactured goods, may benefit by 
the opening up of developed country markets. 
(4) The least developed of the LDCs where export promotion is dif-
ficult and the opening of developed countries markets may be 
inappropriate. For some such countries a transfer approach ra-
ther than an efficiency approach to foreign aid may be more ap-
propriate . 
In addition, many countries are moving toward an intermediate stage 
where they are both givers and receivers of aid. 
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JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
- PROBLEMS OF THE LARGE HOME COUNTRY 
ATSUSHI MURAKAMI 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1951, when, for the first time after World War II, Japan-
ese private capital was invested in the mining industry of India, 
private foreign investment of Japan has increased tremendously. The 
accumulated balance exceeded US$10,000 millions at the end of March 
1974. Outflow of investment was considerable in 1972 and 1973, but 
it suddenly decreased in 1974 due to the serious setback of econo-
mic activity in Japan. 
As the foreign investment of Japan increased, it evoked a strong 
anti-Japanese movement in some of developing countries in Southeast 
Asia. In Thailand, for example, a campaign of boycotting Japanese 
products was organized by the National Students Centre of Thailand 
in November, 1972. Many students and other people demonstrated in 
January 1974 against economic invasion by Japan when the ex-Prime 
Minister Tanaka visited Bangkok. A riot also occurred in Indonesia 
during Mr. Tanaka's stay in Djakarta after his Bangkok visit, with 
the purpose of protesting against Japanese domination . Although 
such visible movements were not seen in other countries in South-
east Asia, it cannot be denied that anti-Japanese sentiment has 
been prevalent elsewhere, in response to the rapidly increasing in-
flow of Japanese forei1n investment. Today it is impossible to dis-
cuss the experience of Japan as a large source of investment with-
out paying due consideration to this anti-Japanese sentiment in 
small host countries. 
This paper aims to discuss the relationship between Japanese for-
eign investment and antagonism to it among Southeast Asian countri-
es. It suggests that antagonism springs from certain features of 
the Japanese investment channelled into these countries, and s ug-
gests ways to harmonize the interests of both parties. It is con-
venient to begin by describing the general characteristics of Jap-
anese investment and of that directed towards Southeast Asian count-
ries in particular. 
II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
As is shown in Table 1, Japanese foreign investment expanded 
year by year throughout the 1960's and at the beginning of the 1970's. 
It accelerated in 1972 and in 1973 under the particular circumstance 
of yen revaluations.ll Although a sharp decline was recorded in 1974, 
mainly due to the serious depression of economic activity,2lit seems 
likely that Japanese foreign investment will continue to expand 
steadily in the long run provided that the underlying factor of for-
eign investment - enlargement of the size of the Japanese economy -
continues. According to the report of the Council on Industrial 
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Structure, the accumulated sum of Japanese foreign investment is 
expected to re~ch US$80,700 millions at the end of 1985, which 
would be 6.6 times larger than the level at the end of 1974 . 
l)Factors accounting for the upsurge in these two years are as fol -
lows: (a) Since the end of 1960 Japanese balance of payments turn-
ed favourable, providing ample funds for foreign investment . The 
inflow of dollars on the eve of yen revaluation was also added to 
the foreign reserves of Japan. (b) The Japanese Government inc-
reased domestic money supply for fear of serious depression after 
revaluation . Together with the expansion of the money supply due 
to the favourable balance of payments, this provided firms with 
huge liquidity to invest abroad . (c) From 1969 to 1972 regula-
tions on foreign investment had been substantially lifted in the 
context of liberalizing international capital movements . Moreover 
the Japanese Government promoted foreign investment in one w~y and 
another in order to avoid yen revaluation. (d) The yen revalua-
tions themselves in 1971 and in 1973 improved the terms of foreign 
investment. (e) As a result of revaluation, international compe-
titivness in some Japanese industries was so weakened that it be-
came necessary for them to undertake overseas production through 
foreign investment . 
2)Expanded money supply was followed by severe inflation. The rise 
of oil prices in 1973 accentuated it . The government was forced 
to take strong anti-inflation measures, which depressed economic 
activity to a great extent . The rate of growth was negative in 
1974 in real terms . The rise of oil prices also led to deteriora-
tion of the balance of payments position . 
Table 1 Trends of Japanese Foreign Investmentll 
Average Value 
Year Number of Cases Value(Million US$) per case (B/A) 
(fiscal) Annual(A) Accumulated Annual(B) Accumulated (million us:~) 
1951-61 790 790 447 447 0.57 
62 171 961 98 545 0.57 
63 213 1,174 126 671 0 . 59 
64 184 1,358 119 790 0.65 
65 197 1,555 159 949 0 . 81 
66 244 1,799 227 1,176 0.93 
67 290 2,089 275 1,451 0.95 
68 369 2,458 557 2,008 1. 51 
69 545 3,003 665 2,673 1. 22 
70 730 3,733 904 3,577 1. 24 
71 904 4,637 858 4,435 0.95 
72 1,773 6,410 2,338 6,773 1. 32 
73 3,097 9,507 3,497 10,270 1.13 
74 (2) 1,940 12,210 
Note : (1) Approved basis. Including acquisition of equity, loans, 
and properties and establishment of overseas direct under-
takings and branches. 
(2) From April to December . 
Source: Approved Performance of Japanese Foreign Investment (Kai-
gai Toshi Kyoka Jitsuseki), Ministry of Finance, Tokyo . 
ATSUSHI MURAKAMI 245 
However, in spite of the rapid expansion of Japanese foreign in-
vestment, it is still less than that of other developed countries. 
According to Table 2, the accumulated balance of Japanese foreign 
investment at the end of March 1973 was only 3 . 9 percent of the to-
tal of all DAC member countries. It was equivalent to just 2 .3 per-
cent of Japan's GNP and 23.7 percent of its exports in 1972 respec-
tively. The accumulated balance per capita was no more than US$63. 
Compared with the foreign investment of other developed countries, 
Japan's has been of limited importance both in the domestic economy 
itself and in the world. This limited importance is also reflected 
in the smallness of the average value of investment per case, as is 
shown in Table 1 . 
The distribution of Japanese for e ign investment by region and by 
industry at the end of March 1974 is shown in Table 3. This table 
indicates that nearly half of the investment - 53.7 percent of the 
number of cases and 49.2 percent of the value accumulated - has 
been directed towards developing countries . Asian developing count-
ries in East and Southeast Asia have absorbed 38.2 percent of the 
number of cases and 23.9 percent of the value accumulated. That is 
a strong concentration of Japanese foreign investment in developing 
countries by comparison with that of other developed countries. 
The ratio of the accumulated balance channelled into developing 
countries was only 26 . 0 percent for the United States and 29.0 per-
cent for West Germany at the end of 1973. A corresponding figure 
for the United Kingdom was 33.3 percent at the end of 1970.3) It is 
obvious that developing countries, particularly those in Asia, have 
been the more attractive region for the overseas investment activi-
ty of Japanese firms, while firms of other developed countries have 
invested mainly in developed areas . 
3) Present Situation of Japanese Foreign Investment (Wagakuni Kaigaitoshi no 
Genjo), JETRO, Tokyo, 1974, p.21. 
U. S.A. 
U. K. 
France 
Table 2 Relative Size of Japanese Foreign Investment 
(at the end of 1972) 
Accumulated Share in Ratio to Ratio to 
Balance DAC Menber GNP in Exports 
(Million US$) Countries{%) 1972(%) in 1972(%) 
94,031 53 . 8 8 . 1 191.0 
25,5111) 14.6 16.5 104 . 6 
10,0621) 5.8 5.1 38.6 
Accumulated 
Balance 
per capita 
(US$) 
450 
457 
195 
West Germany 8,253 
6, 7732) 
4.7 3. 2 17.9 134 
Japan 3.9 2 .3 23 .7 63 
Canada 6,3191) 3.6 6.1 30.l 289 
DAC Member Countries 174,8833) 100.0 6.9 62.2 275 
Note: 1) Accumulated balance at the end of 1970 (U.N. Data) plus 
net outflow of private direct investment in 1971 and 1972. 
2) At the end of March 1973. 
3) Accumulated balance at the end of 1970 (U.N . Data) multi-
plied by the rate of increase in listed six countries up 
to 1972. 
Source: Present Situation of Japanese Foreign Investment (Wagakuni 
Kaigaitoshi no Genjo) JETRO, Tokyo, 197-;r,-p.19. 
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Looking at the distribution by industry, one sees that the rela-
tive share of Japan's investment- in manufacturing.has not been so 
large as that of other developed countries . It was limited to 35.1 
percent of the number of cases and 33 . 0 percent of the value accu-
mulated, compared with 41.3 percent for the United States, 77.2 per-
cent for West Germany and 53.6 percent for the United Kingdom res-
pectively, though these were data for the end of 1970.4) Table 3 
shows that 82.7 percent of the number of cases and 72.5 percent of 
the value accumulated of investment in manufacturing industries was 
in developing countries. In particular, Asian developing countries 
absorbed 68.8 percent and 37.2 percent of the total investment in 
manufacturing industries in terms of the number of cases and of the 
value accumulated respectively. The average value of investment in 
manufacturing industries in Asia was quite small, being equivalent 
to US$0.56 millions. While investment in manufcturing industries 
has been concentrated in developing countries, investment in other 
fields especially in commerce, finance and insurance, has been di-
rected mainly towards developed countries. Within manufacturing in-
4) Japanese Multi-Nationals Facts and Figures (Kaigai Kigyoshinshutsu Soran) 
Toyo Keizai, Tokyo, 1973, p.349. 
Table 3 Distribution of Japanese Foreign Investmentll 
(a) Number of Cases 
Developing 
World Countries Asia 
Manufacturing Industries 
Food 2.6(100.0) 3.1(64.4) 2 . 8(41.6) 
Textile 6 . 1(100.0) 10.3(90.6) 10.9(68.4) 
Lumber, Pulp 1.9(100.0) 2. 8 (8'1 .1) 3.7(69.3) 
Chemical 3 . 6(100.0) 5.5(82.9) 6.4(67 . 6) 
Ferrous, Non-ferrous 3.0(100.0) 5.0(89.2) 5.5(70.3) 
Machinery 3.8(100.0) 5.2(74.1) 5.6(57 . 1) 
Electric Machinery 6.0(100.0) 9.9(88 . 6) 12.2(65.5) 
Transport Equipment 1.0(100.0) 1.6(85.7) 1.6(58.2) 
Others 7.1(100.0) 11.6(87 . 5) 14.8(79.0) 
Sub-total: 35.1(100.0) 54 . 0(82.7) 63.2(68.8) 
Others 
Agriculture, Forestry, 2 . 8(100.0) 3 . 3(63.7) 3.5(47 .8 ) 
Fishing, Marine 1.8(100.0) 2 . 4(70.7) 1.7(34.8) 
Mining 3.5(100 . 0) 3.9(60 . 0) 3 . 0(32.1) 
Construction 1.4(100.0) 1.8(70.2) 1.8(49 .2 ) 
Commerce 28 . 4(100.0) 15.2(28.7) 14.7(19.8) 
Finance, Insurance 3.5(100 . 0) 3.4(51.6) 2.6(28.0) 
Others 23.5(100.0) 14.9(34.1) 14.8(15.6) 
Total : 2l 100.0(100 .0 ) 100 . 0(53.7) 100.0(38.2) 
Note: 1) Approved basis, accumulated at the end of March 1974. Ex-
cluding establishment of overseas branches. 
2) Total cases are 8,947. 
Source: Approved Performance of Japanese Foreign Investment (Kaigai 
Toshi Kyoka Jitsuseki), Ministry of Finance, Tokyo. 
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dustries, t extile , electric al mach inery and "othe rs" , wh i c h contain-
ed many miscellaneous items o f sundry goods, were the three main 
dire ctions into which Japa nese foreign investment was channelled . 
Relative shares of investment in these three industries were 10 . 3 
percent, 9 . 9 percent and 11.6 percent in the number of cases and 
14 . 3 percent, 5 . 3 percent and 3 . 3 percent in the value accumulated-ly 
invested in developing countries. The tendency to concentrate on 
these three industries was more conspicuous in the investment in 
Asia . The three industries together accounted for 37 . 9 percent of 
the number of cases and 33 . 6 percent of the value accumulated in 
this region . It goes without say ing that these industries are la-
bour-intensive ones in which Japan had a comparative advantage and 
on which Japanese exports largely depended till quite recently. 
To sum up, investment in the labour-intensive manufacturing in-
dustries of developing countries , particularly those in Asia, has 
constituted one of the most important streams of Japanese foreign 
investment . 5l Although some investment has occurred in commerce, 
finance and insurance in developed countries, it has not burst into 
bloom so as to operate manufacturing industries there . 
Table 3 Distribution of Japanese Foreign Investment 
(b) Value 
AverageValue 
per case 
Developing in Asia 
~rld Countries Asia (Million US$) 
Manufacturing Industries 
Food 1.7(100 . 0) 1.9 (56.0) 2. 0( 28. 1) 0. 48 
Textile 7. 5(100 . 0) 14 . 3(93 . 7! 20 . 5(65 . 0) 1.29 
Lumber I Pulp 3. 7(100 . 0) 1.8 (24 . 7) 3. 0(19 . 5) 0. 62 
Chemical 5. 4(100 . 0) 9. 5(85 . 7) 3. 2(14. 2) 0. 35 
Ferrous, Non- ferrous 4. 9(100 . 0) 5. 4(54 . 0) 4. 2(20 . 4) 0. 52 
Machinery 2. 2(100 . 0) 2. 9(65 . 9) 2. 1(22 . 5) 0. 26 
Electric Machinery 3. 3(100 . 0) 5. 3(78 . 1) 7. 8(55 . 9) 0. 44 
Transport Equipnent 2. 2(100 . 0) 4. 2(91.4) 3. 3(34.7) 1.45 
Others 2. 1(100 . 0) 3. 3(81.4) 5. 3(63 . 8) 0. 25 
Sub-Total : 33 . 0(100 . 0) 48 . 6(72 . 5) 51.4 (37 . 2) 0. 56 
Others 
Agriculture , Forestry 1.5(100 . 0) 2. 2(69 . 6) 3. 4(53 . 0) 0. 67 
Fishing, Marine 0. 8 (100 . 0) 1.1 (66 . 9) 1.0(29 . 7) 0. 40 
Mining 28 . 2(100 . 0) 27 . 6(48 . 2) 25 . 6(21.7) 5. 99 
Construction 0. 7 (100 . 0) 1.1(79 . 9) 0. 5(17 . 2) 0. 18 
Comnerce 12 . 1(100 . 0) 4. 0(16 . 4) 3. 2( 6.2) 0. 15 
Finance, Insurance 8. 7(100 . 0) 7. 2(40 . 8) 5. 4(14 . 9) 1. 45 
Others 15 . 1(100. 0) 8. 2(26 . 7) 9. 6(15 . 2) 0. 70 
'Ibtal : 100 . 0(100 . 0) 100 . 0(49 . 2) 100. 0(23 . 9) 0. 69 
Note : 'Ibtal value is US$9 , 884 millions . 
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It is of great significance that the distributional character-
istics of Japanese foreign investment summarized above are deeply 
related to the fact that it has remained limited in total amount . 
As mentioned earlier, the accumulated bala nce of Japanese foreign 
investment is quite a small portion of GNP and exports . In a sense 
it still remains a marginal activity of Japanese economic potential-
ities . 6) 
Foreign investment is concerned with the transfer of managerial 
resources - a package of resources consisting of capital, technolo-
gy of production, skill and talent in management and so forth - from 
home country to host country. In spite of the spectacular expans-
ion of its economic activity, Japan has not succeeded in accumulat-
ing sufficent managerial resources to develop world-wide investment 
activities, because of the lack of R & D factors and of well-quali-
fied personnel with international training and experience, includ-
ing linguistic talent. Thus as a result of limited managerial re-
sources, Japanese foreign investment has had to be limited in its 
total amount. Japanese firms have been obliged to confine their 
foreign investment activity mainly to the neighbouring developing 
countries, and to the labour-intensive manufacturing industries there, 
in which they have accumulated relatively abundant managerial re-
sources through their rigorous export activities in earlier decades . 7) 
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ANTI-
JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The fact that Japanese foreign investment has been limited in 
its total amount, and has concentrated on labour intensive manufac -
turing indus t ries in Asia due to the insuf ficient a ccumulation of 
managerial resources, is largely related to the widely prevailing 
antagonism to it among Southeast Asian countries . 
First of all, although the accumulated balance of Japanese for-
eign investment is only a small part of total foreign investment 
of developed countries and is also small relative to GNP and ex-
ports of Japan, when its outlet is confined to a particular region 
and industries, its influence on host countries must be serious. 
S)Needless to say, investment in natural resources has been another important 
constituent of Japanese foreign investment. Given the endowment of natural 
resources, the importance of this type of investment for Japan will be great-
ly increased in the future . HCMever at present it is far from being firmly 
established as exemplified by the system of buying ores in exchange for 
providing funds for develoµnent and by the weakness of oil exploitations. 
Since investment in natural resources depends upon the availability of re-
sources each case poses particular problems and further consideration of 
this investment is omitted in this paper. 
6)It is said that, even from the individual finns' standpoint, the ratio of 
overseas production to total proceeds was only one or two percent for big 
textile producers like Toray and Teijin and nearly five percent for electric 
finns like Matsushita and Hitachi at the beginning of 1970. 
7)The tendency to concentrate on a few industries is accelerated by the band-
wagon effect of investment . In Japan, not only big firms, but also many 
srriall finns, c:anpete excessively with each other. Therefore once a firm 
attempts to invest abroad it is usually follCMed by rrany rival finns, with 
the purpose of continuing canpetition in new ventures . 
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This is especially so when the economic size of the host countries 
is small. By the end of March 1974, a sum amounting to US$1,483 
millions was invested by Japan in five ASEAN countries in Southeast 
Asia, and a sum of US$783 millions in three East Asian countries.Bl 
These are equivalent to 14.4 percent and 7 . 6 percent respectively 
of the total accumulated balance of US$10 , 270 millions. 
At present Japanese foreign investment ranks first among total 
foreign investment, at least in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. It 
is also a substantial proportion of the total in other countries in 
this region. The number of cases of investment by Japan is shown 
in Table 4. According to this table, 855 cases of investment were 
carried out in Southeast Asia, and 1,024 cases in East Asla, in a 
variety of forms by the end of 1973. Here again Japanese foreign 
investment has been concentrated in manufacturing industries, es-
pecially in labour-intensive ones such as textiles, electric machi-
nery and "others".9) Such concentration of Japanese foreign invest-
ment naturally leads to the "overpresence" of Japan in small host 
countries in Asia. When it occupies the predominant share in total 
foreign investment, and a considerable proportion of investment as 
a whole in the country concerned, and when it also exerts an over-
whelming influence in particular industries, it can not be denied 
that it is likely to evoke psychological resistance through being 
excessively perceptible to the people.10) 
The fact that industries dominated by Japanese foreign invest-
ment are mainly consumer good industries which are closely concern-
ed in the lives of the people should be remembered 
Of course, it is impossible to define the terms "overpresence", 
"predominant", "considerable", "overwhelming" on an objective basis, 
because resistance against Japanese foreign investment essentially 
s~ems from psychological feelings of the people. However, one can 
infer that the psychological resistance is a kind of external dis-
economy stemming from investment by private firms in small host 
countries and an important social cost for Japanese foreign invest-
B)Approved basis, including various type of investment. See Note 
(1) in Table 1. Distribution by country is as follows: 
Southeast Asia 
Indonesia US$814 millions 
Malaysia 201 
Singapore 174 
Thailand 163 
Philippines 131 
East Asia 
Korea 
Hongkong 
Taiwan 
418 
223 
142 
9)In the case of Hongkong and Singapore, there was much investment 
in commerce, finance and insurance, and other service industries, 
relecting the nature of economic activity in these countries . 
lO)It should also be errphasized that the psychological resistance to Japanese 
investrrent depends up::m the econanic condition of host countries. If their 
econanies expand successfully, they are able to absorb rrore investrrent witli-
out strong psychological resistance. However, developing countries in Asia, 
particularly Southeast Asian countries, have been frustrated in achieving 
steady econanic growth in recent years. This is one indispensable factor in 
explaining why antagonism to Japanese foreign investment has been so strong 
in these countries. 
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ment. The cost increases suddenly and sharply when the accumulated 
balance of investment goes beyond some point in the host country as 
a whole and in its particular industries . 
Secondly, the implications of the type of industries on which 
Japanese foreign investment has concentrated should be considered 
in the context of the industrial structure of developing countries . 
As mentioned earlier, textiles, electric machinery and "others" 
were the main export industries of Japan to the world and to deve-
loping countries in Asia . When developing countries launched their 
industrialization in the 1950's and the 1960's, they tried to rest-
rict imports from Japan through protective measures and to introduce 
these industries into their economy by providing favourable terms 
to foreign investors. Therefore, Japanese foreign investment in 
Table 4 Japanese Foreign Investment in Asia 
and Involvement of Trading Companies 
East Asia Southeast Asia 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Fcxxl 
Textile 
Lumber I Pulp 
Chemical 
Ferrous, Non-ferrous 
Machinery 
Electric Machinery 
Transport F,quiµnent 
others 
Sut-Total : 
%: 
Others 
A 
22 
133 
6 
41 
64 
80 
178 
3 
242 
769 
100 . 0 
Agriculture, Forestry 3 
Fishing, Marine 8 
Mining 5 
construction 6 
Crnrnerce 129 
Finance, Insurance 23 
Others 81 
B c 
(5) (1) 
(58) (52) 
(2) (2) 
(12) (8) 
(17) (15) 
(7) (5) 
(17) (11) 
(33) (19) 
(151) (113) 
(19.6) (14 . 7) 
% 
2. 1 
13 . 0 
0. 6 
4 . 0 
6. 3 
7.8 
17 . 4 
0 . 3 
23 . 6 
75 . 1 
A 
32 
102 
37 
48 
65 
34 
73 
22 
125 
538 
100.0 
(1) 
(1) 
(3) 
(1) 0 . 3 24 
(36) 
(18) 
(1) 0. 8 25 
(1) 0. 5 40 
0. 6 36 
(13) 12 . 6 73 
2.2 40 
(17) 7.9 79 
B 
(11) 
(73) 
(18) 
(36) 
(44) 
(12) 
(19) 
(10) 
(42) 
(265) 
(49 . 3) 
(15) 
(13) 
(11) 
(14) 
(24) 
(1) 
(31) 
c 
(10) 
(64) 
(15) 
(30) 
(39) 
(7) 
(10) 
(10) 
(34) 
(219) 
(40. 7) 
(15) 
(10) 
(10) 
(13) 
(11) 
(1) 
(30) 
% 
3. 7 
11.9 
4 . 3 
5. 6 
7 . 6 
4.0 
8. 5 
2 . 6 
14 . 6 
62 . 9 
2 . 8 
2.9 
4 . 7 
4 . 2 
8.5 
4 . 7 
9.2 
Total : 
%: 
1,024 (210) (146) 100.0 
100 . 0 (20.5) (14 . 3) 
855 (374) (309) 100 . 0 
100 . 0 (43 . 7) (36 . l) 
Note : A ... Number of cases of investment . 
B . .. Number of cases of investment in which trading companies are involv-
ed . 
C . . . Number of cases of investment in which major ten trading canpanies 
are involved 
At the end of 1973, including planned investment and excluding loans. 
Source : 
Produced from Toyo Keizai, Japanese Multi-Nationals Facts and Figures 
(Kaigai Kigyoshinshutsu Soran~ 1974 . 
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developing countries in Asia was a substitute for shrinking exports 
from Japan . 
Once introduced into developing countries, these industries have 
contributed much to them in creating huge employmnent opportunities, 
in training workers, in transferring the technology of production 
and management, and in spreading forward and backward linkages . As 
international competitiveness has been strengthening, on the basis 
of suitable factor endowments in developing countries, these indust-
ries are expected to expand exports and to produce a net surplus, 
if possible, by offsetting the increasing imports of raw materials, 
intermediate goods and machinery and equipment needed for them . 11) 
It is necessary to pay due consideration to these contributions of 
Japanese foreign investment. These are regarded as external econo-
mies, making the social benefit of investment greater than the pri-
vate benefit . Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
external economies produced by Japanese foreign investment are ·larg-
er than those produced by the foreign investment of other developed 
countries because Japanese investment, which has concentrated on 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries seems to fit better the 
relative factor endowment and absorptive capacity of technology in 
developing countries in Asia than does the more advanced and sophis-
ticated investment of other developed countries . 
However, in the context of the anti-Japanese movement, another 
side of the coin should not be overlooked. Japanese foreign invest-
ment might have a destructive impact upon the native industries which 
had existed before it was introduced . It may prevent native newcom-
ers from getting into the same line of economic activity. The more 
Japanese foreign investment fits the economic environment of host 
countries, the wider will be the range of people who may be actual-
ly or potentially affected by it. This will not be so for foreign 
investment by other developed countries which is channelled into 
fields beyond the reach of developing count~ies, although its con-
tribution will be most limited . In these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the people affected accuse Japanese foreign invest-
ment and bring their hardship to the notice of the nation, pouring 
oil on the flame of psychological resistance. Generally speaking, 
when a country expands its economic relationships with other count-
ries, it necessarily brings about economic loss to the particular 
sector of the country concerned. The loss is usually outweighed 
by gain for the national economy as a whole. Nevertheless thevoice 
of the loser is louder than that of the gainer, and serves to stir 
up popular feelings against expansion of international economic re-
lations . Thus the damage to particular groups, and its amplified 
influence in the host countries, constitute important external dis-
economies for investment activity, implying that the social cost 
curve for Japanese foreign investment shifts upward to that extentt2l 
ll)This point has been strongly emphasized by Professor Kojima on various occa-
sions . For example, see Kiyoshi Kojima, "Reorganization of North-South Trade : 
Japan ' s Foreign Econanic Policy for the 1970 ' s", Hitotsubashi Journal of Eco-
nanics, February 1973, and "A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Invest-
ment", ditto, June 1973. 
12)Incidentally, the unfavourable impact of Japanese foreign investment on the 
ranaining firms of labour intensive manufacturing industries in Japan should 
be taken into account. As Japanese foreign investment supplies the darestic 
market of developing countries and begins exports to third countries, they 
(continued) 
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Thirdly, the fact that Japanese foreign investment is just a 
marginal economic activity of the Japanese economy as a whole seems 
to explain the critical attitude of host countries to it. For in-
dividual firms investing abroad , their overseas production in sub-
sidiaries forms only a small portion of their total output and pro-
ceeds . Subsidiaries are marginal and auxiliary suppliers, supple-
menting the whole production system of parent firms. This means 
that the control of parent firms is so strong as not to allow sub-
sidiaries to behave freely as independent production units . In the 
case of the foreign investment of other developed countries, on the 
contrary, subsidiaries are strong enough to be placed on the same 
level as the parent firms, keeping a free hand in their productive 
operations . In this sense , Japanese foreign investment may be ref-
erred to as extremely home-country-oriented. This feature, which 
reflects insufficient accumulation of managerial resources in Japan, 
has led to the dissatisfaction with Japanese foreign investment in 
host countries . 
For example, it has been insisted that Japanese managers in sub-
sidiaries have always turned their faces to their parent firms and 
have introduced a Japanese style of management in ignorance of the 
particular problems of the host countries . They are not in a posi-
tion to make final decisions and to implement their own policies . 13) 
The interests of parent firms have been pursued with the utmost 
priority , at the expense of subsidiaries . 14) To train local staffs 
and workers, promote them to management and develop new technology 
has been unusual . As long as these complaints hold true, they are 
attributable to the fact that Japanese foreign investment has been 
too much home- country-oriented. Needless to say, the dissatisfac-
tion of host countries with the behaviour of Japanese subsidiaries 
is another external diseconomy entailed in i ts f oreign investment . 
Here again , the psycho l ogical resistance to the overpresence of Ja-
pan would be given a concrete target for attack . 
It is obvious that the anti-Japanese movement in Southeast Asia 
has very complicated motivations . 15) However , in order to under-
stand it in the context of the characteristics of Japanese foreign 
investment, the three points developed above seem to be important . 
IV . SOME SUGGESTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
In the face of the anti-Japanese movement in some of Southeast 
(continued) 
have to lose their :important export market. Moreover , if its products flow 
into Japan their survival will be in danger. They strongly criticize Japan-
ese foreign investment and claim protection . 
13) The so- called rotation systE!TI of staff, under which a nianager can not stay at 
one place for several years, has also prorroted this tendency . 
14)It is reported that ffi3Ily subsidiaries in Southeast Asia have been forced to 
curtail their operations in order to keep the production and exports of pa-
rent firms constant in the face of the serious depression since 1974 . 
lS)In some Southeast Asian countries it is extrerrely difficult for the people 
to criticize their governrrent directly and openly. Therefore the anti- Japa-
nese rrovement was an alternative way to attack the governrrent , which , in turn , 
found it convenient to support the rrovement with the intention of avoiding a 
direct attack from the people . Thus , Japan was a suitable scape-goat in the 
caq:ilicated political situation in this region . 
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Asian countries, Japanese foreign investment became the subject of 
heated discussion in Japan . The arguments have been generally naive, 
enumerating the demerits of investment activity and expressing one-
sided repentance to the people of the countries concerned . Five 
business associations, including the Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, announced a Code of Investment Behaviour in Develop-
ing Countries in June 1973, which emphasized the necessity of loca-
lizing Japanese subsidiaries and of re turning profit for social a nd 
cultural works in host countries. However, this is nothing but a 
manifestation of moral obligation. With the intention of regulat-
ing the excessive competition of Japanese firms abroad, the Associa-
tion of Japanese Overseas Enterprises was set up in April 1974 . 
It is too early to evaluate its activities. However, it is estimat-
ed that the larger part of Japanese foreign investment in future 
will be directed to Asia . According to a recent survey of the Mi-
nistry of International Trade and Industry, 476 cases of investment 
are planned in Asia from 1975 to 1980 (fiscal years), which is equi-
valent to 42.4 percent of the total planned. Among the 476 cases, 
investment in manufacturing industries is predominant.16) 
Thus it is urgent to consider how to harmonize Japanese foreign 
investment with the interests of host countries. 
Undobtedly foreign investment will be carried out as long as its 
profit exceeds the profit of domestic investment. Therefore, the 
issue relevant here is how to increase the social benefits and to 
decrease the social cost of foreign investment. 
As far as the arguments in the previous section are concerned, 
the first way to reduce the social cost of Japanese foreign invest-
ment is to compensate the group of people adversely affected by it . 
It is impossible to compensate potential losers but due attention 
should be paid to the actual losers by the firms investing abroad. 
This seems to have been neglected in the case of Japanese foreign 
investment. Investing firms must be prepared to pay an extra cost 
for that purpose, or a special tax may be levied on the investing 
firms by the government of the investing country in order to inter-
nalize the external diseconomies in question. Tax revenue will be 
transferred to host countries in compensation for the losses incur-
red in the process of investment. 
Secondly, the home-country-oriented features of Japanese foreign 
investment should be altered. As the accumulation of managerial 
resources increases and the scale of Japanese foreign investment 
expands, it may be expected that these features will begin to change. 
However, for the present, responsibility falls on the shoulders 
of individual investing firms. Some improvement has been made, for 
example, in extending the terms of rotation of managers and in trans-
ferring a larger part of the decision-making process from parent 
firms to subsidiaries . Further internationalization of Japanese 
foreign investment has to be accelerated as an urgent necessity . 
If the external diseconomies involved are considered too large, it 
may be necessary for the government of the investing country to in-
tervene, setting some guideline for internationalization. 
As for the ways of increasing the social benefits of Japanese 
foreign investment, it is possible to consider a number of approach-
16)Survey on overseas Activity of Japanese Firms (Wagakuni Kigyo no Kaigai Jigyo-
katsudo Chosa), ~.Unistry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo, 1975. 
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es to conform with the economic polic i es of host countries . In the 
light of the special needs of the developing host countries, however , 
it appears to be adequate to focus on the contribution of Japanese 
foreign investment in expanding the e x ports of manufactured goods 
from Southeast Asian countries . Table 5 shows with what purposes 
and by what incentives Japanese firms have invested in manufactur-
ing industries in East and Southeast Asia . From this table it is 
apparent that their investments in Southeast Asian =untries have been 
mainly induced by the availability of abundant labour and by the 
protective policies of host countries ' governments . They have aim-
Table 5 The Purposes and Incentives of 
Japanese Foreign Investment 
In East Asia In Southeast Asia 
Total Investment Total Ir.vestment in 
Investment in ' 70 & '71 Investment '70 and ' 71 
Purroses 
M3.rket defense in the face 15 % 14 % 28 % 25 % 
of export difficulty 
Sales expansion in the 24 23 38 35 
local market 
New entry into the local 14 
market 
16 16 17 
Export to the third =unt- 24 21 10 12 
ries 
Export to Japan 19 24 5 9 
Others 4 2 3 2 
Total : 1 00 100 100 100 
Incentives 
(453) (165) (367) (137) 
Protective policies of the 14 16 34 28 
host countries' government 
Advantage of producing near 13 12 19 18 
the consumer's market 
Availability of abundant 48 47 30 34 
labor 
Availability of abundant 3 3 7 8 
materials and energy 
Availability of land and 4 4 4 5 
water for industrial use 
Advantage of trading with 16 18 3 5 
third =untries 
Others 2 3 2 
Total : 100 100 100 100 
(522) (191) ( 490) (180) 
Note : Manufacturing industries only. Percentage of the number of 
response from investing firms, whose numbers are shown in 
the parenthesis . Double entry is allowed . 
Source : Present Situation of Japanese Foreign Investment and Direct-
ion of its Development . The Fourth Survey Report on Fore ign 
Investment (Wagakuni Kaigaitoshi no Genjo to Tenkai Hoko) , 
The Export and Import Bank of Japan, Tokyo, March 1974 . 
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ed largely at supplying their domestic markets . The ir inv estments 
in East Asia have also been induced by the a v ailability o f abund-
ant labour but they have been aimed at exporting to third countri-
es and to Japan . 
Although a shift to an export orientation has been observed in 
recent years, the bias towards production for the domestic ~arket 
- import substitution for host countries - was undeniable . This 
is also verified in Table 6, which presents the actual destination 
of proceeds by Japanese foreign inve stment . In the case of invest-
ment in Southeast Asian countries, exports to third countries and 
to Japan make up only a small portion of tot~l proceeds in contrast 
with the cases of Korea, Taiwan and Hongkong, where the export-ori-
ented investment was dominant . The different pattern of investment 
in different sub-regions is partly due to their different stages 
of economic development . The different strategy of development in 
each sub-region - import substitution in Southeast Asia and Export 
Promotion in East Asia - is another important explanation . How-
ever, as is well known, Southeast Asian countries are changing 
their strategies in the direction of encouraging exports of manu-
factured goods. This is certainly the most effective way for them 
to take off from a frustrated situation and to a c hieve a high rate 
of economic development . Therefore, Japanese foreign investment 
should cooperate with the host countries and make greater efforts 
for the expansion of exports from them . 
In this connection, it is interesting to look at Table 4 again . 
Table 4 indicates the extent to which trading companies have been 
involved in Japanese foreign investment . According to this table , 
in many cases of investment in manufacturing industries in South-
east Asia, trading companies, particularly the major ten (general) 
trading companies (SogoShosha), participate . 
The participation of the trading companies in productive acti-
vity abroad is, of course, a unique feature of Japanese foreign 
investment. Since trading companies are well equipped with a glob-
al network of information and very anxious to match supply with de-
Korea 
Taiwan2) 
Hongkong 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Table 6 Destination of Proceeds by Japanese 
Foreign Investmentl) 
To Domestic 
Market 
52 . 4 
45 . 2 
29 . 6 
62 . 5 
87 . 3 
96 . 0 
93.9 
To the 
Third Market 
34.4 
42 . 7 
61 . 9 
32.2 
4.8 
0 . 1 
5 . 5 
Note : 1) Proceeds of subsidiaries in 1972 . 
2) Destination of 2 . 7 percent was unknown . 
To Japan 
13 . 3 
9 . 4 
8.4 
4 . 9 
7 . 8 
3.9 
0 . 6 
Source : Overseas Activity of Japanese firms (Wagakuni Kigyo no 
Kaigai Jigyo Katsuda) - The Third Survey Report, Mini-
stry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo, 1974 . 
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mand elsewhere in the world, Japanese foreign investment is bound 
to be well qualified to contribute to export promotion and thus in-
crease social benefits. It should play its expected role. It is 
advisable for the Japanese government to encourage this by compen-
sat ion for the loss of remaining labour-intensive manufacturing in-
dustries and by promoting industrial adjustment. 
After trying to reduce the social costs and to increase the so-
cial benefits of Japanese foreign investment, it becomes necessary 
to weigh costs and benefits and to limit the total outflow of in-
vestment to a particular country to that amount at which social 
cost is equal to social benefit . At this point the private rate 
of profit of foreign investment may exceed that of domestic invest-
ment, and there may be an incentive for firms to invest more. How-
ever, as long as the anti-Japanese movement is concerned with the 
social costs and benefits of Japanese foreign investment, it is in-
dispensable to limit its total amount in social terms. If Japan 
fails to do so, there is a danger that Japanese foreign investment 
will be totally destroyed. Here again the role of the government 
of the investing country is of crucial importance . 
V. CONCLUSION 
Japanese foreign investment has caused an anti-Japanese movement 
in small host countries in Southeast Asia, not because it is gigan-
tic and strong, but because it is limited in total amount and re-
mains merely a marginal activity of the Japanese economy, due to 
the lack of managerial resources in Japan. It has been obliged to 
confine itself to manufacturing industries in neighbouring Asian 
countries. It was impossible for Japanese investment to spread to 
the world, particularly to developea countries. This led to the 
overpresence of Japan in this region. Japanese foreign investment 
has affected adversely some native industries, and choked their de-
velopment, because it suited the factor endowment in developing 
countries. It was highly home-country-oriented and strongly cont-
rolled by parent firms . All of these were a concomitant, in a 
sense, of the limited extent of Japanese foreign investment. There-
fore it is expected that these limitations will be overcome as Japa-
nese foreign investmnt grows further. However, for the moment, an 
effort must be made to reduce social costs, increase social benefits 
and limit Japanese investment to the level at which cost is equal to 
benefit, regardless of private profitability. In all aspects, the 
intervention of the Japanese government is crucially important if 
catastrophe in Southeast Asia is to be avoided. 
COMMENTS ON MURAKAMI'S PAPER 
(1) HUGH PATRICK 
This paper is divided into three parts - an analysis with consi-
derable empirical evidence of the general characteristics of Japan-
ese foreign direct investment, a rather general but highly suggest-
ive discussion of the rising hostility in Southeast Asia to Japan-
ese economic penetration, and recommendations as to how Japan might 
respond to this anti-Japanese sentiment. Professor Murakami's pap-
er confirms the predictions and concerns expressed by Professor 
Koichi Hamada at the Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
in 1970: Japanese foreign direct investment would grow rapidly, and 
the Japanese involved would make a mess of their personal relation-
ships with nationals in the smaller, ' host countries, especially in 
Southeast Asia. 
The general features of Japan's foreign investment are clearly 
described. Its growth has been rapid, but from a small base, and 
relative to Japan's economic size is still small. It is widely dis-
tributed geographically and by sector, though relatively more con-
centrated in LDCs and in Asia than that of other large foreign in-
vestor nations. The average recorded size of each investment is 
low, mainly because there are many cases of relatively small-scale 
investments in consumer goods industries using relatively labour-
intensive methods of production, especially in East and Southeast 
Asia. 
Perhaps the most interesting point - which the author might 
have stressed even more - is how well Japanese firms respond to the 
goals of host countries as reflected in the incentive structures 
for investment their economic policies provide. South Korea, Tai-
wan and Singapore have stressed foreign investment for exports ra-
ther than home markets, as did Hong Kong implicitly through its 
completely open economy; Japanese investment in those countries 
is substantially export-oriented . In contrast where the purpose 
of foreign investment has been to support import-replacing indust-
rialization programs - as in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand -
the Japanese cheerfully and rapidly hurtled the trade barriers ere-
cted for those purposes and invested in production for domestic mar-
kets . If Japanese firms in those countries did not export, it was 
not their fault; the host governments simply did not set up the in-
centive structure for them, or for any manufacturer, to do so. The 
moral appears to be: profit signals are effective in these countri-
es, in that at least Japanese firms respond well to the opportuni-
ties for profit provided by the combination of local resources and 
host government policy . 
The main thrust of the paper concerns the problem of the anti-
Japanese reaction in Southeast Asia. There are a number of import-
ant questions, some of which Professor Murakami delicately raises 
only indirectly. How substantial - how widespread, severe, and 
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fundamental - is the anti-Japanese reaction? What have been its 
main causes? It is apprently greater in Thailand than elsewhere: 
why? What has been its actual impact? Has further Japanese in-
vestment in those countries been retarded, or terms substantial-
ly changed? Professor Murakami ' s judgment is that the Japanese 
portion of the cause of the anti-Japanese reaction has not been 
so much the overwhelming economi c presence of Japan due to its 
very large size as that J apanese firms have regarded these foreign 
investments as only marginal in their overall operations so that 
they have not devoted the effort and managers of sufficient quali -
ty to them. While this is true, the analysis deliberately focuss-
es only on Japanese defects. Suppose Japanese managerial practic-
es in their Southeast Asian subsidiaries had been excellent? 
Would anti-Japanese sentiment have evaporated, or been seriously 
ameliorated? I think not. 
It is the combination of the size and the visibility, as well 
as the character, of the Japanese presence, that makes it such an 
easy foreign scapegoat for what usually are domestic political 
conflicts. It probably would be more effective in reducing Japan-
ese visibility to develop local brand names for Japanese consumer 
products than to stop direct investment, or to expect Japanese 
subsidiaries to alter their internal features greatly. Moreover, 
I suspect that Southeast Asian countries are not trying hard to 
keep Japanese foreign direct investment out, or even to restruc-
ture in any major way the conditions for that investment. 
It seems inevitable that the Japanese economic presence in de-
veloping Asian countries will become larger over time - in trade 
as well as in Japanese direct investment. While the economic be-
nefits to both sides will expand, so too will be the temptation 
occasionally to use the Japanese presence as a scapegoat in inter-
nal political and social conflicts. Moreover, the sense of frust-
ration vis-a-vis Japan in developing Asian nations is likely to 
rise, as their relationship is perceived increasingly as one of 
dependence rather than interdependence. Japanese will have to be-
come very skillful to minimize these frustrations and the emotion-
al outbursts they engender. 
Much of the paper focusses on the lack of supply by firms of 
adequate Japanese managers to their foreign investment subsidiari-
es. A fundamental problem is that the decision-making and informa-
tion-flow processes which are such a great strength for Japanese 
management in their domestic operations become a major weakness in 
foreign operations. Each company has its own style, its own sign-
als; the managers, from a common background a.nd with long experi-
ence together, can communicate effectively and often without many 
words in reaching concensual decisions. But in foreign operations 
one needs local manag~rial and supervisory talent; they have im-
mense difficulties in communicating and reaching decisions with 
the resident (much less home off ice) Japanese managers since they 
do not know the company's decision-making system or Japanese langu-
age. 
However, Japanese managerial practices in their international 
operations are evolving, and some of the supply problems to which 
Professor Murakami refers may be disappearing . They are learning 
by doing. More importantly, as the international component of 
their production activities rises the internal structure of the 
Japanese firm changes. More, and higher quality, managerial re-
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sources and power are devoted to their foreign activities . This 
pattern of evolution is similar to that of large American firms in 
their early stages of international activ ities. 
What can-the Japanese government do in response to anti-Japanese 
sentiments in developing Asian countries arising from increased 
direct investment and other forms of economic presence . The govern-
ment can only indirectly, and perhaps minimally, influence the 
actual behaviour of Japanese firms and Japanese residents and visit-
ors abroad . It can , and should, preach the importance to Japanese 
of being good corporate and personal citizens abroad. It can help 
develop, and enforce, rather concrete and specific, national or 
preferably international, codes of conduct for foreign direct in-
vestment behaviour. Professor Murakami suggests the government 
might limit the outflow of Japanese capital to sensitive areas de-
spite high profitability and host-country willingness to accept it . 
I am not yet fully persuaded that would be appropriate or desirable . 
Nor do I see it as sensible that the Japanese government (as oppos-
ed to the direct Japanese business interests) compensate those in 
the host country actually or potentially harmed by the investment. 
After all, there is only so much that the home government (Japan) 
can be expected to do. It is the main responsibility of the host 
country government to determine the conditions in which it will 
make possible Japanese or other foreign investment in their own 
country. Perhaps the most beneficial Japanese government policy 
is to be sympathetic and responsive to the legitimate policies of 
the host country government rather than regarding its role narrow-
ly as supporting the interests of specific Japanese firms investing 
abroad . Those interests do not necessarily coincide with the Jap-
anese national interests. 
(b) DAVID LIM 
Professor Murakami begins by providing a useful statistical 
backdrop on Japanese global foreign investment relative to that of 
other developed countries. The main findings and conclusion of 
this section of the paper are: 
(i) Japanese foreign investment is small relative to that of the 
United States, United Kingdom, France and West Germany in ab-
solute terms. 
(ii) It is also relatively insignificant when the comparison is 
made in terms of the share of foreign investment in the in-
vesting country's GNP and exports. 
(iii) In spite of these unimpressive positions in the international 
league table, certain features of the geographical and pro-
duct concentration of Japanese foreign investment are import-
ant, according to the author, in explaining the rise of anti-
Japanese feelings in South East Asian countries. One of 
these is the relatively greater concentration of Japanese 
foreign investment in LDC's in general and in East and South 
East Asian LDC's in particular . While the direct foreign in-
vestment of other developed countries has been concentrated 
within the developed countries themselves Japanese foreign 
investment tends to be in LDC's. 
(iv) Another important characteristic of Japanese foreign invest-
ment is that while the relative share of this in manufactur-
ing is less than that in other developed countries this in-
vestment in LDCs is concentrated in a few industries . These 
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are textiles, electronics and "others" . "Others" being mis-
cellaneous items of sundry goods . These industries are lab-
our-intensive ones in which Japan "has comparative advantage, 
and on which Japanese exports largely depended until quite 
recently". 
These four features are the ones that most characterize Japanese 
foreign investment . According to Professor Murakami they are the 
consequence of a shortage of managerial talent and skill in Japan 
with "international training and experience including linguistic 
talent" . Up to this point, Professor Murakami has said nothing 
convincing to show why there should be antagonism ill-feeling to-
wards Japanese foreign investment in South East Asia. In fact one 
gets the distinct impression that these features might have put Ja-
panese firms operating in South East Asia in good stead. These 
firms are, after all, in labour-intensive activities and this pat-
tern of investment fits the relative factor endowment of these 
countries. They create significant employment opportunities and 
comply with the Hecksher-Ohlin hypothesis of comparative advantage. 
Why then the antagonism? A number of reasons were given but I 
am not entirely convinced of their validity as described by Profes-
sor Murakami. Let us look at each of these in detail. 
(i) The first is that Japanese foreign investment though unim-
portant to Japan, is important to South East Asia in view 
of the smallness of the South East Asian economies. Japan-
ese foreign investment turns out to be the most important 
of developed country investment in these LDCs. It also 
dominates the textile and electronics industries . 
Largeness in itself is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for the type of anti-Japanese feeling that we are 
talking about . It is surely what has been done with this 
largeness that matters. The use of terms such as "overpre-
sence" and "predominance" has only limited use in this con-
text. 
(ii) The second reason given is that Japanese foreign investment 
"may prevent native new corners from getting into the same 
line of economic activity" . I presume Professor Murakami 
is talking about the backwash effects that industrialization 
has on the traditional handicraft activities. 
· I was not entirely clear what the net effect of his arguments 
are. He begins by paying tribute to Japanese foreign invest-
ment in South East Asia by saying that it has "contributed 
much in creating high employment opportunities, in training 
labour, in transferring technology of production and manage-
ment and in spreading forward and backward linkage . " 
Then he argues that there are backwash effects, especially 
as Japanese penetration and dominance are in industries which 
are within the reach of LDC's technologically. I am not cer-
tain that such backwash effects are significant in the type 
of industries (textiles, electronic , "other") listed as the 
ones favoured by Japanese firms. Professor Murakami himself 
said that "the loss is usually outweighed by the gain to the 
national economy as a whole" . 
The positive effects as painted by the author, are such that 
the statement that "the voice of the loser is louder than 
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that of the gainer and serves in stirring up common cry 
against the expansion of international economic relations' 
loses much of its significance . 
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(iii) The third reason given is that the Japanese foreign compa-
nies operating in LDC's are, to quote the author too, "home-
country oriented" . 
I think that this is one area in which Professor Murakami 
might have spent much more time exploring . He did, of 
course, say that the interests of the parent companies had 
often been pursued at the expense of the interests of their 
subsidiaries in South East Asia. But nowhere did he go in-
to any detail. Thus he mentioned only very briefly the 
fact of the widespread retrenchment of workers in Japanese 
firms in Sou~h East Asia in 1974 in order to keep product-
ion and employment in the parent companies in Japan const-
ant. 
He also mentioned but again only very briefly that the train-
ing of local labour and the promotion of local staff to po-
sitions of responsibility in Japanese firms has been limit-
ed. I would have liked to see more data and research done 
on this as I would on issues such as the comparative effi-
ciency of foreign and local firms, and the remittance of 
profits and dividends by Japanese firms. It is perhaps in 
these areas that we may find the reasons why Tanaka had such 
a rough reception in Thailand and Indonesia. 
As it is, the paper leaves the discussion at a very general level . 
The discussion, whether at the academic or the non-academic level, 
on the rate of foreign investment in South East Asia has usually 
been conducted at a general and at an emotional level. Our under-
standing of the issues will not be increased by continuing in this 
vein . I am sorry to see that Professor Murakami has not taken this 
opportunity of guiding the discussion in a more fruitful direction. 
His recommendations for policy changes, based as they are on casual 
observations about the behaviour of Japanese firms in South East 
Asia do not have the impact that they deserve. 
(c) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
It was suggested that the pattern of Japanese foreign investment 
should not surprise as it was similar to that taken by United States 
foreign investment which was also initially close to home. As Unit-
ed States investment spread into more sophisticated industries, so 
it also spread geographically. Also some studies had found that 
within particular industries in some host countries, Japanese invest-
ment has not necessarily been more labour intensive. 
A further point made was that the Japanese have viewed criticisms 
as superficial, emotional and as problems of perception . If the pro-
blems are of this nature, the code of conduct adopted by five Japan-
ese firms in 1973 should have had some impact . The suggestion tha~ 
individual Japanese abroad do not fit into the local culture raised 
the question of whether the training programmes for Japanese manag-
ers involved in foreign investment had had any impact. Dissatisfac-
tion with foreign investment often reflects dissatisfaction with loc-
al enterprise which often appear to be of lower quality than foreign 
businesses and this may be one of the reasons for the troubles Japan 
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had encountered. To some extent it was made a scapegoat. 
The comment was also made that in studying foreing investment 
we must distinguish between economic and socio-political aspects . 
Economic analysis will fail in the investigation of the socio-po-
litical aspects. Murakami ' s paper used economic reasoning . 
Analysis of the problem in South East Asia needed to take 
these into account . The Japanese have expanded outwards in trade 
and travel . The sheer number of Japanese travellers has caused 
antagonism from locals, especially those in the travel and hotel 
accommodation industry. 
It was pointed out also that there are various patterns in the 
presence and absence of conflict. There had been conflict sur-
ruounding American investment in Latin America; British invest-
ment in East Africa and so on . But there are not major conflicts 
over European investment in Latin America, Japanese investment in 
Brazil and the like . There must be an explanation of these pat-
terns. It involves a number of factors: 
1 . There is the problem of the economic, social and political 
gains. 
2. Vital decisions are made abroad. 
3 . There is the problem of the degree of development. Domestic 
firms are less competitive than foreign ones. 
4 . Cultural values conflict. This conflict cannot be studied 
through economics. 
5. There is the problem of the power of the donor, and also the 
distance of the host from the donor country. 
6 . Historical memories also shape attitudes. 
It was thought by one participant that some of the sources of 
hostility to foreign investment lack remedial possibilities. But 
we must not just leave things at that. 
Japan is closer to South East Asia than is the United States . 
Also it is more suited to the factor proportions of the region . 
This apparent advantage has also led to problems. Japanese par-
ticipation has relatively more impact on local competitors. 
Also, Japan is important in ways other than direct investment 
such as aid, imports, exports etc. Professor Murakami's paper is 
a partial analysis on direct foreign investment. Japan's involve-
ment adds up to a large total impact. The protest is often against 
the size of the total Japanese influence. The Japanese firm is 
the local focus for this protest. 
A further point is that foreign investment is very heterogene-
ous . There are questions of dynamics. For example, to what ex-
tent does foreign investment fade away in the future? Some types 
of investment are temporary, e . g . resource depletion. Other typ-
es involving product differentiation etc. are, however, not so 
temporary. 
In response to the discuss ion Professor Murakami said that the 
role of the Japanese government may be limited but necessary as 
a last resort. Though Dr . Lim thought that the paper's genera-
lizations were not enough to support his ssertions it was possible 
to pick up other types of evidence. Professor Murakami noted al-
so that many developing countries have frustrating economic ex-
periences. The frustration in the local economy finds expression 
in the anti-Japanese movement . He realised that there were non-
economic influences in foreign investment; but there were problems 
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in incorporating these influences into economic analysis. The pap-
er took these other factors into account as much as possible. 
Further points made in response to specific questions were: 
(a) The code of conduct for foreign investment has had some impact 
in changing the impact of Japanese firms in South East Asia . 
There is, however , a conflict in practice between the profit 
motive and "good behaviour " in the LDC . The code of conduct 
is just a guideline. 
(b) The average salary in Japanese firms in Asia is less than in 
United States firms there but is as high as in local firms . 
But there are many fringe benefits with Japanese companies. 
Japanese efficiency is superior to that of local firms . Many 
local firms working with Japanese ones have bad conditions. 
Even if there are beneficial effects of investment, you only 
need one or two "losers" for dissatisfaction to arise . 
(c) A special training ~cademy for managers expecting to go abroad 
was established 10 years ago. But the Japanese are still in 
the process of learning by doing. It takes a great deal of 
time to gain a deep understanding of local conditions: Japan 
is making a great effort to do so. 
12 
PROBLEMS OF THE SMALL HOST COUNTRY 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA EXPERIENCE 
Ross GARNAUT 
Papua New Guinea is a small, new country which is already integ-
rated closely into the Western Pacific economy. It faces all of 
the problems of instability and uncertainty that are well-known 
characteristics of the small, open economy. But in many ways its 
international management problems are unusually acute, as Papua 
New Guinea could never have existed as a single political entity 
without large resource transfers from overseas, and it can only 
survive in future if it manages successfully a massive aid rela-
tionship with Australia and a huge investment and trade relation-
ship with the rest of the world. 
There could hardly be a worse year for Papua New Guinea to be 
despatched to independence. Recession and inflation at home have 
shortened Australia 's horizons to Cairns and Darwin. The world is 
uncertain about whether it wants more of the minerals, energy and 
other natural resources that Papua New Guinea must sell in large 
quantities if it is ever to loosen the aid ties to Australia with 
which it was born. Large investors are uncertain about the future 
profitability of possible investments and the criteria which they 
should apply to new investments. 
And yet there is no autarchic option for Papua New Guinea. The 
little internal integration that has been achieved is dependent 
on high levels of public expenditure. Internal trade and specia-
lisation is too limited in scale and profitability to support even 
a small proportion of the required expenditure. Papua New Guinea 
must plot a course amongst the hazards of the international economy 
in the mid-seventies. 
This paper discusses the importance of the international economy 
to this small, new country and some of the hazards, and looks at 
some approaches to management that have been adopted. In particu-
lar, it takes examples from Papua New Guinea's relationship with 
Japan - the dominant influence in the Western Pacific economy. 
Resources scarcity: Is an export strategy viable? 
The cycles in economic thought are as pronounced as those in 
real economies. When the prices of commodities are low, theories 
are developed to explain why they will remain low, just as business-
men who expect prices to remain low hold back from investment and 
sow the seeds of the next commodity boom. The rises and falls 
through the trade cycle are large and dramatic, while the trends 
inch towards increasing scarcity or abundance. 
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The world economy experienced more or less steady growth through-
out the 1950's and 1960's. But, despite the exponential growth of 
demands on resources, there was a consistent decline in the money 
prices of primary commodities taken as a whole . The trend in the 
United Nations price index for all primary commodities was upward 
from 1968, but between 1968 and 1971 the rise in prices for primary 
commodties was .still lower than for manufactured goods . There was 
an historic change between 1971 and 1974, when the prices of prima-
ry commodities rose much faster than those of manufactured goods.l) 
The downward trend in the real prices of primary commodities 
during the 1950's and 1960's contrasts with earlier periods of sus-
tained world growth, such as the decade before 1914, and the 1920's 
prior to the crash in 1929. The literature is replete with expla-
nations of declining primary goods prices, and so raises large ques-
tions about price behaviour since 1971. It is an impressive pheno-
menon that must be explained: during the three-year commodity boom, 
the relative price of all primary commodities rose to about one-quar-
ter above the Korean Wa~ peak. 
Early in 1974 many of us were asking whether the commodity boom 
was only an exceptionally pronounced cyclical peak, or whether in-
creasing scarcity was raising permanently the rent value of natural 
resources.2) When the slump came in mid-1974 it was so severe and 
it has endured so long that some resource exporting countries are 
nervously asking an opposite question: does the slump in prices for 
resources other than energy reflect an incapacity within the indust-
rial countries to adjust to the high resource prices of 1973-4, or 
to other consequences of sustained growth? 
From a great volume of speculation and analysis on these matters 
over the past few years there has emerged something of a consensus, 
although question marks still hang over many of the major issues. 
The main general factor was the unprecedented coincidence of boom 
in the industrial economies in 1972 and 1973. Average growth rates 
at 6.5 percent exceeded the trend by one quarter, strained supply 
capacity to its limit and raised quasi-rents sharply in all resource 
industries. Specific factors increased the pressure on several com-
modity markets, especially foodstuffs. There was no general secular 
trend towards increased scarcity. 
However, increased scarcity was important for some commodities. 
The world economy in the early 1970's was three times as large as 
it had been two decades earlier. The burgeoning resource demands 
of the industrial countries was spawning new industries in distant 
and difficult environments, most spectacularly in the Western Paci-
fice region under the influence of explosive Japanese growth. 
There is little doubt that increasing scarcity, and the expecta-
tion of future scarcity, contributed to rising energy prices and 
paved the way for the initial successes of the OPEC cartel. There 
is widespread awareness that exponential growth in world consumption 
of organic fuels at the rate of the 1960's and early 1970's could 
1) Fifteen Economists, Trade in primary commodities: coflict or co-
operation, Brookings, Washington, 1974. 
2) Ross Garnaut and Ron May, 'Towards a Papua New Guinea Trade Poli-
cy', in Ross Garnaut (ed.), 'Foreign Economic Relations of Papua 
New Guinea', New Guinea Research Bulletin, No.56, Canberra and 
Port Moresby, 1974, p.174. 
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continue only for one or two generations beforeknownresource.limits 
are met. The probability of greatly increasing the known limits 
through new discoveries are relatively small for the organic fuels. 
The picture is not so simple for mineral ores . Reserves of most 
mineral ores could supply world demand, expanding exponentially at 
the rate of recent years, well into the twenty-first century. Cop-
per is one of a few exceptions: reserves of this strategic metal 
would be exhausted after two decades of such exponential growth. 
But the limits to copper reserves are more economic than physical : 
it has not been worthwhile to invest heavily in proving reserves 
in many areas of known mineralisation in advance of the immediately 
fore seeable needs of the mining industry. 
The mining industry has been moving steadily into lower grade 
ores of many minerals, but the costs of mining have been contained 
by technological improvements . There is no logical reason why such 
technological change should remain abreast of declining ore grades, 
and upward shifts in real mining costs and prices are possible if 
world demand continues to expand. But there is no question of ab-
solute supply limits being reached in the foreseeable future, or 
of rises in costs coming to represent an important component of 
world incomes. 
The increased expense and scarcity of petroleum and anxieties 
about resource supplies contributed to pessimism about continued 
growth in the industrial countries and to world recession in 1974 
and 1975. Energy constraints would certainly prevent a return to 
long, sustained growth in the post-war pattern, unless there are 
major changes in patterns of energy use. The policy stances of 
several resource-exporting countries and misapprehension about 
those stances has been the origin of anxieties about the continued 
supply of resources in some major industrial economies, including 
Japan, and close international co-operation in trade, investment 
and technological development is required for the structural change 
in energy use that is necessary for continued growth. Continued 
expansion of income within an open world economy is necessary for 
the maintenance of high prices for all but a few commodities. Thus , 
the policy reactions of resource-rich countries are important deter-
minants of whether there is a so lution to current world economic 
problems short of drastic fall s in living standards in all countri-
es. The rich and poor countries are linked by trade in resources 
and investment in a relationship that is critically important to 
the prosperity of both. The nature of some of the links is illust-
rated below with examples from the region, in Japan and Papua New 
Guinea . 
Resources and development : Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea has been a beneficiary of expanding resource 
markets throughout the 1960's and of the commodity price boom of 
the early 1970's . The long period of world trade growth, and es-
pecially the expansion of the proximate Japanese market, created 
opportunities for several new industries, of which the most import-
ant was mining on Bougainville. The new industries and older pri-
mary industries both enjoyed high, windfall gains in 1973 and 1974 . 
All are suffering difficulties through the current world recession, 
which also threatens to have major, adverse effects on investment 
in resource industries, and so on the prospects for long-term na-
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tional financial self-reliance and growth. 
Late colonial policy in Papua New Guinea was influenced powerful-
ly by the worldwide growth and growth optimism of the 1960's. There 
was rapid expansion of administrative services and subsidised infra-
structure, supported by massive injections of Australian financial 
aid and personnel . One result was that the first national govern-
ment, which took office in 1972, inherited a large administration, 
financed largely by foreign grants and loans, which provided a 
range of services of varying usefulness to part of the population. 
Mr. Somare's Government faced the awful choice of dismantling most 
services and moving quickly towards a high degree of financial self-
reliance, or of modifying the most highly valued services and seek-
ing to extend them to areas which did not have them . By choosing 
to maintain and to extend services, the new Government was bound 
to seek an accommodation with foreign governments on long-term aid 
and with foreign corporations on major resource investments. 
Papua New Guinea's only viable route to significantly greater 
financial self - reliance is via revenues from major investments in 
minerals and energy. The resource base is in the early stages of 
evaluation, but it is probably sufficiently rich to support several 
such projects over the next decade, given a favourable domestic po-
litical and external economic environment. But the resource-invest-
ments route to greater national self-reliance is a testing one in 
a volatile and uncertain world economy. 
The world commodity boom, which gathered steam from late 1972 
and faltered in the first half of 1974 and collapsed in the second 
half, brought unprecedented prosperity to Papua New Guinea . The 
magnitude of these effects isdemonstratedmost simply by reference 
to the balance of commodity trade, which moved from a deficit of 
$125 million in 1971-72 (including the first three months' exports 
from the Bougainville project), to a small surplus of $20 million 
in 1972-73, and a large surplus of $220 million in 1973-74. Fall-
ing export prices and rising import prices have led to a return to 
very large deficits in 1974-75 . 
High commodty pric~s raised rural incomes to unprecedented levels, 
especially in coastal areas . They also contributed to very buoyant 
government revenues and to some short-term reduction in aid require-
ments. The prodigious profitability of the Bougainville project 
over this period allowed the renegotiation of the tax-agreement 
along lines that preserved the viability of the company while great-
ly increasing government revenue . 
The Bougainville renegotiation, in particular, brought major 
long-term benefits to Papua New Guinea. But the high intensity of 
the boom also had costs, most importantly through the upward shift 
in the wage structure that was spurred by high company profits 
throughout the 1972-74 period. 
One by one, the prices of major export commodities collapsed 
from mid-1974. The buoyant first half of 1974 kept total govern-
ment revenue from Bougainville Copper's 1974 income at the healthy 
level of $93.5 million. However, revenue from the company's income 
for 1975 may be only about one-third of that figure. Government 
revenue was also affected adversely, although less dramatically, 
by the reduced prices of agricultural commodities. 
Papua New Guinea is well-protected from the cyclical variations 
in copper revenues by the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund, 
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which was established by legislation in late 1974 . But it is not 
protected against other major effects of the recession, including 
some reduced investment associated with current world economic pro-
blems . 
The revenues that are likely to be available from major invest-
ments in minerals and energy are affected greatly by uncertain-
ties both in the domestic political environment and the external 
economic environment . The two types of uncertainty are intertwin-
ed, as they both affect the terms upon which investments are under-
taken, and the terms themselves are important determinants of do-
mestic political responses. 
Evaluation of new, major minerals and energy projects is progres -
sing steadily , despite the uncertainties . Following the lift in 
oil- prices, oil exploration expenditures have increased enormously , 
especially in the drilling of promising structures on-shore and 
off-shore in the Gulf of Papua . A major feasibility study is in 
progress of the Purari hydroelectric resource, financed under uni-
que arrangements by grants from the Japanese, Australian and Papua 
New Guinea governments . Three major porphyry copper deposits are 
being explored intensiv~ly, two financed privately by Australia n 
and Japanese consortia, and one, at Ok Tedi, financed by the Papua 
New Guinea Government following the failure of negotiations about 
the terms upon which a major project might be mounted by the Ken-
necott Corporation . 
It is inevitable that there will be tensions and domestic poli-
tical controversy associated with major resource investments, des-
pite their importance to Papua New Guinea ' s economic strategy. 
Whether or not the tensions are so large as to make such projects 
unacceptable depends principally on the effectiveness of government 
administrative control over the activities of private companies, 
and on the fiscal and associated terms upon which the projects are 
mounted . 
The difficulties of maintaining effective administrative control 
of resource developments is essentially a domestic problem, which 
must be given high priority among the many administrative problems 
of the new Government . 
On fiscal arrangements, the Papua New Guinea Government has 
adopted as policy an approach that would give a high proportion of 
profits in excess of a ' reasonable return on investment' to the 
Government as taxation . Under this approach, a ' reasonably' profit-
able project would be subject only to normal corporation taxation, 
but a project that turns out to be highly profitable is taxed, on 
average over its life, at a higher rate . This progressiveness with 
rate of return is designed to overcome an almost universal problem 
associated with resource projects in developing countries : profit-
ability is highly uncertain at the time of investment, conventional 
taxes and royalties are set at rates that would not cause the pro-
ject to fail with ex post profitability at the lower end of the 
range of possibilities; and the national share of benefits is unac-
ceptably low when profitability turns out to be at the higher end 
of this range . In many countries, realisation of this problem has 
given rise to pressures for nationalisation and to other responses 
which in Papua New Guinea would be inimical to further, major re-
source investments. There is wide political support in Papua New 
Guinea for the Government's approach and, as one example of this 
approach, for the terms of the renegotiated Bougainville Agreement . 
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There are difficulties in applying the precise formula of the 
Bougainville Agreement, which was designed for a highly profitable, 
established project which had enjoyed almost two years tax-free in-
come at the time of the renegotiation, to new projects . Statements 
by the Papua New Guinea Government on taxation of new resource pro-
jects indicate an awareness of and willingness to make allowance 
for the difficulties. There are principally those relating to the 
effects of inflation, the arbitrary effects of profit fluctuations 
on average profit, and the rather indirect relationship between the 
rate of return on an annually calculated 'total investment' and the 
discounted cash flow concepts that are most important to new invest-
ors. 
One rather special and important source of uncertainty at the 
present time relates to the investment criteria used by investors . 
High inflation during the early 1970's and low profits for most ma-
jor mining companies have caused companies to be uncertain about 
the investment criteria that should be employed in new projects. 
Interest rates have been lower than the general rate of price in-
creases in many economies since 1973, and many major resource deve-
lopment companies have had to accept low or negative rates of return, 
when adjusted for inflation. The familiar investment criteria that 
were developed in times of low inflation - a range of from 13 to 18 
percent in expected discounted cash flow returns on total cash flow 
seems to have been widely accepted as justifying mining investment 
in the late 1960's and early 1970's - are used more cautiously, and 
some companies are tempted to 'look for' inflation-adjusted returns 
as high as these old benchmarks. This is unrealistic in the light 
of the current market, but it is difficult to judge what is realis-
tic in times of such rapid economic change on a global scale. This 
uncertainty seems to have been important in inhibiting new invest-
ment in non-energy resources in many places, and, despite the cur-
rent market glut, there is a danger that current under-investment 
will lead to a fierce boom in metal prices as the world emerges from 
recession (though probably with a considerable time-lag while exces-
sive stocks are absorbed into consumption). 
The general uncertainty about the expected rate of return that 
justifies major investment becomes a major feature of negotiations 
related to resource developments when a tax system is progressive 
with rate of return . The progressive tax system reduces disputes 
about cost and price parameters in negotiation of agreements and 
shifts dispute on to what constitutes a 'reasonable return' in a 
given set of market circumstances . Negotiation becomes an easier 
task, but it can only be an easy task in more settled circumstances 
than those existing at present. 
Investors' perceptions of p~itical risk, which can be well or 
poorly based, raise the expected rate of return at which investment 
in developing countries is - attractive to well above the rates appli-
ed to investment in the industrial countries. This factor can be 
viciously destabilising in relation to major investments in develop-
ing countries, especially when the projects are to operate within 
conventional royalty and taxation systems. Ex post rates of return 
well in excess of international norms are, of course, magnets for 
political concern, so that there is some tendency for companies' 
perceptions of risk to be self-fulfilling . As a new country, Papua 
New Guinea inevitably attracts some 'risk premium'. However, sophi-
sticated corporations are aware that the successful implementation 
of progressive tax systems is an important insurance against arbit-
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rary interference with negotiated agreements. Different companies 
perceive risk in a particular environment in different ways, and 
there must clearly be a 'sorting out' of investors by this criteri-
on over the next few years. 
The Papua New Guinea Government has not yet enunciated a fiscal 
policy on oil and gas developments, but it has been reported that 
policy on these developments is likely to incorporate many charact-
eristics of mining policy. The major petroleum companies tend to 
be more experienced than mining companies in evaluating commercial 
and political risk in an international environment, and the chances 
of extremely profitable projects being launched is higher in the 
petroleum industry at p r esent prices than in mining. There should 
not be great problems in reaching agreement on the fiscal terms up-
on which major petroleum developments would be undertaken. 
Negotiations on the terms of investment in processing industries 
based on hydroelectricitv resources mav be more difficult. It is 
only recenily that high ~orld energy p~ices and awareness of future 
scarcity have made large-scale investment in export industries bas-
ed on the hydroelectric potential of developing countries potential-
ly highly profitable. There is no tradition of successful invest-
ment of this kind. Investing companies will no doubt argue that 
the types of fiscal concessions that were once offered by many deve-
loping countries to investors in industrial activities will be neces-
sary to attract sufficient users to the enormous Purari potential . 
This could create problems for the development, especially if invest-
ors are reluctant to trade tax relief in the case of low realised 
profitability against high tax in more favourable circumstances. 
The commencement of projects at any two of the half-dozen major 
resource prospects under intensive investigation is likely to place 
Papua New Guinea well on the road to fiscal self-reliance at an at-
tractively high standard of living in the early 1980's, given the 
continuation of effective administration and appropriate policies 
in other areas of government, and given the maintenance of something 
like present world energy prices and the return of metal prices to 
postwar averages in real terms. Both the prospects of launching 
new projects and the national benefits associated with those pro-
jects, together with the established project on Bougainville, are 
very dependent on the existence of an expanding and open regional 
and world economy. At the same time, Papua New Guinea's willingness 
to participate in the regional economy through the exports of re-
sources contributes to the re-emergence of these conditions. Judge-
ments on whether it is sensible to take the risks of an export-ori-
ented strategy are assisted by analysis of the recent boom-and reces-
sion period in the industrial .countries. Here we look for signposts 
in the important case of Japan. 
Resource limits to growth_:__Japan 
Continued economic growth at over 10 percent per annum throughout 
the 1960's raised anxieties about resource supplies earlier in Japan 
than in other countries. Japan's specialisation in the importation 
of mineral fuels and non-ferrous metals and ores strengthened during 
this period of rapid growth, and Japanese demand had important ef-
fects on world markets for these cornrnodities.3l Japan accounted for 
3) See Jenny Corbett and Ross Garnaut, Japan and the Resource-Rich Developing 
Countries, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokvo, 1975 . 
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more than one-quarter of the expansion in world petroleum imports 
and more than one-half of world imports of non-ferrous minerals and 
metals during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Thus, Japan contri-
buted significantly to the pressures on resource supplies in the 
early 1970's, although many Japanese react sensitively to the sug-
gestion that this was the case. 
Japan reacted constructively to impending resource problems well 
ahead of the 1973 price peaks and the 'oil crisis' of late 1973 . 
The problem of securing future resource supplies was linked crea-
tively to problems of environmental deterioration, domestic labour 
shortages, inflation and payments surpluses in the development of 
a new foreign economic strategy, and in a series of policy initia-
tives between 1971 and 1973 . Within the new strategy, Japanese ex-
port specialisation was to be shifted towards 'knowledge-intensive' 
products, making less demands on imported natural resources, on 
less-skilled labour and on the domestic environment. Processed 
goods were to become more important in imports. New, overseas sourc-
es of labour-intensive and resource-intensive goods were to be en-
couraged in supplier coutries by direct Japanese investment. The 
new strategy was supported by tariff cuts, several yen revaluations, 
the lifting of controls on private foreign investment, and the ex-
pansion and liberalisation of foreign aid . 
The Japanese balance of pavments had already turned around in 
response to these measures ~h~n the oil supply -restrictions and 
price increases struck in late 1973. The turn-around accelerated 
sharply, and the new payments deficit became the major concern of 
Japanese economic policy. The long-term adjustments lost their 
priority in the face of more urgent problems. 
Japan applied savage constraints to money supply expansion and 
demand, as r~eans of combating external payments deficits and domes-
tic inflation. Just as Japan contributed greatly to bringing the 
world into boom in 1972 and 1973, the sharp contraction in Japanese 
incomes and imports, and in capital outflow, added significantly to 
world recessionary tendencies in 1974 and 1975. 
The Japanese recession had massive effects in some commodity mar-
kets. The volume of petroleum imports fell from 289.7 million ton-
nes in 1973 to 278.4 million tonnes in 1974 contributing to the 
world's excess petroleum supply that was becoming apparent in late 
1974. This was to become a major problem for Indonesia. More dra-
matically, the rate of Japan's copper consumption in the first half 
of 1974 was 17 percent below the 1973 level. By June and July, the 
rate of consumption was 46 percent below the 1973 level. Japan be-
came one of the world's largest exporters of copper metal, as smelt-
ers poured the surplus over domestic demand back on to world markets, 
and contributed to the shift fall in London Metal Exchange prices 
from £1400 sterling in April to about £500 sterling at the end of 
1974. Under pressure from the CIPEC governments, Japanese smelters 
agreed to cease exports in November 1974, and in return secured an 
undertaking that CIPEC countries would reduce total exports by 10 
percent and apply the whole of the cutback to the Japanese market, 
and that new copper industries in Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Papua New Guinea would reduce shipments to Japan by 15 percent. 
Further cutbacks were agreed to under pressure from Japanese smelt-
ers early in 1975. 
The Japanese recession has been very costly for Japan, whose real 
gross national product fell by 1.7 percent in 1974, and even more 
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so for developing countries 
and world corrunodity markets 
ery in Japan. 
in the region. Recovery in regional 
over the next few years requires recov-
However, rapid growth on the pattern of the 1960's may never re-
turn in Japan. An emerging consensus in Japan is that the costs of 
such high growth, including internationa l tensions associated with 
the securing of resource supplies, are too great. Official growth 
projections have been lowered to between 6 and 8 percent per annum 
over the next decade. · 
However, it is doubtful whether the energy supplies will easily 
be available to support even these more modest growth projections. 
The plans after the oil crisis provide for 7 percent annual growth 
in energy consumption, compared with over 14 percent per annum be-
tween 1965 and 1970. It is anticipated that nuclear sources will 
provide between 10 . 3 percent and 11.4 percent of total energy sup-
ply by 1985, and that Japan's share in world petroleum imports will 
remain at about the present level. But, early plans for the instal-
lation of new nuclear capacity have been damaged, and their imple-
mentation delayed, by local, political opposition. Moreover, the 
maintenance of the current Japanese position in world petroleum 
trade may leave the countrv feeling too vulnerable to the vagaries 
of international politics. · 
The realisation of Japan's revised growth goals requires signifi-
cant progress in the implementation of the new foreign economic 
strategy. Perhaps most important of all in the strategy, it requir-
es the shifting of much of its metal-processing industry outside 
Japan, to sites with access to abundant power. This requires the 
building of confidence both in Japan and in other countries in the 
reliability of the international economic order. It also requires 
the avoidance of what must appear as a 'soft option' in Japan: un-
diminished reliance on fossil fuels, available in glut proportions 
during the first half of 1975 as a temporary result of the lift in 
petroleum prices and the world recession. The successful movement 
towards the importation of heavily resource-intensive commodities 
would loosen the constraints on continued Japanese growth and f aci-
li tate a return to growth in many resource-exporting countries . 
The chances for a small, new ecGnomy 
What are the chances for a sma ll, new country that must succeed 
in developing new resource exporting industries to survive? Is good 
management of its foreign economic relations enough for Papua New 
Guinea to make its way out of extreme aid dependence, or are the 
dice weighted too heavily the other way? Will there be an expand-
ing, open world economy over the next decade? 
There are few serious opinions that there can be a return to the 
high growth that led to the 1973-4 boom. Deputy Prime ~inister Fu-
kuda expressed a more common view in his economic policy speech to 
the Diet early this year : 
... the world economy has to bid farewell to the age of 
prosperity and shift- to a new age of 'low growth'. More-
over, the new age will be far from stable. In view of the 
new 'resource nationalism' and other trends, we must pre-
sume that it will, in all probability, be an age of •iow 
growth', fraught with the danger of unrest. Our country, 
therefore, should steer its economv with ~ircumspection to 
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achieve and maintain a steady and a moderate growth, which 
will also be in harmony with the economic and related acti-
vities of the international community as a whole. 4) 
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To achieve even a ''steady and moderate ~rowth", Japan and the re-
source-importing industrial countries must accept major structural 
adjustments in their domestic economies . At least in the case of 
Japan, the required structural adjustments have a large internation-
al content, and depend on a high degree of confidence in the stabi-
lity of the international economy . 
Like investors' perceptions of political risk in a developing 
country, fears of a decline in international trade tend to be self-
fulfilling . If Papua New Guinea judges that there are no prospects 
for establishing new, profitable resource industries ov er the next 
decade, it makes sense f or her to attempt to adjust now to much low-
er incomes and standards, no matter how painful or d i sruptive the 
adjustment. Similarly, it is sensible for Japan to adjust now to 
areducedlevel of foreign trade and to lower incomes if there is 
likely to be a future fdilure of resource supplies. If Japan is like-
ly to retreat from increasing integration into the international 
economy, the necessary conditions for the launching of new resource 
projects in Papua New Guinea are unlikely to be met. If the resource 
exporting countries believe that Japan is likely to retreat from 
trade-oriented growth, they are unlikely to commit themselves to 
heavy investment in resource industries. 
The reactions of the rich, Western Pacific countries to the cur-
rent recession have been insensitive to their effects on confidence 
in the international economy. Cutbacks in both countries' aid pro-
grammes have raised anxieties in neighbouring developing countries, 
and Australian aid reductions have had an especially severe effect 
in Papua New Guinea. Japanese reduction of copper concentrate im-
ports below the levels specified in sales contracts early in 1974 
has introduced a new element of uncertainty into all mining invest-
ments. Australian restrictions on imports of labour-intensive pro-
ducts have produced a similar effect on a much smaller scale. Aust-
ralian policies which encourage the extravagant use of scarce hydro-
carbon fuels and which might in future inhibit the processing of 
Australian minerals at low cost through the use of renewable energy 
sources in other countries, fly in the face of adjustments that are 
necessary for maintaining world prosperity in the long term . 
The world's return to a moderate and steady growth must be a 
highly co-operative task . The developing countries are potentially 
the major losers from uncertainty in resource trade and investment. 
Papua New Guinea is one small country that has sought to manage the 
uncertainties that are inevitably associated with outward-looking 
growth. But the possibility must be faced that she could fail be-
cause of myopic policies in the region's rich economies. 
A moderate and steady growth through the region would quickly 
restore demand for resource-intensive commodities, and would pro-
vide very important opportunities for trade in energy-intensive 
commodities, because energy would again become scarce . Energy scar-
cities raise difficult problems of adjustment in the industrial 
countries, that could defeat the opportunities they provide for re-
source-rich countries. All countries in the region share an inter-
4) Economic Policy Speech by Director-General Takeo Fukuda, Mini-
stry-of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1975, p.2 . 
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est in the co-operation that is necessary to avoid this defeat, 
which would be fatal for the smallest and newest among them. 
COMMENTS ON GARNAUT'S PAPER 
(a) GEOFF BRAAE 
I have found that this interesting paper by Dr. Garnaut high-
lights a number of the specific aspects or themes which have kept 
re-occurring in many if not all the papers presented . I want brief-
ly to discuss these in the setting of this paper and then to ask 
some questions on certain specific points in the paper which I 
would like elaborated . These may of course reflect my ignorance of 
the Papua New Guinea economy, but I think they fit in with the 
topic of foreign investment in a small developing country. Dr . 
Garnaut has in fact made some reference to these in his opening re-
marks . 
The first point is that of viability and continued development, 
of a small newly independent economy . In this respect Papua New 
Guinea faces problems similar to other countries of the region, and 
it has perhaps an added interest in viability because of its "new-
ness" although there has been a period of preparation . As was men-
tioned in previous discussions these matters are relative. But 
given the build up of the infrastructure and administration before 
independence it would seem the first national government would have 
had little option in reversing the trends . Papua New Guinea like 
most countries has great interests in the expansion of the world 
economy, with links through trade and investment, and Dr . Garnaut ' s 
paper recognises that an autarchic option for Papua New Guinea is 
not on . 
The second point concerns the sharing of the gains from foreign 
investment . What are the strategies open to the governments of 
these economies and Papua New Guinea in particular? For the major 
investment in Bougainville copper the tax arrangements may perhaps 
be unique as Dr . Garnaut recognises . Bargaining on a reasonable 
rate of return however, can obviously involve concessions and other 
adjustments or what could be called mixed strategies . I refer here 
to the range of options mentioned e . g . by Professor Desai with re-
spect to Fiji and these may be used for other investment . There 
may however be other controls. One factor could be restraints or 
limits on remittances of profits, and I ask whether this has been 
or is likely to be implemented as a policy variable either in iso-
lation or in conjunction with other factors . From time to time 
large remittances of profits can become highly controversial issues 
and in any case can raise balance of payments difficulties . One 
could also ask about controls through a stake in the investment . 
This presumably will be limited to Papua New Guinea for some time . 
New Zealand, I understand, has a sort of vetting process in order 
to decide on the local share. This could be seen as an alternative 
to the purely tax gains. There is we have been told a 20% share 
in Bouganville Copper held by the Papua New Guinea government. We 
remember too Dr. Wionczek's point about problems of negotiating 
with the multi-national corporations. A skilled and knowledgeable 
team of administrators is necessary and Dr. Garnaut has given us 
some reassurances in this matter. 
The other general aspect is to point up what may appear to be a 
difference between Papua New Guinea and some other economies that 
have been discussed. We have been reminded many times that the 
L.D . C's of the Pacific region have limited options for development . 
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Papua New Guinea has minerals in addition to traditional primary 
products. The development of these has started, and there are also 
prospects in energy products, oil and natural gas, and hydro-elect-
ric power, which we are told would back investment in processing 
industries. To many of the other Pacific region economies this 
range of prospects must appear attractive to say the least and puts 
Papua New Guinea in a special position . These are however poten-
tialities and not actualities - the realities depend on an expand-
ing and open regional and world economy with special emphasis on 
Japan and Australia. 
I now turn to some specific points : 
1. There is a reference to a Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund. 
Could we have some details on this? This is not directly connect-
ed with foreign investment but clearly has an effect on that in-
vestment. 
2 . What has been the influence of foreign investment on the wage 
structure, on the availability of labour for the lesser paid jobs 
and on the growth of unionism? It is mentioned that inflation 
led to an upward shift in wage structure - but has foreign invest-
ment caused a division between a relatively small well-paid group 
which may also have other foreign benefits and the larger group 
of lower paid workers in primary and other industries? 
3 . Has it created other social problems - in e.g. housing, health? 
4 . Finally has it created or is it likely to create marked regional 
differences within Papua New Guinea which would in time lead to 
political problems about development and sharing of the gains? 
One final comment. When asked to participate in this conference 
it was mentioned that a main purpose was "to explore various feas-
ible alternatives in order to minimise the disadvantages of small 
countries, without them or the larger countries losing benefits of 
relatively full trade and investment flows." It seems to me that 
Dr. Garnaut's paper comes into this framework. Both large and 
small countries as he has shown can gain from trade and investment. 
(b) GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Participants raised a numbe r of questions on which they sought 
further information. These inc luded the speed at which independ-
ence was achieved and whether this meant that Papua New Guinea was 
being forced to develop at a faster pace and in different directions 
than ihe inhabitants really wis hed . This could mean too great a re-
liance on foreign aid and investment and it was perhaps questionable 
that, given that local managerial talent was very short, foreign ex-
perts could negotiate in Papua Ne w Guinea's best interests . The 
Bougainville Copper Agreement was cited in this connection. 
Concern was also expressed at the possible effects on Papua New 
Guinea's development if the flow of aid and private investment were 
significantly reduced . Though Australia would retain a major role 
as an aid source in the immediate future, aid and investment from 
elsewhere would continue to be necessary . The need to develop other 
projects would also be important if the Bougainville separatist move-
ment were to succeed. 
Replying to comments, Dr. Garnaut said that the downward readjust-
ment that now appeared to be inevitable could be the result of Aust-
ralia's having pushed Papua New Guinea too far off the ground. Giv-
ROSS GARNAUT 277 
en the geographical fragmentation of the country impeding communi-
cation and integration, the very short time for which some tribes 
had been in contact with the Australian administration (as little 
as a decade in some cases) a h igh ~evel of expensive infrastructure 
investment was necessary in order to achieve the deg r ee of politi-
cal integration necessary for i ndependence . 
He agreed that stages of development have been skipped . Some Pa-
pua New Guineans have not handl ed this as easily as others . But 
the Papua New Guineans themselves have had very little choice in 
the matter . Their rapid development had been forced upon them by 
outside pressures . 
Responding to Professor Braae he sa i d that the new government 
does not want investment at any cost . It fully recognises the po-
tential costs and wanted to keep these to a minimum but given Papua 
New Guinea ' s development needs this would have to be a fairly high 
minimum . The government ' s deliberate policy is to be interested 
in foreign investment only when benefits to Papua New Guinea are 
substantial. 
On the question of controls on the remittances of profits these 
are regarded as being self defeating in the long run . 
Turning ~o the Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund, the fund's 
purpose is to even out the flow of revenue to the government from 
mining operations in the face of severe cyclical fluctuations . The 
fund's managers have the task of projecting long term trends in 
copper prices and managing revenues accordingly . 
The suggestion of one speaker of investing the stabilization 
funds in equities in real estate suffers from the problem of liqui-
dating those funds . When copper prices are low equities and real 
estate value are also likely to fall . 
Replying to questions about how indigenous is the process of 
negotiation and administration, Dr . Garnaut said that Papua New 
Guinea ' s negotiating strength is still heavily dependent on foreign-
ers although Papua New Guineans hold several key posts and are right 
on top of developments . 
The Bougainville Copper Agreement had been renegotiated and the 
new terms are considered satisfactory . There was no evidence that 
multinationals are behind the Bougainville secessionists . Rio Tin-
to Zinc would be very prudent in this given the experience of the 
last ten years or so. 
As regards future state involvement in development projects most 
projected state developments relate to agriculture, education and 
infrastructure . It is important not to direct too many scarce ad-
ministration resources away from these areas into the management of 
mining projects . However , there is no ideological commitment eith-
er way . It is something to be decided case by case . 
The point regarding internal transfer mechanism is important and 
Papua New Guinea is paying considerable attention to this . Diversi-
fying capital services is also important but a borrowing strategy 
is surely dangerous at this stage of transition. It would involve 
an even greater commitment to continual expansion rather than tak-
ing one thing at a time . Dr . Garnaut concluded that in his opinion 
Papua New Guinea will succeed despite the problems that beset it. 
Among other things it has unusually good political leadership. 
13 
COOPERATION IN NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: f'lARINE RESOURCES 
LEWIS M. ALEXANDER AND FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR. 
The process of developing the natural resources of the oceans is 
taking place against a background of continual change: change in 
the political map of the world as countries become independent; 
change in demands for marine resources and in abilities to explore 
for and exploit them; and change in the law of the sea, whereby the 
public order of the oceans is maintained. In few parts of the world 
are these changes more in evidence than here in the Asia/Pacific 
region where new states are emerging, new resource demands are sur-
facing, and there are new perspectives of the ocean and its wealth 
potential . During this period of transition from the era of the 
free seas to one of a managed sea there are strong opportunities 
for cooperation and joint development; but there are also increased 
possibilities of conflict as States vie with one another for their 
share of the benefits derived from the sea. Such conflicts need be 
not only between developing and developed countries, but also among 
developing States themselves, or between those which are developed . 
In this area of the world ocean, where continents and islands are 
in such relatively close proximity to one another, cooperation in 
ocean use is a vital need; and the new law of the sea should provide 
impetus for such interaction . 
It is difficult to generalize on conditions of marine resources 
development, because of the disparities existing among and within 
ocean regions of the world. There are, for example, differences · 
in coastal configurations and in the relation of islands to one 
another. Some island groups are clustered together as archipelagos, 
while others are widely strung out . There are differences in the 
extent of underseas platforms a d joining land masses . And there are 
certainly wide variations in the existence of marine resources off 
countries ' coasts. Some areas constitute rich fishing grounds , while 
others are biological deserts. Some continental margins are known 
to have vast oil and gas resources; for others no indications of 
hydrocarbons, have yet been found . A new type of ocean resource are 
the manganese nodules of the deep seabed . Here again the pattern of 
distribution is uneven . Nodules with particularly high concentrations 
of nickel and copper have been found to exist in an east-west band 
of southeast and southcentral North Pacific, beyond the limits of 
the Asia/Pacific Region . But the effects of large-scale nodule pro-
duction may in time be felt by land producers of the same minerals, 
such as New Caledonia in terms of nickel, Papua New Guinea with 
respect to nickel and copper, and Australia in terms of copper and 
manganese . 
New advances in technology are making possible marine exploration 
and exploitation in increasingly hostile environments; they also make 
possible greater harvesting capacities of fish , and the ability to de-
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stroy natural reefs, create artificial islands, drain off wetlands, 
and otherwise alter the marine environrrent, sorretimes with disastrous effects. 
In this paper, three issues will be stressed . First there will 
be a summary of ocean activities and the changing jurisdictional 
needs. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the on-going 
Law of the Sea Conference . With these two topics as background the 
text will then turn to the theme of cooperation and conflict in 
marine resources development, with special emphasis on the role of 
fisheries management. Through these discussions runs the theme 
that in the case of marine development there is considerable oppor-
tunity for less-developed States, particularly here in the Asia/ 
Pacific Region, to find themselves in a fairly strong bargaining po-
sition vis-a-vis the developed countries, in part because of the 
LDCs' control over critical ocean areas and marine resources, and 
because of the growing need for these countries' cooperation in 
regional marine programmes, such as those involving fisheries and 
pollution control . 
Ocean Activities and Jurisdictional Needs 
General ocean activities might be divided into two broad cate-
gories: natural resources development, and non-resource uses of 
ocean space·. The two categories are often interrelated; activities 
under each of the headings may take place within a State ' s coastal 
zone, or up to a considerable distance offshore . 
1 . Natural Resources Development 
Among the resources of the sea, a distinction must be drawn be-
tween living and non-living . The former are renewable on a yearly 
basis, assuming they are exploited under proper management conditions; 
the latter are non-renewable, except over long periods of time.l) 
Among the non-renewable resources, by far the most valuable are off-
shore oil and gas. 
According to recent estimates2l offshore exploration for hydro-
carbons is in progress on the continental shelves and slopes of 80 
countries, with commercial production reported from 26 of these. 
Discoveries of commercial hydrocarbon potentials have been made off 
13 additional countries, although no commercial exploitation is in 
progress. Worldwide oil production from offshore accounts for about 
18 per cent of total output, and this figure is expected to rise to 
30-35 per cent of the total by 1980. 3 ) 
1) There are, of course, special cases of renewal, such as sedi.rcents 
which are continually being replenished at the mouths of rivers. 
2) John Albers, "Offshore Petroleum: Its Geography and Technology," 
in Gamble, J.K •. , and Pontecorvo, G., eds., Law of the Sea: The 
Emerging Regime of the Oceans (Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger 
Publishing Company, 1974) .- pp. 293-313. See also "Summary 
Petroleum and Selected Mineral Statistics for 120 Countries, In-
cluding Offshore Areas, "Geological Survey Professional Paper 
817 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1973). 
3) McKelvey, V.E. and Wang, F.F.H., "World Subsea Mineral Resources," 
U.S. Geological Survey Misc. Geol. Inv. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 1970). 
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Offshore hydrocarbons have to date been exploited only on 
continental shelves, in depths of up to 450 feet, but technology 
will soon permit recovery beyond 600 feet, out on the continental 
slopes and ride . There are considerable areas of continental shelves 
along the East Asian littoral (particularly the Yellow, East China, 
and South China Seas), in Indonesia and the Philippines, and off 
Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia ranks second among the cotmtri-
es of the world in terms of total area of the continental shelf off 
its coasts, and Australia ranks third. From the standpoint of ex-
tent of total continental margin (shelf, slope, and rise) Australia 
ranks first among the wor ld 's coastal States, Indonesia second, and 
New Zealand sixth. There are extensive areas of margin surrounding 
and to the east of Papua New Guinea; marginal belts also adjoin the 
New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Tonga , but many of the smaller 
pacific islands and island groups have little or no continental 
margins off their coasts. 
So far as bydrocarbon reserves are concerned the Far East is gen-
e rally credited with 3.6 billion barrels of ultimate recoverable 
offshore oil reserves, or 2 per cent of the world's total recover-
able reserves; and Oceania with 2.9 billion barrels, bringing the 
ultimate recoverable offshore reserves of the Asi~/Pacific Region 
to use under 4 per cent of the world tota1.4) For natural gas the 
figures for the Region are 16 .3 trillions of cubic f5et, or 15 per-
cent of the worldwide recoverable offshore reserves. ) 
The total figures for hydrocarbons are perhaps less important 
than is the distribution. Which of the LDCs of Asia/Pacific Region 
would be in the position to profit from these offshore resources? 
Indonesia, certainly, in the Java Sea, Makassar Strait, and off 
West Irian. Malaysia, particularly off Sarawak and Sabah; Brunei, 
although not yet an independent State, as well as South Vietnam, 
off its southeasternrnost coast; and there are good indications off 
Papua New Guinea . But at this stage of knowledge, not many others. 
There are few indications of hydrocarbons within and around the 
Philippines, off Fiji and Tonga, and in the vicinity of the small-
er Pacific islands. Australia, on the other hand, has considerable 
hydrocarbon potential off its northwest coast, and there are some 
recoverable reserves off New Zealand. In the Yellow and Last China 
Seas, large-scale production of hydrocarbons by the littoral States 
may before long be underway . 
A potential resource problem of the future involves the possibili-
ty of maganese nodule resource s existing in the economic zones of 
the myriad of islands and atolls spread out across the Asia/Pacific 
Region. One of the proposals receiving considerable support at the 
Third Law of the Sea Conferance is for the establishment off each 
country's coast of an economic zone out to a maximum distance of 
200 nautical miles. Within the zone the coastal State would have 
rights to both living resources of the waters, and to the non-
iiving resources of the seabed and subsoil, even beyond the limits 
of the continental margin, if this margin ends less than 200 miles 
from shore. 
4) Albers, op cit., p. 295. Percentages are based on a total 
which includes the Persian Gulf with 60 per cent of the world-
wide ultimate recoverable offshore oil reserves . 
5) Albers,~ cit., p. 297 
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A map of the 200-mile limits in the Asia/Pacific Region shows 
that the establishment of such a zone wou ld "enclose" virtually all 
of the ocean space of the area , except for a gap between Australia 
and New Zealand, another to the north of New Zealand, and a third 
to the east of the Phil.ippines. 
No strong support has yet appeared at the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence for distinguishing among islands, rocks, and atolls, in terms 
of their use as bases for describing a 200-mile economic zone. One 
mid-ocean rock could theoretically be entitled to an economic zone 
measuring 125,000 square nautical miles of ocean space; in fact, 
however, most economic zones of the world overlap one another so 
that the extent of area closed off by a single basepoint would be 
considerably less. But two issues are important here. One is that 
within the economic zones of small islands important manganese 
nodules resources may in time be discovered; these presumably 
would belong to the State which owns the island or islands in question. 
A second point is that the ownership of a ·n}lmber of islands and 
island groups of the Pacific are in dispute. Among these are the 
Northern Cook Islands and the Tokelaus, contested between the United 
States and New Zealand, and the southern Ellice, Pheonix, and Line 
Islands, claimed by both the United States and the United Kingdom.6) 
Turing to the exploitation of living resources, we are faced with 
problems of great complexity. First, there are the dimensions of the 
resource itself, second tlie nature and extent of the commercial fish-
eries, and· third, the opportunities for cooperation and for conflict 
among the exploiting States. These issues are for the most part cov-
ered later in this paper. At this point consideration will be given 
only to the general extent of fisheries resources of the region. 
According to Gulland,7) the natural fisheries wealth of the Asian 
Pacific might be considered under the following headings: (1) the 
Northwest Pacific, with an estimated annual potential catch of about 
7 million metric tons; (2) the Western Central Pacific (including 
the South China Sea, Indonesia, and the Philippines), with an estimate-
ed annual potential of somewhere between 11 and 19 million metric 
tons; and (3) the Sou~hwest Pacific with an estimated annual po-
tential of less than 2 million metric tons, the majority of this 
off southern Australia and New Zealand, Gulland notes the low fisher-
ies potentials for the waters off the smaller islands of the Pa-
cific, and reports that of the considerable potential of the Western 
Central Pacific, probably less than 3.5 million tons are actually 
harvested each year. The estimates suggest that this region is one 
of the most productive of the world, but it has not yet attracted 
the traditional long-distance fleets. Gulland feels that local 
fishing could be increased tremendously in the Indonesian and 
Phillippine archipelagos, as well as in adjacent waters underlain 
by continental shelf. Despite the unutilized fisheries potential, 
particularly in the Western Central Pacific, there are many problems 
6) For a description of these disputes, and their possible effects 
on marine resource development, see F.M. Auburn, "Some Legal 
Problems of the Commercial Exploitation of Manganese Nodules in 
the Pacific, "Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 
Vol. 1 (Summer, 1973), pp. 185-201. 
7) J.A. Gulland, ed., The Fish Resources of the Ocean, FAO Technical 
Paper No. 97 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations, 1970). 
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of possible conflict as certain stocks become overfished, as 
vessels from two or more countries share in a common fishery, and 
as congestion of ships and of gear occur in heavily-fished areas . 
Closing off the inter-island waters of archipelagos as national 
waters would have the effect of protecting fisheries resources there 
from foreign fleets; extending economic zone limits to the 200-rnile 
maximum would further expand coastal State jurisdiction over species 
traditionally harvested by foreigners, particularly vessels from 
Japan, but also from Thailand, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, 
and other States which are beginning to develop distant-water 
capabilities. 
2. Non Resource Uses of Ocean _Space 
The principal woldwide activity in this category, at least from 
the standpoint of economics, is shipping. Much of this involves 
shipping among the countries of a region, or through a region from 
one part of the world to another. But a considerable amount of 
movement of goods and people, particularly in the Asia/Pacific Region 
is between two parts of the same country. For an area so closely 
associated with waterways as this is two special issues are important; 
safety of navigation, and freedom of transit. The second issue is 
of particular import to law of the sea concerns. 
Within the Asia/Pacific Region are some of the world's most impor-
tant international straits, among them Malacca, Sunda, Lornbod, Torres, 
Formosa, and Bashi Channel. Countries bordering on straits used for 
international navigation have traditionally been concerned first 
about the unrestricted use of such waterways by potential polluters; 
and second, by foreign military vessels. In the first case, oil 
tankers, nuclear vessels, and others may fai l to adhere to certain 
safety standards, and carry inadequate liability to compensate the 
coastal State in the event of a major environmental disaster. In 
the second instance the State may be reluctant to permit the free 
pas sage of submerged nuclear submarines through its coastal waters, 
or the unrestricted overflight of foreign military aircraft. These 
issues are complicated in the case of archipelagos where traditional 
sealanes pass through the inter-island waters . 
Countries contemplating a 200-rni le economic zone frequently refer 
to the "free" transit of foreign vessels through the zone beyond 
narrow territorial lirni ts, but such transit, as in the case of straits , 
may . in time become subject to restrictions in the interests of pollution 
control and/or of national security . Clearly, in the Asia/Pacific 
Region, possible infringements of navigation may prove to be an ex-
tremely controversial issue in corning years. 
Another non-resource use of ocean space is scientific r esearch. 
Fundamental research has traditionally been looked upon by the major 
maritime powers as one of the freedoms of the high seas, althouth 
research involving a foreign State's continental shelf requires 
prior consent from that State before being carried out. But the 
impending 200-mile economic zone may threaten freedom of research. 
Coasta l States may look upon their economic zone as a part of the 
national territory, within which they should have jurisdiction over 
oceanographic research activities, both with respect to the ocean 
floor, and to the water column itself. 
One emerging trend may be the establishment of regional science 
centres throughout the world. Countries with oceanographic capabili-
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ties might join and help support such centres in return for per-
mission to carry out research in the other member States's waters. 
Still another ocean use involves control over pollution. Within 
the coming economic zone ought a coastal State have the right to 
establish its own standards, particularly with respect to vessel-
source pollution, or should it abide by internationally-set rules 
and regulations, such as those laid down by the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization(IMCO)? If the coastal State is 
a developing one, should it have the right to adopt double standards 
- one set for its own vessels and those of its developing neighbours 
and another set for ships of developed countries? Finally, who 
should b e ar the responsibility for enforcing pollution control 
standards, the coastal State through whose waters a vessel is pass-
ing, or the State whose flag the vessel is flying? 
Here again is a chance for regional cooperation. Littoral States 
about semi-enclosed seas have the opportunity of setting camon environ-
mental standards (as oc~urred recently in the Baltic) and of cooper-
ating in pollution abatement programmes for the area . 
There are other types of current or impending ocean use which 
might be discussed here. Among these are military use, recreation, 
use of the sea for fresh water, or as a coolant, and the utilization 
of ocean space for storage or as a site for power plants. And in 
coastal areas, oil refineries or nuclear power complexes may be 
constructed. But space limitations preclude discussion of these 
uses, and of impending ones, such as the generation of energy from 
tides, currents, or geothermal gradients. What is important here is 
that increases in the extent and nature of ocean uses bring with it 
increases in potential conflict, and in the need for cooperative 
management efforts by the countries of a region. But the inst-
tutional mechanisms for achieving such cooperative efforts are often 
virtually non-existent, and it becomes difficult to identify the 
short-term incentives which would bring such management efforts into 
being. 
Developments in the Law of the Sea 
Many of the standards now generally accepted as par t of the inter-
national law of the sea were laid down at the First Law of the Sea 
Conference , which was held in Geneva in the spring of 1958 . These 
standards pretty much reflect the views of the developed maritime 
States. In the years since the First Conference about 60 former 
dependent territories have become independent. Many of these have 
joined with developing countries having longer histories of self-
rule to form the so-called "Group of 77" (which now numbers over one 
hundred members) to press for changes in the ocean regime which 
would appear to make it more favourable to the States of the Develop-
ing World . 
There was a Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960 which tried 
unsucessfully to reach agreement on one single issue - a uniform 
breadth of the territorial sea . Seven years later the United Nations 
General Assembly took the initial step toward the convening of a 
Third Law of the Sea Conference, and after a number of years of pre-
paration, the third Conference held its first substantive session in 
Caracas during the summer of 1974. Instead of the 86 delegations 
which were present at the First Conference, 138 attended the Caracas 
meeting. Nothing conclusive emerged from Caracas, and during the 
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past spring, a second substantive session was convened in Geneva. 
Although a great many issues remained unresolved after the eight 
weeks of negotiation, there did emerge from the Geneva sission an 
Informal Single Negotiating Text prepared by the Chairmen of the 
three Committees of the session, with the help of their staffs. 
While the Text does not purport to represent in any way an agreed 
position on law of the sea issues, it does have che advantage of 
spelling out the major themes of the Conference, and of constitut-
ing a basis for further negotiations. These negotiations will 
probably take place beginning in March, 1976 in New York City. 
It should be stressed that the Third Conference is but a part of 
a long-term transition process from the relatively "free seas" re-
gime of the past, to one of national and international management 
of the oceans and their resources . The impetus for UN action in 1967 
was provided by an address to the General Assembly by Ambassador 
Aivid Pardo of Malta in which he suggested that the mineral resources 
of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should 
be the common heritage of mankind, and that a portion of the revenue 
derived from their exploitation should go to an international fund 
to be distributed among the less developed States of the world. 
Ambassador Pardo's concept has since become widely accepted, and 
has been one of the driving forces behind the willingness of many 
countries to coritribute the expenses and time necessary for the 
long preparations and for the formal sessions of the Third Conference. 
There are se\;era_1_ approaches to a discussion of the Law of the 
Sea Conferenc~. One involves the Committee structure. Much of the 
real work of the Conference has been done through its Committees . 
The First Committee is concerned with t:w regime of the deep seabed 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In some respects this 
is the most controversial of the three groups, because of the wide 
divergence of views between developed and developing States on the 
proper nature of the impending International Seabed Authority. 
The Third Committee handles questions of protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment, scientific research, and technology 
transfer. The Second Committee is something of a potpourri, since 
it deals with many aspects of offshore jurisdiction. Among its res-
ponsibilities are offshore zones and boundaries, the continental 
shelf, the high seas, straits U3ed for international navigation, the 
regime of islands, land-locked States, archipelagos, and semi-en-
closed seas. Its concern with offshore zones and boundaries involves 
it alsc in the whole question of fisheries. 
A second method of considering the Conference might be in terms 
of the groupings of States on the basis of common interests. One, 
already noted, is the ''Group of 77" composed of developing countries 
at the Conference. The solidarity of the Group was enhanced by an 
agreement among its members that dEc .:is ions should be based on the 
consensus rule. But on many issues consensus was impossible because 
of the wide diversity of conditions and interests among the develop-
ing States. For example, the more than twenty land-locked States 
felt their special needs were not being sufficiently recognized at 
the Conference; on several issues they were joined by a number of 
shelf-locked and other "geographically-disadvantaged" countries. 
Other interest groups banded together for specific purposes. The 
archipelagic States sought r ecognition of their unique geographic 
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characteristics; the straits States were concerned with the conditions 
of passage of foreign vessels close to their coasts . The scientific 
research group sought to maximum freedom of research beyond terri-
torial limits, while some States bordering on semi-enclosed seas 
were anxious to have special regimes authorized for such water bodies . 
There were the usual regional groups, s uch as the Latin Arrerican, African, 
and East European States, and one informal working party , the so-
called "Evensen Group" which-met continually during the conference 
in order to prepare a draft text on the economic zone. 
Still another way of viewing the Third Law of the Sea Conference 
is in terms of the Single Negotiating Text which emerged from the 
Geneva session. In his charge to the Chairmen of the three Committees 
the President of the Geneva session stressed that the text should 
take account of all formal and informal discussions held so far, 
that it would be imformal in character and would not prejudice the 
position of any delegation, and that it would not represent any 
negotiated text or accepted compromise. Rather, it should be seen 
as a procedural device which could provide a basis for further nego-
tiation. 
The three parts, representing the work of each of the three Com-
mittees are somewhat uneven in nature. The Chairman of the First 
Committee would not accept the draft text prepared by his staff, and 
instead wrote himself the 75 Articles which comprise Part I. Delegates, 
particularly from developed conutries contend that Part I is more a 
statement of the developing countries' position on the highly-
controversial seabed regime question than it is an attempt to reflect 
"all the formal and informal discussions held so far" at the Confer-
erence. On the other hand Parts II and III of the Single Text seem 
much more balanced in their treatment of the issues to be included 
in a new ocean regime. Accompanying the Single Negotiating Text is 
a Text on Settlement of Disputes, prepared by an informal Working 
Group at Geneve. In this case only the first four Articles represent 
a consensus of the Working Group; the remaining Articles appear as 
Annexes. 
It should be re-emphasized that the Caracas and Geneva sessions 
are but a part of a long-term process of working out a new law of 
the sea. Negotiations at next spring's session, and perhaps at still 
later sessions, may fail to produce a comprehensive ocean treaty 
acceptable to all or most of the States of the world. There may 
be no global treaty whatever emerging from the Third Conference. 
But there has been considerable progress toward a general acceptance 
of rules for quite a number of issues;. and the alternatives possible 
for other, more controversial topics, have been greatly narrowed. 
Probahly the greatest stumbling bloc at this time involves conflict-
ing concepts as to the structure and functions of the future inter-
national seabed authority, a topic which will be considered again 
further in this paper. 
In summary, activities in the law of the sea would appear to be 
working in favor of developing States in at least three respects. 
First as new independent countries continue to emerge, the Third 
World is coming to control ever larger areas of ocean space and great-
er resource potentials. Second, the LDCs as a group have increased 
voting strength at international conferences. Third, through regional 
arrangements developing States can pool their resources in joint 
efforts for the development and management of ocean resources. 
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Problems of Conflict and Cooperation 
Using the Third Law of the Sea Conference as a background, we turn 
now to some of the issues dividing and uniting States, with special 
reference to the Asia/Pacific Region. Some of these issues have al-
ready been alluded to earlier. Four categories will be considered 
here: (1) Offshore Zones and Boundaries; (2) Transit and Po llution 
Control; (3) the Regime of the Deep Seabed; and (4) Fisheries. 
l. Offshore Zones and Boundaries 
The three principal offshore zones of control recognized by the 
Conventions adopted at the 1958 Geneva Conference are (1) the zone 
of internal waters , (2) the terr i torial sea, and (3) the continental 
shelf. Over its internal waters, which lie l andward of the baseline 
from '.vhi ch the breadth of its terr itorial sea is measured, a State 
exercises complete sovereignty . The coastal State also exercises 
sovereignty over its territorial sea, subject to the right of 
innocent passage of foreign vessels th r ough the territorial waters . 
The breadth of the territorial sea claimed by coastal States 
generally varies between three and twelve nautical miles . 
The continental shelf is defined in the Geneva Conventions as 
the submerged area adjacent to the coast extending seaward to a 
depth of 200 meters (656 feet), or beyond to a depth where exploit-
ation of the resources of the shelf is possible. Up to now no cou-
ntry has claimed jurisdiction over its shelf beyond the 200-meter 
isobath on the grounds of t.he exploitation criterion. Over its 
adjacent continental shelf the coastal State has the exclusive right 
to explore and exploit the mineral resources, as well as certain 
living organisms which at the harvestable stage are in constant 
physical contact with the shelf . 
Two changes are evolving with respect to offshore zones. One is 
a move to extend coastal State control over shelf resources, even 
without proof of ability to exploit, out beyond the 200-rreter isobath, 
to include the continental slope and at least a portion of the rise, 
to some point which will be fixed as "the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin". This situation arises, of course; only if the 
"outer edge" is more than 200 miles from the coast . Within the 
200-mile economic zone all resources of the seabed, at whatever 
the depth, would belong to the coastal State. 
A second trend involves archipelagos. The move to close off 
their inter-island waters raises a host of questions. By what criteria 
should "legal" archipelagos be de fined? Some island groups are too 
small in land area and too widely scattered over the ocean to be closed 
off by a system of straight base l ines. And once an archipelago is 
defined, what should the status b e of the waters within the closing 
lines? Are they internal in nature, should innocent passage of 
foreign vessels be guaranteed through these waters, and should "archi-
pelagic sealanes" be established following traditional navigation 
routes through archipelagos? In such sealanes, free transit by all 
foreign vessels might be guaranteed, much as in the case sought for 
in international straits. 
These archipelago issu·~s are particularly germaine to the Asia/ 
Pacific Region where, in addition to Indonesia and the Philippines, 
there are a number of other island groups such as Fiji, Tonga, and 
Papua New Ginea which might also seek archipelagic status . And new 
island groups may before long achieve independence and then declare 
F.T. CHRISTY AND L. ALEXANDER 287 
themselves "legal" archipelagos. In no other area of the world does 
the possibility exist of closing off so much ocean space with archi-
pelaqic lines as here in the Western Pacific. 
A major source both of conflict and of possible cooperative action 
are the maritime boundaries between adjacent or opposite states . In 
the past there have been boundaries o n the seabed, partitioning joint-
ly-held continental shelves, and boundaries separating adjacent or 
opposite territorial seas and internal waters from one another. In 
the future there will also be problems of placing limits between 
adjacent or opposite economic zones. 
The general procedure f or delimiting offshore boundaries is first 
that their location should if possible be settled by agreement be-
tween the States concerned . There also may be "special circumstance 
situations" which should be taken into account in the boundary de-
termination, although the exact nature of these circumstances , and 
the effects to be given to them, has never been spelled out . Finally, 
an alternative system of delimitation is the use of the median line 
every point of which is equidistant from the baselines of the re-
spective countries from which the breadth of their territorial seas 
is measured . 
Dispite the complex mozaic of mainlands and islands in the Asia/ 
Pacific Region, only seven offshore boundaries have been delimited 
and accepted by the States concerned. Indonesia has defined i ts 
offshore boundaries with Malaysia, Singapore , Australia, Thailand , 
and India . Thailand has agreed on its maritime boundary with Malaysia, 
and Japan with the Republic of Korea . While in coming years commer-
cial f isheries may come to represent a source of potential conflict 
between States in the absence of defined common maritime boundaries 
between them, the principal importance of such boundaries today in-
volves offshore oil . 
In the Yellow and East China Seas, for example, scientific investi-
gations have resulted in indications of considerable hydrocarbon poten-
tial, and some years ago exploratory leases were issued to oil com-
panies by Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Several of these 
leases overlapped one another; in one sector each of the three 
countries had leased out the same area of seabed. The situation 
was further complicated by the failure of the People's Republic of 
China to release maps indicating where it considered its seabed 
boundaries with So~th Korea and Japan to be, by the dispute between 
the People's Republic and the island of Taiwan as to the latter's 
political status; and by the announcement by the People ' s Republic 
of its claim to ownership of the Senkaku Islands, northeast of 
Taiwan. These islands, which were at that time claimed both by the 
Republic of China and by Japan are important as basepoints for calcu-
lating median line boundaries in the East China Sea . Controversy 
also exists with respect to the Gulf of Thailand where islands are 
in dispute, and where the littoral States (Malaysia, Thailand, Carra:x:xlia, 
and South Vietnam) are issuing exploratory leases; and in the South 
China Sea where similar conditions exist, as evidenced by recent 
activity in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Disputes such as these 
are divisive enough - now; how much more so will they become when and -
if substantial resources are proven to exist in boundary zones? 
It is not difficult to describe conflict -situations with respect 
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to boundary issues. It is more difficult to suggest rreans of conflict 
resolution. One procedure, at least in the short-term, might be to 
delay any permanent delimitation, and rather for neighboring States 
to proceed jointly with hydrocarbon exploitation in the general zone 
through which their common boundary would pass. Revenues from the 
exploitation might be held in escrow until a final boundary determin-
ation is made, or applied to other joint developemnt projects . 
So far as a final settlement of an offshore boundary issue is con-
cerned the Single Negotiating Text which emerged from Geneva last 
spring has a blanket provision calling for dispute settlement of all 
contested law of the sea issues . But we suggest this may not be 
enough; that regions such as the Asia/Pacific may not wish to run 
the full gamut of a global dispute settlement mechanism for each un-
settled boundary. Rather, what might be wanted is some sort of a 
multi-stage regional operation . First you would need a fact-finding 
body, including geologists, resource economists , boundary experts, 
and fishing authorities. And considering the number of potential 
problems, the fact-finding group might almost be considered as a 
permanent body. Second, you would need an arbitral body to try to 
work out agreements between the interested parties, based on the 
facts as presented. Finally, you might need some sort of juridical 
body in case arbitration failed . In this case the dispute might go 
to some form of Special Regional Tribunal, to the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal as outlined in the Text on Settlement of Disputes, or to 
the International Court of Justice. 
2. Transit and Pollution Control 
Both o f three issues have already been noted . What is important 
to emphasize here is first that so much of the waters of the Asia/ 
Pacific Region lie close to the coasts of developing countries, and 
second that some of the transit through these coastal waters is by 
vessels of developed States, either located within the region (i . e . 
Japan , Australia, New Zealand), or outside the region . Unimpeded 
transit through, over, and beneath the waters of straits used for 
international navigation, and through archipelagic sealanes, may seem 
to some affected States as an unfair abridgement of their sovereign 
rights . Yet the unwarranted imposition of restrictions on the free-
dom of vessel movement might wreak havoc on the economic and security 
interests of developed maritime countries . 
There is no simple answer to this dilemma . With respect to the 
passage of foreign military vessels a~d aircraft the coastal State 
could be guaranteed that they would respect navigational and other 
safery standards, and would in no way interfere with the internal 
affairs of the State . Tankers and other potential polluters could 
be required to adhere to traffic separation schemes in congested areas, 
to abide by uniform pollution control standards, and to be adequate-
ly insured against damage to the coastal State resulting from acci-
dents . In fact, a worldwide insurance pool, amounting to perhaps 
several billions of dollars, might be established to take care of 
emergencies. And the coastal State should be assured of speedy 
settlement of claims, involving perhaps a tightening up of the rules 
for flag-of - convenience operations . Certainly if the world maritime 
community wants continued freedom of transit there are certain steps 
it should take to ensure more rational procedures for operation. 
We leave this issue with a question . Might not the presence of 
an important international waterway close to its coast (and more ~~r-
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ticularly within its twelve-mile territorial sea) be considered by 
the coastal State as one of its natural resources, along with fish, 
oil, or scenic coastlines? If so, should the State have the right 
to capitalize on this resource by charging rents for the use of the 
waterway? Over a century ago this - issue of tolls for passage through 
narrow waterways was presumably settled in favor of the maritime 
States. But in the new ocean regime it might in time be reopened as 
a factor in helping to balance developing coastal State with develop-
ed maritime State needs and intersts . The use of tolls may even tend 
to work over the long run to the advantage of the maritime States . 
In heavily congested areas a graduated toll system might guarantee 
priority passage to vessels with particular time constraints, such as 
those carrying perishable goods . 
3. The Deep Seabed Regime 
It has been estimated that of the more than two-thirds of the 
earth's surface which is water, about 40 per cent could be closed off 
within the limits of national jurisdiction should a 200-mile economic 
zone be universally adopted, and if broad margin States extended 
their resource jurisdictions beyond 200 miles to the outer limits of 
the continental margin. This leaves some 63 million square nautical 
miles, or about 42 per cent of the-total earth's surface, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, and thus, perhaps, subject to some 
sort of international regime. The principal commercial resource of 
the deep seabed, known at present, are the manganese nodules . These 
nodules, containing small percentages of manganese, nickel, copper, 
and cobalt, have not as yet been recovered commercially in any quanti-
ty, but their exploitation by some of the developed countries appears 
a virtual certainty within the next few years. 
The debate on the nodule exploitation has become laced with ide~ 
ology . In the New Economic Order who should have the right to exploit 
these "common heritage" resources, who should set the conditions of 
exploitation, who should receive the wealth derived from their pro ~ 
duction and sale? 
In broad terms there are two models. The developed countries' 
model would be essentially an international licensing Agency which 
would issue permits on some sort of competitive basis to individual 
companies or to State agencies to exploit the nodules under certain 
minimal operating conditions. A portion of the revenue derived from 
this exploitaion would be turned over to an international fund to be 
distributed among the LDCs . The Agency or Authority would have juris-
diction only over the nodule exploitation on the seabed. Scientific 
research, military operations, and other activities associated with 
the deep seabed would not be within its purview. 
The counter-model would be one of an enterprise Agency which 
alone would have access to the seabed resou~ces . It would set the 
rules for exploitation, and would have the right to contract out 
mining operations as it saw fit. There could be production and 
price controls to protect the interests of developing States which 
are land-based producers of manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt. 
The Authority would also have jurisdiction over non-resource ac-
tivities on the seabed, and within the Authority, the supreme 
policy-making body would be the Assembly, in which each member-
State would have one vote. 
It is not the intention here to go into all the ramifications of 
the seabed machinery issue . A number of the developed States are 
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ready to start manganese nodule exploitation with or without an ocean 
treaty . , But for them to do so might cause considerable alarm amon 
de':'eloping States,, and perhaps wreck any chances of a new ocean treag 
being concluded within the forseeable future . It is within this areaty 
of deep ~eabed.resources that some developing States perceive their 
opportunity - in part be~a~se of the sheer weight of their votes at 
t~e conference - of obtaining a strong bargaining position vis-a-
vis the developed States, and perhaps of winning concessions from 
the developed countries on both seabed and non-seabed issues. 
4. Fighery Issues 
With regard to fishery resources, the problems of cooperation 
and conflict will be particularly difficult to resolve and are likely 
to persist for many years to come . This is due to certain character-
istics of the resources and the industry that distinguish them 
from most other resources and uses of the sea. 
(1) Characteristics of Fisheries 
A fundamental characteristic of marine fishery resources is that, 
with a few exceptions, they are wild stocks not readily susceptible 
to cultivation. There is a limit to the yield that any particular 
wild stock can sustain·over time - a limit known as the "maximim 
sustainable yield" (MSY). While it may be possible to produce 
catches that are greater than that limit in any one· year, such catches 
cannot be sustained and will lead to lower catches in subsequent 
years. When this happens and the catches become lower than MSY, 
the stock is said to be depleted . 
There are a few species of marine fish-that can be cultivated and 
whose yields can be increased beyond the natural maximum. These, 
however, are very few in number and generally limited to species whose 
environment can be easily controlled and which command high prices in 
a luxury market (i . e., oysters, salmon) . In the future, techniques 
will be developed that will make cultivation of more species possi-
ble, but the total amount will probably always be a negligible pro~ 
portion of the total world catch of marine organisms . 
Another important characteristic of fish stocks is their fugitive-
ness. Although this varies widely, ranging from sedentary oysters 
to species such as salmon and tuna that swim thousands of miles, 
there are numerous stocks of fish that are spatially extensive. 
Since any particulat stock must be managed as a single unit, wherever 
it occurs, cooperation among States is essential where a stock ex-
tends to the waters of two or more countries. The problems of co-
operation may also be complicated by inter-relationships among stocks 
of different species. In some cases, the biological niche of one 
species may overlap with that of another and there may be competition 
between the two. In other cases, there may be a predator/prey relation-
ship between the species. In these situations it may be necessary 
to manage both stocks as a single unit, even though they jointly 
cover a vast area. 
A third importantcharacteristic is that different species may 
occupy the same space and threfore, be caught by the same fishing 
gear. This has already become a major problem for cooperation in 
the northern temperate regions as vessels fishing primarily for cod 
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(pollack) incidentally take large amounts of h addock (o r halibut) • 
Since different countries fishing in the same waters place different 
values on the different species, the problems of determining how 
much of which species to harvest are not readily reasonable . These 
problems become even more complicated and difficult in tropic waters, 
where there tend to be large numbers of species but small populations 
of each one. In the South China Sea, "It is, for example , not un-
common to take as many as 200 species in a single trawl haul, a 
factor which has major implications for fishery development and 
management . 11 8) 
Another important characteristic is that of the difficulty of 
gaining knowledge about the resources . The sea is a three dimmsional , 
opaque, and fluid medium that is difficult to penetrate and highly 
complex in nature . There are no inexpensive and accurate techniqu-
es for determining and evaluating all of the factors that affect the 
population and yields of individual stocks . This has two different 
kinds of effects . First , and most obvious , the difficulty of ob-
taining information creates severe problems for management . While 
there is frequently evidence that a stock has been depleted , there 
is generally little basis for determining what the level of catch 
should be in order to overcome the problems of deplet i on and re~ 
store the stock to a maximum sustainable yield . Indeed, it is often 
very difficult to determine the MSY itself, particularly for those 
species, such as certain kinds of herring and anchoveta, t hat are 
subject to extremely wide fluctuations in population and yield . 
The other effect of the high costs of fisheries research is that 
information is much more fully available for stocks of the northern 
temperate zones than it is for those of the tropic regions . By and 
large, most fishery scientists have been trained in northern, de-
veloped co~ntries . And most research has focused on the selective 
fisheries that a~e typical of temperate waters where there are few 
species but large populations of each one . This means that , not 
only is there less research devoted to the tropical waters of de-
velopi ng States , but also that the training received in northern de-
ve l oped countries is not fully applicabl e to the problems of tropi-
cal waters . For example, the concept of maximum sustgj.nable yield, 
which has been the basis for fisheries management in northern waters 
for decades, is relatively easy to apply where there are hi9hly 
selective fisheries for stocks that have large populations . ) But 
in tropical waters where large numbers of defferent species are 
caught in the same nets , the concept is not readily applicable . 
For e xample, to maximize the sustainable yield of shrimp would re-
quire a relatively small mesh in the trawl nets . This would catch 
large _numbers of other species , most of which would be "trash" fish 
8) John C. Marr , Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia , 
RFF /PISFA Paper 7 (Resources for the Future, Washington) (In press) 
9) Whether the concept of MSY should be applied is another question. 
It is solely a physical goal and , by itself , has no relevance 
to societal needs . Nevertheless , the concept is a fundamental 
part of the training of most fishery scientists as we l l as a . 
fundamental part of conventional · fisheries management . And it 
does have some value when applied in conjuction with social and 
economic criteria . 
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of low uri{t value or no value af all. But some of the species tak-
en in the shrimp-size mesh might be of equal or greater value than 
shrimp if they were marketed at a larger size . In other words, to 
maximize the sustainable yield of shrimp could mean lower than maxi -
mum sustainable yields of other more highly valued species. 
In these kinds of situations, training that has been focused on 
the population dynamics of individual species and on the determi-
natiori of the maximum sustainable yields of individual species, is 
not particularly valuable. The problems of management, which are 
inordinately complicated, will require different kinds of approach-
es than those suitable for the selective fisheries of temperate 
zones. 
In addition to the natural characteristics discussed above, 
there are critically important institutional and legal character-
istics that have traditionally governed the use of marine fisheries. 
These are the principle of the freedom of the seas and the general 
treatment of fisheries as common property natural resources. It is 
these characteristics that provide the fundamental cause for the 
biological _and econo_:i:~c waste that pervades th~_ wor~~' s fisheries. 
The principle of the freedom of the seas was advanced on the as-
sumption that the costs of acquiring and maintaining exclusive 
rights over the sea's resources (beyond a short distance irom land) 
were greater then the benefits that could ' be obtained from the ex-
clusive rights. At the time that Hugo Grotius advanced the principle 
of the freedom of the seas (Mare Liberum was published in 1608) 
there was some degree of truth to the two parts of this assumption. 
Certainly it was true that exclusive rights over vast areas of the 
sea . could not be fully enforced. And it was at least partia11'.i true 
that fishery resources were sufficiently abundant that fishermen, 
if excluded from one region, could turn to others at only moderate 
increases in costs . But wh ile the former aspect is still significant 
- that is, costs of enforcement are still high - the latter aspect 
no longer exsists. Demand has increased rapidly, but supplies are 
relatively fixed, so that value of exclusive rights to resources 
in situ has become very high . Thi s is, in large part, the reason why 
attempts to acquire exclusive r ights through the unilateral extension 
of jurisdiction have become so prevalent throughout the world and 
why the principle of the freedom of the seas is being dismantled. 
And indeed, frnm an economic point of view, the principle should 
be dismantled; for as long as the principle is maintained it means 
that access to fishery resources is free and open and that the re-
sources are treated as common property . Under this treatment, both 
biological and economic waste is inevitable as demand increases. 
Where resources are common to a group of users, no individual 
user can afford to take an interest in future returns . If a fish-
ery stock is depleted and requires some restraint on present catch-
es in order to achieve higher future yields, the common property 
condition means that no individual fisherman by himself, has an 
incentive to exercise such restraint . Anything that he leaves in 
the sea for tommorrow will be taken by others today. And since all 
fishermen operate under the same system of incentives, depletion 
is inevitable unless all fishermen agree to accept some form of 
control. 
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The record of depleted fishery stocks is long and has been grow~ 
ing rapidly in the past few years. Virtually all of the fish stocks 
that are of historical importance in the North Atlantic and North 
Pacific have been depleted . Of the six major species of tuna , all 
but one are being fished at or beyond the point of maximum sustain-
able yield, in all oceans of the world. Furthermore, modern fleets 
of highly specialized vessels are so effective that a stock can be 
depleted within two or three seasons . 
In addition to the biological waste through depletion, the common 
property condition also results in significant economic waste. 
Under common property treatment, access to a resource is free and 
open and there are no controls on the amount of capital and labour 
that can be used . Inevitably in this situation, capita l and la-
bour will flow into the industry until total costs and revenues are 
equal rather than marginal costs and revenues . For -a common proper-
ty resource there is no owner or agent that can prevent the applicat-
ion of redundant units of capital and labour . 
In fisheries, the economic waste is very large, as has been indic-
ated by several studies . For ex~ple, it was estimated several years 
ago, that the same amount of Northeastern Pacific salmon (and some 
total revenues) could have been taken with $50 million less capital 
and labour per year than was then being used . 10) A recent study has 
estimated that large reductions in the nµmber of vessels in the U.S. 
yellowtail flounder fishery could lead to significant increased pro-
fits , amounting to as much as $6 . 9 million per year.11) 
It is most likely that every international fishery, with even a 
short history of use , is marked by redundant capital and labour and 
by economic waste. Although there are no estimates of the total 
amount of economic rents dissipated in all world fisheries, it would 
not be unreasonable to guess that they might amount to more than $1 
billion per year . 
These kinds of wastes can only be prevented by removing the con-
dition of free and open access . Capital and labour inputs have to be 
controlled, either directly by limiting the number of vessels or a-
mount of gear, or indirectly by extracting economic rents through 
taxes or user fees. However, the exercise of such controls requires 
a high degree of authority, as well as the re:t~1oval of the principle 
of the freedom of the seas . Since authority can best be exercised 
when it is least diffused, there is some merit to the unilateral ex-
tensions of jurisdiction by coastal States - at least in the sense 
of improving the basis for economic efficiency. 
(2) Distribution of Fisheries Wealth 
But extensions of jurisdiction directly affect the distribution 
of wealth, providing thereby a source of conflict, and they are only 
partly satisfactory in providing the necessary authority. The dis-
tribution of wealth is affected in two ways. First, those countries 
whose fishermen have traditionally fished off the coasts of foreign 
10) 
11) 
James A. Crutchfield and Giu~io Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon 
Fisheries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969) . 
John M. Gates and Virgil J , Norton, "The Benefits of Fisheries 
Regulation: A Case Study of the New England Yellowtail Founder 
Fishery . " University of Rhode Island Report No. 21 . 
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States will lose the free and open access they have enjoyed in the 
past. They may either be excluded from the waters or required to 
pay for the privilege of fishing . The second effect is that of un-
even distribution due to accidents of geography. Not all States 
will gain proportinately from the extensions of jurisdiction. Land-
locked States, such as Laos, and shelf-locked States, such as Singa-
pore, will acquire no increased wealth. At the other extreme, an 
extension of jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles, will provide the 
Philippines , Indonesia, and several other States, authority over 
vast areas of the sea. These kinds of distribution effects mean 
that the extension of jurisdiction over fisheries will provide a 
potential source of conflict. Attempts to reduce this conflict can 
be found in some of the provisions suggested for a treaty on the 
law of the sea - provisions discussed more fully below. 
But a potential source of conflict can also be found in the fact 
that extensions of jurisdication only partly provide the basis for 
an effective exercise of authority. There are numerous situations 
where stocks will continue to be shared by two or more coastal Stat-
es no matter how far out jurisdiction is extended. In these situa-
tions, the sharing States will have to reach agreements among them-
selves as to how to distribute the benefits and how to manage the 
fisheries. 
Five kinds of situations can be depicted. (1) Those in which a 
stock is found entirely outside of national jurisdiction. (2) Where 
a stock lies both outside of national jurisdiction and within the 
jurisdiction of two or more States. (3) Where a stock uses the 
fresh waters of a coastal State but can also be found beyond that 
State's jurisdiction. (4) Stocks that are found within the waters 
of two or more coastal States but not on the high seas. And (5) 
Stocks found only within the jurisdiction ~f a single State. 
Obviously the classification is determined both by the migratory 
patterns of the stock and the extent of the coastal States' borders, 
along the coast as well as ~way from the coast. For example, most 
stocks off the south coast of Australia would fall within the 
exclusive authority of that State if it extended its jurisdiction 
to 200 nautical miles. Conversely, many stocks in the South China 
Sea would still be subject to exploitation by several States even 
with extensions of jurisdiction. 
These different kinds of situations are associated with different 
kinds of problems - three of which are particularly critical for the 
Asia Pacific Region. The first is that of developing arrangements for 
the species (tuna, in particular) that swim both inside and outside of 
areas 200 miles from shore. The second - at the opposite extreme -
is that of determining what, if any, rights or privileges a coastal 
State should provide to other States. And the third, and perhaps 
most difficult and persistent problem, is that of facilitating effec-
tive cooperation among States sharing the same or closely inter-
related stocks. 
(3) Tuna Issues 
Unless there is a dramatic improvement in cooperation arrong States 
it is likely that many tuna stocks throughout the world will become 
severely depleted in the next decade. As stated above, only one 
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of the six major species of tuna - skipjack - still provides oppor-
tunities for increa3ed catches . 12 ) And yet there continues to be a 
very rapid increase in the construction of large, modern tuna fish-
ing vessels capable of fishing anywhere in the world . The aggre-
gate expectations of the tuna-fishing (and potential tuna-fishing) 
countries are probably greater than the total sustainable yields 
that can be expected. The rapid increase in fishing effort, the 
global mobility of tuna vessels, and the wide ranging movements of 
the tuna stocks make it diffucult to arrive at acceptable and effec-
tive international arrangements . 
The two·major interest groups are the countries. that have ex-
tensive aistant-water tuna-fishing operations, such as the United 
States, Spain, France, Republic of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, and 
the countries off-whose shores the tuna stocks are fished, such as 
Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and the Ivory Coast. The issue between the 
two groups is one of wealth distribution and the techniques for 
achieving controls. Essentially, the former group is interested 
in dividing up tuna resources on the basis of historic rights, while 
the latter chooses proximity to the resource as the major criterion. 
With regard to the former interests, the most likely technique 
would be that of a system of national quotas - a division of the 
total allowable catch on the basis of past (or present) records of 
catch. The obvious difficulty is that of determining the basis 
for the division. In the case of tuna, this difficulty is particu-
larly intransigent because of the rapid increases in investment in 
fishing vessels and the concomitant expectations that most States 
have for increased levels of catch. As noted above, these expect-
ations may well add up to more than the total sustainable yields 
available to present fishing techniques. Thus, in order to reach 
agreement, either the expectations have to be sacrificed or the 
States would have to choose a total allowable catch beyond that 
which could be sustained. This latter course of action was follow-
ed by the States using Antarctic whales, with the resultant severe 
declines in annual yields. There is some indication that this short-
sighted course of action may also be adopted for tuna. In the 
regulatory area of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, sci-
entists recommended a total quota for yellowfin tuna for 1975 of 
i30,000 metric tons. The fishing States, however, insisted upon a 
total quota of 185,000· tons. While it is not clear that this is an 
excessive amount, the pattern of rejecting scientific recx:mrendations 
is reminiscent of the difficulties experienced by the International 
Whaling Commission. 
Even if the tuna-fishing States were able to reach agreements 
among themselves on national quotas, such agreements would not be 
acceptable to the coastal States. These States tend to prefer a 
system that permits them to extract benefits in the form of license 
fees, taxes, or other items of value. Such an approach can signi-
cantly improve economic efficiency by extracting economic rents and 
forcing out the less efficient and redundant fishermen. However, 
the problem of determining the appropriate fee schedule would not 
be easy. In the first place, the fees should cover entire stocks 
12) Saul Saila & Virgil Borton, Tuna; Status, Trends, and Alterna-
tive Management Arrangements, RFF/PISFA Paper 6 (Washington: 
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1974). 
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wherever they are caught - both within and outside of a 200-mile 
zone. And second, the fees should be determined on a unified basis 
reflecting the value of the fishery area . 
Unless there is a_ u~ified authority over the stock throughout its 
range ! the situation is unstable. If the fees are not app~opriate 
to the value of the waters of the different States, fishing effort 
will flow to the area where the greatest profit can be obtained. 
Other States will then have an incentive to lower their fees in 
order to attract more fishing in their waters . Such competition 
could well be mutually destructive to the interests of all parties 
since it could lead eventually to exc essive levels of catch and ex-
cessiv e investments in effort . In short, there are no forces in 
sha:ed fisheries that will correct imbalances or control instability 
until the stock has been fished to the point of profitlessness . 
The challenge is to prevent the imbalances from occuring, a nd this 
can only be done in the tuna fisheries if there is a high degree 
of cooperation among the coastal States and the fishing States in 
setting up a unified authority with a carefully developed system 
of fees and quotas. 
(4) Coastal State Controls 
One of the chief areas of contention at the UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea is that of defining the rights that can be exercised 
by coastal States within a 200-mile "economic zone" . Some delegat-
ions propose that coastal States should have complete discretion to 
dispose of the resources within their zones as they see fit . Others 
argue, however, that the rights of the coastal States should be con-
strained by certain general principles and rules that would provide 
for foreign access to the resources . Those arguing the latter view 
include States with distant-water fisheries and States that are 
land-locked or with only small toe-holds on the oceans. The distant-
water States want to protect their investments in the large vessels 
and fleets that fish off foreign shores hundreds or thousands of 
miles from their home ports . The land-locked and shelf-locked 
States see that a large amount of ocean wealth is being distribut-
ed and want to share in the distribution. 
The chief proposal advanced to meet these interests is that a 
coastal State's right to fish should be restricted to the amount 
that ~t can catch. It is proposed that each coastal State be 
able to catch only that portion of the yield of a stock that it 
has the capacity to catch, and that the balance of the yield be 
made available to foreign fishermen . It is assumed that this re-
quirement would permit "full utilization " of the sea's fisheries 
wealth. 
Several questions can be raised about such proposals. First, al-
though the proposal is advanced by distant-water and land-locked 
States, it is . not at all clear that they would stand to gain more 
from a "full utilization" approach than from one in )'lhich coastal 
States operate without constraints. Most of the "full utilization" 
proposals permit coastal States to charge fees to the foreigners 
who gain access to their surplus yields . If the fees accurately 
reflect the values of the stocks, then·the coastal States would be 
appropriating the full wealth of the stocks, just as they would be 
were no such constrains in effect. 
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A second question can be raised with regard to the costs associat-
ed with the implementation of a "full utilization" scheme. Such a 
scheme calls for a large amount of information. It requires esti-
mates not only of the yields of all stocks of interest to foreign-
ers but also of the coastal State's capacity to harvest the various 
stocks. Most proposals would also lead to fairly high negotiating 
costs, because of the provisions intended to protect the interests 
of distant-water States and neighboring land-locked and shelf-lock-
ed States. There are suggestions for allocating the rights of ac-
cess to the surplus yields, but there are no clear-cut criteria . 
It is not unreasonable to expect that such suggestions, if adopted 
internationally, could lead to long periods of difficult negotiat• 
ions between coastal States and the foreign States desiring to fish 
in the economic zone . If coastal States were not so constrained 
but could freely dispose of the resources within their zones, such 
costs could be largely avoided . 
A third question about the "full utilization" concept has to do 
with the effect it may have on a coastal State's allocation of capi-
tal and labor resources . Under a principle in which a State can 
have as much as it can harvest, there would be a natural temptation 
for a State to increase its fishing capacity, particularly if it 
were not receiving full rents for foreign fishing of the surplus. 
Such a temptation may lead to sreater investments in fishing effort 
than would be in the best interests of the coastal State. 
Each of the three questions raised above hinges, in part, on the 
degree to which coastal States can extract full rents from the 
foreign fishermen . It was noted above that the extraction of eco-
nomic rents is an important technique for overcoming the ineffi~ 
ciencies of common property utilization . But the use of monetary 
measures, such as taxes or user fees, is also an important technique 
for allocating access rights among foreigner.s. The ability to 
determine who gets the right to fish by finding out who is willing 
to pay the most would simultaneously maximize the rents collected, 
reduce economic waste, and reduce the costs of negotiation . It 
would seem preferable, in these regards, to permit coastal States 
to operate as free as possible from such constraints as the prin-
ciple of "full utilization" . 
One of the arguments made by the advocates of the "full utiliz-
ation" principle is that coastal States with fully exclusive rights 
may be tempted to prohibit all foreign fishing and let resources go 
unutilized . While this is likely to occur in some instances, it 
is not likely to be significant for the world as a whole nor to 
persist for very long . But even if this were a problem, it is doubt-
ful that the principle of "full utilization" would be sufficiently 
enforceable to prevent a dedicatedly xenophobic State from sitt-
ing on unutilized resources. 
(5) The Problems of Shared Stocks 
The above remarks refer largely to situations where stocks are 
fully enclosed within the zones of individual coastal States. Where 
a stock is shared by two or more States, then some kinds of inter-
national principles or rules are necessary, even if these simply 
obligate the sharing States to confer with each other. The problems 
of shared stocks are extremely difficult to resolve and are likely 
to provide the most persistent challenges for cooperation of all 
of the problems of the law of the sea. The nature of the problems· 
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can best be described in terms o f the four major functions of fish-
eries administration - distribut ion, research, management, and en-
forcement. All of the problems described below exist today. And 
in most situations, they are not handled very well. The extension 
of jurisdiction, by diminishing the diffusion of authority, will 
amel iorate some of the difficulties. But it will also make those 
States acquiring the authority face up to the problems more direct-
ly and fully than they have in the past. 
There are two aspects to the problems associated with the distribu-
tion of fisheries wealth. The first is that of defining wealth . 
To some countries a particular stock may be valued primarily because 
it provides important employment opportunities in an area where 
alternative sources of employment may be scarce or non-existent. 
To other countries, however, the same stock might be valued because 
cf its contribution ~J the growth of the economy. Such differences 
in values present a major dilemma, for the former countries would 
wish to maintain or increase employment opportunities while the 
latter would wish to improve economic efficiency and reduce employ-
ment and total costs. A single stock cannot be managed so as tc 
maximize simultaneously the amount of fisheries labor and the amount 
of net economic resources. 
One solution to this dilemma is to divide up the total yield 
into national quotas and then permit each country to use its quota 
to maximize whatever it wishes . While this solution has a lot of 
merit in many situations, it also has a lot of difficulties. As 
already noted, national quotas for individual stocks may not be very 
meaningful in tropical waters where many different species inter-
mingle. Another problem may occur if different States value the 
species at different sizes . Cooperation would also be hard if the 
most efficient harvesting were to take place in the waters of only 
one of the sharing States, requiring that State to permit foreign 
access. In short, national quotas may be useful in some situations 
but not all, and even where they are useful their adoption may in-
cur high costs. 
The second distribution problem is that of negotiating the shares. 
As noted above with regard to tuna, there are no objective economic 
or social criteria for determining who should get what from the 
~ea's wealth. Past history of use, as a criterion, depends upon hCM 
history is defined - 1 year, 3 years, 12 years? Proximity to 
share depends not only upon the choice of a limit but also upon the 
amount of time spent by the fish, or the amount of qrowth achieved, 
while within that limit. Economic dependence, a criterion sugge~t­
ed in some proposals, would be very difficult to apply. In short, 
there are no criteria likely to be fully acceptable to all parties 
sharing a stock of fish. It will be necessary, in each case, to 
negotiate the distribution of the benefits of shared stocks. 
In addition to the problems associated with the distribution of 
benefits there are also problems in the distribition of costs. In-
formation requirements could be quite high, depending upon the dis-
tribution systems and management techniques that are adopted. The 
States sharing the stock or stocks will have to agree on the kinds 
of information required, the conduct of_ the research, and how the 
costs are to be shared. The formulation and adoption of manage-
ment measures will also require a high degree of cooperation and, 
probably, the creation of some kind of administrative machinery. 
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Perhaps the most diffucult problem for States sharing stocks will 
be that of enforcement - many coastal States may be unwilling to 
permit patrol vessels of neighboring states within their economic 
zones, even though the vessels are patrolling catches of stocks 
shared with their neighbors . But unless the neighbors can be 
assured that the rules are being followed, they will have no in-
centive to restrain their catches when the stocks are in their 
waters, and the whole system is likely to collapse. As noted above 
with regard to tuna, shared fisheries are fundamentally unstable 
fisheries. Once it is believed, rightly or wrongly, that one of the 
sharing States is violating the rules and that it cannot be forced 
to stop the violations, then all shariug States will operate with-
out restraint. ~here are no national or economic forces to prevent 
this from happening until the fishery reaches the point where total 
costs and revenues are equal and all economic rent has become dis-
sipated. 
(6) Summary 
Among the various issues raised in the law of the sea, those councer-
ing fisheries are likely to be the most persistent and difficult 
to resolve. While they are not generally of great economic impor-
tance, they can be very significant in political terms and they are 
likely to provide a continuous source-of conflict among States for 
many years to come . 
A careful calculation might indicate that the transaction costs 
involved in achieving and maintaining effective distribution and 
management systems are greater than the benefits that could be 
obtained. The costs of negotiation may be very high, particularly 
where a shared stock is valued for different purposes by different 
States . Research necessary to provide the desired information can 
be extremely costly. And enforcement of complicated rules for high-
ly migratory or inter mixed stocks can also require heavy expendi~ 
tures. These costs, in aggregate, could outweigh the benefits that 
might be obtained, and the wisest policy might be to offer the fish-
eries the condition of benigh neglect . 
Such a conclusion, however, fails to take into consideration the 
political importance of fisheries. Governments cannot afford to 
ignore either the interests of their own fishermen or the confron-
tation with the fishermen of other countries. As limits are extend-
ed and as the principle of the freedom of the seas is dismantled, 
fishery issues must receive increasing attention if cooperation is 
to be effective and conflict is to be reduced. 
COMMENTS ON CHRISTY AND ALEXANDER'S PAPER 
(a) LESLIE CASTLE 
In arranging commentators for this programme I had considerable 
diffuculty in finding two participants who were prepared to accept 
the role for this paper and so I appear simply as a last resort 
candidate without presuming to know very much about the subject . 
Perhaps the reluctance I encountered is because many economists 
consider that the issues involved are primarily of a technical, 
legal or political nature and that economics has little to contribute. 
While it would be perilous to ignore those other factors, economics 
has plenty to offer at least in understanding the nature of the 
problems and recent years have seen the development of areas of 
theory - externalities, public _goods, common property resources-and 
choice under uncertainty - which are all highly relevant. It is 
worth noting _ too that economics rests within a framework of law 
and custom, a point well appreciated by our classical forbears as 
Robbins and others have been at pains to remind us . What in essence 
we are faced with in the management and exploitation of the world's 
ocean resources is the establishment of a system of property 
rights pertaining to a major common property (or access) resource 
and to do that in a way that (unlike the enclosure of the commons) 
is regarded as equitable and enables its exploitation to be under-
taken in the most efficient way . The Christy/Alexander paper 
sets out very comprehensively the complex issues involved but it 
is not a very· optimistic picture and one lias the impression that 
an accommodation among the widely differing objectives and circum-
stances of the world's nations in each of the four basic areas set 
out in the paper is rather remote. 
For my part I see no particular sense in the division of oceans 
in a geographical sense with exclusive property rights being accord-
ed to particular nations within these zones; nor much in the 
argument that because some nations have few resources they should 
gain exclusive control over a larger share of the spoils to be 
divided up. But to have no agreed allocation of property rights is 
to invite the dissipation of all rents from the resource as we have 
already observed in the case of many fisheries. Only by sheer 
accident is the allocation of rights on a simple geographical basis 
likely to lead to optimal management of oc~an resources. 
The functional approach in my view offers more promise since it 
recognises the many facets of the ocean as a resource, for fisheries 
of different kinds and requiring different spatial arrangements, 
for minerals, for waste disposal, for communications and rrany others . 
This does not however readily dispose of many of the issues 
considered at successive Law of the Sea conferences. There is the 
problem of accommodating existing property rights acquired by power 
and superior technology with those demanded by new nations and 
by further technological innovation . While the idea of a single 
world body managing the resource optimally has superficial attract-
ions, experience wi th such bodies does not inspire one with con-
fidence that it could do the job. Apart from being administrative-
ly cumbersome, the costs of information enforcement and compliance 
are likely to be very great and I find it hard to envisage that 
within one such body it would be possible to reconcile the often 
conflicting objectives in the use of oceans. But then a constel-
lation of such bodies covering different aspects of the resource 
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might be even more of a Tower of Babel. As an alternative there 
is the possibility of devolving resource-management to coastal 
states, but-that is not an adequate answer in the case of those 
uses of the resource which are not in their nature the sole concern 
of any one. Further, looking at past experience, one is certainly 
not inspired with confidence that single states themselves can be 
relied upon to optimally or sub-optimally manage the ocean resources 
that lie within their jurisdiction . 
(bl Ross GARNAUT 
This is a very important and interesting paper. 
The paper takes us to the frontiers of technology, law and inter-
national relations. There is no law on the frontier, and yet a 
system of law and custom is necessary for resources - to be used 
effectively . For any stable ·system of law to emerge from the current 
international discussion of the law of the Sea, it will have to 
blend consideration of power and of justice. It will have to be 
acceptable to the big and rich maritime states, especially Japan, 
the Soviet Union and the United State~, and it will have to seem 
fair to the many developing countries that have an interest in the 
matter. 
The Christy-Alexander paper presents an interesting description 
of the problem, but the practical importance of the jurisdictional 
problem may have been overplayed a little, especially as it now 
seems very likely that the 200 mile economic zone concept will 
become very widely accepted over the next year or two . The 200 
mile limit will cover nearly all of the world's commercial fisheries, 
l~aving a residual problem of international control only over a 
small volume of deep sea fishing and the fishing of the small number 
of commercial species subject to large-scale inter-jurisdictional 
migration. Similarly, there are at present few prospects of petro-
leum exploitation outside the 200 mile limit. The deep sea nodules 
present a problem for international co-operation on the high seas, 
but my own brief contact with the subject has suggested that deep 
sea mining is still a plaything of millionaires, and that large-scale 
mining of nodules is still a long way off. I am very interested in 
the suggention that commercial nodule production may in fact be 
very close, and I would be interested in more facts on this possi-
bility. 
Very difficult problems of administration and international re-
lations will remain, even if the 200 mile limit removes the most 
important jurisdictional problems . As the paper recognises, it is 
very difficult to assess profitability of the fishing industry, 
and to tax and to control it, most importantly because of the 
geographic mobility of capital and labour employed in the industry. 
But the world can probably go a long way towards solving its law of 
the sea problems if it can develop systems whereby boats from fish-
ing countries are licensed to work within the 200 mile limits of 
other countries with the "host country" taxing away most of the 
rents of the fisheries. 
If a licensing and taxing system is to be successful, it must 
preserve the following interests: (i) The interest of fish import-
ing countries and the world in conservation and stability of supply. 
(ii) The interest of fishing countries in preserving employment and 
quasi-rents of capital ana labour that is committed to fishingo 
(iii) The interest of poorer maritime countries in raising their 
share of fisheries rents. 
The fundamental economics of the system suggest that a stable 
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system may be possible to achieve, subject only to the ingenuity 
of man in devising satisfactory administrative arrangements. The 
possibility that total fisheries rents could be raised with more 
rational controls is important, because it may be possible for 
many countries to feel better off without any feeling worse off . 
If a large part of the rents of fisheries are being appropriated by 
the "host" countries, there will be relatively little cause for 
disrupting in the short term employment of specific fishing capital 
and labour. The most important re-distribution of rents will be 
favourable to the developing countries, and so is likely to appear 
just. The main problems will probably arise in the licensing of 
Japanese boats in North Pacific waters of the Soviet Union, United 
States and Canada. There, a redistribution of rents away from 
Japan will not seem fair, and special arrangements will probably 
be necessary. 
(c) GENERAL DrscussroN 
Participants devoted most of their attention to the question 
of whether the establishment of a large corporation was a feasible 
approach to ocean resource management . On this opinion was divid-
ed. It was suggested that the problem could not be solved simply 
by the allocation of shares but only by an approach which aimed at 
optimal resource management . The large corporation was one approach 
but this would not in itself solve the resource management questions, 
indeed these would still remain . The United States had originally 
supported the idea of a single corporation but the conflicts among 
divergent internal interests on this idea and the policies to be 
adopted had been impossible to reconcile. 
Some participants argued that rather than a new international 
body it would be better to try to adapt existing bodies such as 
IMFO, FAO and UNESCO which could all play a role in different 
aspects of the problem. 
Responding to the discussion, Professor Alexander said there 
was a limited role for existing agencies - the Soviet Union for ex-
ample was not a member of FAO. He feared that others (Canada and 
Mexico) might follow the United States to a unilateral 200 mile 
declaration and personally he regretted the prospect. The only 
revenue which could realistically be contemplated for possible 
funding purposes was from offshore hydrocarbons. On fisheries 
any institution would have to allocate quotas and at present the 
only regional arrangement which was workable was the common fish-
eries policy of the EEC. 
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CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC 
REGION - RELATIONS BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL COUNTRIES: 
A SUMMING UP 
HARRY G. JOHNSON 
My assignment is to sum up and evaluate the Conference. I must 
begin by confessing that it has proved a more difficult assignment 
than I expected. I was not there the first day, because I was per-
suaded that I should stop off for rest on the way here, on the as-
surance that the proceedings would be carefully kept by the rapport-
eurs and made available to me on arrival. As it turned out, the 
papers themselves were only distributed here, too late for me to 
read them, and the record-keeping was less up-to-date than predict-
ed. Dealing with the first day has been like a problem in detect-
ion: I began with the discussion record, then got some of the of-
ficial commentators' notes. It was like reconstructing "Hamlet" 
by starting with Rosenkranz and Guildenstern, then making what one 
could of the words of Polonius and Fortinbras, but never reading 
Hamlet's part or seeing the full script; or like building a house 
by starting with installing the roof, then putting up the walls, and 
finally guessing at the foundations. What I offer is very much i n-
ference about a past civilization from its archaelogical remains. 
The first session was the official opening, which struck a natur-
al but ultimately awkward note - that of a changing world, a world 
crisis, and the need for new ideas and a new world order. The theme 
reflects a dominant strand of thinking and concern in the larger 
countries of the Atlantic region - especially the United States and 
the European Common Market countries - in the wake of the oil cri-
sis, the sharp rise in food prices in 1972-73, and stagflation; and 
the intellectual news has not surprisingly reached the Antipodes, and 
been purvey~d by some members of the Conference. 
I find this theme difficult to get excited about, largely because 
I have spent a lot of my career waiting for disasters, changes, and 
transformations that ultimately failed to happen. These included 
the euphoria of the election of Labour in Britain in 1945, the ex-
pected descent of the American economy into an unprecedented post-
war slump, and the creation of United Europe as a counterweight 
against the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. superpowers. As regards the deve-
loping countries, there was the expectation politically of a third 
force wed to peace and justice on a basis of democratic central 
planning; and economically, the idea that Egyptian claims to the 
Suez Canal would introduce a new world order giving developing 
countries their due, and later the UNCTAD I demand for a new world 
trade order based on trade preferences an.d price-raising commodity 
agreements. Be that as it may, I do not see the O.P.E.C. oil poli-
cy as constituting a precedent for a basic change in the world trad-
ing system; and it has had very undesirable developmental side ef-
fects. The general theory of development indicates that any income 
redistribution achievable by monopoly would be small in relation to 
the capital investment needed to fill the development gap; that mo-
nopoly in fact affects a very small part of total world trade; and, 
contrary to common assertion, monopoly does not reverse comparative 
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advanta~e theory but merely restricts its opeation . After all, mo-
nopoly is only a private tariff on trade, dependent on trade still 
going on; and its effects are mostly redistributive, with second- ord-
er efficiency losses . 
These remarks pertain to general matters running through the 
first day's proceedings. 
I turn now to the specific papers and sessions. 
Reuber's paper on development assistance and regional coopera-
tion among large and small countries in the region put its finger 
on a major point : the region is geographical, not cultural or his-
torical . Hence many European and Latin American ideas - also for 
that matter ideas that used to be held about "the Indian sub-conti-
nent" - which rely on an assumption of an historical "community" 
are inapplicable . This point, however, cuts somewhat against Reub-
er' s general scepticism about regional arrangements and aid for de-
velopment . More may be possible in the Pacific, precisely because 
it is not an historical and cultural entity, provided that the ap-
proach is pragmatic (e . g . free trade association as contrasted with 
common market) . 
Reuber was criticized on two main grounds . One was the lack of 
a sense of crisis . I regard that as a virtue . Man's mouth works 
much faster in predicting change than his hands work in producing 
it, with the result that too many non-critical crises are announced 
and debated . Intellectua l s and governments live by the mouth, and 
advertise themselves by crisis - mongering; but the plain man who liv-
es by his hands may be better advised to wait until the crisis is 
clearly present. One relevant q uestion would be, when we look back 
over, say , twenty years of intermittent announced crises, how much 
evidence can we find of them in statistical series of output, emp-
loyment, growth rates, etc. 
The other ground for criticism was that Reuber assumed competi -
tion, whereas it was contended that the oil crises proved that 
trade is characteristical l y monopolistic . The oil crisis proves no 
such th i ng - in fact, the consternation caused by OPEC ' s action 
would be evidence on the other side. Trade remains largely compe-
titive, and it is well for the developing countries that it does, 
because it is the rich who win the most in trials of economic 
strength, not the poor. I am still less sympathetic to the content-
ion that the oil crisis requires us to re-think basic theory; al-
most invariably, in my experience, the demand for "radical re-think-
ing" is a demand to stop thinking at all, and accept instead the un-
supported emotional prejudices of someone who does not understand 
theory well enough to be able to judge when re-thinking is necessa-
ry. The "new world trade order" that UNCTAD I was all about amount-
ed in the end to no new comprehensive commodity agreements, a few 
token preferences carefully designed to limit the expansion of 
competitive exports by developing country beneficiaries, and a 
sharpened developed country disillusionment with the whole process 
of development aid-giving . It was almost ten years before any de-
cisive action occurred on the commodity front; and it came where 
studies had concluded was the only place where it might succeed - oil, 
not the product that the typical dev~loping country produces and is 
concerned about . And there is reason for doubt that the oil price 
will hold up as time passes - and the same reason for doubting that 
tea, coffee, sugar, cocoa and bananas permit any similar action . 
The third session was devoted to Holmes's paper surveying the 
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development problems of small countries. I was unable to obtain 
much i nformation about that session, other than the general view 
that the paper was a good survey of a lot of relevant problems. I 
suspect that, like any useful work on development, it had to dis-
card the idea that developing countries can be categorized and typ-
ed easily, and therefore was led into surveying more problems than 
could easily be discussed. I understand that the session tended to 
drift into rather unsatisfactory efforts to find larger but still 
manageable classification systems. 
The fourth session was intended to discuss two case studies on 
the problem of "dependence". This term I first came across in a 
study of New Zealand by an economist still active here; it is a 
very vague concept. Unfortunately Dr. Salgado, author of the Ameri-
can paper, was unable to come, and sent a paper in Spanish. Profes-
sor Wionzcek charged manfully into the breach, in an effort to trans-
late the paper into English for discussion, but could not finish 
the job in the inadequate time available. The only information I 
have on it is that it was very general and did not lend itself to 
Conference discussion. 
The study of investment in Thailand, by Narongchai and Naya, mak-
es an awesome wodge of paper. It is a commendable attempt to use 
the tools of market share analysis to throw light on Japanese in-
vestment in Thailand. Unfortunately, the technique, due to Tyszyns-
ki has the grave defect of embodying an insoluble identification 
problem. Are the data produced by supply forces, demand forces, or 
both together? It also tends to generate interminable statistical 
objections and questioning, which the paper did not surmount too 
well. This session introduced a question that reappeared in later 
sessions - Thai hostility to Japanese investment and production 
activity in ~hailand - to which I shall return in due course. 
The first session on Tuesday, concerned with Ashok Desai's paper 
on "Small Island Economies: Problems of External Dependence" con-
cluded the section of the conference devoted to case studies - at 
least nominally, since the case approach necessarily dominates any 
Pacific Region conferer.ce. The paper, as Macrae pointed out in his 
comment, dealt with four themes - export dependence and economic in-
stability; the limits to diversification, with special reference to 
the tendency to foreign monopoly; the possibilities of regional co-
operation; and the possibility of rationalizing the capital market 
to give local investors more participation and a higher return on 
their savings. On the first subject the paper contained some inter-
esting statistical work regarding the multipliers for foreign invest-
ment and for migrants' remittances; but there was not much interest 
in pursuing this technical subject very far. At this point of time, 
one might suggest that the issue in its conventional form is now 
moribund or dead. It grew out of a particular set of ideas derived 
from the 1930s experience of primary producers, conjoined with an 
identification of their problems in an inappropriately Keynesian way 
with fluctuations in employment rather than real income in the more 
usual welfare sense, and lasted as long as it did largely through 
the determination of some armchair theorists of development to dis-
regard facts if they were inconsistent with attractive economic 
myths. 
The subject of regional cooperation was also not discussed at 
any great length; the reasons are familiar from previous Conferences . 
Here too, one senses an undue and inappropriate application to the 
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Pacific of ideas originated in Latin America, where the concept of 
a "region" of countries of similar background potentially capable 
of cooperating makes much more sense. The one idea that should pro-
bably have received more attention than it got was that of improv-
ing the capital markets , interpreted in a broad sense . Unfortunate-
ly, this idea usually is confined to giving the government, or al-
ready prosperous local capitalists, a bigger share in the profits 
of foreign enterprise, rather than identified with giving small po-
tential savers better returns on forms of saving they can cope with . 
Here there is often a conflict between the desire, in effect, to 
tax the small saver by low administered yields, usually for the gov-
ernment's benefit, and the objective of encouraging locally-based 
development . Most attention was devoted to the second point, limit-
ed diversification, and the subheading of government-supported trade 
and investment monopolization by foreign enterprises. 
Wionzcek repeated his assertion that a new world order of exploi-
tation of monopoly power by primary producers was on its way in the 
wake of OPEC, expressing a view of the Bougainville agreement as a 
19th century agreement that evoked strong protest from Arndt. A 
more interesting question, raised by Macrae and others, was why gov-
ernments cossetted foreign monopoly so assiduously. The answer pro-
vided - but not extemely satisfactorily - was "employment neurosis", 
together with the indirect ~uggestion of bribery and corruption . 
One suspects that the answer lies deeper, in the sense that vested 
interests became more quickly and strongly vested in the typical de-
veloping country as a result of .the political weakness of government 
and hence its intrinsically conservative attitude towards any econo-
mic activity that comes into existence. The most interesting idea 
that came out of th'e more general discussion was the importance of 
easy migration as a way of compensating for the limited diversifica-
tion possibility of the small island economies. This idea is useful, 
and the phenomenon itself probably peculiar to this part of the 
world; as such I think it needs more careful analysis. 
The Conference then turned to the next section of its program, 
on development assistance. Krause's paper was unfortunately large-
ly misunderstood. Its purpose was "positive" and not "normative" -
to evaluate the various motives for aid - given with a view to pre-
dicting the size and type of future U.S . aid; but it was interpreted 
ed by many as a cold-hearted refusal to preach what the United Stat-
es owed to other countries. I think this misunderstanding very im-
portant to recognise and watch out for. There is a strong tempta-
tion to all the rest of us to tell the United States what it 
should do for us, without asking whether anyone is listening, or 
whether if we were in the place of the United States government and 
dependent on American votes rather than only handing out advice to 
the United States government about how it.could please us best, we 
would take our own advice. Too often, discussions of development 
assistance assume both that aid-giving governments are elected by 
saints rather than by ordinary citizens, and that sanctity is measur-
ed by what the not-noticeably-saintly governments of poor countries 
consider their moral rights to revenue. Some agreement emerged 
eventually, however, on the acceptance that governments run on self-
interest and that the aim must be to convince them that assistance 
is mutually beneficial. There was also a suggestion from English, 
that it might be advisable to shift attention from aid to the alter-
ation of the rules of world trade to give more benefit to the deve-
loping countries. 
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The Conference then digressed to consider a paper presented by 
the Soviet economist colleagues. The paper circulated and present-
ed by Dr . Chekhutov was felt to be rather short of hard facts, but 
the supplementary comment by Yakubovsky contained much if not all 
of the statistical information expected, and the discussion ranged 
widely over the whole field of Russian development methods and poli-
cies in the Pacific region . 
The Conference then returned to the printed programme, with Dr. 
Viviani's paper on Australia as an example of the small donor and 
its problems. Australian policy has been changing significantly, 
presumably in part in accordance with the general disillusionment 
with aid, and a new emphasis on effectiveness of aid and an associ-
ated swing towards project aid have been emerging . In commenting 
on the paper, Thompson pointed out that aid ostensibly in the form 
of non-repayable gifts does not really mean a pure gift, because 
gratitude is expected, and gifts give a freer hand for aid-tying . 
The importance of migration as a source of flexibility to the aid 
recipients was again stressed. Reuber developed the point that the 
small donor faced a different set of constraints than the large don-
or, a point revealed by a Canadian re-evaluation of aid policy simi-
lar to the Australian one. Wionczek emphasized the positive contri-
butions that small donors could make, mentioning in particular the 
possibility of assisting in improving agriculture. Arndt and others, 
on the other hand, got on to the actual great cost and difficulty 
involved in the apparently simple idea of providing technical as-
sistance with a small-scale programme. This led Narongchai to sug-
gest the solution of using local people rather than nationals, an 
idea which was not taken up. 
Both this subject, and the suggestion made earlier that migration 
was a means of overcoming the limited possibility of domestic sub-
stitution, called to my attention the extent to which aid discus-
sion tend to be governed by implicit assumptions. Specifically, 
both the implicit assumption that technical assistance will be ren-
dered by nationals, and the form of migration automatically assum-
ed as the natural one for South East Asia, implicitly accept the 
idea of people being attached to nation-states, and of development 
as consisting of raising peoples' standards of living by means that 
leave them tethered to their native territories. Since territo-
ries are defined by governments and states rather than people as 
human beings, the inevitable consequence is conflict between the 
idea of development as improvement of people's personal welfare, 
and development as a means of increasing the power of nation-states 
and of the elites that control these states . 
The final session, of the day and of the programme section, des-
cribed as concerning the problems of the aid recipient and present-
ed by Dr. Mooy, was a case study of Indonesia. There was consider-
able disagreement over the meaning of the main constituent of this 
success story, the multilateral aid consortium. This was generally 
thought to have been a great advantage to Indonesia, though it was 
pointed out that the members of the consortia were all western 
countries. The discussion then turned extensively to more general 
matters, specifically the two topics of the effects of aid tying, 
which in some cases may effectively come to reverse aid, and the 
different "types" of developing countries that need to be distin-
guished in the wake of the success of OPEC. 
Wednesday morning and half the afternoon were devoted to the new 
programme topic of foreign investment. Professor Murakami's paper 
~ n . - . 
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for session 9 dealt with Japan as a case of the large home country, 
and had as its central theme the willingness of Japan to invest, 
the hostility in South East Asia towards Japanese investment and 
recommendations for overcoming it . Of the commentators, Patrick 
suggested that Japanese willingness to meet host country require-
ments might have been emphasized more, recommended more careful re-
search into the nature and distribution of anti-Japanese reaction, 
and argued against Murakami that l imited managerial talent was not 
the real reason for the f eeling . What was indicated was the main-
tenance of a low profile through, for example, the establishment of 
local brand names. The other commentator suggested that Murakami's 
reasons for anti-Japanese feeling were insufficiently persuasive, 
and recommended more research . The discussion tended to follow 
this theme of uncertainty about facts, feelings and recommendations, 
with the exception that Naronqchai stressed that economic analysis 
cannot expa l in socio-political factors. Wionczek made a strong 
criticism, in his usual stvle, of economists for not understanding 
sociology and other relevant matters, and Arndt a graceful speech 
in his usual style stressing the persistence of historical memory. 
I found myself, during the discussion, impressed by the lack on 
the part of all kinds of economists and policy-makers of historical 
and comparative knowledge of problems; a~d the lack on the part of 
those who criticize economists for not understanding sociology and 
history of any serious effort to use their assumed superior knowl-
edge to contribute more than debating points in their own favour. 
I can recall, a decade and a half ago or so, the efforts of Ame-
rican firms and officials to find out whv American foreign invest-
ment was so resented, and to remedy the situation by teachi ng bet-
ter manners to Americans operating abroad. More to the point I re-
call the efforts of Professor English, Professor Safarian, and a 
number of other Canadian economists to find out the facts abou t Ame-
rican firms operating in Canada, and the results, which were gene-
rally a clean bill of health for the corporations. I also know 
that the economic facts do not convince anyone who does not want to 
be convinced; that has certainly been the ~tory of Canadian politi-
cal attitudes towards American investment. But having confronted 
the problem in many different parts of the world, I am not content 
to describe it as sociology, ani criticize the economists for not 
understanding it. I find econo1 ics, plus a little social psycholo-
gy, pretty useful here. Briefly, societies are organised in hierar-
chies, and equiped with attitudes of superiority over foreigners. 
It hurts to realize that foreigners are more efficient than vou are, 
especially if they stand lower in their societv than you do in yours. 
You would like their wealth, and your social mythology suggests that 
you deserve it more than they do. But you have a very limited possi-
bility, if any, of extracting it; and to justify robbery, or attempt-
ed robbery, you naturally call on all the xenophobia your tradition-
al culture can muster. In the course of time, your society will 
have to change, and control shift to those who are prepared to work 
at the new technology instead of claiming an unearned right to it 
by virtue of traditional status in a more traditional system of pro-
perty ownership. In the meantime, I see no particular intellectual 
or social contribution in siding with the traditional elite - includ-
ing the self-stvled radical elite, and the educated leisure class 
of students and intellectuals - and no particular justification for 
claiming the support of a superior understanding of political sci-
ence and sociology in so doing. In short , there is no reason to ex-
pect development policy to be guided by considerations of efficiency 
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and competition rather than by considerations of preserving and ex-
panding what might be called sociological monopoly profit; but equ-
ally there is no reason why the economist should accept as true, 
and superior to economic analysis, the logic that would-be monopo-
lies seek to impress on his thinking . 
To return to the subject of the session, I am not surprised at 
hostility to Japanese foreign investment no matter how well-behaved 
and docilely conformist the firms involved are. In this conncetion, 
I am reminded of the story of the AmGrican in England during the 
Second World War, who was-- so stung by deliberate anti-American rude-
ness that he eventually asked an Englishman why the English were so 
irrationally anti-American . "It's not at all irrational" the Eng-
lishman replied, "there are four very good logical reasons for our 
hostility; you Americans are overfed, over-paid, over-sexed and over-
here." But I should add in conclusion that there are some aspects 
of hostility to Japanese investment worth investigating on a scien-
tific basis: various people in fact suggested such questions as 
type of industry (extractive, manufacturing, export-promoting, im-
port-substituting, intermediate or final product, labour-intensive 
versus capital or technology-intensive) and type of country (ethnic 
character, always independent or one-time colonial, which country's 
former colony) . 
Session 10 dealt with the small host country as exemplified by 
Papua New Guinea. Garnaut's expertly knowledgeable paper started 
an interesting discussion of technical issues such as the stabili-
zation fund . Desai made the good point that what is involved there 
is not stability but profitable investment of funds that a rational 
producer would carry over from good years to bad - and the govern-
ment 's interest rate is not very interesting in an inflationary 
period or a growing economy . I was rather surprised, myself, to 
hear no reference to the long British discussion in the early 1950' s, 
published in the Economic Journal, that followed Peter Bauer's de-
vastating exposure of West African marketing boards and ended wi th 
Milton Friedman applying his permanent income concept to the prob-
lem. One gets from this a feeling of gloominess and disillusion-
ment about development economics - though of a different kind than 
Holmes complained of - or perhaps recognition of immutable sociolo-
gical laws that lead to repetition in country after country of exa-
ctly the same mistakes. On my first visit to Papua New Guinea, I 
was schocked to hear the then Professor of Economics at the Uni versi-
ty advocating a heavy protective tariff on infant-industry grounds, 
in sublime ignorance of, among many other historical experiences, 
the Prebisch - UNCTAD I criticisms of inward-looking development 
policy . In this discussion I felt a similar excess of optimism 
about the possibility of developing the territory, if only enough 
foreign investment could be captured and tamed (or gelded) into 
docile development service. 
The afternoon session, on Alexander's paper on "Cooperation in 
Natural Resources Development : Marine Resources", brought a welcome 
change of pace and style~ Alexander gave us a brisk no-nonsense 
account of the main uses of marine resources - fishing, offshore 
oil and gas, and shipping - and the implications of the extensions 
to the 200 mile limit. Castle, in commenting, put his finger on 
the essential economic problem - developing property rights in the 
only remaining major common property resource (outer space has not 
yet become valuable) . But he left a problem, inasmuch as he (right-
ly in my view) saw no sense in rectifying inequalities among count-
310 A SUMMING UP 
ries by giving the disadvantaged disproportionately large shares in 
this particular resource, but also regarded an international autho-
rity as doubtfully useful because of the large enforcement costs 
that would be entailed . Garnaut, in contrast, favoured the exten-
sion of the limit as a means of deriving revenue from the resource 
for the poor countries, though Alexander's later expressed opinion 
was that there was little prospect of revenue in the near future 
from fishing - oil and gas, and minerals perhaps, being a different 
story. My own expressed view is that the 200 mile limit is no way 
to solve the common property resource problem. I was also reminded 
of the work that Pincus and I independently did ten years ago on 
the possibility of price-raising commodity agreements, which showed 
how badly distribution of profits according to production (here, 
ownership) shares matches any humanitarian concept of who deserves 
the gains . Doubts on the probabilitv of a tidy solution were en-
hanced by Krause's brief description of all the lobbies and pres-
sure groups in the United States that have come out in favour of 
and against the 200 mile limit. 
I conclude with some brief remarks on the Conference as a whole. 
First, I am confident that we have fulfilled the objectives of this 
Conference, even though they bulked less in the totalprogrammethan 
in the intentions of the committee. They were to devote attention 
to the specific problems of development of small island economies 
in the Pacific. Though formal discussion of the problems has con-
centrated on Papua-New Guinea, other cases have been discussed, and 
ideas of general applicability have been generated. There is only 
one small ~ sland economy in the Pacific I would have liked to know 
more of , and this is our host country New Zealand. A second objec-
tive was to consider marine resources and their development; and 
here the session based on Alexander's paper has led us to think se-
riously about aspects of the development problem we have not here-
tofore devoted much attention to. 
A second comment is that the Conference has certainly been of 
value to the continuing work of the Conference, especially in fill-
ing out our concept of the Pacific. As I have mentioned, the Paci-
fic is a geographical but not a cultural area; and our mental pic-
ture of it tends to be dominated by those parts of it that fit into 
our own Atlantic or continental cuitural a;d historical perceptions. 
In my own case, as a boy in Canada the Pacific meant China and the 
Indian Empire, with Japan somewhere out there too. When I moved to 
the United Kingdom, the Pacific became Pakistan, India, Ceylon, -
Burma, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand. But when I moved to the 
United States, it became Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Viet Nam, Cambodia 
and so forth, and the shadowy presence of mainland China. Each of 
these conceptions is only a partial view of the picture of the Paci-
fic, and Arndt has reminded us of the existence of a host of small 
island economies that fit into no-one's colouring of the Pacific. 
Third, the question of "the new world order" apart, the confer-
ence has come to see various standard problems in a new light. This 
includ~s ~oth trade liberalization and preferences, and the problems 
of achieving more orderly stable trade in foodstuffs, as well as the 
~roblems of direct foreign investment and especially the problem of 
instability that may be associated with it in a small, one-main-re-
source economy. 
